The August 2023 Camp David Summit marked a significant milestone in diplomatic relations between the United States, Japan, and South Korea. The Camp David Principles — founded on the pillars of shared norms, respect for international law, and common values — aim to foster a free and open Indo-Pacific. The principles also vehemently oppose any unilateral attempts to alter the status quo by force or coercion, particularly the Taiwan issue, and strive to contribute to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.1The White House, “Camp David Principles,” The White House, August 18, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/08/18/camp-david-principles/.
This trilateral partnership, however, raises important questions about the role of other interested parties in the region. In light of Canada’s declared interest in a proactive and contributory place in the Indo-Pacific as highlighted in the November 2022 release of Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy,2Global Affairs Canada, “Canada Launches Indo-Pacific Strategy to Support Long-Term Growth, Prosperity, and Security for Canadians,” Government of Canada, November 27, 2022, https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2022/11/canada-launches-indo-pacific-strategy-to-support-long-term-growth-prosperity-and-security-for-canadians.html. there are questions as to whether Canada can plug into this minilateral and add value? Is there room for another member under the Camp David Principles? What is the correct balance of minilateral and bilateral engagement? This policy brief explores the strengths and weaknesses of this new minilateral and considers the potential opportunities for Canada to strengthen its Indo-Pacific engagement.
The Camp David Principles represent a commitment to annual joint military exercises, regularized trilateral leaders’ diplomacy, and annual meetings between foreign ministers, defence ministers, commerce and industry ministers, and national security advisors. The initiative is also designed to oppose any unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the Indo-Pacific region by force or coercion, particularly with regard to Taiwan. Centrally, it aims to contribute to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, a shared priority in Seoul, Tokyo and Washington.3The White House, “Camp David Principles.”
This minilateral cooperation holds the potential to significantly influence the geopolitical dynamics of the Indo-Pacific region. Crucially, more security synergy between the three minilateral participants means that more resources can be delivered in a coordinated manner to promote peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific, on the Korean Peninsula, and potentially across the Taiwan strait. It also highlights the challenges of managing a diverse set of national interests within a complex regional context. South Korean and Japanese domestic politics, in particular, may hinder deeper cooperation but so will the upcoming US Presidential elections.
Despite the strong potential of the Camp David Principles, it is not clear that Canada’s participation would be efficient or welcomed. How could Canada effectively insert itself into this nascent minilateral? Where are the areas of synergy? What could Canada bring to the table? The answer to these questions is that the trilateral itself is at an experimental stage regarding where, why, how, and what it does, and including Canada at this stage may complicate the institutionalization of the minilateral.
As for being welcomed to the minilateral, Tokyo and Seoul, while satisfied with the current trajectory of bilateral relations both know that domestic politics in South Korea will determine the sustainability of both the bilateral relationship and the trilateral relationship within the context of the Camp David Principles. Adding a fourth member to the new and still precarious Camp David Three may be inculcating a complexity that does not warrant involvement.
A more nuanced approach would be for Canada to strengthen its engagement in the Indo-Pacific through bilateral cooperation with each stakeholder. Such an approach would enable Canada to navigate the complexities of regional politics more effectively than attempting to join the existing trilateral partnership. Each bilateral relationship offers a unique opportunity for Canada to advance its interests in the region.
With the United States, Canada shares a long history of close cooperation and mutual understanding.4Global Affairs Canada, “Canada-United States Relations,” Government of Canada, March 28, 2019, https://www.international.gc.ca/country-pays/us-eu/relations.aspx?lang=eng. Expanding this partnership to encompass Indo-Pacific issues could lead to significant benefits for both countries. A deeper engagement with the United States in the context of the Indo-Pacific could involve regular high-level consultations on Indo-Pacific affairs, coordination of policies, and joint initiatives for capacity-building in the region. The two countries could also work together on promoting rules-based order and good governance in the region, and on issues like climate change and cybersecurity where they have common interests.
Operation NEON, an established platform of cooperation between Canada, other countries and the trilateral minilateral presents a compelling model for future engagement. This platform has proven to be an effective means of fostering military cooperation and understanding between the nations, contributing to the stability and security of the Indo-Pacific.5Department of National Defence, “Operation NEON,” Government of Canada, October 2, 2020, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-neon.html.
By continuing, if not expanding Operation NEON, Canada could cultivate a sustainable diplomatic footprint within the region. Not only would this bolster Canada’s defence relations in the region including with the trilateral, but it would also serve as a tangible demonstration of Canada’s commitment to peace and stability within the Indo-Pacific.
Another area of coordination should be trade. Canada should work with Japan to enlarge the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP),6Government of Canada, “Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP),” Government of Canada, 2018, https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/cptpp-ptpgp/index.aspx?lang=eng. with South Korea, Thailand, Taiwan and the Philippines as potential candidates. The objective should be to expand the trading bloc so that its combined economies reach a critical mass and surpass that of China. This would serve not only to provide the gravity needed to shape the region’s economic development, but it would also enhance the strategic autonomy of all current and future CPTPP members by reducing their vulnerability to economic coercion.
Furthermore, enhancing cooperation with Japan could entail a closer alignment of policies towards the region, particularly in areas such as maritime security, infrastructure development, and connectivity initiatives. The two countries could also collaborate on initiatives that promote inclusiveness and sustainability in the region, and engage in joint research and development in emerging technologies.
South Korea presents an opportunity for Canada to engage with a dynamic economy that is becoming increasingly influential on the global stage.7International Trade Administration, “South Korea – Market Overview,” International Trade Administration, August 13, 2021, https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/south-korea-market-overview. The two countries already have a free trade agreement,8Global Affairs Canada, “Canada-Korea Free Trade Agreement,” Government of Canada, November 27, 2015, https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/korea-coree/index.aspx?lang=eng. which could serve as a foundation for broader strategic cooperation. Canada could look to deepen its engagement with Seoul by working together on issues such as nuclear non-proliferation and peace initiatives on the Korean Peninsula. This could include synergizing Canadian and South Korean diplomacy to hold a series of regular dialogues on North Korea, denuclearization and peace and stability in Northeast Asia. The two countries could also seek to enhance their economic ties, particularly in sectors like clean energy, digital economy, and advanced manufacturing.
In addition to these bilateral initiatives, Canada could also seek to expand its role in existing platforms of cooperation, such as the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) and the Northeast Asia Cooperation on Security (NEACS). According to the Japan Centre for International Exchange (JCIE), NEACD was launched in 1993 by the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation of the University of California, San Diego, and JCIE served as Japan secretariat in 2005 and 2006. The NEACD meetings serve as a unique, multilateral, Track 1.5 forum, involving foreign ministry officials, defence ministry officials, military officers, and academics from China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States. The NEACD keeps vital lines of communication open in Northeast Asia by providing regularly scheduled meetings in an informal setting, allowing participants to candidly discuss issues of regional security and cooperation.9Japan Center for International Exchange, “Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue,” JCIE, n.d., https://www.jcie.org/programs/northeast-asia-cooperation-dialogue/.
NEACS is another platform that may be an venue for Canadian engagement with Japan, South Korea and the US in the area of security cooperation or at least dialogue to help shape the contours of security cooperation.
In either case, a Canadian voice at the table contributes to identifying, defining and shaping what security challenges and forms of cooperation can and do occur among core stakeholders in Northeast Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific.
For Seoul, Tokyo, Washington and other capitals throughout the Indo-Pacific, a more focused approach to the region that will lay the foundation for broader regional engagement might be an approach to foster stability into Canada’s Indo-Pacific engagement. For example, Taiwan, Japan and South Korea are on the front line of disinformation and cyberattacks emanating from China and North Korea.10Leo Lewis, “Japan’s Cyber Security Agency Suffers Months-Long Breach,” Financial Times, August 29, 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/de0042f8-a7ce-4db5-bf7b-aed8ad3a4cfd; Maggie Miller and Joseph Gedeon, “Taiwan Bombarded with Cyberattacks ahead of Election,” Politico, January 11, 2024, https://www.politico.com/news/2024/01/11/taiwan-cyberattacks-election-china-00134841; Al Jazeera, “US, Japan, South Korea Step up Efforts to Counter North Korea Cyber-Threats,” Al Jazeera, December 9, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/9/us-japan-south-korea-launch-new-efforts-to-counter-n-korea-cyber-threats. Working with Taipei, Seoul, Tokyo and Washington, Ottawa should seek to craft a disinformation and cybersecurity nexus in which stakeholders share best practices and research to combat these forms of hybrid warfare.
Human capacity building is another area of concern. Canada’s engagement with the Camp David minilateral could be leveraged to address the distinct shortage of Canadians who have regional experience there and an understanding of the cultures and languages. Working with Tokyo, Seoul and Washington, Ottawa should invest in the establishment of endowed chairs of Indo-Pacific studies at universities across Canada; such a federal initiative, a geostrategic successor to the Canada Research Chair and Canada Excellence Chairs programs, could contribute to building a cadre of Canadians that have the skills, knowledge and networks to successfully negotiate in the region. Here, Tokyo, Seoul and Washington could dispatch experts to Canada or create exchange programs that allow Canadians to have study abroad experiences in all three countries. Within five years, hundreds of young Canadian Indo-Pacific professionals could be available to contribute to the foreign service, defence, business, academia and nongovernmental organizations focused on the region.
The sustainability of the new minilateral arrangement will depend on the ability of the US, Japan, and South Korea to navigate their domestic political landscapes and align their national interests. This is a significant challenge, given the historical tensions and territorial disputes in the region. There is also the possibility that Donald J. Trump could be elected as president in 2024, which would inject a considerable amount of instability into international politics and the nascent minilateral.
We should also be realistic that the road to the Camp David Principles was leadership driven, and that President Yoon and Prime Minister Kishida at the time of this writing were at record lows in terms of their favorability ratings.11Nikkei Asia, “Japan PM Kishida’s Approval Rating Remains near Record Low: Nikkei,” Nikkei Asia, January 29, 2024, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Japan-PM-Kishida-s-approval-rating-remains-near-record-low-Nikkei; Sarah Kim, “President Yoon’s Approval Rating Hits Nine-Month Low,” Korea JoongAng Daily, February 2, 2024, https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-02-02/national/politics/President-Yoons-approval-rating-hits-ninemonth-low/1973331. Unless the Camp David Principles and cooperation are institutionalized, they will be subject to shifts in domestic politics and their preference or opposition to cooperation. Here, there is little Canada can do except continuing to send the message to both Seoul and Tokyo that Canada supports bilateral cooperation between Japan and South Korea.
For Canada, the challenge is to define its own role within this new geopolitical framework. The Camp David Principles represent a step towards a more structured and regularized international engagement in the Indo-Pacific. Yet, the complexities of the regional context, particularly the tensions between Japan and South Korea,12Frank Aum and Mirna Galic, “What’s behind Japan and South Korea’s Latest Attempt to Mend Ties?,” United States Institute of Peace, March 21, 2023, https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/03/whats-behind-japan-and-south-koreas-latest-attempt-mend-ties. suggest that a more flexible and nuanced approach may be beneficial for Canada.
Engaging bilaterally with each of the stakeholders and expanding its role in existing platforms of cooperation could enable Canada to cultivate a sustainable diplomatic footprint in the region, reflecting its interests, capabilities, and resources. This approach may also allow Canada to contribute to regional stability and prosperity, reinforcing its position as a responsible global actor.
In conclusion, while the Camp David Principles represent a significant development in Indo-Pacific diplomacy, their potential impact and sustainability remain uncertain. For Canada, navigating this new geopolitical landscape will require a balanced and strategic approach, leveraging bilateral relationships, and existing platforms of cooperation.
Investing at home in endowed chairs of Indo-Pacific studies at Canadian universities across the country is the most significant and durable way for the Canadian government to bolster Canada’s Indo-Pacific engagement and ability to work with minilateral partnerships such as the South Korea-Japan-US partnership. Through a focus on Indo-Pacific research programmes, human capital development, and a cross country set of programmes that links strategic studies, area and language studies, and study abroad and/or internship programmes, Canada would be much better situated strategically and in terms of experience to contribute meaningfully to minilateral partnerships and securing its national interests in the region.
The opportunity is there; it is up to Canada to seize it.
The Western powers have failed to effectively manage the increasing threat of proliferation in the Middle East. While the international community is concerned with Iran’s nuclear program, Saudi Arabia has moved forward with developing its own nuclear program, and independent studies show that Israel has longed possessed dozens of nuclear warheads. The former is a member of the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while the latter has refused to sign the international agreement.
On Middle East policy, the Biden campaign had staunchly criticized the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal and it has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier since assuming office in January 2021. However, serious obstacles remain for responsible actors in expanding non-proliferation efforts toward a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.
This panel will discuss how Western powers and multilateral institutions, such as the IAEA, can play a more effective role in managing non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Peggy Mason: Canada’s former Ambassador to the UN for Disarmament
– Mark Fitzpatrick: Associate Fellow & Former Executive Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
– Ali Vaez: Iran Project Director, International Crisis Group
– Negar Mortazavi: Journalist and Political Analyst, Host of Iran Podcast
– David Albright: Founder and President of the Institute for Science and International Security
Closing (5:45 PM – 6:00 PM ET)
What is the current economic landscape in the Middle East? While global foreign direct investment is expected to fall drastically in the post-COVID era, the World Bank reported a 5% contraction in the economic output of the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries in 2020 due to the pandemic. While oil prices are expected to rebound with normalization in demand, political instability, regional and geopolitical tensions, domestic corruption, and a volatile regulatory and legal environment all threaten economic recovery in the Middle East. What is the prospect for economic growth and development in the region post-pandemic, and how could MENA nations promote sustainable growth and regional trade moving forward?
At the same time, Middle Eastern diaspora communities have become financially successful and can help promote trade between North America and the region. In this respect, the diaspora can become vital intermediaries for advancing U.S. and Canada’s business interests abroad. Promoting business diplomacy can both benefit the MENA region and be an effective and positive way to advance engagement and achieve foreign policy goals of the North Atlantic.
This panel will investigate the trade and investment opportunities in the Middle East, discuss how facilitating economic engagement with the region can benefit Canadian and American national interests, and explore relevant policy prescriptions.
Panelists:
– Hon. Sergio Marchi: Canada’s Former Minister of International Trade
– Scott Jolliffe: Chairperson, Canada Arab Business Council
– Esfandyar Batmanghelidj: Founder and Publisher of Bourse & Bazaar
– Nizar Ghanem: Director of Research and Co-founder at Triangle
– Nicki Siamaki: Researcher at Control Risks
The Middle East continues to grapple with violence and instability, particularly in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Fueled by government incompetence and foreign interventions, terrorist insurgencies have imposed severe humanitarian and economic costs on the region. Meanwhile, regional actors have engaged in an unprecedented pursuit of arms accumulation. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have imported billions of both Western and Russian-made weapons and funded militant groups across the region, intending to contain their regional adversaries, particularly Iran. Tehran has also provided sophisticated weaponry to various militia groups across the region to strengthen its geopolitical position against Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Israel.
On the other hand, with international terrorist networks and intense regional rivalry in the Middle East, it is impractical to discuss peace and security without addressing terrorism and the arms race in the region. This panel will primarily discuss the implications of the ongoing arms race in the region and the role of Western powers and multilateral organizations in facilitating trust-building security arrangements among regional stakeholders to limit the proliferation of arms across the Middle East.
Panelists:
Luciano Zaccara: Assistant Professor, Qatar University
Dania Thafer: Executive Director, Gulf International Forum
Kayhan Barzegar: Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Science and Research Branch of Azad University
Barbara Slavin: Director of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council
Sanam Shantyaei: Senior Journalist at France24 & host of Middle East Matters
The emerging regional order in West Asia will have wide-ranging implications for global security. The Biden administration has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier, an initiative staunchly opposed by Israel, while also taking a harder line on Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen. Meanwhile, key regional actors, including Qatar, Iraq, and Oman, have engaged in backchannel efforts to bring Iran and Saudi Arabia to the negotiating table. From a broader geopolitical perspective, with the need to secure its energy imports, China is also expected to increase its footprint in the region and influence the mentioned challenges.
In this evolving landscape, Western powers will be compelled to redefine their strategic priorities and adjust their policies with the new realities in the region. In this panel, we will discuss how the West, including the United States and its allies, can utilize multilateral diplomacy with its adversaries to prevent military escalation in the region. Most importantly, the panel will discuss if a multilateral security dialogue in the Persian Gulf region, proposed by some regional actors, can help reduce tensions among regional foes and produce sustainable peace and development for the region.
Panelists:
– Abdullah Baabood: Academic Researcher and Former Director of the Centre for Gulf Studies, Qatar University
– Trita Parsi: Executive Vice-President, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
– Ebtesam Al-Ketbi: President, Emirates Policy Centre
– Jon Allen: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Israel
– Elizabeth Hagedorn: Washington correspondent for Al-Monitor
Military interventions, political and economic instabilities, and civil unrest in the Middle East have led to a global refugee crisis with an increasing wave of refugees and asylum seekers to Europe and Canada. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has, in myriad ways, exacerbated and contributed to the ongoing security threats and destabilization of the region.
While these challenges pose serious risks to Canadian security, Ottawa will also have the opportunity to limit such risks and prevent a spillover effect vis-à-vis effective humanitarian initiatives in the region. In this panel, we will primarily investigate Canada’s Middle East Strategy’s degree of success in providing humanitarian aid to the region. Secondly, the panel will discuss what programs and initiatives Canada can introduce to further build on the renewed strategy. and more specifically, how Canada can utilize its policy instruments to more effectively deal with the increasing influx of refugees from the Middle East.
Panelists:
Erica Di Ruggiero: Director of Centre for Global Health, University of Toronto
Reyhana Patel: Head of Communications & Government Relations, Islamic Relief Canada
Amir Barmaki: Former Head of UN OCHA in Iran
Catherine Gribbin: Senior Legal Advisor for International and Humanitarian Law, Canadian Red Cross
In 2016, Canada launched an ambitious five-year “Middle East Engagement Strategy” (2016-2021), committing to investing CA$3.5 billion over five years to help establish the necessary conditions for security and stability, alleviate human suffering and enable stabilization programs in the region. In the latest development, during the meeting of the Global Coalition against ISIS, Minister of Foreign Affairs Marc Garneau announced more than $43.6 million in Peace and Stabilization Operations Program funding for 11 projects in Syria and Iraq.
With Canada’s Middle East Engagement Strategy expiring this year, it is time to examine and evaluate this massive investment in the Middle East region in the past five years. More importantly, the panel will discuss a principled and strategic roadmap for the future of Canada’s short-term and long-term engagement in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Ferry de Kerckhove: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Egypt
– Dennis Horak: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
– Chris Kilford: Former Canadian Defence Attaché in Turkey, member of the national board of the Canadian International Council (CIC)
– David Dewitt: University Professor Emeritus, York University
While the United States continues to pull back from certain regional conflicts, reflected by the Biden administration’s decision to halt American backing for Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen and the expected withdrawal from Afghanistan, US troops continue to be stationed across the region. Meanwhile, Russia and China have significantly maintained and even expanded their regional activities. On one hand, the Kremlin has maintained its military presence in Syria, and on the other hand, China has signed an unprecedented 25-year strategic agreement with Iran.
As the global power structure continues to shift, it is essential to analyze the future of the US regional presence under the Biden administration, explore the emerging global rivalry with Russia and China, and at last, investigate the implications of such competition for peace and security in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Dmitri Trenin: Director of Carnegie Moscow Center
– Joost R. Hiltermann: Director of MENA Programme, International Crisis Group
– Roxane Farmanfarmaian: Affiliated Lecturer in International Relations of the Middle East and North Africa, University of Cambridge
– Andrew A. Michta: Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at Marshall Center
– Kelley Vlahos: Senior Advisor, Quincy Institute
The security architecture of the Middle East has undergone rapid transformations in an exceptionally short period. Notable developments include the United States gradual withdrawal from the region, rapprochement between Israel and some GCC states through the Abraham Accords and the rise of Chinese and Russian regional engagement.
With these new trends in the Middle East, it is timely to investigate the security implications of the Biden administration’s Middle East policy. In this respect, we will discuss the Biden team’s new approach vis-à-vis Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The panel will also discuss the role of other major powers, including China and Russia in shaping this new security environment in the region, and how the Biden administration will respond to these powers’ increasing regional presence.
Panelists:
– Sanam Vakil: Deputy Director of MENA Programme at Chatham House
– Denise Natali: Acting Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies & Director of the Center for Strategic Research, National Defense University
– Hassan Ahmadian: Professor of the Middle East and North Africa Studies, University of Tehran
– Abdulaziz Sagar: Chairman, Gulf Research Center
– Andrew Parasiliti: President, Al-Monitor
