A Failure of Timing or a Failure of Foreign Policy? Lessons Learned from Canada’s Failed UNSC Bid

Image credit: “United Nations Security Council” by Neptuul

The perception surrounding Canada’s failure to secure a seat on the UNSC has been widely regarded as a pivotal moment for the nation’s foreign policy. However, the defeat does not equate to the decline of Canada’s international image; rather, it is a chance to refocus domestic policy and international efforts where they are most needed.

By Sarah Sutherland | Canada’s Role on the Global Stage Policy Researcher

Canada’s bid for a seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) came to a close on 17 June, 2020, when the country failed to secure the necessary 2/3 votes. Competing against Ireland and Norway, Canada faced tough opposition – both abroad and here at home – from national experts, the general public, and allied states. This issue brief aims to highlight various critiques of the Trudeau administration’s timing, policy, and campaign for the UNSC seat, and poses various recommendations for Canada’s future.

On 17 June 2020, Canada competed against Ireland and Norway for the Western European and Other Group’s (WEOG) seats on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Allocated two council seats that rotate on a biennial basis, this is not the first time Canada has failed to gain one of the seats available for the WEOG group. Under the Harper administration, Canada was skipped over in favour of Portugal and Germany in 2010. In the most recent UNSC elections, and despite the Trudeau administration’s final push, Ireland and Norway were able to secure the necessary 2/3 of the vote to win, with the nations garnering 128 and 130 votes respectively. Canada’s second failed bid in the past decade, which saw the nation obtain only 108 votes compared to the 114 received under Prime Minister Harper, has raised questions about messaging and the clarity of Canada’s foreign policy. There appears to be a gap between how Canada perceives itself and how other nations view its contributions to the international community

Although Canada spent more than $2 million on their UNSC campaign, the effort was thwarted by an unclear message. With a wide gap between rhetoric and action, for many it was not a surprise that Canada failed to achieve its goal. Leading up to the 17 June vote, it was noted that Prime Minister Trudeau and his team mounted a final push to secure votes which involved calling leaders in nations such as India, Pakistan, North Macedonia, and Fiji. Similarly, it was only in February 2020 that the Prime Minister and members of his team flew to Senegal, Ethiopia, and Germany to pitch Canada’s candidacy for the seat – a far cry from the staggering years-long campaign mounted by Ireland and Norway. Many have critiqued this style of pitching, including Mark Kersten, Deputy Director of the Wayamo Foundation.

Press Conference by Prime Minister of Canada by United Nations Photo

“If [Prime Minister Trudeau] had five years, why would [he] wait so long for these trips and meetings?” Kersten questioned during an interview with The Guardian. He further noted that building the goodwill and relations with other states that is necessary to get the votes for a UNSC seat does not happen overnight. It is therefore no surprise to him that Prime Minister Trudeau’s last-minute efforts did not equate to adequate votes for the nation.

Many, including Kersten, have criticized the seeming hypocrisy of Canada’s current feminist foreign policy in recent years as well. Kersten highlighted that to have such a policy, Canada needs to ensure every “decision that’s relevant to Canadian international relations should be examined through its gender dimensions,” which is not the current case with Canada’s deal with Saudi Arabia or relations with China. Some have even highlighted the Prime Minister’s previous defence of SNC-Lavalin, which had admitted fraud and bribery in countries like Libya, as a key instance in which Canadian policy and action did not line up. As the UN is one of the largest international forums, the importance of a voice in discussions within the UN system is critical; but a nation needs a clear foreign policy to do so.

The significance of the UNSC and its rotating seats was underscored by Bessma Momani, a Senior Fellow at the Centre for International Governance and Innovation and a Professor of Political Science at the University of Waterloo, in a discussion with CBC News. She maintained that the loss of a seat at arguably the most powerful international table should act as a wake-up call for Canadians. This is due to the fact that although there are problems within the UN, there is still merit in being involved in the system because “organizations are only as good as the people who get engaged in them.”

Similarly, Thomas Juneau, Professor of International Affairs at the University of Ottawa, suggested that although Canada appears to support many initiatives rhetorically, Canada’s current commitment to initiatives like Peacekeeping, a historical cornerstone of Canada’s international legacy, is at a 60-year low. Canada’s recent mission to Mali, the largest in nearly a generation and only lasted one year, “reinforced the perception that [Canada] wanted to tick a box as opposed to really doing the heavy lifting.” Juneau, like his colleagues, hope that the unsuccessful UNSC bid will prompt a re-examination of Canada’s foreign policy and the goals it hopes to achieve.

In comparison, Robert Fowler, Canada’s longest-serving ambassador to the United Nations, has suggested that Prime Minister Trudeau’s refusal to denounce American President Trump on various issues is also a compounding factor. Referring to Prime Minister Trudeau’s awkward 21-second pause following a question regarding President Trump’s suggestion of sending in the military to stop protests in the United States following George Floyd’s murder, Fowler noted that this was not a good sign for allies. Fowler suggested that the pause indicated to nations that “if you elect Canada, you’re electing a second Trump” within the Security Council, which is already marred by a deadlock between the feuding Permanent 5 members. With high tensions between states like the United States and China, such a comparison did little to help Canada’s campaign.

“Foreign Leader Visits” by The White House

Other experts suggest that Canada should not have attempted the UNSC bid in the first place. Janice Stein, Professor at the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, has vocally opposed the bid since it was originally suggested in 2016. Stein noted that given the current tension between Permanent 5 members, largely the United States and China, Canada would have put itself directly in the ‘firing line’ of power politics. In a panel discussion with CBC News, Stein said that obtaining the UNSC seat would have forced Canada to take a concrete position when the national strategy has typically been to “choose the areas where [it] wants to weigh in.” Although her opinion is largely indicative of failure of Canadian foreign policy, she notes that the opposite is true.

Stein does not believe that Canada’s international image should solely be based on the UNSC loss, and states that the UNSC just may not be the forum in which Canada is best posed to engage in. She has gone on to highlight the important work Canada has achieved regarding the reform of the World Trade Organization and generally shifting the UN towards sustainable development; all of which has taken place in other key forums.

Following the defeat, Foreign Affairs Minister François-Philippe Champagne attempted to soften the UNSC loss by stating that the campaign itself was the goal, as it allowed Canada to become more present around the globe. However, many outside the Liberal caucus did not take such a view. Prior to the vote, Conservatives had already suggested that even if Canada did receive the required votes it would have been because the “Liberal government had been less principled in its pursuit;” the government had conceded too much to obtain the seat. In 2019, Andrew Scheer, the previous Conservative Party leader, told the Globe and Mail that although Canada can play an immensely valuable role on the international stage, that role should not come at the “expense of selling out our principles or selling out our long-standing positions on various issues.”

Scheer was quick to criticize the outcome of the bid on 17 June as “another foreign affairs failure for Justin Trudeau,” doubling down on the previous comments made by the Conservative Party. Other parties have also been critical of Prime Minister Trudeau’s decision to run for the UNSC seat, given the late stage of competition.

The New Democratic Party (NDP) released a statement following the defeat noted the shortcomings of Canadian foreign policy in the recent decade that contributed to the failed bid. The NDP noted that under the current Liberal government, “Canada’s Official Development Assistance is just a third of what it should be – smaller than the contribution of the Harper years…[and] the Canadian government has been inconsistent in [its] support for human rights.” Going forward from the UNSC vote, the NDP Critic for Foreign Affairs Jack Harris highlighted that Canada needs to repair the damage to our reputation and focus on keeping the commitments we make to the international community.

The Bloc Québécois also echoes the feeling that the loss of the UNSC seat is related to the failure of Canada’s foreign policy in recent years. Yves-François Blanchet, leader of the Bloc Québécois, spoke with CTV News a day after the UNSC loss and stated that the defeat was simply part of a “larger trend in a foreign policy that has failed to get results.” Pointing to tension with China, the continued arms sales to Saudi Arabia, and the failure to obtain the flight records from the downing by Iran of an airliner with Canadians on board, Blanchet underscored that recent events and global decisions have “stained Canada’s international prestige.”

In order to restore it, it has been argued by various parties that Canada needs to take this time to rethink its global priorities – a sentiment that is mirrored by surveys conducted recently by groups such as EKOS Research Associates. Their survey was designed to ask Canadians about issues relating to areas where Canada appears to fall behind on key issues compared to its UNSC competitors, including climate change, peacekeeping, and developmental assistance.

“50th Anniversary of Canada’s Peacekeeping Mission to Cyprus | 50e anniversaire de la mission de maintien de la paix à Chypre” by VAC-ACC

Taking place between 5 June and 10 June 2020 on behalf of the Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East, Independent Jewish Voices Canada, and the United Network for Justice and Peace in Palestine-Israel, the EKOS survey confirmed what most academics and political parties have suspected – that the current Canadian foreign policy is “out of touch with the preferences of Canadians.” However, the topics that they believe the policy is out of touch with depends on which political party they are affiliated with. There is a noticeable polarization between supporters of the Conservative party and all other parties’ supporters.

For example, the survey found that at large, most Canadians are supportive of increasing the nation’s contributions to the global community. This includes a large majority supporting an increase of funding to climate change initiatives, with Liberal (77%), NDP (98%), and Green (90%) voters leading the support. Conservative supporters felt drastically different, with only 18% noting their support for increasing funding for climate change initiatives. In general, the EKOS survey highlights the divergence between political views regarding Canada’s contribution on the world stage; a divide many Canadians already knew about. Similarly, the survey highlighted that despite the federal cuts to Canada’s commitments and funding to global initiatives, Canadians themselves are “generally supportive of increasing Canada’s contributions to the international community” as a whole.

The Canadian loss of a UNSC seat has also raised concern for like-minded nations, and fellow WEOG states, such as Australia and New Zealand. With continued attacks on multilateralism by the American President and the failure of a typically strong middle power such as Canada to obtain a seat, like-minded states are becoming increasingly concerned about what this will mean in the future. This unease also stems from the fact that many Latin American and African states have shifted toward Chinese revenue flows and loans, which can have a strong influence on their voting patterns. It has been suggested that countries like Australia and Canada should “structure a like-minded international political alliance” with other democratic states, such as Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, and India to act as a counterweight to Chinese power in the global arena. This would extend to voting in UNSC elections as well; however, this alliance could only work if nations like Canada gave more warning when attempting to secure a seat.

Traditionally, countries like New Zealand have given their full support to Canada and even gone so far as withholding its second vote (or what is known as voting short) so that Canadian opposition has a difficult time reaching the needed 2/3 voting threshold. However, despite the Canada-Australia-New Zealand voting sub-group, by the time Canada announced its bid for the contested UNSC seat this time around, New Zealand had already promised one of its two votes to Ireland years prior. Without that single vote, Ireland would not have been able to reach the 2/3 voting threshold and voting would have been pushed to a second round.

For Adam Chapnick, a Professor of Defence Studies at the Royal Military College of Canada, Canada’s defeat reflects a “failure of political judgement [and timing] more than it does a failure of foreign policy.”

In short, Canada simply chose the wrong time to run. Regardless of timing, rising global tensions between nations, or the political division becoming apparent within Canada, we must now focus on Canada’s global future.

Experts have suggested various ways in which Canada could re-examine its foreign policy and priorities moving forward. Allan Rock and Sergio Marchi have created such a set of recommendations for the Canadian government. First, they suggest that Canada needs to generally re-evaluate its global priorities and examine best practices regarding promotion. They believe that an all-party parliamentary committee should be created for this specific purpose so that opinions from all sides of the political spectrum are considered. Further, Rock and Marchi highlight the constant defunding of Global Affairs Canada (formerly the Department of Foreign Affairs) as a central issue. If Canada hopes to best promote its interests and support global initiatives, it needs to ensure it has the funding to do so. Thirdly, they suggest that Canada should broaden its efforts to strengthen global governance.

Outside of the UN, Canada is a member of various international groups including the G7, G20, La Francophonie, and NATO. Rock and Marchi therefore note that Canada could leverage their other networks and memberships to foster better global cooperation and promote Canadian leadership. Finally, they suggest that Canada should continue to follow through on its campaign commitments, including focusing greater international attention on the development of the Global South. Rock and Marchi note that this recommendation could be achieved through asking the parliamentary committee to tell the public whether Canada is contributing enough to foreign aid in respect to the size of our economy.

“NATOs hovedkvarter” by Utenriksdept

While some experts have focused their efforts on suggesting recommendations for the Canadian government, others have taken a more ground level approach. Ben Rowswell and the Canadian International Council (CIC) are joining Global Canada and other partners to create Open Canada and explore what a new Canadian foreign policy could look like through citizen engagement. Initially, Rowswell, President and Research Director of the CIC and former Canadian Ambassador to Venezuela, was surprised at the “breadth of opposition to Canada’s pursuit of a seat on the [UNSC]” prior to the voting in June. In part, this was due to the fact that in a rules-based international order, the UN is the global body in which the rules are enshrined, so countries should strive to engage in it. However, he acknowledged in a CBC Radio interview following the defeat that the COVID-19 pandemic has “forced us to confront the reality that the rules-based international order is now over.” Therefore, Canada has essentially run into a dead-end in regards to its foreign policy as a result.

Speaking alongside Fowler, Rowswell highlighted that the loss of the UNSC seat and the current COVID-19 pandemic has given Canada a chance to pursue a foreign policy that takes full account of the power to secure international cooperation going forward.Therefore, Rowswell and the CIC’s creation of the Open Canada platform will act as a connection between citizens and foreign policy in order to highlight the areas of most concern. Open Canada is centred upon the perspective of citizens and suggests that Canada may need to rethink national security. Specifically, the COVID-19 pandemic has illustrated that nations with high levels of social trust and policies based on science have had higher success in containing the spread of the virus. Therefore, national security can no longer be thought of in a physical or cyber realm; other sectors need to be placed on higher priority as well. Open Canada will therefore act as a central point of discussion for these key topics and allow citizens to directly engage in conversations previously only few were able to join.

In short, perception surrounding Canada’s failure to secure a seat on the UNSC has been widely regarded as a pivotal moment for the nation’s foreign policy. Although some experts viewed the initial decision to run as a poor choice, and the campaign itself as lack-luster, the following consensus is that this defeat does not equate to the decline of Canada’s international image; rather, it is a chance to refocus domestic policy and international efforts where they are most needed.

Sarah is a recent Master of Global Affairs graduate from the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy with an emphasis in Justice and Security Studies. She has also obtained a Hon. BA in International Relations, an Honours in Global and Intercultural Engagement, and a Minor in English from Western University. Following an academic exchange at the University of St Andrews in Fife, Scotland, she was inspired to pursue research on the impact of the United Nations’ peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, specifically in Central Europe and the former Belgian colonies in Africa. She has therefore focused her research on the role of gender and ethnicity in various security contexts and has recently pursued research on the security concerns surrounding the commercialization of outer space. From her time interning at the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations in Geneva, Switzerland, she has further developed her passion for promoting gender inclusiveness in security resolutions in order to foster stronger multinational engagement on key disarmament and human rights resolutions.

September 11, 2020

The perception surrounding Canada’s failure to secure a seat on the UNSC has been widely regarded as a pivotal moment for the nation’s foreign policy. However, the defeat does not equate to

Panel — The Future of Grand Strategy in the Post-COVID World

Watch the video of the panel on IPD’s YouTube Channel.

The Institute for Peace & Diplomacy (IPD) hosted a panel discussion on Sept 9, 2020 titled “The Future of Grand Strategy in the Post-COVID World,” in partnership with The American Conservative magazine and as part of the launch for IPD’s International System 2050 program.

The panel discusses the state of the international system, specifically the structural shift toward a multipolar order. How has the COVID-19 pandemic impacted the “liberal” world order, and accelerated trends – such as the return of great power politics, or increased skepticism about globalism – which are already transforming global geopolitics?

This panel is part of a discussion series by IPD about the impact of COVID-19 on global order and international peace and security. The discussion series is supported by the Department of National Defence’s Mobilizing Insights in Defence and Security (MINDS) program.

Click here to watch the video of the panel discussion.

Panelists:

Col. Lawrence Wilkerson, Senior Visiting Fellow at the Center for Study of Statesmanship, Distinguished Adjunct Professor of Government and Public Policy at the College of William & Mary

Lawrence Wilkerson is a retired United States Colonel and former Chief of Staff to Secretary of State Colin Powell. Col. Wilkerson served in the U.S. Army for 31 years. Since then, he has given interviews to various media outlets, written about his experience preparing Powell’s February 2003 speech to the United Nations calling for an invasion of Iraq, and criticized the interventionist American foreign policy establishment.

George Beebe, Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center for the National Interest

George Beebe has previously served as the director of the CIA’s Russia analysis and as Special Advisor to Vice President Dick Cheney for Russia, Eurasia and Intelligence Programs. His areas of expertise include Russia – US relations, cyber security, conflict resolution, European security, analytic methodology, arms control and Russia/Eurasia. In 2009, he published The Russia Trap: How Our Shadow War with Russia Could Spiral into Catastrophe.

Christopher Preble, Co-Director at the Scowcroft Center’s New American Engagement Initiative at the Atlantic Council

Christopher Preble is the former Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute. Dr. Preble has written for the New York Times, USA Today, the Los Angeles Times, the Financial Times, National Review, The National Interest, and Foreign Policy. He teaches US foreign policy at the University of California, Washington Center. He recently published Peace, War, and Liberty: Understanding U.S. Foreign Policy (2019).

Arta Moeini, Research Director at the Institute for Peace & Diplomacy

Arta Moeini is an international political theorist and a revisionist scholar of Nietzsche and Modernity, whose interests lie at the nexus of contrasting traditions of political realism, culture and politics, and international relations theory. Dr. Moeini’s current project explores the philosophical origins and history of “realism” and advances a theory of “cultural realism” as a cornerstone to a new understanding of foreign policy. He is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Center for the Study of Statesmanship and an elected member of the Academy of Philosophy and Letters.

Moderator:

Kelley Vlahos, Executive Director of The American Conservative

Kelley Vlahos has written extensively about national security, foreign policy, civil liberties, domestic politics, war and returning veterans since 2007. She has appeared on Al Jazeera, NPR, CSPAN, Democracy Now! and FOX News, where she has discussed issues such as national security in the wake of 9/11, Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Middle East, the media and the federal budget.

September 1, 2020

The Institute for Peace & Diplomacy (IPD) is pleased to announce our upcoming virtual panel “The Future of Grand Strategy in the Post-COVID World,” in partnership with the American Conservative as part

International System 2050: Rethinking Grand Strategy for a Multipolar World

The Institute for Peace & Diplomacy (IPD) launches a new program called “International System 2050: Rethinking Grand Strategy for a Multipolar World”. This new program will be led by IPD’s Research Director Dr. Arta Moeini.

The world is at a great inflection point comparable in scale to 1919, 1945, and 1989. The integrity of the rules-based international system, what some have called the liberal world order, is under increasing threat. As the world undergoes systemic change and new great powers rise to contest the global dominance of the West (particularly the North Atlantic bloc), the international system no longer accepts a global policeman, nor does it permit projects of empire and hubris. In line with this general trend against global hegemony, scholars and practitioners must rethink conventional wisdom in foreign policy and question long-held assumptions separating the chaff from the wheat.

Through sponsoring contrarian researchers, experts, and fellows as well as hosting panels and discussions, the International System 2050 Program welcomes serious debate and unconventional thinking that reconsiders the role of the West within a changing global geostrategic landscape where many non-Western civilizations are reemerging as great powers that want an equal say in shaping the post-Pax Americana international order. The program encourages research that scrutinizes the nature of ‘power’ itself as well as its full range of instruments including trade, diplomacy, and cultural exchanges to promote engagement while discouraging interference.

“This new program, International System 2050, is a non-partisan effort that will spearhead and support innovative research and programming that seek viable alternatives grounded in restraint and realism and actively challenge the mainstream orthodoxies of the North Atlantic foreign policy establishment,” said Bijan Ahmadi, IPD’s Executive Director.

“We are convinced that longstanding dogmas perpetuated by the ‘blob’ have seriously damaged the Atlantic bloc’s power and prestige exhausting its cultural and material resources”, Dr. Arta Moeini noted. “By inviting provocative original thinking that challenges the decades-old presumptions of North Atlantic foreign policy, we seek to construct a new framework for analysis and inquiry that approaches the world through realism, common sense, and restraint instead of militarism, interventionism, hegemony.”

“What this critical moment requires is acceptance among our elites that the emerging multipolar order is not a momentary lapse, as many in the West hope, but a structural reality that is here to stay, accommodating which will largely determine the course of the 21^st century. The IS-2050 program aims to advance, facilitate, and support this much-needed paradigm shift and encourage a culture change among policymakers by returning to the first principles of foreign policy, devising new approaches, and adjusting strategic priorities accordingly,” Dr. Moeini added.

The International System 2050 initiative will complement IPD’s important area studies work, providing them with a concrete theoretical foundation through which to approach important policy and security challenges. Only through such novel grand strategic frameworks such as ‘restraint’ could we hope for a future in which peace and diplomacy, as well as non-militaristic instruments of power, become the norms of international relations and recognition of the sovereignty and interests of strategic competitors is not disparaged as ‘appeasement’ or ‘isolationism’.

July 19, 2020

The Institute for Peace & Diplomacy (IPD) launches a new program called “International System 2050: Rethinking Grand Strategy for a Multipolar World”. This new program will be led by IPD’s Research Director

Canada-Saudi Relations: Time to Get Back on Track

Chrystia Freeland during the Munich Security Conference 2018. 16 February 2018/ By Hildenbrand / MSC

Canada’s determination to stand its ground and absorb the costs won it plaudits from human rights constituencies at home and abroad. But it was a pyrrhic victory. Canada’s ability to actually have an impact and genuinely advance its values or human rights agenda in Saudi Arabia suffered.

Dennis Horak, Former Canadian Ambassador to Saudi Arabia

It’s been nearly two years since an ill-conceived tweet and Saudi Arabia’s massive over-reaction to it upended Canada-Saudi relations in August 2018.

Saudi Arabia’s decision to effectively downgrade diplomatic ties with Canada, cut cultural/student contacts and freeze commercial ties was not pre-meditated. Despite their dissatisfaction with Canada’s neglect of the relationship and Ottawa’s singular focus on human rights, the Saudi-Canada relationship was still valued.

The abrupt derailment had all the hallmarks of Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman’s (MBS) impulsive nature and hyper-sensitivity to criticism (international or domestic). The tweet demanding the “immediate release” of women rights activists unjustly detained on fabricated “security” allegations, provided MBS with the opportunity to send a message to the international community: Critics of Saudi Arabia would pay a heavy price. Targeting a G-7 country in such a high-profile, over-the-top manner would ensure that that message would resonate widely.

Canada wasn’t looking for this kind of fight either. The Government had issued similar – if less incendiary – tweets in the past (as had other countries) with little blowback. To say that the Saudi reaction was a surprise would be an understatement.

But for some within and outside Government, the bilateral derailment provided an opportunity for Canada to underscore its willingness to pay the price to defend its principles and values. Moreover, it freed the Government from having to consider the impact various human rights initiatives might have on the bilateral relationship (it is worth considering, for example, whether Canada would have been as enthusiastically assertive in offering refuge to a young Saudi woman, Rahaf Mohammad Al-Qunn in December 2018 had relations been on a normal footing).

Canada’s determination to stand its ground and absorb the costs won it plaudits from human rights constituencies at home and abroad. But it was a pyrrhic victory. Canada’s ability to actually have an impact and genuinely advance its values or human rights agenda in Saudi Arabia suffered.

Despite the increasingly authoritarian rule of MBS and the tightening of political space in the Kingdom, the social and economic reform efforts launched by the Crown Prince’s Vision 2030 program and the weakening of the role of the Saudi religious establishment in the Kingdom are significant. While success is far from certain – and the economic fallout from the pandemic, coupled with MBS’s penchant for self-inflicted wounds, raises real questions about the program’s viability going forward – many of the reforms being pursued have had a positive impact, especially on the role of women in Saudi society (although there is much more that needs to happen).

Normal diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia allowed Canada to play a supportive role in these reform efforts, both directly and indirectly.

The thousands of Saudi students who came to Canada annually – men and women – returned to the Kingdom with a different perspective. Many took the lessons they learned here to work as agents of change back in the Kingdom. One Saudi graduate from St. Mary’s, for example, returned home and started a very successful company devoted solely to facilitating the entry of Saudi women into the workforce. These students are no longer coming.

Another, more direct, example of Canadian support for change was the contribution Canada was making to teacher training as part of a broader Saudi initiative to reform the way their sclerotic school system functions. The success of these and other Educational reforms will be a key element in the transformation of Saudi society over the longer term. Canada could have been recognized as a leader in that effort, but that has now also ended.

These two examples may lack the pizazz of a widely shared social media post, but they had a practical value on the ground that no tweet could ever hope to match. Tweeting is Public Relations, not diplomacy. Tweets preach to a choir. They tick brand boxes in a search for “Likes”. Tweets may be politically and emotionally satisfying for Ministers and supporters but, they do nothing to actually change the lives of Saudis, which ostensibly, is the goal of Ottawa’s human rights policies. In this case, however, Canada’s penchant for being seen to be on the “right side” with a tweet undermined the Government’s ability to actually have a meaningful impact. The Government, effectively, traded effectiveness for applause and that is an exchange Canada should not find acceptable nor let stand.

There is a way out of this, but it won’t be easy or entirely comfortable. The Saudis have demanded a public apology and that is rightly off the table. Canada has nothing to apologize for. But there is a way forward and there is precedent.

The Germans and the Swedes found themselves on the outs with Riyadh not so long ago following critical comments about Saudi Arabia by Ministers in their countries. They ultimately succeeded in getting relations back on track through a combination of sustained, high-level diplomatic engagement, determined political will and creative diplomatic drafting of “non-apology apologies” that satisfied the needs of both sides.

It didn’t mean that they suddenly jettisoned their principles or concerns about Saudi Arabia. They understood that normal diplomatic ties were not a seal of approval but a means to an end. They realized that to do everything they wanted to do, including on human rights, they needed to be playing at full diplomatic strength.

Canada has reportedly made efforts to repair the relationship, but with little success to date. It will be hard and there may be additional complications (including MBS’s quixotic nature). It will take a level of political commitment and sustained engagement – at the most senior levels – that may not be entirely popular among the constituencies who cheered Canada’s “principled” stand and continue to champion the idea of “ghosting” the Kingdom. But it is worth doing.

That doesn’t require sacrificing Canadian principles. On the contrary, it means putting Canada back in a position to actually be able to pursue them and to have an impact – however small – beyond the easily ignored hectoring from the social media sidelines that seems to pass for effective diplomacy these days.

About the Author:

Dennis Horak served as Canadian Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain, Yemen, and former Head of Mission in Iran.

Note: The views and opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Institute for Peace & Diplomacy or its executive team.

July 13, 2020

Panel — The Future of Iran Nuclear Deal Amid U.S.-Iran Tensions

The Institute for Peace & Diplomacy (IPD) hosted a panel discussion on the future of the Iran Nuclear Deal on July 15, 2020.

Panelists:

Joe Cirincione: National Security Analyst & Former President of Ploughshares Fund

Ellie Geranmayeh: Senior Policy Fellow and Deputy Head of the MENA Programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

Hassan Ahmadian: Assistant Professor of MENA Studies at the University of Tehran.

He Wenping: Professor and Research Program Director at the Institute of West-Asian and African Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

Moderator: Younes Zangiabadi

As we approach the fifth anniversary of the Iran Nuclear Deal known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iranian foreign minister Javad Zarif sent a letter to Joseph Borrell, High Representative of the European Union expressing Iran’s frustration at the European leaders to salvage the 2015 Nuclear Deal and triggering the dispute resolution mechanism of the agreement. This letter comes a day after a mysterious fire/explosion broke out at the Natanz uranium enrichment facility.

Meanwhile, the Trump administration has launched a rigorous campaign to sway the UN Security Council members to “indefinitely extend” the UN arms embargo on Iran that is set to expire in October under the terms of the deal. The U.S has threatened to invoke the snapback provision of the deal to re-impose all UNSC sanctions on Iran if the Security Council fails to extend the embargo.

With a few months left until the U.S Presidential election, the remaining parties to JCPOA are faced with a variety of difficult scenarios to save an already hobbled agreement amid the heightened Iran-US tensions.

With experts from Iran, United States, Europe, and China, this timely discussion aims to examine the perspectives of various stakeholders in the JCPOA, shedding light on the complexities to keep the nuclear deal alive.

July 10, 2020

The Institute for Peace & Diplomacy (IPD) hosted a panel discussion on the future of the Iran Nuclear Deal on July 15, 2020.

The International Community Must Not Remain Silent on Israeli Annexation of the West Bank

Embassy Dedication Ceremony, Source: U.S. Embassy Jerusalem, May 13, 2018

This plan is no longer a settlement policy, long deemed illegal by the international community. Instead, it is simply a massive territorial takeover based on a plan, which neither has international legitimacy nor legality, based on the countless, albeit ineffective United Nations resolutions on the Middle East Peace Process.

Ferry de Kerckhove, Former Canadian Ambassador to Egypt

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in the midst of his corruption trial, has decided to initiate the illegal expansion of Israeli sovereignty in the West Bank as early as July, taking advantage of both the enhanced indifference of the international community due to the global pandemic and the one-sided policies of the US President Donald Trump.

Inspired by the White House support, Netanyahu believes that there has never been a more auspicious time in the country’s history to enshrine the sovereignty of the “Hebrewstate” through an accelerated uptick of annexations.

With the recognition of Israel’s claim to Jerusalem as its undivided capital confirmed by the move of the US Embassy, as well as the recognition of the Golan Heights of Syria as Israeli territory, the Trump administration has developed the most unfavorable disposition towards the Palestinians of all modern US administrations.

On the Israeli side, this plan is no longer a settlement policy, long deemed illegal by the international community. Instead, it is simply a massive territorial takeover based on a plan, which neither has international legitimacy nor legality, based on the countless, albeit ineffective United Nations resolutions on the Middle East Peace Process. And make no mistake; those annexations would not even grant Israeli citizenship to the Palestinians being enclaved into the territory they would be deprived of.

People must revisit the map of Palestine under the British mandate to realize how years of settlements, abetted by the US and timidly condemned by the international community, have forcefully reduced Palestinian territory to a rump that hosts millions of Palestinians in very dire conditions.

Today, the Palestinian territory – excluding Netanyahu’s planned annexation – represents less than 20 % of the original map with no access given to the sea except for Gaza whose people are barred from the commercial use of the sea on the Mediterranean. The Jared Kushner, senior advisor to President Trump – who is in charge of brokering peace in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is now paving the way for the further extension of Israeli sovereignty over about 30 % of the West Bank, which – despite decades of Israeli settlements – was still presumed to become the territory of the future Palestinian State since 1947.

Is it yet again the continuation of the “law of the strong”, which will prevail despite an international consensus calling for the creation of two states for Israelis and Palestinians? It seems to be the case with the immoral support of the current US President, trampling blatantly on international law.

In the face of the recent well-attended demonstrations in Tel Aviv against the Netanyahu’s annexation plan, the U.S. State Department underscored the terms of the US plan, emphasizing on the resumption of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations without expansion of settlements “by either side”, the latter point to be a clear insult to the Palestinians whose lands have been stolen.

But it is clear that in the midst of the US elections campaign, Trump will not even consider telling Netanyahu to back down now, especially when the coalition government of Netanyahu and Benny Gantz agreed on the annexation to proceed next month. The alliance between Gantz and Netanyahu can only affirm Trump’s willingness to ignore the other side of the bargain, even if his government hypocritically, calls for the resumption of negotiations towards what can only be a barely survivable Palestinian microstate, scattered within a large and powerful Israel.

As for the Arab countries, whose relations with Israel have improved considerably, they will simply mobilize the increasingly powerless Arab League to issue their usual and unanimous remonstrations with nothing more than forceful references to the comminatory resolutions of the United Nations. Jordan is also musing about withdrawing from their peace treaty with Israel, which will ultimately only remain at a rhetorical level. And that will be it! Why?

Because through its support of its Arab partners against Iran, the US President has achieved two major objectives both at home and abroad. First, he gained himself the title of the most pro-Israel President in American history, while secondly, ensuring that its Arab partners would side with the US to oppose Iran in exchange for remaining silent on the Israeli-American Middle East Peace Plan.

For the Palestinians, there was never an alternative but to put their faith in their perennially divided Arab brothers while relying on the US support without realizing that after the 1967 six-day war and the Yom Kippur war of 1973, it would side with the Israelis, ensuring that they always have the upper hand against Palestinians.

In light of Israel’s annexation plan, President of Palestinian National Authority Mahmoud Abbas may well denounce the agreement of cooperation with Israel in the field of security, viewed by some as a betrayal of the national cause. Yet, he has very little room to maneuver and challenge Israel. Inexorably, with or without Kushner, Palestine, which has not existed since 1947, may well cease to exist even in the imagination.

The ensuing apartheid regime, as it is increasingly described, will be intolerable as there is no party on the left in Israel strong enough to defend the Palestinian cause. Consequently, Netanyahu is unfortunately but absolutely right when he says it is the perfect time to carry out annexations.

On the one hand, the European Union, which in principle is the defender of the Palestinian interests, has lost all its leverage with Washington on virtually every level while it is confronted with both the COVID-19 and the tremors of European unification, undermined by the Brexit and Eastern Europe’s illiberalism. On the other hand, the political West is also increasingly absent from the Middle East, the region being now occupied by Russia and other adventurous regional actors.

In the short-term, Israel’s expansionist policies such as the annexation of the West Bank may make Israel feel more secure but it undoubtedly puts its security and stability at great risk in the long-term. It also leaves the long-standing Israeli-Palestinian conflict with only one viable solution and that is a one-state solution associated with many complexities. Israel’s real long-term security can only be assured when it embraces the reality of Palestinians as their brethren and not their foes whose destiny is to be continuously dispossessed of their lands.

About the Author:

Ferry de Kerckhove entered the Canadian Foreign Service in 1973. From 1981 to 1985, he was Economic Counsellor at the Canadian Delegation to NATO. In September 1992, he was posted to Moscow as Minister and Deputy Head of Mission. In 1995, he became Associate Chief Air Negotiator, then Deputy Head of the Policy Branch and Director-General, Federal-Provincial Relations in Foreign Affairs and International Trade. He was named High Commissioner to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in August 1998. In September 2001, he became Ambassador to the Republic of Indonesia. He was also accredited to Timor Leste.

In 2004, he became Director-General of International Organizations. In July 2006, he added to his responsibilities the function of Personal representative of the Prime Minister for La Francophonie. In 2008, he was named ambassador to the Arab Republic of Egypt. He retired from the Foreign Service on September 23d, 2011. He is an Advisor to the President of the University of Ottawa for Security, Women, and Peace as well as a Senior Fellow at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ottawa, a Fellow of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, and a former Member of the Board of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute.

June 11, 2020

In the short-term, Israel's expansionist policies such as the annexation of the West Bank may make Israel feel more secure but it undoubtedly puts its security and stability at great risk in

From a realist perspective, Canada’s long-term interests are guaranteed when its foreign policy is centered on multilateralism, which allows the country to capitalize on its soft power as a complementary, but a vital force to protect and promote liberal values and respect for human rights on the international stage. Hence, unilateral approaches such as Magnitsky sanctions are counterproductive, particularly when it comes to dealing with a major global power like China.

This article was originally published on The Hill Times.

By Younes Zangiabadi

TORONTO—After weeks of Canada’s diplomatic restraint from joining other allies like Australia in calling for an international investigation into China’s early handling of the global pandemic, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau finally toughened up on Beijing during one of his latest daily briefings when he said that there are many questions, “particularly, for China,” around the origins and behaviours in early days of the COVID-19 global pandemic.

Soon after, Chinese Ambassador Cong Peiwu, for the first time since the outbreak, said that the Chinese government would be, indeed, open to an “inclusive” review of the coronavirus that is led and run by the World Health Organization. While this is a positive development that must be welcomed, it is still unknown whether the investigation process will or will not meet the expectation of the international community. Regardless of that, Canada made the right decision to join other allies in demanding more transparency from China.

However, there is still some domestic pressure on Trudeau’s government to go beyond the use of diplomacy and take more coercive measures against China. For instance, there have been calls from influential former ministers—on both sides of the aisle—to impose Magnitsky sanctions on Chinese officials whom some, including former Liberal minister of justice, Irwin Cotler, accuse of suppressing key information related to COVID-19 in the early days of the outbreak in the city of Wuhan.

In an interview with The Globe and Mail, Cotler said that “the Chinese Communist Party has to be held accountable through naming and shaming, in the court of public opinion, in actual courts of law through international tort actions, and through Magntisky sanctions.” In the same vein, Peter MacKay, also a former minister of justice who is currently in the race for the leadership of the Conservative Party of Canada, has called for invoking the Magnitsky Act once the individuals accused of concealing and fabrication of data for COVID-19 are identified in China.

The Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act (Magnitsky sanction) allows the Government of Canada to sanction “foreign nationals responsible for gross violations of internationally recognized human rights,” imposing travel bans and asset freezes in Canada. The act is named after Sergei Magnitsky, the Russian lawyer who was jailed, tortured, and killed in a prison in Moscow after revealing state-backed fraud in Russia.

So far, Canada’s Magnitsky sanctions have targeted officials of foreign countries including Russia, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, South Sudan, and Myanmar. Despite extensive efforts by some Conservative Senators to add Chinese officials to the Magnitsky sanction’s list, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has not yet shown willingness to support these hardline measures against China. While this hesitation might seem contradictory to Canada’s commitment to promoting international justice and respect for human rights, it is indeed a pragmatic decision aligned with Canada’s long-term national interests.

First and foremost, sanctions are foreign policy instruments that aim to either coerce, constrain, or signal the sanctioned party to change its behaviour and actions that are believed to undermine and violate international norms and values. Canada, as a middle power, does not merely have the political, economic, and financial levers to constrain or coerce China to change its behaviour. Unfortunately, the lack of progress in resolving the ongoing detainment of Michael Kovrig and Micheal Spavor is a clear indication that Canada, despite much effort, is not able to influence China on its own.

Consequently, Ottawa could only resort to Magnitsky sanctions as a way to send a signal to Beijing that it is concerned and discontented with Chinese violations of human rights. This is exactly what Irwin Cotler refers to as “naming and shaming.” But one must conduct a cost-benefit analysis of such an approach toward China when it is almost certain that Canada’s unilateral imposition of Magnitsky sanctions will not be effective in inducing any kind of change in Chinese behaviour, let alone protecting and promoting human rights inside the country. In technical terms, it is also impossible to implement such measures, considering difficulties associated with identifying Chinese officials responsible for human rights violations and the alleged coverup of the pandemic.

It is important to remember that China has historically opposed what it considers as foreign meddling in its internal affairs and its ambassador to Canada has previously made that clear when he warned Ottawa of “very firm countermeasures” if Parliament adopts a Senate motion that called for Magnitsky sanctions on China for its alleged human rights abuses against Muslim Uighurs and pro-democracy protesters in Hong Kong. Therefore, these sanctions will undoubtedly further deteriorate the already strained Canada-China relations, creating unnecessary and serious crises for Canada as it struggles to recover and rebuild its economy in the post-pandemic era.

In addition, the global pandemic has exposed serious vulnerabilities in Canada’s supply chain, which makes taking such unilateral measures a huge strategic mistake as it stigmatizes China at a time when much of Canada’s import of personal protective equipment including face masks currently come from that country. Prime Minister Trudeau certainly understands this reality and that is why his government has recently taken concrete steps to diversify Canada’s trade partnerships with other countries across Asia and Europe.

From a realist perspective, Canada’s long-term interests are guaranteed when its foreign policy is centered on multilateralism, which allows the country to capitalize on its soft power as a complementary, but a vital force to protect and promote liberal values and respect for human rights on the international stage. Hence, unilateral approaches such as Magnitsky sanctions are counterproductive, particularly when it comes to dealing with a major global power like China.

June 1, 2020

Coronavirus: How Canada Can Strengthen its Health Diplomacy

Photo from PM Trudeau’s Facebook page.

This global crisis demands more cooperation among world powers. The U.S. has failed to lead, hence making it a strategic imperative for Canada to help fill the leadership vacuum and strengthen its health diplomacy.

This article was originally published on The Hill Times .

By Pouyan Kimiayjan

COVID-19 has triggered an unprecedented humanitarian crisis. With thousands killed and millions inflected, the pandemic has also crippled the global economy. Governments around the world are scrambling to import desperately-needed medical equipment while struggling to keep their economies afloat amid widespread lockdowns. Instead of increasing international cooperation, the pandemic has sparked ruthless competition among states to gather humanitarian aid. One disappointing example was the Trump administration’s decision to not only halt the export of N95 respirators to Canada but also putting the World Health Organization (WHO) funding on hold due to its political disagreements with China.

Global stability is at risk, and responsible powers are acting to preserve it. Canada and its allies, particularly the European Union, have stepped up their foreign aid initiatives to manage the pandemic in other hard-hit countries. On February 11th, Canada provided $2 million to the World Health Organization to help vulnerable countries prepare and respond to COVID-19 events. In March, the Trudeau government rolled out foreign aid to combat COVID-19 in developing countries. International Development Minister Karina Gould announced that Canada has earmarked $50 million amid the launch of the United Nations COVID-19 humanitarian response plan. This announcement included $8 million, which was allocated to the World Health Organization, the Pan American Health Organization, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

The EU has also been working on a joint European approach in helping the most vulnerable states, particularly in Africa and across the world. The union has reoriented funds from its total budget, allocating an astounding €20 billion foreign aid package to distribute among its global partners to better handle the pandemic. To accommodate the costs, the package will consist of European Investment Bank (EIB) and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) loans and member-state contributions. While Canada has limited resources compared to the EU, it can engage in multilateral discussions to get involved in collaborative aid programs.

Canada has so far been successful in managing the virus’ spread, effectively flattening its curve. The federal government is well-positioned to put more focus on Canada’s health diplomacy and fight the pandemic on a global scale to prevent its resurgence within our own borders. Similar to the EU’s foreign aid strategy, Canada must provide funds and assist the most hard-impacted countries. One example was the union’s particular response to Iran’s struggle with the pandemic, the most affected country in Western Asia. Last month, EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell announced that it will send €20 million in humanitarian aid to the sanctions-hit country.

In addition, Canada must increase its funding of the WHO following the US’ decision to halt its contributions. Member-state donations make up 51% of the WHO’s funding. US contributions accounted for about 20% of the organization’s budget, having pledged more than $57 million for January 2021. Canada has only pledged more than 6.5 million for next January, along with its recent emergency contributions to the organization.

Meanwhile, the US withdrawal has created a budget vacuum. More funding will translate to more political influence, and as expected, China is taking advantage. While China’s funding already accounted for %12 of WHO’s total budget, Beijing has pledged to increase its financial support for the global health body. The country has also become a global leader in providing humanitarian aid, supplying Canada and other US allies with humanitarian aid.

If Canada intends to re-establish itself as a prudent middle-power, the Trudeau government must consolidate its international reputation as a leading global power in confronting COVID-19. Further investment in COVID-19 related foreign aid will also supplement Canada’s campaign to successfully secure a bid for the United Nations Security Council. Canada faces serious competition from Ireland and Norway. The two countries spend far more on international development to poor countries and have contributed a higher number of military personnel to UN peacekeeping efforts. In addition to increasing its financial assistance to humanitarian organizations and states suffering the most from the pandemic, Canada can compensate for its low troop contribution to UN-led missions and pledge military assistance to countries struggling from COVID-19. Canadian troops are already engaged on the domestic front, assembling to help contain the pandemic in multiple provinces. They can utilize their experience at home to help Canada’s global pandemic efforts.

This global crisis demands more cooperation among world powers. The US has failed to lead, hence making it a strategic imperative for Canada to help fill the leadership vacuum and strengthen its health diplomacy. Fortunately, we have the global legitimacy and the necessary financial and medical resources to do just that.

May 18, 2020

This global crisis demands more cooperation among world powers. The U.S. has failed to lead, hence making it a strategic imperative for Canada to help fill the leadership vacuum and strengthen its

Securing Canada’s Supply Chain in the post-pandemic World

Minister Freeland and Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam, Pham Binh Minh, met at the ASEAN meetings and underlined the strong ties between Canada and Vietnam. Source: Global Affairs Canada’s Facebook Page

Even before the pandemic, international companies with manufacturing in China and the privately-owned Chinese companies were moving their production base to Vietnam, among other locations in Southeast Asia. The key decision in moving manufacturing from one country or region to another includes the cost-benefit analysis, ease of doing business in a country, and the political stability – among other things.

Guest Author: Aadil Brar

The COVID-19’s most disruptive impact has been on international travel and supply chains. The first supply shock of the pandemic was meted to the medical supplies. This has followed disruption to all of Canada’s international supply chains.

The world of policy experts and journalists has been abuzz with chatter about what the post-COVID-19 trade will look like. One thing that can be said for certain is that COVID-19 is bound to transform global trade.

President Trump’s escalation of trade tensions with China, Canada, the European Union, and other countries has stirred the debate about supply chains and global trade. The COVID-19 pandemic and China’s actions during the crisis has ensured that major economies will look to reduce supply chain dependence on one country – China.

The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed serious vulnerabilities in Canada’s supply chains. The shortage of personal protective equipment for front-line doctors, nurses and medical workers has topped the news across the Canadian media.

Canada has taken some steps to ensure steady supply of essential goods from international markets during the pandemic. Minister Mary Ng announced that Canada has signed agreements with Australia, Brunei, Chile, Myanmar, New Zealand, and Singapore to ensure “open and connected supply chains throughout the pandemic”. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau spoke to India’s Prime Minister Modi on the “vital need to keep supply chains open for medical equipment and other critical supplies, as well as the need for increased international cooperation to accelerate the development of diagnostics, treatments, and potential vaccines”

Ottawa was swift to announce measures to secure Canada’s critical domestic industries from being bought out by state-owned enterprises or individuals with ties to a foreign government. Similar measures have been announced by Australia, Japan, and India. Because of COVID-19, 40 economies have imposed export restrictions on medical supplies and 150 countries have imposed international and domestic travel restrictions.

Prior to the pandemic, Canada was working on diversifying its trade partnerships through new alliances and agreements. In 2017, the Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement with the European Union, and in 2018, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, entered into force. The impact of both these agreements has been mixed so far, but these agreements have laid the foundation for comprehensive collaboration between Canada and other countries in Asia.

“Canada needs to build alliances with like-minded countries to maintain open international supply chains. This could mean mutual strategies to address threats among the alliance, and pledges of assistance to individual members. Such alliances would supplement and work in concert with existing and future trade agreements” Daniel Schwanen and Glen Hodgson of the C.D Howe Institute said in a memo.

Even before the pandemic, international companies with manufacturing in China and the privately-owned Chinese companies were moving their production base to Vietnam, among other locations in Southeast Asia. The key decision in moving manufacturing from one country or region to another includes the cost-benefit analysis, ease of doing business in a country, and the political stability – among other things. The rising cost of labour in China has marked up the cost of production in recent years, making it viable to seek better options for a manufacturing base.

Moving the manufacturing base from China to Vietnam hasn’t been a smooth sail, the Wall Street Journal reported, “The specialized supply chains that made China a production powerhouse for smartphones and aluminum ladders and vacuum cleaners and dining tables are nowhere near as developed in Vietnam.” Despite the challenges, Vietnam and India still offer economies that can be reliable sources of supply chain diversification for Canadian companies.

On September 10 2019, the conclusion of the exploratory discussion on the Canada-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement was announced in Bangkok. The group of ASEAN countries together make up as Canada’s sixth-largest trading partner. ASEAN countries include: Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Laos.

According to a World Bank report released earlier in April, Vietnam is the only country in the ASEAN group of countries that can maintain positive GDP growth of +1.5% despite the pandemic bringing global trade to near collapse.

Wayne Farmer of the Canada-ASEAN business council said “If Canada signed a deal with ASEAN, it would have access to a market of more than 642 million consumers with a combined economy of $2.8 trillion. With an average annual GDP growth of 5.4% in recent years, ASEAN is now the fifth-largest economy in the world and on track to become the fourth-largest by 2030, after the U.S., China, and the European Union.

According to a survey by the Asia-Pacific Foundation in 2018, 63% of Canadians support an FTA with ASEAN, which is up from 40% in 2014. In 2018, Canada’s two-way trade with Vietnam was at $6.46 billion.

About 66% of the Canadians support an FTA with India, according to the same survey by Asia Pacific Foundation.

China will remain the hub for manufacturing technological products such as Apple iPhones and MacBook computers because China still offers the best options to manufacture those goods. Automation of manufacturing will reduce further the dependence on labour in China, making it feasible for companies to stay put in the country. However, the COVID-19 pandemic and a potential second-term for US President Trump will grow the trade uncertainties and accelerate the movement of companies from China to other locations in Southeast Asia and South Asia.

It was Nixon’s visit to China that paved the way for a new relationship with the US. Similarly, Former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s visit in 1973 shifted the gears of Canada’s relationship with China. Trade agreements can only lay a roadmap for Canadian companies, but it will take action by the political leadership for them to actually walk on it.

About the Author: Aadil Brar is a freelance journalist. His reporting has appeared in the BBC, the Diplomat, Devex, and other publications. His work can be view at www.aadilbrar.com. You can follow him on Twitter at @aadilbrar.

May 11, 2020

Panel — Weatherproofing NATO’s Future: Coming Considerations for Climate Security

Image Credit: NATO

ZOOM WEBINAR

The Institute for Peace & Diplomacy will host a panel webinar titled ‘Weatherproofing NATO’s Future: Coming Considerations for Climate Security‘ which will discuss the alliance’s commitments to and outlook on climate security both now and in the future on April 29, 2024 from 1:00 PM – 2:00 PM ET.

Under the backdrop of NATO’s recently-established Climate Change and Security Centre of Excellence, how is the alliance adapting its mandate and strategies to address the evolving threats posed by climate change? This panel will explore the prism through which NATO views the relationship between climate security, energy security, and relevant geopolitical challenges from Russia to the Arctic. It will also examine Canada’s role in driving NATO’s climate security initiatives forward and Ottawa’s strategic contributions on this front.

Speakers

Mathieu Bussières

Panelist

Director, NATO Climate Change & Security Centre of Excellence

Pauline Baudu

Panelist

Non-Resident Fellow, Centre for Climate and Security; Senior Fellow, Arctic360

Bruno Charbonneau

Panelist

President, Climate Security Association of Canada; Professor and Director, Centre for Security and Crisis Governance, Royal Military College Saint-Jean

Paul Rushton

Panelist

Officer for Climate & Energy Security, NATO Headquarters

Alexander Landry

Moderator

Young Fellow, Institute for Peace & Diplomacy

April 29, 2024

The Institute for Peace & Diplomacy will host a panel webinar titled ‘Weatherproofing NATO's Future: Coming Considerations for Climate Security‘ which will discuss the alliance's commitments to and outlook on climate security

The West’s Strategy in Ukraine Needs a Reset

Image Credit: Presidential Office of Ukraine

April 25, 2024

Written By:

Through the first months of 2024, Ukraine has experienced shortages in ammunition, manpower and air defence as Russia has continued its onslaught and shifted the attrition rate in its favour. Despite the US Congress approving a long-awaited support package this week, Kyiv will not prove able to return to the offensive in 2025 absent a successful large-scale mobilization.

Given the heavy losses that Russian forces have suffered since the start of the war, much doubt has been cast on Moscow’s continued ability to conduct sophisticated combined arms operations. Nonetheless, further Russian advances should not be ruled out if certain points along the Ukrainian lines become sufficiently embrittled – conditions similar to those which facilitated Ukraine’s stunning gains in the Kharkiv region in the autumn of 2022.

With Western arms production set to increase by next year, Moscow undoubtedly sees an opportunity to try for a breakthrough before the end of 2024, although the precise location and outcome of this offensive cannot be known for certain. Such a move would escalate hostilities but could also open a window for discrete diplomacy if Russia believes it will not be able to make further battlefield progress.

The conduct of responsible statecraft requires that Western countries be prepared for all possible outcomes. If the time for talks does come, they need to keep three things in mind, all of which should inform their approach to shaping the future continental and global security orders.

Russia’s Strategic Defeat?

Recent statements from French President Emmanuel Macron refusing to countenance the possibility of a Ukrainian defeat may simply be aimed at jolting European governments out of their complacency. Nonetheless, they point in the direction of Western leaders dangerously tying their hands should events spiral out of control. The same is true of NATO discussions to establish and take charge of a $100 billion Trump-proofed fund for Ukraine, which is likely to reinforce Moscow’s narrative that it is directly at war with the alliance.

While it remains important to maintain support for Ukraine, Western governments must be careful not to double down on their existing strategy – one which has failed to deliver its desired results after more than two years of high-intensity warfare.

Since the start of the war, the Western approach has aimed to deal Russia some kind of strategic defeat while simultaneously avoiding a direct NATO-Russia clash. However, the measures taken – from adopting severe sanctions against Russia to scaling up assistance for Ukraine – have failed to prevent Moscow from retaining both the capacity and the political will to wage its war of aggression. Western policy has proven essential in safeguarding Ukrainian sovereignty, but it has also left Russia more militarized and uncompromising – and made a dangerous escalation more likely.

Russia is not the superpower that the Soviet Union once was – but it remains one of Europe’s most powerful states. Simply put, if a future European security order fails to account for Russian interests – at least to some degree – then there will be no stability in Europe. Rather than aiming for Moscow’s strategic defeat, which amounts to a gambit to preserve the ability to shape the continental order without Russian input, a smarter strategy would treat Russian power as an inevitable fact and seek to manage it in ways that align best with Western interests.

How to Nuance the West’s Russia Strategy

First, Western governments and analysts should avoid simplistic, binary discourses about the sources of Russian conduct. Far too much time has been wasted debating whether NATO expansion was the cause of Russia’s invasion, or whether it was purely brought on by an ageing autocrat’s imperial fantasies and lust for power. NATO’s own website has joined the war of narratives, positing Russian “disinformation” in opposition to NATO “facts”.

More nuanced explanations are all too often ignored in this polarizing environment. For example, one might assert that while many causal factors can be attributed to Vladimir Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine, NATO expansion was nonetheless an important contributing element in souring post-Cold War relations between Russia and the West, especially when membership was promised to Ukraine and Georgia at the 2008 Bucharest summit. Moreover, whatever the “objective” reality of NATO intentions may have been, subjective perceptions inevitably shape the way that states calculate threats to their security.

In a similar vein, far too much effort is expended on questioning whether Russia is a European country or alien to Europe. From Muscovy’s rise under the Mongol Golden Horde to its centuries of engagement in the European balance of power system, Russia has developed a national character that is inevitably both European and Eurasian. A better approach would simply be to accept Russia as it is – an actor with profound links to Europe, but which will not fully align with Western political norms or geopolitical preferences, no matter who sits in the Kremlin.

When the time comes to rebuild some kind of collective continental architecture, Western countries will need to focus on what they can realistically hope to obtain. Doing so will require abandoning the West’s prevailing post-Cold War approach.

Second, while some aspects of European security will need to be built against or without Russia due to its aggressive behaviour, there are some elements of security (e.g., arms control and transparency measures) that are only possible with Russia. And when the time comes to rebuild some kind of collective continental architecture, Western countries will need to focus on what they can realistically hope to obtain. Doing so will require abandoning the West’s prevailing post-Cold War approach, in which the US and its allies publicly and repeatedly chastised Russia for failing to adhere to various norms and principles, only to have Moscow respond with whataboutism and accuse the West of failing to practice what it preaches.

The problem is that the European security order’s core principles, outlined in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, are in tension with one another. Sovereignty and non-intervention in states’ internal affairs can clash with respect for human rights. The self-determination of peoples, when posited in opposition to the territorial integrity of states, for decades prevented the peaceful resolution of “frozen” conflicts such as Nagorno Karabakh. And the freedom to choose one’s security partners can contradict the notion of indivisible security – the idea that one state should not take actions to enhance its own security at others’ expense.

Rather than engaging in mutual recriminations, principles will need to be adjudicated more flexibly and more privately, on a case-by-case basis. In the case of eventual ceasefire talks in Ukraine, as egregious as Moscow’s conduct has been, a realistic approach to strengthening Ukraine’s security will need to prioritize addressing Kyiv’s security status in the continental order (i.e., what NATO and Russia are for each other) over restoring Ukraine’s territorial integrity (i.e., what Russia is and where it ends) for the foreseeable future. This may require closing the door to Kyiv’s bid for NATO membership but insisting that meaningful (albeit limited) security links between Ukraine and the West will be preserved.

Order in Europe… and Beyond

Finally, the West needs to adjust its understanding of how international order is maintained. Since the early days of the Russian invasion, Western governments have claimed to be acting in defence of the “rules-based international order”. Yet in the Western discourse, Western violations of international law in Yugoslavia (1999) and Iraq (2003) were not deemed to have dealt a decisive blow to this order. This belief likely owes itself to the narrative that the United States birthed the contemporary order in 1945 and continues to underwrite it through its leadership and hegemony.

In invading Ukraine, Russia aims to shape the contours of the next international order: who will earn a seat at the rulemaking table and what principles and practices will reign supreme. And while aspects of the current order will undoubtedly survive, we have already entered a period of order transition. Whatever the result of the war, the world is continuing to move toward greater multipolarity and, as such, Western hegemony will not remain an enduring feature of global politics. Taken together, this suggests that the West should no longer think of international order purely as something to be preserved, but rather as the careful management of inevitable conflict and change – both in Europe and globally.

It is not too early to lay the groundwork for successful diplomacy. This requires internalizing that deterrence will not succeed without reassurance, that security will not return to Europe if mutual recriminations take the place of genuine diplomacy.

So long as the war continues, the best one may be able to hope for are deconfliction measures aimed at avoiding a NATO-Russia clash and mitigating the risk of nuclear conflict. The war itself has exposed the limits of the West’s ability to shape Russian behaviour when the Kremlin considers that it has core interests at stake. But even as fighting goes on and support for Ukraine continues, it is not too early to lay the groundwork for successful diplomacy. This requires internalizing that deterrence will not succeed without reassurance, that security will not return to Europe if mutual recriminations take the place of genuine diplomacy, and that no one wins from a long war.

Author

Zachary Paikin

Dr. Zachary Paikin is a Senior Fellow at the Institute for Peace & Diplomacy. He is also Senior Researcher in International Security Dialogue at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy and a part-time Research Fellow in Grand Strategy at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft in Washington, DC.

April 25, 2024

Senior Fellow Zachary Paikin writes that "even as fighting goes on and support for Ukraine continues, it is not too early to lay the groundwork for successful diplomacy."

Mitch Shin for The Korea Times — President Yoon Should Recalibrate His Policy on North Korea

April 22, 2024

In The Korea Times, Mitch Shin writes that "to make sure that South Korea is a main driver on North Korea issues, Yoon should show his diplomatic flexibility that opens the possibility

Jeffrey Reeves in the Washington Quarterly — Bidenomics in the Indo-Pacific: Strategic Implications

April 16, 2024

Senior Washington Fellow Jeffrey Reeves writes that "Indicators suggest that Bidenomics in the Indo-Pacific has strengthened the overall US strategic position in Asia."

Turkey: A Middle Power Pioneer

Image Credit: Alimurat Üral

April 10, 2024

Written By:

Middle powers are becoming more prominent in a world that lacks a global hegemon. In the new era that is to define the rest of this century, multipolarity provides as many, if not more, opportunities for countries whose ambitions are regional and do not inspire the kind of global balancing coalitions that are usually formed in response to conventional great powers such as the United States, China, and Russia. Far from a “New Cold War”, a multipolar age is, in fact, a time of geopolitical diversification around world regions and a global pivot away from ideological universalism or Manichean binaries. The age of the meta-narrative and ideology has ended; history and reality are back in focus. The new era is marked by the return to traditional and regionally-focused competition between a medley of actors, driven primarily by their immediate, interest-based, and physical security needs.

So far we have seen India chart out a strongly independent course in its foreign policy as a reaction to the Ukraine War and its own growing power. Meanwhile, Japan has begun to take charge of its security, initiating the largest defense budget increases in its postwar history. But the middle power state most ahead of the curve in embracing this new reality and its geopolitical “actorness” is Turkey. It therefore serves as an interesting bellwether for what might be to come.

Turkey's recognition of the new structural conditions and its embrace of its middle power status was not immediate, nor did it arise without initial difficulty. Ankara began the multipolar era that arose in the aftermath of the Great Recession by inserting itself into the minefield of the Syrian Civil War.

Turkey’s recognition of the new structural conditions and its embrace of its middle power status was not immediate, nor did it arise without initial difficulty. Ankara began the multipolar era that arose in the aftermath of the Great Recession by inserting itself into the minefield of the Syrian Civil War. It remains embedded in that quagmire to this day, having made dangerous alliances with unreliable and fanatical non-state actors. The costs of this new and assertive policy towards the Middle East initially outweighed the benefits. Nevertheless, even in this early stage of increasing the country’s role in its near-abroad, Turkey showed a remarkable pragmatism in its ability to both be a strategic rival to Russia (in a country of contention between the two) while also retaining its ability to keep open channels with Moscow for de-escalation and partnership on other issues where rivalry was less acute. In effect, Turkey began to engage in diplomatic compartmentalization, wherein it could negotiate based on specific issues of import, even as it competes with the same rival power in other areas.

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine began in February of 2022, that initially shaky trial run at a compartmentalized foreign policy has come to achieve its full potential. Turkey’s existing diplomatic commitments to NATO—and growing defense ties with Ukraine—would suggest that it is firmly in the anti-Russia bloc. However, Ankara did not adhere to NATO’s standard sanctions policy against Moscow, nor did it discard its previously constructed platform of de-escalatory bilateral relations with that country. This has enabled Turkey to position itself as the central pivot and go-between for any negotiations related to the Black Sea region, while also allowing its private sector to do business with both parties. The first sign of this was the Istanbul conference shortly after the outbreak of the war, which may have played a role in Russian withdrawal from the outskirts of Kyiv, before being effectively sabotaged by the former U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson.

Ankara did not adhere to NATO’s standard sanctions policy against Moscow, nor did it discard its previously constructed platform of de-escalatory bilateral relations with that country. This has enabled Turkey to position itself as the central pivot and go-between for any negotiations related to the Black Sea region

Despite this apparent failure, Turkey’s position as a Black Sea power broker has only grown since 2022. This was especially apparent during the temporarily successful negotiations to allow the export of Ukrainian grain out of the Black Sea without fear of military interception by Russia. Ankara will likely continue, if not expand, its role as the most important non-combatant in the Ukraine war. Ankara seems to have found its diplomatic niche, which it will continue to leverage the longer other NATO countries refuse to adopt a diplomatic approach to the crisis. Early in March, Ankara once again offered to host a peace summit between Ukraine and Russia. If present trends continue this may well become a reality.

Turkey’s unique geographic location astride the Straits of Marmara has always been an asset. De facto control over the entrance and exit from the Black Sea has made the country a desirable partner and an undesirable rival. This position has been successfully leveraged throughout the republic’s 100-year history as well as in the prior Ottoman periods and before. In World War I, the Ottoman ability to deny Entente aid from Britain and France to Imperial Russia played a role in the collapse of the Russian Front, resulting in the Battles of Gallipoli where the Entente powers failed to break through. After the Ottoman defeat in the war, Britain and France attempted to internationalize the Straits, but the more neutral new Republic that arose in Ankara was able to diplomatically leverage the crucial location of the Straits to keep it in Turkish control. For instance, the early republic was able to get critical Soviet support in its War of Independence (1919–1923) by positioning itself as the Black Sea’s defender from the imperial designs of Britain and France. In the Second World War, Turkey used its neutrality, for most of the conflict, to shield itself from being consumed in the fires that swept all nations in its neighborhood. This propensity to act as a regional anchor, bridging the East Mediterranean and the Black Sea, is highlighted once more by the current trends of Turkish foreign policy.

Ankara’s policies underscore the pragmatic and reasonable alternatives that are now available to those middle powers willing to break with the ideological orthodoxies of the past.

Sometimes categorized as subversive by other NATO countries, Ankara’s policies underscore the pragmatic and reasonable alternatives that are now available to those middle powers willing to break with the ideological orthodoxies of the past. By successfully leveraging its geographical location, relative wealth and political stability, and desire to resist outside power dominance in its region, Turkey’s recent foreign policy positions indicate the likely future course of other middle-power states that occupy similarly critical spatial positions in an ever more regionally-based and multipolar world.

Around the world, several other countries also occupy such a high-value strategic property and their growing regional power similarly escapes the attention of great powers who see these nations simply as useful levers in their blocization schemes, to be marshaled to advance their global interests without any real autonomy of their own. This fixation on binary thinking blinds many to the intermediate space occupied by countries that can project significant power (rivaling a great power) but only in very specific regional contexts.

While Turkey has not entirely shed the cloak of old ideologies such as pan-Turkism that could distort their real interests with romantic and globalist dreams, Ankara’s real power capability has so far limited their ambitions to the East Mediterranean. Nevertheless, over-extension remains a real possibility that could squander the natural geographic and logistical advantages held by regionally rooted middle powers: the temptation to act like a “mini-empire” can be powerful, but the imperial drive is also corrosive as evident in the downfall of the Ottoman state.

Although, structurally and materially, Turkey cannot project power globally in the foreseeable future, a middle power’s regional sources of power and its constrained global capacity should not blind us to the critical role it plays in the power struggles in its particular region. If anything, the strong showing of Turkey’s opposition in the recent municipal elections shows that the desire for Turkey’s strategic assertiveness is not dictated from the top down but embraced by much of the general public, who demand their leaders prioritize their near-abroad like Palestine rather than focus on the more distant ambitions (such as in Central Asia) as Erdogan did before the Ukraine War. A more independent line from Ankara on the Gaza war is an important example of this trend, which will likely intensify if the opposition gains power. Notably, the most important and decisive of these electoral turnarounds was that of the strategically critical city of Istanbul itself, with the electorate seemingly rejecting the fact that Erdogan’s rhetoric on Israel has not impacted bilateral relations or produced effective action by the government to bring an end to the hostilities in Gaza. Regardless of the changing vagaries of domestic politics, Turkey as a middle power will continue to insist on its strategic actorness in the East Mediterranean, to the point that any impression of appeasement by its political elites could incite a populist reaction.

It is rather the return of regionalism and locality that is of greatest import, heralding a polycentric order based around multiple regional systems that would reverse or supplant “globalization” itself.

Given the rise of civilizational powers that are anchored to a specific region as middle powers in a changing international system, the intriguing thing about multipolarity is not the so-called “great power competition” that pits the two or three states capable of global power projection against each other. It is rather the return of regionalism and locality that is of greatest import, heralding a polycentric order based around multiple regional systems that would reverse or supplant “globalization” itself—a phenomenon whose impact had always been vastly exaggerated.

Author

Christopher Mott

Dr. Christopher Mott is a Washington Fellow at the Institute for Peace & Diplomacy and a former researcher and desk officer at the U.S. Department of State.

April 10, 2024

Ankara’s policies underscore the pragmatic and reasonable alternatives that are now available to those middle powers willing to break with the ideological orthodoxies of the past.

Canada-Taiwan Forum on Economic Security in Global News — Beijing is Looking to Improve Relations With Ottawa

April 6, 2024

Global News quoted remarks from defence committee chair John McKay's keynote at IPD's Canada-Taiwan Forum on Economic Security.

NATO in a Second Trump Term

Image Credit: White House

April 5, 2024

Written By:

Trump’s NATO Plans

Donald Trump in 2024 is campaigning to secure a second term in the White House on a more NATO-hostile platform than in 2016. At a rally on February 10, he reaffirmed that, if an ally fails to meet its budgetary commitment to NATO, he would not only refrain from protecting it, but also encourage Russia to do ‘whatever the hell they want’. Trump’s remark was an unprecedented denunciation of free-riding NATO allies. However, it overshadowed the details of what he might demand from NATO should he win the presidential election in November of this year.

A national security adviser to Trump, Keith Kellogg, later added that a second Trump term would likely entail a NATO meeting in 2025 about the alliance’s future. NATO could subsequently become a ‘tiered alliance’, in which some members enjoy greater protections based on their compliance with NATO’s founding treaty. Apart from losing the U.S. commitment to collective defense in accordance with Article 5, underpaying allies could also lose access to training and shared equipment. Kellogg highlighted NATO’s Article 3, which obliges allies to make appropriate efforts to develop their individual defense capabilities. Article 3 provides no further specification, but NATO allies in 2014, after U.S. pressure, pledged to move toward spending at least two percent of their GDP on defense.

Kellogg’s words are so far the most detailed about what a second Trump presidency could mean for NATO. Europeans and Canadians should take them seriously. The Trump team seemingly plans to come into office in 2025 better prepared for fundamental change than in 2017. It can be expected that Trump back in the White House would be more preoccupied with realizing his election promises than during his first term, whose durable impact on U.S. grand strategy and foreign policy establishment was debatable. The possibility of a second Trump term suggests that the Europeans should significantly increase their defense capabilities to prepare for the eventuality of defending against Russia and supplying Ukraine without the full backing of the United States.

Europe’s Defense Posture

As of end-2023, only a third of NATO allies met the minimum two-percent-of-GDP defense-spending requirement. The underspenders include the geographically most exposed countries to Russia, namely Germany, Bulgaria, Denmark, Norway, and new member Sweden. The same applies for Canada with its proximity to Russia in the Arctic. However, the uncertainty about the U.S. commitment to individual allies can hardly be separated from the credibility of NATO’s overall deterrence. Although Congress recently passed a law barring any president from withdrawing from NATO, nothing obliges the president as commander in chief to honor the spirit of the alliance’s Article 5, whose obligation on an individual ally is already defined in loose terms (‘such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force’). The bottom line is that no U.S. troops will fight if the president does not order them to do so, and the uncertainty about U.S. commitment creates uncertainty about NATO’s collective resolve.

The uncertainty about the U.S. commitment to individual allies can hardly be separated from the credibility of NATO’s overall deterrence.

NATO has strengthened its in-place force presence on the eastern border after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The troops include a British-led battalion in Estonia, a Canadian-led brigade in Latvia, and a German brigade in Lithuania. In addition, the Baltic States are building their defensive lines toward Russia and Belarus. However, while the enhanced troops narrow the deterrence gap vis-à-vis Russia, they do not close it, because they continue to rely on the swift reinforcement of troops and equipment from west to east in the event of a war.

The new NATO Force Model envisages the arrival of 100,000 troops within ten days, an additional 200,000 troops within 30 days, and a further 500,000 within six months. The total of 800,000 troops is a serious preparation for war with Russia, but it also relies heavily on U.S. contributions. If the U.S. president in a scenario of such large-scale mobilization would refuse to commit troops and equipment to NATO’s reinforcement, it is unclear if and how fast European countries could generate the extra forces to compensate for the missing U.S. contribution.

Wavering U.S. commitment to NATO nourishes uncertainty that goes beyond the timely and sufficient mustering of conventional fighting power.

The first concern is about NATO’s nuclear deterrent vis-à-vis growing fears that Russia sees its nuclear weapons as a tool to support its expansionist foreign policy. Russia has moved tactical (low-yield) nuclear weapons into Belarus, while Russian security policy intellectuals encourage the Kremlin to exploit Western fears of nuclear war by threatening the limited use of nuclear weapons to bring the Ukraine war to a favorable end. The United States has tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey. A scenario in which the United States relinquishes its nuclear sharing leaves the question open of whether Russia would be tempted to test the coercive effect on NATO of the threat of nuclear weapons, or their military effectiveness, for instance in the Suwalki Gap connecting the Baltic States with Central Europe.

The second concern is about NATO’s ‘nervous system’, also known as the C4ISR capability of the military. This includes command and control, strategic enablers and situational awareness capabilities, including satellites, to detect and trace enemy forces. It is an area where the United States is also unmatched as illustrated by the case of American warnings of a Russian troop buildup around Ukraine prior to February 2022. It is of course possible that Trump would not refuse sharing C4ISR with the Europeans, which is inexpensive and would not cost the lives of any U.S. soldier, but the eventuality of a refusal does put pressure on the Europeans to ensure their own functioning ‘nervous system’ for a concerted defense effort.

It would be a mistake for the Europeans and Canadians to treat Trump as an aberration from an ideal of a general U.S. foreign-policy continuity committed to the ‘liberal international order’.

It would be a mistake for the Europeans and Canadians to treat Trump as an aberration from an ideal of a general U.S. foreign-policy continuity committed to the ‘liberal international order’. During the Barack Obama presidency, the United States blamed the Europeans for allowing a ‘two-tiered’ NATO in the context of the Afghanistan war because some allies were unwilling to accept losses. This is what led the United States to make allies commit to the two-percent-of-GDP-defense-spending target in 2014. Trump embodies the culmination of weariness with foreign commitments and the perception of easy-riding allies in Europe, which distracts the United States not only from its real peer competitor, China, but also from economic investments in its decaying domestic base.

European Options

There is beginning anxiety in the European capitals (Berlin, Warsaw, and Copenhagen) about whether Russia in the near future might attempt an attack on NATO to test its collective preparedness. It stems from the fact that Russia currently has the upper hand in Ukraine, while the Republican majority in Congress under Trump’s influence is blocking further military aid to Kyiv over uncontrolled migration at the U.S. southern border. Although Trump recently has not said he is considering completely withdrawing from NATO, the strong external pressure on Europe to take care of its own security is giving renewed energy to discussions about enhanced European defense cooperation. Three main areas stand out.

European Options

Nuclear deterrence

Potential U.S. nuclear abandonment of one or more allies raises the main question of whether NATO can maintain the capacity to match a Russian escalation to limited nuclear war. The United Kingdom and France have smaller and less diversified nuclear arsenals than the United States, which gives NATO fewer options for a gradual escalation than Russia. It remains unclear how and if the British and French strategic nuclear forces could compensate for a potential U.S. refusal to sharing its tactical nuclear weapons, and whether they could resist Russian temptations to test NATO’s collective will to respond to a limited escalation. As for France, it recently proposed a dialogue about the role of its nuclear weapons in Europe’s collective security, but this would require a fundamental break with its national-focused deterrence tradition.

Defense investment

The more promising aspect of a more distinct European defense capability lies with the EU’s financial and economic encouragement of joint weapons production. Existing EU efforts primarily focused on the deployment of military training and advisory missions and the long-term strengthening of Europe’s defense industry and strategic enablers. The need to supply Ukraine against an enemy with superior military capability has changed the EU’s internal dynamic, starting with the financial incentivization of member states’ supplies of weapons to Ukraine (compensation through the European Peace Facility). The possible return of Donald Trump has further given the European Commission the stimulus to leverage its Single Market in the field of defense with the newly proposed European Defense Industrial Program for member states to ramp up defense production and to buy European. However, much depends on whether the European Commission will be able to convince its member states to raise an estimated €100 billion to become a serious defense-industrial match vis-à-vis a Russia that has its economy on war footing.

Defense planning

Europe, finally, needs to plan its defense against Russia in a way that reduces NATO’s vulnerability to the eventuality that Europe might have to defend itself alone. European troops as defenders of first resort seem to be the principle behind NATO’s in-place forces in the Baltic States, which consist of a majority of European troops. Also, Poland’s significant defense investment over the past years raises confidence that European forces would be able to muster a credible first defense on the eastern border. NATO at the Vilnius Summit in 2023 adopted the regional defense plans that detail how it is supposed to provide reinforcements via activation of the NATO Response Force in case of armed aggression (their content is classified). It would seem crucial that the Europeans build a plan for European force generation and conduct military exercises in a way that prepares for the eventuality of having to fight Russia alone. This would also require strengthening military mobility in Europe to increase the likelihood that large amounts of troops and heavy equipment could travel east uninterruptedly.

Although Trump and his campaign indicated that only those allies not spending two percent of GDP on defense would be exempt from Article 5, this distinction is hard or impossible to operationalize for NATO as a whole. Maintaining NATO’s credibility in the case of a Trump return hinges on the Europeans filling in the potential gaps to the extent that is within their military capability. Whereas they seem unable to replace U.S. tactical nuclear and ‘nervous system’ capabilities in the foreseeable future, they should focus on building their conventional fighting power. This serves not only to deny Russian aggression on NATO territory but also to supply Ukraine sufficiently to defeat Russia’s ambition of militarily outproducing them.

Author

Henrik Larsen

Henrik Larsen is a Research Fellow at the Institute for Peace & Diplomacy.

April 5, 2024

Maintaining NATO’s credibility in the case of a Trump return hinges on the Europeans filling in the potential gaps to the extent that is within their military capability.

Carlos Roa for Newsweek — U.S. Foreign Policy Needs Some Washingtonian Realism

April 4, 2024

Carlos Roa writes in Newsweek that "the essence of Washingtonian Realism lies in its pragmatism, strategic flexibility, and commitment to a principled engagement with the world—one that prioritizes diplomacy and cooperation over

Panel — The Relevance of Containment for Dealing with Russia

ZOOM WEBINAR

The Institute for Peace & Diplomacy hosted a panel webinar titled ‘The Relevance of Containment for Dealing With Russia‘ which reassessed the utility of containment in managing relations with Russia on April 4, 2024.

Russia’s belligerent foreign policy conduct since 2022 has compelled the Western countries to rethink foreign policy. The webinar seeks to uncover whether containment policy, which guided the Western countries successfully during the Cold War, is appropriate for dealing with Russia today. It does so through a discussion of the effectiveness of four sub-elements of containment:

The military approach both for NATO and for arming non-allies like Ukraine;

The sanctions approach in terms of denying Russia access to Western technology and markets;

The diplomatic approach toward Russia and the non-aligned 'Global South' countries; and

The resilience approach in terms of limiting the impact of Russian influence campaign on Western politics and public opinion.

Speakers

Stefanie Babst

Panelist

Former Deputy Assistant Secretary General, NATO; Senior Associate Fellow, European Leadership Network

Michael Kimmage

Panelist

Professor, Catholic University of America; Senior Associate, Center for Strategic & International Studies

Nicolai Petro

Panelist

Senior Washington Fellow, Institute for Peace & Diplomacy; Professor, University of Rhode Island

Andrew Latham

Panelist

Senior Fellow, Institute for Peace & Diplomacy; Professor, Macalester College

Henrik Larsen

Moderator

Research Fellow, Institute for Peace & Diplomacy

April 4, 2024

The Institute for Peace & Diplomacy hosted a panel webinar assessing the implications of a second potential Trump administration on the Ukraine war and broader European security.

Arta Moeini for Compact — Why Europe Sacrificed Ukraine

April 2, 2024

Ukraine has become central to the agenda of transforming the European Union from a regional and institutional association of multiple nations into a sovereign administrative superstate.

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Panel — Weatherproofing NATO’s Future: Coming Considerations for Climate Security

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The West’s Strategy in Ukraine Needs a Reset

Russia’s Strategic Defeat?

How to Nuance the West’s Russia Strategy

Order in Europe… and Beyond

Turkey: A Middle Power Pioneer

NATO in a Second Trump Term

Trump’s NATO Plans

Europe’s Defense Posture

European Options

European Options

Nuclear deterrence

Defense investment

Defense planning

Panel — The Relevance of Containment for Dealing with Russia

ZOOM WEBINAR

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