When the Liberal government of Justin Trudeau announced its Indo-Pacific strategy in late November 2022, it promised a more robust engagement for Canada in the region. Given that the Indo-Pacific is, as the government’s key document, Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, put it — with considerable understatement — “home to numerous security hotspots with potential global repercussions,” it was unsurprising that the government would commit to a role as “a reliable partner in the region to promote security and stability across the region and at home.”1Global Affairs Canada, “Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy,” Government of Canada, November 24, 2022, https://www.international.gc.ca/transparency-transparence/indo-pacific-indo-pacifique/index.aspx?lang=eng. The policies outlined in the strategy are purposely wide-ranging. The five strategic objectives embraced by the government include peace, resilience, and security; expanded trade and investment, and supply chain resilience; people-to-people connections; sustainability and green policies; and the entrenchment of Canada as “an active and engaged partner” in the region. These new objectives were framed as Canada’s response to the rising influence of the Indo-Pacific region: this, the government declared grandly, was a “once-in-a-generation global shift that requires a generational Canadian response.”2Ibid.
As the other contributions to this assessment of the first year of the Indo-Pacific Strategy demonstrate, the ways in which the five interconnected strategic objectives have been implemented varied considerably. In the case of some objectives, such as the efforts to improve Canada’s relations with key regional actors, Ottawa has deepened its relations with Japan; it has moved to improve ties with the Republic of Korea and Indonesia; and it has secured the status of a “strategic partner” of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Likewise, a number of people-to-people initiatives were put in place in relatively short order.
In the case of the peace, resilience, and security objective, however, we see a somewhat different pattern. Following the enunciation of the strategy in November 2022, the government sought to flesh out what Hugh Stephens has called the “unclothed skeletons” of the strategy.3Hugh Stephens, “Canada’s New Indo-Pacific Strategy: A Critical Assessment,” The School of Public Policy Publications 16, no. 1 (June 21, 2023), https://doi.org/10.11575/sppp.v16i1.76860. Of the $2.3 billion devoted to the strategy over five years (2022–2027), $500 million was devoted to shifts in defence policy to align with the objectives laid out in the Indo-Pacific Strategy. This included shifting Canada’s naval assets to the Indo-Pacific and increasing the tempo of Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) deployments in the region. Thus, in March 2023, HMCS Montréal was deployed from its base in Halifax to the Pacific region along with the MV Asterix, a naval replenishment vessel that is also based in Halifax, to Operation PROJECTION, Canada’s naval forward presence mission in the Indo-Pacific region. HMCS Montréal also was deployed to Operation NEON, Canada’s contribution to United Nations sanctions efforts against North Korea.4Department of National Defence, “His Majesty’s Canadian Ship Montréal and Motor Vessel Asterix Depart to the Indo-Pacific,” Government of Canada, March 26, 2023, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2023/03/his-majestys-canadian-ship-montreal-and-motor-vessel-asterix-depart-to-the-indo-pacific.html.
In June, while in Singapore at the annual Shangri-La Dialogue, the minister of national defence, Anita Anand, announced that the government would significantly enhance its military presence in the Indo-Pacific. A new operation, Operation HORIZON, was inaugurated, replacing the Indo-Pacific portion of Op PROJECTION; henceforth there would be an additional warship deployed to the Indo-Pacific so that Canada could increase its participation in international exercises.5Department of National Defence, “Defence Minister Anita Anand Announces Revamped Indo-Pacific Military Mission and Strengthens Canada’s Defence Relationships in the Region,” Government of Canada, June 2, 2023, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2023/06/defence-minister-anita-anand-announces-revamped-indo-pacific-military-mission-and-strengthens-canadas-defence-relationships-in-the-region.html.
With this new arrangement in place, HMCS Ottawa and HMCS Vancouver, along with MV Asterix, were deployed in August 2023 to join bilateral and multilateral exercises in the Indo-Pacific. HMCS Vancouver assisted in the monitoring of UN sanctions against Korea and in September transited the Taiwan Straits with an American guided-missile destroyer, USS Higgins.6Department of National Defence, “Royal Canadian Navy Ships Deploy to Indo-Pacific Region,” Government of Canada, August 14, 2023, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2023/08/royal-canadian-navy-ships-deploy-to-indo-pacific-region.html.
The shift in naval assets to the Indo-Pacific was also accompanied by new defence initiatives in Korea. Anand secured the appointment of a Canadian general as the next deputy commander of the UN Command in Korea, continuing a pattern set in 2018, when Gen. Wayne Eyre, currently the Chief of the Defence Staff, was the first non-US general officer appointed to this position. Canada also signed a ten-year memorandum of understanding on defence research and development that sought to increase collaboration between the two countries in the defence sector. Defence cooperation with the Philippines was also strengthened, with Canada’s first resident defence attaché appointed to Manila in October 2023.
These shifts in defence policy and posture introduced in the year after Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy was released are by no means inconsequential. But they are not the kind of sharp break with the past implied by the promise of a “once-in-a-generation” response to the challenges posed by the geostrategic changes in the politics of the Indo-Pacific. The shuffling of an east-coast frigate to the Indian and Pacific Oceans, a modest increase in the tempo of naval operations in the Indo-Pacific, and improvements in defence cooperation with the Republic of Korea and the Philippines reflected a limited redeployment of existing resources. The shift in policy did not dramatically move assets from the Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific; nor did it allocate significant new resources that could have provided Canada with the ability to project a significantly different level of naval capacity in the Indo-Pacific region.
Far from a “once-in-a-generation” response, what we have seen in the strategy’s first year is a deeply inertial approach to geostrategic policy. The Canadian government’s evolving defence policy in the Indo-Pacific region in 2023 was very much in keeping with how governments, both Liberal and Conservative, have approached defence policy for the last sixty years.
First, despite the modest changes in policy, we continue to see the privileging of the Atlantic in defence policy. I have argued that during both the Cold War and post–Cold War eras, Canada’s defence policy was anchored in the North Atlantic area; but in the contemporary era, we see little willingness to make a substantial shift to the Indo-Pacific.7Kim Richard Nossal, “The North Atlantic Anchor: Canada and the Pacific Century,” International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis 73, no. 3 (September 2018): 364–78, https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702018792909. As the contributions that Canada has made to both Operation REASSURANCE in Latvia, and to the defence of Ukraine, the inertial drag of Atlanticism continues to shape Canadian defence policy in the post-American world.
A second inertial factor has been the unwillingness of the government in Ottawa to even dream of spending what would be necessary to make such a shift a reality. The Trudeau government, like every government in the last sixty years, both Liberal and Conservative, continues to embrace a pinchpenny approach to spending on international affairs.8Kim Richard Nossal, “Pinchpenny Diplomacy: The Decline of ‘Good International Citizenship’ in Canadian Foreign Policy,” International Journal 54, no. 1 (1998): 88, https://doi.org/10.2307/40203357. What The Economist has characterized as Canada’s “miserly” defence spending can be — and is — called free riding.9See The Economist, “Canada’s Miserly Defence Spending Is Increasingly Embarrassing,” The Economist, July 24, 2023, https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2023/07/24/canadas-miserly-defence-spending-is-increasingly-embarrassing; The Editorial Board, “Canada Is a Military Free-Rider in NATO,” Wall Street Journal, July 12, 2023, sec. Opinion, https://www.wsj.com/articles/canada-military-defence-spending-justin-trudeau-lithuania-nato-summit-bd1771d9. But Joel Sokolsky, former principal of the Royal Military College of Canada, has a more accurate characterization. Canadians, he argued in 2004, are not so much free riders as they are “easy riders”: they spend as little on international policy as they can get away with.10Joel J. Sokolsky, “Realism Canadian style: National security policy and the Chrétien legacy,” Policy Matters 5, no. 2 (2004): 11, https://irpp.org/research-studies/policy-matters-vol5-no2/. Certainly the Liberal government’s approach to the Indo-Pacific in the year after it articulated Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy was very much in the easy-riding tradition.
Moreover, there is no indication that there is any willingness in Ottawa to abandon that easy-riding approach. On the contrary: the defence budget has come under significant pressure, with cuts of nearly up to $1 billion announced in September 2023.11Murray Brewster, “Federal Government Looking to Cut $1 Billion from National Defence Budget,” CBC, September 29, 2023, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/department-national-defence-budget-billion-1.6981974. Some of that pressure comes from the dynamics of domestic politics: the Conservative Party of Canada under opposition leader Pierre Poilievre has decided to focus its attacks on the Liberal government for its supposedly profligate ways. While this makes eminent sense for the electoral prospects of the CPC in the next general election, it also ensures that any spending increase becomes deeply political. And because Poilievre himself has pointedly refused to commit himself to increased defence spending — no doubt because he recognizes that this would undercut his party’s simplistic “axe the tax” mantra — it adds to the wider aversion to spending serious money on defence in the Indo-Pacific.
But the Trudeau government’s hesitation to spend much more on defence in the region is not just driven by electoral calculations. There is a broader aversion at work: Canadian governments have demonstrated that they are generally unwilling to take strategic decisions on broad geopolitical shifts they have faced. It can be argued that the Trudeau government’s decision to abandon this a-strategic approach and publish an Indo-Pacific strategy was only taken because the need for some kind of policy response was simply too overwhelming.12See, for example, Dr. James Boutilier, “Thoughts on Canada’s ‘old’ horizon of opportunity in the Indo-Pacific region,” CDAI Institute Threat Assessment, vol. 2, April 2023, https://cdainstitute.ca/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Final-2-The-New-Indo-Pacific-Horizon-edited-version-2.pdf; on the historical propensity of Canadian governments to take an ‘a-strategic’ approach to great power politics, see Kim Richard Nossal, “An ‘a-strategic power: Canada, China, and great power transitions,” in James Fergusson and Francis Furtado, eds., After Afghanistan” Reflections on Canadian International Security Policy (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016), 151–61, https://nossalk.files.wordpress.com/2021/03/nossal_2016_astrategic-power.pdf. But even then, there appears to be a deep division among cabinet ministers on just how important defence spending is — at least by some accounts.13For example, Richard Shimooka, “Replacing Anand in Defence Is a Risky Political Gambit,” The Hub, July 26, 2023, https://thehub.ca/2023-07-26/new-messengers-for-the-same-tired-message-the-hub-reacts-to-the-trudeau-governments-cabinet-shuffle/. This division would certainly help explain why the Defence Policy Update to the government’s 2017 defence white paper, Strong, Secure, Engaged, has yet to appear. First promised in early 2022 for publication in the fall of that year, the update has been routinely postponed, most recently in November 2023.
However, even if the Trudeau government eventually shrugs off its easy-riding ways and significantly ramps up defence spending with an eye to projecting a greater Canadian naval presence in the Indo-Pacific, the path-dependent and deeply inertial consequences of decades of easy riding by Canadian governments, both Liberal and Conservative, would make such a goal impossible to achieve, at least in the short and medium term. The Royal Canadian Navy has only twelve Halifax-class patrol frigates, twelve Kingston-class coastal defence vessels, and four Victoria-class submarines to deploy, assisted by one supply/replenishment ship, MV Asterix, that since 2018 has serviced the RCN fleet on an interim basis. Well might the Royal Canadian Navy characterize so much of its fleet with the adjective “future” — the warships under construction are known as the “future Canadian surface combatants” and the joint support ships are the “future Protecteur class.”14Department of National Defence, “Surface Fleet,” Government of Canada, June 8, 2022, https://www.canada.ca/en/navy/corporate/fleet-units/surface.html. However, a “future fleet” has only limited utility in the here and now. The warships, for example, will not begin to see service until the early 2030s — so far in the future that these vessels will have no impact on contemporary efforts to project a Canadian naval presence in the Indo-Pacific.
And there is no way to rectify this in the short term. If warships grew on trees, as Timothy Choi and Jeffrey Collins have noted so crisply,15Timothy Choi and Jeffrey F. Collins, “If only warships grew on trees: The complexities of off-the-shelf defence procurement,” Canadian Global Affairs Institute, March 2022, https://assets.nationbuilder.com/cdfai/pages/4983/attachments/original/1647471456/If_Only_Warships_Grew_on_Trees.pdf?1647471456. Canada would be able to rapidly expand its naval capacity to meet the challenges of the Indo-Pacific. But since they don’t, Canada is stuck with the fleet it has. Now it is true that the Trudeau government could order the RCN to deploy its resources more aggressively in the region. More of the Halifax-class fleet could be ordered into the Indo-Pacific from service in the Atlantic. The Kingston-class maritime coastal defence vessels could be deployed to the South China Sea to assist in freedom-of-navigation exercises with other navies, particularly with the Philippine Navy. More of the Victoria-class submarines could be deployed, as HMCS Chicoutimi was in 2017-18, in the Indo-Pacific for exercises with allies and service with Op HORIZON. However, even if the Trudeau government were to decide to ramp up Canada’s naval presence in the Indo-Pacific region in such ways, we would see the inertial consequences of decades of easy riding. For today the RCN simply does not have enough personnel to engage in such an increase in tempo. The navy has had such difficulty recruiting and training sailors that the vacancy rate in some occupations is more than 20 percent.16Sarah Ritchie, “Canadian Navy in Critical State, Could Fail to Meet Readiness Commitments: Commander,” CBC, November 29, 2023, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canadian-navy-critical-state-1.7044267. For an explicit statement of the problem, see the video posted by the commander of the RCN, Vice-Admiral Angus Topshee: “The state of the Royal Canadian Navy | L’état de la marine royale du Canada,” YouTube, 27 November 2023, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FuD6Q1HXsKw.
In short, the IPS set an almost impossible task for a government that is so deeply committed to an inertially-driven easy-riding approach to defence. A greater Canadian presence in the Indo-Pacific can only be achieved if both the Liberals and the Conservatives are willing to spend far more on defence. And that will only happen when both parties recognize that a pinchpenny approach to the current geostrategic environment in global politics is simply inadequate to protect Canadian interests.
The Western powers have failed to effectively manage the increasing threat of proliferation in the Middle East. While the international community is concerned with Iran’s nuclear program, Saudi Arabia has moved forward with developing its own nuclear program, and independent studies show that Israel has longed possessed dozens of nuclear warheads. The former is a member of the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while the latter has refused to sign the international agreement.
On Middle East policy, the Biden campaign had staunchly criticized the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal and it has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier since assuming office in January 2021. However, serious obstacles remain for responsible actors in expanding non-proliferation efforts toward a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.
This panel will discuss how Western powers and multilateral institutions, such as the IAEA, can play a more effective role in managing non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Peggy Mason: Canada’s former Ambassador to the UN for Disarmament
– Mark Fitzpatrick: Associate Fellow & Former Executive Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
– Ali Vaez: Iran Project Director, International Crisis Group
– Negar Mortazavi: Journalist and Political Analyst, Host of Iran Podcast
– David Albright: Founder and President of the Institute for Science and International Security
Closing (5:45 PM – 6:00 PM ET)
What is the current economic landscape in the Middle East? While global foreign direct investment is expected to fall drastically in the post-COVID era, the World Bank reported a 5% contraction in the economic output of the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries in 2020 due to the pandemic. While oil prices are expected to rebound with normalization in demand, political instability, regional and geopolitical tensions, domestic corruption, and a volatile regulatory and legal environment all threaten economic recovery in the Middle East. What is the prospect for economic growth and development in the region post-pandemic, and how could MENA nations promote sustainable growth and regional trade moving forward?
At the same time, Middle Eastern diaspora communities have become financially successful and can help promote trade between North America and the region. In this respect, the diaspora can become vital intermediaries for advancing U.S. and Canada’s business interests abroad. Promoting business diplomacy can both benefit the MENA region and be an effective and positive way to advance engagement and achieve foreign policy goals of the North Atlantic.
This panel will investigate the trade and investment opportunities in the Middle East, discuss how facilitating economic engagement with the region can benefit Canadian and American national interests, and explore relevant policy prescriptions.
Panelists:
– Hon. Sergio Marchi: Canada’s Former Minister of International Trade
– Scott Jolliffe: Chairperson, Canada Arab Business Council
– Esfandyar Batmanghelidj: Founder and Publisher of Bourse & Bazaar
– Nizar Ghanem: Director of Research and Co-founder at Triangle
– Nicki Siamaki: Researcher at Control Risks
The Middle East continues to grapple with violence and instability, particularly in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Fueled by government incompetence and foreign interventions, terrorist insurgencies have imposed severe humanitarian and economic costs on the region. Meanwhile, regional actors have engaged in an unprecedented pursuit of arms accumulation. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have imported billions of both Western and Russian-made weapons and funded militant groups across the region, intending to contain their regional adversaries, particularly Iran. Tehran has also provided sophisticated weaponry to various militia groups across the region to strengthen its geopolitical position against Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Israel.
On the other hand, with international terrorist networks and intense regional rivalry in the Middle East, it is impractical to discuss peace and security without addressing terrorism and the arms race in the region. This panel will primarily discuss the implications of the ongoing arms race in the region and the role of Western powers and multilateral organizations in facilitating trust-building security arrangements among regional stakeholders to limit the proliferation of arms across the Middle East.
Panelists:
Luciano Zaccara: Assistant Professor, Qatar University
Dania Thafer: Executive Director, Gulf International Forum
Kayhan Barzegar: Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Science and Research Branch of Azad University
Barbara Slavin: Director of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council
Sanam Shantyaei: Senior Journalist at France24 & host of Middle East Matters
The emerging regional order in West Asia will have wide-ranging implications for global security. The Biden administration has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier, an initiative staunchly opposed by Israel, while also taking a harder line on Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen. Meanwhile, key regional actors, including Qatar, Iraq, and Oman, have engaged in backchannel efforts to bring Iran and Saudi Arabia to the negotiating table. From a broader geopolitical perspective, with the need to secure its energy imports, China is also expected to increase its footprint in the region and influence the mentioned challenges.
In this evolving landscape, Western powers will be compelled to redefine their strategic priorities and adjust their policies with the new realities in the region. In this panel, we will discuss how the West, including the United States and its allies, can utilize multilateral diplomacy with its adversaries to prevent military escalation in the region. Most importantly, the panel will discuss if a multilateral security dialogue in the Persian Gulf region, proposed by some regional actors, can help reduce tensions among regional foes and produce sustainable peace and development for the region.
Panelists:
– Abdullah Baabood: Academic Researcher and Former Director of the Centre for Gulf Studies, Qatar University
– Trita Parsi: Executive Vice-President, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
– Ebtesam Al-Ketbi: President, Emirates Policy Centre
– Jon Allen: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Israel
– Elizabeth Hagedorn: Washington correspondent for Al-Monitor
Military interventions, political and economic instabilities, and civil unrest in the Middle East have led to a global refugee crisis with an increasing wave of refugees and asylum seekers to Europe and Canada. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has, in myriad ways, exacerbated and contributed to the ongoing security threats and destabilization of the region.
While these challenges pose serious risks to Canadian security, Ottawa will also have the opportunity to limit such risks and prevent a spillover effect vis-à-vis effective humanitarian initiatives in the region. In this panel, we will primarily investigate Canada’s Middle East Strategy’s degree of success in providing humanitarian aid to the region. Secondly, the panel will discuss what programs and initiatives Canada can introduce to further build on the renewed strategy. and more specifically, how Canada can utilize its policy instruments to more effectively deal with the increasing influx of refugees from the Middle East.
Panelists:
Erica Di Ruggiero: Director of Centre for Global Health, University of Toronto
Reyhana Patel: Head of Communications & Government Relations, Islamic Relief Canada
Amir Barmaki: Former Head of UN OCHA in Iran
Catherine Gribbin: Senior Legal Advisor for International and Humanitarian Law, Canadian Red Cross
In 2016, Canada launched an ambitious five-year “Middle East Engagement Strategy” (2016-2021), committing to investing CA$3.5 billion over five years to help establish the necessary conditions for security and stability, alleviate human suffering and enable stabilization programs in the region. In the latest development, during the meeting of the Global Coalition against ISIS, Minister of Foreign Affairs Marc Garneau announced more than $43.6 million in Peace and Stabilization Operations Program funding for 11 projects in Syria and Iraq.
With Canada’s Middle East Engagement Strategy expiring this year, it is time to examine and evaluate this massive investment in the Middle East region in the past five years. More importantly, the panel will discuss a principled and strategic roadmap for the future of Canada’s short-term and long-term engagement in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Ferry de Kerckhove: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Egypt
– Dennis Horak: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
– Chris Kilford: Former Canadian Defence Attaché in Turkey, member of the national board of the Canadian International Council (CIC)
– David Dewitt: University Professor Emeritus, York University
While the United States continues to pull back from certain regional conflicts, reflected by the Biden administration’s decision to halt American backing for Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen and the expected withdrawal from Afghanistan, US troops continue to be stationed across the region. Meanwhile, Russia and China have significantly maintained and even expanded their regional activities. On one hand, the Kremlin has maintained its military presence in Syria, and on the other hand, China has signed an unprecedented 25-year strategic agreement with Iran.
As the global power structure continues to shift, it is essential to analyze the future of the US regional presence under the Biden administration, explore the emerging global rivalry with Russia and China, and at last, investigate the implications of such competition for peace and security in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Dmitri Trenin: Director of Carnegie Moscow Center
– Joost R. Hiltermann: Director of MENA Programme, International Crisis Group
– Roxane Farmanfarmaian: Affiliated Lecturer in International Relations of the Middle East and North Africa, University of Cambridge
– Andrew A. Michta: Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at Marshall Center
– Kelley Vlahos: Senior Advisor, Quincy Institute
The security architecture of the Middle East has undergone rapid transformations in an exceptionally short period. Notable developments include the United States gradual withdrawal from the region, rapprochement between Israel and some GCC states through the Abraham Accords and the rise of Chinese and Russian regional engagement.
With these new trends in the Middle East, it is timely to investigate the security implications of the Biden administration’s Middle East policy. In this respect, we will discuss the Biden team’s new approach vis-à-vis Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The panel will also discuss the role of other major powers, including China and Russia in shaping this new security environment in the region, and how the Biden administration will respond to these powers’ increasing regional presence.
Panelists:
– Sanam Vakil: Deputy Director of MENA Programme at Chatham House
– Denise Natali: Acting Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies & Director of the Center for Strategic Research, National Defense University
– Hassan Ahmadian: Professor of the Middle East and North Africa Studies, University of Tehran
– Abdulaziz Sagar: Chairman, Gulf Research Center
– Andrew Parasiliti: President, Al-Monitor
