By virtue of its location, the Arctic is an avenue of approach to North America, Europe and Russia. The Arctic, therefore, has always been strategically important. And yet strategic attention from NATO – and Canada especially – has waxed and waned.
A new, emerging world order of strategic competition in which formerly agreed rules of international behaviour are flouted, together with the desire for great powers to “command the commons”, particularly to exploit natural resources, have placed the Arctic back on NATO’s agenda. Because Russia is the most consequential Arctic state, its egregious and unprovoked attacks on Ukraine mean that the Arctic’s “exceptional peace” (i.e., cooperative activities among the Arctic, non-Arctic states and indigenous representatives on the Arctic Council) has been ruptured.
Many conclude that the Arctic needs more NATO, and, as a NATO ally, Canada needs to shift its attention in the Arctic toward contributions to NATO, including in the North American Arctic. However, we argue that the best way for Canada to protect its Arctic from military threats is to ensure the investments in the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) modernization are made irrespective of the pressure that Canada faces to contribute resources in other regions. Such insulation would represent a statement of strategic intent on the part of the Government of Canada and is demanded by the US government.
NATO has increased attention to the Arctic of late. First, NATO has held two of its biggest exercises ever in the Arctic in 2018 (Trident Juncture with 51,000 personnel) and 2022 (Cold Response with 35,000 personnel), both organized by Norway and conducted in and near Norway. Next, NATO adopted a new Strategy in 2022 that references the “High North” (NATO speak for the European Arctic) for the first time. It is important to recall that it was Canada that rejected a reference to the Arctic at the Kehl/Strasbourg NATO summit in 2014. Moreover, NATO has a new Joint Force Command based in Norfolk twinned to the US 2nd Fleet with a mandate to surveil the North Atlantic and Arctic maritime approaches.
There is a long tradition in Canadian defence policies for successive governments, both Conservative and Liberal, to justify Canadian contributions to CANUS North American defence agreements as a NATO commitment. Indeed, Prime Minister Diefenbaker invoked the contribution to NATO as the reason for Canada to sign the binational agreement creating the North American Air Defence Command in 1958, and Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau rationalized the Canada-United States’ Cruise Missile Testing Agreement in 1983 as a NATO commitment.
From the creation of NATO in 1949, however, North American defence agreements have always been operationally and practically within the sole purview of Canada and the United States. As well, European NATO allies have shown little, if any, interest in North American defence until recently. After all, the United States was the world’s military hegemon and was assumed to be providing its own homeland defence and ensuring continental defence. From either side of the Atlantic, NATO has been about European defence, notwithstanding the ultimately disastrous campaign in Afghanistan.
Two changes have occurred of late, however, that have turned NATO’s attention to the Arctic, and both are direct results of Russian aggression elsewhere in the world, especially in its near abroad. First, NATO has recognized the Arctic as an avenue of approach to Europe and to North America. Russia’s military presence and capability in the Arctic and its new missile technology that can threaten both North American and Europe requires attention to the Arctic. As such, the Arctic has emerged as the most direct route to threaten North America and Europe.
Second, with the accession of Finland, and soon Sweden, to the alliance, seven of the eight Arctic States will be NATO allies with only Russia outside the alliance. The NATO-Russia Council is all but moribund and, due to Western sanctions, official contact with Russian government officials has become decidedly complicated. This means that many of the Arctic fora, that include the eight Arctic states, can quickly resemble an Arctic-7 versus Russia.
For the alliance and certainly for national reasons, Canada directing its attention and defence investments to the Arctic appears reasonable and necessary. However, Canada’s and the United States’ primary focus is on the Arctic as avenue of attack against North America, not NATO writ large.
NORAD has always been focused on the North American Arctic’s position relative to the Soviet Union/Russia. The Harper Government’s Canada First Defence Strategy (2008) reignited a concerted Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) effort to orient toward the Arctic with the start of yearly Operation NANOOK in which individual NATO allies (such as Denmark and the United States) were invited to exercise in the Canadian Arctic. The Trudeau Liberal’s 2017, Strong, Secure, Engaged, continued this trend but now Operation NANOOK takes place year-round in four tranches and NORAD’s most important asset, the North Warning System, was earmarked for “renewal”. This was followed by significant investments of $38.6b over 20 years for NORAD Modernization, of which a significant portion is devoted to new Arctic and polar radar systems.
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’s visit to Canada’s Arctic August 24 – 26, 2022 (the first time a Secretary General has visited Canada’s Arctic) served mainly as signalling, but the most important for Canada was to highlight the government’s attention to NORAD modernization. While Mr. Stoltenberg underlined the High North’s strategic importance for Euro-Atlantic security, especially in the context of a rapidly warming climate and rising geostrategic competition, he visited some important NORAD sites such as Cambridge Bay to see an NWS radar and he visited 4 Wing at Cold Lake, Canada’s busiest fighter base.
Stoltenberg’s visit did not provoke or reflect a rethink of Canada’s position on NATO in the Arctic nor Canada’s Arctic posturing. It also does not signal that NATO’s focus on the European Arctic will change. NATO remains focused on the Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap, and the Arctic coasts of Norway, Finland, and Sweden (the High North). Rather, Stoltenberg’s visit signals the importance of linking NORAD’s Arctic efforts in North America to NATO efforts, including its large Arctic exercises off the coast of Norway, Norfolk Joint Force Command activities and the general solidarity of NATO allies to share information, and align strategic messaging, as well as capabilities and training opportunities.
The United States has never ceded control of its security and defence to another country or combination of countries and is not likely to start now. There is no indication that the United States wants more NATO in the North American Arctic other than certain Arctic-capable NATO allies to participate in their exercises. The United States relies on its 2nd Fleet, NORAD, USNORTHCOM, the US Coast Guard’s 17th District, and deterrence by punishment. In this respect, Canada and the United States are very much aligned: their focus is on integrating and coordinating efforts across problematic US combatant command seams and between NORAD and NATO so that they are not stovepiped in their collective defence efforts. It is not time to put NATO in the North American Arctic; rather it is time for allies to work together.
To be sure, the investments in NORAD to protect the North American Arctic contribute to the defence of NATO as a whole, as argued by Timothy Sayle. The last thing NATO needs is to come to the rescue of North America because it has undervalued continental defence given the very real pressure on NATO eastern flank. But great caution must be taken if arguing to increase the CAF’s military footprint in Canada’s Arctic or the need for NATO personnel in Canada’s Arctic. The best way to defend Canada’s Arctic and contribute to NATO is via NORAD modernization, investment in the Canadian Coast Guard, better coordination and sharing of domain awareness information, and exercising with the (soon to be) seven Arctic NATO states. Large, permanent bases in Canada’s Arctic present more harm than help.
The NORAD modernization projects of most importance, therefore, are the Arctic and Polar Over-the-Horizon Radar Systems, upgrades to the Forward Operating Locations in the Arctic (Iqaluit, Inuvik and Yellowknife), and the Deployed Operating Base in Goose Bay, a space-based Constellation for enhanced surveillance and communication, and research and development in new technological solutions, including sensors for undersea surveillance. These assets will provide domain awareness that can be shared with NATO allies, fulfill Canada’s obligations to NORAD and mitigate pressure on the very limited infrastructure in the Arctic. With too few houses, old and limited septic systems, polluting power supplies, inadequate communication infrastructure and few essential services (like hospitals, social workers and schools that support military families), a large permanent military base in the Arctic will only deprive local communities.
The solution, therefore, is not more of Canada in NATO’s high North or NATO in Canada’s Arctic, but more attention to continental defence. First, the Canadian government, via the Northern Policy Framework (ANPF) (2019) and NORAD modernization, is already committed to an enhanced military presence in the Arctic that is “persistent” (not permanent) with an ambitious, if not unrealistic, timeline for operational completion. While the ANPF was first to encourage a whole of government effort and discuss the potential multi-purposeness of future Arctic infrastructure, it is NORAD modernization that sees significant funds committed and concerted government consideration of civilian infrastructure needs in Canada’s Arctic.
The idea for a permanent military base, whether for an enhanced Army and/or Navy presence in the Arctic, is problematic. In terms of an Army base, two already exist. The first is the base at Yellowknife, the home of Joint Task Force North, with detachments in Iqaluit and Whitehorse. The second is the CAF’s Arctic Training Facility in Resolute Bay co-located with Natural Resources Canada’s Polar Continental Shelf program. And of course, there is the very important presence of the 1st Canadian Ranger Patrol Group. Expanding the Joint Task Force North or the training centre would be extremely costly and a strain on Canadian Army capabilities, especially given the commitment to the NATO Multinational Brigade in Latvia with a planned increase from 800 to 2,100 troops. Furthermore, a larger permanent Army presence in the Arctic with southern soldiers poses potentially major implications for Army recruitment and retention, especially in terms of pressure on military families posted to the Arctic.
More importantly, there is no ground-based military threat for Canada that would necessitate a major, permanent Army presence, especially in mid-winter. Their purpose would be to assist with the logistical challenges that are Arctic exercises, providing support as necessary to territorial governments and to other government departments. The CAF has primary responsibility for aeronautical search and rescue, while the Canadian Coast Guard is responsible for maritime search and rescue. Land-based searches are conducted by police, local communities, and Parks Canada (in the national parks), although territorial and provincial governments can request CAF assistance. Moreover, whether at Yellowknife, Resolute, or some other Arctic location, such a base would place an immense burden on persistently strained local resources and infrastructure. Many local Arctic communities face, for example, a housing, drinking and grey water/sewer crises.
As for the Royal Canadian Navy’s presence in the Arctic, the Harper government commissioned a refueling station at Nanisivik (still not operational and not appropriate for winter use), designed to support the new Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships with first-year ice capability. Canada’s Northwest Passage (claimed by the Government as historic, internal waters) has seen an increase in activity but not enough to require military support given unpredictable ice conditions, lack of navigational aids and the need for more bathymetric mapping of the seabed. The Northwest Passage is only navigable in the summer even to Canadian Patrol Frigates and future Combat Vessels, as well as allied ships.
By contrast, a permanent, year-round naval base at Nanisivik or Churchill, Manitoba, the only existing deep-water port in the Arctic, would also be problematic on several grounds and more likely to be needed for the Canadian Coast Guard, Transport Canada, RCMP, Ice Services and CBSA.
Churchill would certainly shorten travel times for the RCN, currently embarking from Halifax, but even so the distance is significant. In addition, although Churchill possesses other useful assets – for example, a long runway (operated by Transport Canada), an old rocket testing facility and a new University of Manitoba Churchill Marine Observatory – providing support and supplies to the town with no road connection would be via air or the rail line that is vulnerable to melting permafrost. Such upgrades would require additional federal and provincial funding, and both rail and port upgrades are a Transport Canada responsibility.
Finally, like the Army, a permanent year-round naval base in the Arctic is not required. There is no major naval threat to the Canadian Arctic and no real naval role, especially during the winter. Certainly, the AOPS are valuable to reinforce Canada’s presence, undertake surveillance and assist other government departments, especially the Canadian Coast Guard. The real naval threat is the potential use of the Arctic Ocean by submarines capable of launching missiles against North America. In that regard, the Department of National Defence (DND), through Defence and Research Development Canada has been experimenting with underwater sensors to track submarine movements.
Certainly, DND’s Arctic investments as part of NORAD modernization will have a positive impact on the local communities, including the government’s mandatory requirement that federal departments and agencies “ensure a minimum 5% of the total value of contracts [be] held by Indigenous businesses”. The result, if properly coordinated with other government funding for infrastructure, could improve living standards in the Arctic, but this is not the focus of NORAD modernization nor within DND/CAF’s purview to promise. For example, the planned space-based communications component of modernization could assist the local communities with improved communication, assuming a low (civilian) and high (secret) side to the infrastructure can be created.
Increasing defence investment in the Arctic beyond what is planned for NORAD modernization is simply unrealistic. As for the NATO side of the equation, the alliance’s attention to the Arctic is not the North American part. For Canada’s European allies, the Arctic remains primarily limited to the approaches to the North Atlantic, especially the GIUK gap rather than the Canadian Arctic. As we argue in our book on NORAD, Denmark, as a function of its responsibility for the defence of Greenland, and Iceland are countries to watch for future partnering with the United States given their proximity to USNORTHCOM’s area of responsibility.
Depending upon the future of the alliance’s relationship with Russia, Canada may face pressure to expand its forward military presence in Eastern Europe. This is likely to be the best predictor for an increase in defence spending. The danger, however, is that calls for more Canadian assistance in Eastern Europe will not come with an increase in spending, but a re-allocation of investments away from continental and North American Arctic defence.
In the end, the NATO 2% of GDP commitment does not differentiate between investments directly relevant to NATO’s front line in Europe and other defence commitments or requirements. Canada can continue its tradition of legitimizing North American, national and Arctic defence commitments as part of its NATO commitment, but this will not get Canada to 2%, nor will it significantly change the operational reality of North American defence.
The Western powers have failed to effectively manage the increasing threat of proliferation in the Middle East. While the international community is concerned with Iran’s nuclear program, Saudi Arabia has moved forward with developing its own nuclear program, and independent studies show that Israel has longed possessed dozens of nuclear warheads. The former is a member of the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while the latter has refused to sign the international agreement.
On Middle East policy, the Biden campaign had staunchly criticized the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal and it has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier since assuming office in January 2021. However, serious obstacles remain for responsible actors in expanding non-proliferation efforts toward a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.
This panel will discuss how Western powers and multilateral institutions, such as the IAEA, can play a more effective role in managing non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Peggy Mason: Canada’s former Ambassador to the UN for Disarmament
– Mark Fitzpatrick: Associate Fellow & Former Executive Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
– Ali Vaez: Iran Project Director, International Crisis Group
– Negar Mortazavi: Journalist and Political Analyst, Host of Iran Podcast
– David Albright: Founder and President of the Institute for Science and International Security
Closing (5:45 PM – 6:00 PM ET)
What is the current economic landscape in the Middle East? While global foreign direct investment is expected to fall drastically in the post-COVID era, the World Bank reported a 5% contraction in the economic output of the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries in 2020 due to the pandemic. While oil prices are expected to rebound with normalization in demand, political instability, regional and geopolitical tensions, domestic corruption, and a volatile regulatory and legal environment all threaten economic recovery in the Middle East. What is the prospect for economic growth and development in the region post-pandemic, and how could MENA nations promote sustainable growth and regional trade moving forward?
At the same time, Middle Eastern diaspora communities have become financially successful and can help promote trade between North America and the region. In this respect, the diaspora can become vital intermediaries for advancing U.S. and Canada’s business interests abroad. Promoting business diplomacy can both benefit the MENA region and be an effective and positive way to advance engagement and achieve foreign policy goals of the North Atlantic.
This panel will investigate the trade and investment opportunities in the Middle East, discuss how facilitating economic engagement with the region can benefit Canadian and American national interests, and explore relevant policy prescriptions.
Panelists:
– Hon. Sergio Marchi: Canada’s Former Minister of International Trade
– Scott Jolliffe: Chairperson, Canada Arab Business Council
– Esfandyar Batmanghelidj: Founder and Publisher of Bourse & Bazaar
– Nizar Ghanem: Director of Research and Co-founder at Triangle
– Nicki Siamaki: Researcher at Control Risks
The Middle East continues to grapple with violence and instability, particularly in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Fueled by government incompetence and foreign interventions, terrorist insurgencies have imposed severe humanitarian and economic costs on the region. Meanwhile, regional actors have engaged in an unprecedented pursuit of arms accumulation. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have imported billions of both Western and Russian-made weapons and funded militant groups across the region, intending to contain their regional adversaries, particularly Iran. Tehran has also provided sophisticated weaponry to various militia groups across the region to strengthen its geopolitical position against Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Israel.
On the other hand, with international terrorist networks and intense regional rivalry in the Middle East, it is impractical to discuss peace and security without addressing terrorism and the arms race in the region. This panel will primarily discuss the implications of the ongoing arms race in the region and the role of Western powers and multilateral organizations in facilitating trust-building security arrangements among regional stakeholders to limit the proliferation of arms across the Middle East.
Panelists:
Luciano Zaccara: Assistant Professor, Qatar University
Dania Thafer: Executive Director, Gulf International Forum
Kayhan Barzegar: Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Science and Research Branch of Azad University
Barbara Slavin: Director of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council
Sanam Shantyaei: Senior Journalist at France24 & host of Middle East Matters
The emerging regional order in West Asia will have wide-ranging implications for global security. The Biden administration has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier, an initiative staunchly opposed by Israel, while also taking a harder line on Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen. Meanwhile, key regional actors, including Qatar, Iraq, and Oman, have engaged in backchannel efforts to bring Iran and Saudi Arabia to the negotiating table. From a broader geopolitical perspective, with the need to secure its energy imports, China is also expected to increase its footprint in the region and influence the mentioned challenges.
In this evolving landscape, Western powers will be compelled to redefine their strategic priorities and adjust their policies with the new realities in the region. In this panel, we will discuss how the West, including the United States and its allies, can utilize multilateral diplomacy with its adversaries to prevent military escalation in the region. Most importantly, the panel will discuss if a multilateral security dialogue in the Persian Gulf region, proposed by some regional actors, can help reduce tensions among regional foes and produce sustainable peace and development for the region.
Panelists:
– Abdullah Baabood: Academic Researcher and Former Director of the Centre for Gulf Studies, Qatar University
– Trita Parsi: Executive Vice-President, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
– Ebtesam Al-Ketbi: President, Emirates Policy Centre
– Jon Allen: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Israel
– Elizabeth Hagedorn: Washington correspondent for Al-Monitor
Military interventions, political and economic instabilities, and civil unrest in the Middle East have led to a global refugee crisis with an increasing wave of refugees and asylum seekers to Europe and Canada. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has, in myriad ways, exacerbated and contributed to the ongoing security threats and destabilization of the region.
While these challenges pose serious risks to Canadian security, Ottawa will also have the opportunity to limit such risks and prevent a spillover effect vis-à-vis effective humanitarian initiatives in the region. In this panel, we will primarily investigate Canada’s Middle East Strategy’s degree of success in providing humanitarian aid to the region. Secondly, the panel will discuss what programs and initiatives Canada can introduce to further build on the renewed strategy. and more specifically, how Canada can utilize its policy instruments to more effectively deal with the increasing influx of refugees from the Middle East.
Panelists:
Erica Di Ruggiero: Director of Centre for Global Health, University of Toronto
Reyhana Patel: Head of Communications & Government Relations, Islamic Relief Canada
Amir Barmaki: Former Head of UN OCHA in Iran
Catherine Gribbin: Senior Legal Advisor for International and Humanitarian Law, Canadian Red Cross
In 2016, Canada launched an ambitious five-year “Middle East Engagement Strategy” (2016-2021), committing to investing CA$3.5 billion over five years to help establish the necessary conditions for security and stability, alleviate human suffering and enable stabilization programs in the region. In the latest development, during the meeting of the Global Coalition against ISIS, Minister of Foreign Affairs Marc Garneau announced more than $43.6 million in Peace and Stabilization Operations Program funding for 11 projects in Syria and Iraq.
With Canada’s Middle East Engagement Strategy expiring this year, it is time to examine and evaluate this massive investment in the Middle East region in the past five years. More importantly, the panel will discuss a principled and strategic roadmap for the future of Canada’s short-term and long-term engagement in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Ferry de Kerckhove: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Egypt
– Dennis Horak: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
– Chris Kilford: Former Canadian Defence Attaché in Turkey, member of the national board of the Canadian International Council (CIC)
– David Dewitt: University Professor Emeritus, York University
While the United States continues to pull back from certain regional conflicts, reflected by the Biden administration’s decision to halt American backing for Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen and the expected withdrawal from Afghanistan, US troops continue to be stationed across the region. Meanwhile, Russia and China have significantly maintained and even expanded their regional activities. On one hand, the Kremlin has maintained its military presence in Syria, and on the other hand, China has signed an unprecedented 25-year strategic agreement with Iran.
As the global power structure continues to shift, it is essential to analyze the future of the US regional presence under the Biden administration, explore the emerging global rivalry with Russia and China, and at last, investigate the implications of such competition for peace and security in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Dmitri Trenin: Director of Carnegie Moscow Center
– Joost R. Hiltermann: Director of MENA Programme, International Crisis Group
– Roxane Farmanfarmaian: Affiliated Lecturer in International Relations of the Middle East and North Africa, University of Cambridge
– Andrew A. Michta: Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at Marshall Center
– Kelley Vlahos: Senior Advisor, Quincy Institute
The security architecture of the Middle East has undergone rapid transformations in an exceptionally short period. Notable developments include the United States gradual withdrawal from the region, rapprochement between Israel and some GCC states through the Abraham Accords and the rise of Chinese and Russian regional engagement.
With these new trends in the Middle East, it is timely to investigate the security implications of the Biden administration’s Middle East policy. In this respect, we will discuss the Biden team’s new approach vis-à-vis Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The panel will also discuss the role of other major powers, including China and Russia in shaping this new security environment in the region, and how the Biden administration will respond to these powers’ increasing regional presence.
Panelists:
– Sanam Vakil: Deputy Director of MENA Programme at Chatham House
– Denise Natali: Acting Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies & Director of the Center for Strategic Research, National Defense University
– Hassan Ahmadian: Professor of the Middle East and North Africa Studies, University of Tehran
– Abdulaziz Sagar: Chairman, Gulf Research Center
– Andrew Parasiliti: President, Al-Monitor
