“NATO 1.0 was a clear defense against Soviet aggression and expansionism, and NATO 2.0 was a post-Cold War search for purpose; NATO 3.0 will mean that Europe will take more of the burden for conventional defense and the U.S. will be more of a cavalry-over-the-hill kind of ally”, Radoslaw Sikorski, Poland’s foreign minister and a former defense minister, said in an interview.
At the recent Ankara summit, NATO doubled down on becoming a more capability-driven alliance focused on military readiness, technological innovation, and defense-industrial resilience. By all appearances, NATO 3.0 is now firmly established doctrine. The summit declaration emphasized record defense spending from European allies and Canada, major new procurement commitments, and plans to expand manufacturing capacity. Crucially, NATO is increasingly measuring member contributions through tangible military capabilities rather than empty political declarations. That’s real progress.
By integrating concepts such as an interoperable transatlantic warfighting cloud and advanced AI, NATO has signaled that it views the war in Ukraine as a general blueprint for future digital battlescapes. Ukraine is no longer a passive recipient of military assistance: Kiev is now actively shaping NATO’s understanding of modern warfare — offering vital lessons in unmanned systems, defense innovation, and rapid operational adaptation. In effect, Ukraine has become a NATO member by proxy.
The summit’s second defining feature was its recalibration of transatlantic burden-shifting. The United States sought to reduce its nominal footprint within the Alliance and redistribute responsibilities. Washington encouraged European allies to assume a far greater share of conventional defense, defense-industrial production, and support for Ukraine, while retaining leadership in nuclear deterrence, advanced technologies, strategic command, and alliance direction.
This evolving division of labor reflects a broader American strategic objective of freeing resources for competition in the Indo-Pacific and other priority theaters, such as in the Western Hemisphere. However, this adjustment has fomented internal confusion: although European governments broadly accept the need for higher defense spending, they differ over whether increased investment should reinforce an American-led defense ecosystem or strengthen Europe’s own strategic autonomy and industrial base. Defense procurement is therefore no longer just a matter of collective security and readiness, but also of industrial competitiveness, technological leadership, and economic policy.
Finally, NATO’s transformation has also exposed widening political divisions both within Europe and across the Atlantic. Divergent threat perceptions continue to shape national priorities — with Poland, the Baltic states, and the Nordic countries emphasizing rapid military expansion and a closer alignment with the United States; France prioritizing European strategic autonomy; and Germany balancing rearmament against fiscal constraints. These differences suggest that NATO’s future cohesion will depend not only on military capabilities, but also on its ability to reconcile competing strategic, industrial, and political visions among its members.
This essay focuses on two main areas that could lead to future rifts within the North Atlantic alliance: 1) the burden-shifting itself, and 2) Turkey’s role as a key NATO ally for the Trump administration to operationalize that shift in Europe.
We will begin, however, with a brief review of three existing proposals that frame the current debate.
Published in the Engelsberg Ideas, the first proposal argues that shifting American strategic priorities and growing doubts about the long-term reliability of U.S. security guarantees have sparked renewed interest in European nuclear deterrence. As Washington pivots toward the Indo-Pacific and pressures European allies to shoulder a greater defense burden, some European states are exploring alternatives to the traditional NATO framework. Most notably, French President Emmanuel Macron has proposed extending France’s nuclear umbrella to European partners, backed by new “forward deterrence” postures involving military deployments and joint exercises.
However, these initiatives remain largely symbolic, signalling political intent rather than delivering meaningful enhancements to Europe’s nuclear capabilities. A French-led deterrent cannot replace the existing U.S.-led architecture, which remains the most credible and cost-effective foundation for European security. Any European-led alternative faces insurmountable structural and political constraints: proposals to “Europeanize” nuclear forces through shared control or multinational command structures are impractical, as neither France nor the United Kingdom would relinquish sovereign authority over their arsenals.
Consequently, attempts to build a purely European deterrent risk introducing institutional complexity without significantly increasing Europe’s military power. Furthermore, domestic and institutional obstacles within France — such as its historical reluctance to integrate into NATO nuclear planning and the country’s political volatility — threaten to render extended deterrence commitments conditional or transactional. Ultimately, strengthening European security is far better achieved by reinforcing existing Anglo-American and NATO frameworks rather than building a fragile, French-centered model or pinning hopes on limited Anglo-French cooperation.
A second influential paper focuses on “burden-seizing”, examining the widely invoked idea of a “European pillar” within NATO. The paper argues that, although European governments are increasingly recognizing the need to assume greater responsibility for their own defense and become a strategic “actor” — largely due to the uncertainty brought on by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Washington’s strategic shift toward other global priorities — the concept remains poorly defined and largely rhetorical. Persistent differences in national threat perceptions, uneven military capabilities, and limited political and military coordination continue to prevent European states from acting collectively, leaving a significant gap between their strategic ambitions and practical ability to contribute effectively to the alliance.
To bridge this gap, the author advocates for stronger institutional mechanisms that would enable European NATO members to coordinate defense planning, harmonize priorities, and develop unified positions. Crucially, these proposed structures are designed to complement rather than replace NATO’s existing framework or diminish the U.S. role, aiming instead to make European contributions more consistent, credible, and strategically effective. The paper concludes that a genuine European pillar must rest on practical capability development, deeper political coordination, and closer integration between NATO and European Union defense initiatives. Ultimately, the author treats greater European autonomy and continued transatlantic cooperation as mutually reinforcing, noting that only through concrete institutions, sustained political will, and enhanced military capabilities can Europe become a truly resilient partner within the alliance.
A third influential policy brief from the CATO Institute contends that the United States is entering a period of strategic retrenchment shaped by ideological shifts and material constraints. The authors argue that Washington is gradually abandoning its post–World War II doctrine of global primacy in favor of a more limited and selective engagement, signaling that Europe must adapt in turn and assume primary responsibility for its own defense—shedding expectations of an indefinite and unconditional U.S. security guarantee.
Although Europe possesses the necessary economic strength, population size, and industrial capacity to deter regional threats like Russia independently, habitual reliance on the U.S. security umbrella has historically incentivized underinvestment in defense. While reduced American military presence may initially cause uncertainty and undermine deterrence, it could, according to the authors, equally be the catalyst for long-overdue structural reforms, encouraging European states to raise their defense spending, increase military cooperation, and deepen operational coordination. Rather than signaling the collapse of the transatlantic alliance then, the authors view U.S. retrenchment as an opportunity for structural rebalancing toward a European-led NATO — forcing greater European self-reliance and strategic leadership within the alliance.
The brief outlines three potential trajectories for transatlantic security: The most optimistic scenario envisions an orderly adjustment in which European governments respond to a calibrated U.S. drawdown with a synchronous expansion of their military capabilities and strategic cooperation, thereby preserving NATO through a more balanced distribution of responsibilities. A second, more pessimistic scenario foresees a disorderly retrenchment wherein U.S. withdrawal of its conventional forces outpaces Europe’s ability to adapt, resulting in critical capability gaps, weakened deterrence, and deepened political divisions that could invite external coercion or conflict. Between these two extremes lies a hybrid scenario in which partial U.S. engagement coincides with limited European adaptation, producing a fragile continuity marked by persistent uncertainty about alliance credibility, burden-sharing, and strategic leadership. Ultimately, NATO’s future will depend on whether European nations can muster the requisite political will and capital investments to safeguard their own security and achieve a degree of strategic autonomy in an increasingly multipolar international system.
Summarizing the three strategic briefs discussed above yields three distinct trajectories for transatlantic relations. The first outcome points to integrated hegemony — a renewed Anglo-American commitment that shifts tactical and conventional burdens to U.K. command networks while maintaining overarching U.S. hegemony. It explicitly discourages an autonomous European defense posture, circumventing potential French institutional dominance within the European Union. The second envisions Europe as an autonomous security pillar achieved via a gradual burden-shifting process in which the EU deliberately develops an independent defense architecture alongside or secondary to the U.S.-led NATO structures. The third outlines a catalytic retrenchment, where a partial or phased U.S. withdrawal forces long-dithered institutional and structural security reforms across Europe.
In devising its approach to NATO, the Trump administration has demonstrated internal strategic incoherence, torn between transactional reforms — demanding that “Europe” increase its defense spending through aggressive rhetoric combined with marginal adjustments to U.S. force postures — and an ideological “divide-and-rule” impulse that reallocates military assets toward Eastern European states through bilateral arrangements, providing it with more control over strategy while also undermining EU supranational integration.
Neither approach, however, achieves the necessary reset in the alliance. Raising NATO spending targets does not address the core question of U.S. force deployment or security guarantee. While permanent troop withdrawals from the continent will likely face resistance in the U.S. Congress, POTUS retains the constitutional authority to adjust military deployments unilaterally; thus, if the Trump administration intends to enforce genuine burden-sharing, a substantial, unilateral draw-down of U.S. ground forces represents the only credible lever to overcome European free-riding and overdependence. Conversely, merely redeploying U.S. forces from Western to Eastern Europe fails as a strategic incentive, as shifting troops closer to the Eastern flank actually reassures Western European capitals that American forces will continue to shoulder frontline defense obligations, thereby disincentivizing burden-sharing and autonomous defense planning.
Europe’s security architecture is entering a period of profound transformation as the transatlantic alliance confronts persistent strategic uncertainty regarding the long-term reliability of the United States as NATO’s primary security guarantor. Facing the dual prospects of U.S. retrenchment and sustained Russian resurgence, European states are accelerating defense expenditures, expanding industrial cooperation, and exploring alternative institutional frameworks to strengthen continental deterrence.
A recent study led by former Finnish President Sauli Niinistö makes three proposals for a future European security architecture: 1) a Europeanized NATO, wherein European allies assume primary responsibility for conventional defense while continuing to rely on the U.S. strategic nuclear umbrella — which also aligns with my concept of a “Dormant NATO”; 2) the creation of a European Security Council designed to streamline crisis decision-making and operational planning outside NATO’s traditional consensus mechanisms; and 3) a security framework that operationalizes the EU’s mutual defense clause, encouraging greater strategic autonomy, deeper defense-industrial integration, and closer cooperation with Ukraine. If adopted, these three adaptations could prepare Europe to become strategically independent and take on a much greater responsibility for its own defense.
Europe’s security architecture is entering a period of profound transformation as the transatlantic alliance confronts persistent strategic uncertainty regarding the long-term reliability of the United States as NATO’s primary security guarantor. Facing the dual prospects of U.S. retrenchment and sustained Russian resurgence, European states are accelerating defense expenditures, expanding industrial cooperation, and exploring alternative institutional frameworks to strengthen continental deterrence.
A recent study led by former Finnish President Sauli Niinistö makes three proposals for a future European security architecture: 1) a Europeanized NATO, wherein European allies assume primary responsibility for conventional defense while continuing to rely on the U.S. strategic nuclear umbrella — which also aligns with my concept of a “Dormant NATO”; 2) the creation of a European Security Council designed to streamline crisis decision-making and operational planning outside NATO’s traditional consensus mechanisms; and 3) a security framework that operationalizes the EU’s mutual defense clause, encouraging greater strategic autonomy, deeper defense-industrial integration, and closer cooperation with Ukraine. If adopted, these three adaptations could prepare Europe to become strategically independent and take on a much greater responsibility for its own defense.
A critical aspect of the burden-shifting debate is the future of Europe’s nuclear deterrence. As confidence in the permanence of the American nuclear guarantee wanes, European states are exploring supplemental arrangements to NATO’s existing deterrence structure, specifically centered on a combined Franco-British nuclear framework. France has initiated bilateral discussions regarding its concept of forward nuclear deterrence, while non-nuclear frontline states, including Poland and Finland, are re-evaluating their long-standing assumptions about nuclear policy and strategic dependence.
In fact, the broader debate surrounding NATO 3.0 reflects a deliberate transition from European overreliance on U.S. extended deterrence and military capability to a more balanced, bi-pillar partnership. Beyond meeting military spending benchmarks and burden-sharing requirements, the fundamental challenge facing European leadership is political: constructing a coherent vision for Europe’s strategic autonomy and self-reliance while preserving effective cooperation and functional interoperability with Washington where interests converge. Instead of sending mixed signals, U.S. policy should actively incentivize and facilitate this transition.
Turkey’s position within U.S. grand strategy warrants recalibration. Ankara occupies a paradoxical role within NATO, representing both one of the alliance’s most indispensable strategic assets and one of its most contentious political relationships. With NATO facing uncertainty over the level of U.S. commitments to Europe, Turkey’s standing — grounded in its robust military capabilities, sovereign control over the Turkish Straits, and extensive regional influence across the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and the Eastern Mediterranean — has assumed heightened significance.
Since its accession in 1952, Turkey has served as the anchor of NATO’s southern flank; however, its relationship with Western partners has routinely been strained by divergent strategic priorities, ranging from historic disputes over Cyprus and Aegean maritime boundaries with fellow NATO member Greece to unilateral interventions in Iraq and Syria and outside-NATO procurement decisions. These recurring tensions have produced a persistent degree of mistrust: Ankara has often argued that its security concerns have not received adequate recognition from its Western allies, while many NATO members have questioned Turkey’s strategic direction and reliability.
Historically, Turkey’s alignment with NATO has been dictated less by ideological affinity than by structural necessity; its geostrategic location, military capacity, and expanding defense-industrial sector — particularly in cost-effective unmanned aerial systems — position Ankara as a formidable “buck-catcher” and crucial offshore balancer for Washington. As such, Turkey’s influence tends to expand when external rivalries intensify and diminish when strategic threats decline. To manage this “Turkey paradox” effectively, NATO must therefore forego unrealistic expectations of complete alignment and focus on developing a pragmatic, reliable, and strategically effective partnership based on shared interests in a fast-evolving international system.
To this end, the United States should foster trilateral defense relations among Washington, Berlin, and Ankara to bridge capability gaps and harmonize command structures along NATO’s eastern and southern flanks. Simultaneously, Washington should assume an active mediation role among Turkey, Greece, France, and Cyprus to establish an operational modus vivendi in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean, reducing friction on NATO’s maritime periphery.
Ultimately, leading a structured transition to NATO 3.0 offers the Trump administration a major opportunity to consolidate its strategic legacy in Europe. Amid the ongoing war in Ukraine and his self-inflicted quagmire in Iran and the broader Persian Gulf — both carrying a heightened risk of nuclear escalation — Trump can leverage this policy to revitalize an America First platform that has recently lost momentum. This approach would reduce American commitments in Europe, shoring up support among a key constituency that seeks to free U.S. foreign policy from its Cold War trappings and focus on domestic priorities.
By pairing explicit strategic guidelines with a disciplined timeline for European defense adaptation, Washington can execute a sustainable burden-shifting strategy — satisfying domestic demands for retrenchment while preserving European stability and alliance cohesion.
The Western powers have failed to effectively manage the increasing threat of proliferation in the Middle East. While the international community is concerned with Iran’s nuclear program, Saudi Arabia has moved forward with developing its own nuclear program, and independent studies show that Israel has longed possessed dozens of nuclear warheads. The former is a member of the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while the latter has refused to sign the international agreement.
On Middle East policy, the Biden campaign had staunchly criticized the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal and it has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier since assuming office in January 2021. However, serious obstacles remain for responsible actors in expanding non-proliferation efforts toward a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.
This panel will discuss how Western powers and multilateral institutions, such as the IAEA, can play a more effective role in managing non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Peggy Mason: Canada’s former Ambassador to the UN for Disarmament
– Mark Fitzpatrick: Associate Fellow & Former Executive Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
– Ali Vaez: Iran Project Director, International Crisis Group
– Negar Mortazavi: Journalist and Political Analyst, Host of Iran Podcast
– David Albright: Founder and President of the Institute for Science and International Security
Closing (5:45 PM – 6:00 PM ET)
What is the current economic landscape in the Middle East? While global foreign direct investment is expected to fall drastically in the post-COVID era, the World Bank reported a 5% contraction in the economic output of the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries in 2020 due to the pandemic. While oil prices are expected to rebound with normalization in demand, political instability, regional and geopolitical tensions, domestic corruption, and a volatile regulatory and legal environment all threaten economic recovery in the Middle East. What is the prospect for economic growth and development in the region post-pandemic, and how could MENA nations promote sustainable growth and regional trade moving forward?
At the same time, Middle Eastern diaspora communities have become financially successful and can help promote trade between North America and the region. In this respect, the diaspora can become vital intermediaries for advancing U.S. and Canada’s business interests abroad. Promoting business diplomacy can both benefit the MENA region and be an effective and positive way to advance engagement and achieve foreign policy goals of the North Atlantic.
This panel will investigate the trade and investment opportunities in the Middle East, discuss how facilitating economic engagement with the region can benefit Canadian and American national interests, and explore relevant policy prescriptions.
Panelists:
– Hon. Sergio Marchi: Canada’s Former Minister of International Trade
– Scott Jolliffe: Chairperson, Canada Arab Business Council
– Esfandyar Batmanghelidj: Founder and Publisher of Bourse & Bazaar
– Nizar Ghanem: Director of Research and Co-founder at Triangle
– Nicki Siamaki: Researcher at Control Risks
The Middle East continues to grapple with violence and instability, particularly in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Fueled by government incompetence and foreign interventions, terrorist insurgencies have imposed severe humanitarian and economic costs on the region. Meanwhile, regional actors have engaged in an unprecedented pursuit of arms accumulation. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have imported billions of both Western and Russian-made weapons and funded militant groups across the region, intending to contain their regional adversaries, particularly Iran. Tehran has also provided sophisticated weaponry to various militia groups across the region to strengthen its geopolitical position against Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Israel.
On the other hand, with international terrorist networks and intense regional rivalry in the Middle East, it is impractical to discuss peace and security without addressing terrorism and the arms race in the region. This panel will primarily discuss the implications of the ongoing arms race in the region and the role of Western powers and multilateral organizations in facilitating trust-building security arrangements among regional stakeholders to limit the proliferation of arms across the Middle East.
Panelists:
Luciano Zaccara: Assistant Professor, Qatar University
Dania Thafer: Executive Director, Gulf International Forum
Kayhan Barzegar: Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Science and Research Branch of Azad University
Barbara Slavin: Director of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council
Sanam Shantyaei: Senior Journalist at France24 & host of Middle East Matters
The emerging regional order in West Asia will have wide-ranging implications for global security. The Biden administration has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier, an initiative staunchly opposed by Israel, while also taking a harder line on Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen. Meanwhile, key regional actors, including Qatar, Iraq, and Oman, have engaged in backchannel efforts to bring Iran and Saudi Arabia to the negotiating table. From a broader geopolitical perspective, with the need to secure its energy imports, China is also expected to increase its footprint in the region and influence the mentioned challenges.
In this evolving landscape, Western powers will be compelled to redefine their strategic priorities and adjust their policies with the new realities in the region. In this panel, we will discuss how the West, including the United States and its allies, can utilize multilateral diplomacy with its adversaries to prevent military escalation in the region. Most importantly, the panel will discuss if a multilateral security dialogue in the Persian Gulf region, proposed by some regional actors, can help reduce tensions among regional foes and produce sustainable peace and development for the region.
Panelists:
– Abdullah Baabood: Academic Researcher and Former Director of the Centre for Gulf Studies, Qatar University
– Trita Parsi: Executive Vice-President, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
– Ebtesam Al-Ketbi: President, Emirates Policy Centre
– Jon Allen: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Israel
– Elizabeth Hagedorn: Washington correspondent for Al-Monitor
Military interventions, political and economic instabilities, and civil unrest in the Middle East have led to a global refugee crisis with an increasing wave of refugees and asylum seekers to Europe and Canada. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has, in myriad ways, exacerbated and contributed to the ongoing security threats and destabilization of the region.
While these challenges pose serious risks to Canadian security, Ottawa will also have the opportunity to limit such risks and prevent a spillover effect vis-à-vis effective humanitarian initiatives in the region. In this panel, we will primarily investigate Canada’s Middle East Strategy’s degree of success in providing humanitarian aid to the region. Secondly, the panel will discuss what programs and initiatives Canada can introduce to further build on the renewed strategy. and more specifically, how Canada can utilize its policy instruments to more effectively deal with the increasing influx of refugees from the Middle East.
Panelists:
Erica Di Ruggiero: Director of Centre for Global Health, University of Toronto
Reyhana Patel: Head of Communications & Government Relations, Islamic Relief Canada
Amir Barmaki: Former Head of UN OCHA in Iran
Catherine Gribbin: Senior Legal Advisor for International and Humanitarian Law, Canadian Red Cross
In 2016, Canada launched an ambitious five-year “Middle East Engagement Strategy” (2016-2021), committing to investing CA$3.5 billion over five years to help establish the necessary conditions for security and stability, alleviate human suffering and enable stabilization programs in the region. In the latest development, during the meeting of the Global Coalition against ISIS, Minister of Foreign Affairs Marc Garneau announced more than $43.6 million in Peace and Stabilization Operations Program funding for 11 projects in Syria and Iraq.
With Canada’s Middle East Engagement Strategy expiring this year, it is time to examine and evaluate this massive investment in the Middle East region in the past five years. More importantly, the panel will discuss a principled and strategic roadmap for the future of Canada’s short-term and long-term engagement in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Ferry de Kerckhove: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Egypt
– Dennis Horak: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
– Chris Kilford: Former Canadian Defence Attaché in Turkey, member of the national board of the Canadian International Council (CIC)
– David Dewitt: University Professor Emeritus, York University
While the United States continues to pull back from certain regional conflicts, reflected by the Biden administration’s decision to halt American backing for Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen and the expected withdrawal from Afghanistan, US troops continue to be stationed across the region. Meanwhile, Russia and China have significantly maintained and even expanded their regional activities. On one hand, the Kremlin has maintained its military presence in Syria, and on the other hand, China has signed an unprecedented 25-year strategic agreement with Iran.
As the global power structure continues to shift, it is essential to analyze the future of the US regional presence under the Biden administration, explore the emerging global rivalry with Russia and China, and at last, investigate the implications of such competition for peace and security in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Dmitri Trenin: Director of Carnegie Moscow Center
– Joost R. Hiltermann: Director of MENA Programme, International Crisis Group
– Roxane Farmanfarmaian: Affiliated Lecturer in International Relations of the Middle East and North Africa, University of Cambridge
– Andrew A. Michta: Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at Marshall Center
– Kelley Vlahos: Senior Advisor, Quincy Institute
The security architecture of the Middle East has undergone rapid transformations in an exceptionally short period. Notable developments include the United States gradual withdrawal from the region, rapprochement between Israel and some GCC states through the Abraham Accords and the rise of Chinese and Russian regional engagement.
With these new trends in the Middle East, it is timely to investigate the security implications of the Biden administration’s Middle East policy. In this respect, we will discuss the Biden team’s new approach vis-à-vis Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The panel will also discuss the role of other major powers, including China and Russia in shaping this new security environment in the region, and how the Biden administration will respond to these powers’ increasing regional presence.
Panelists:
– Sanam Vakil: Deputy Director of MENA Programme at Chatham House
– Denise Natali: Acting Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies & Director of the Center for Strategic Research, National Defense University
– Hassan Ahmadian: Professor of the Middle East and North Africa Studies, University of Tehran
– Abdulaziz Sagar: Chairman, Gulf Research Center
– Andrew Parasiliti: President, Al-Monitor
