Executive Summary
On May 28th, the Institute for Peace & Diplomacy (IPD), the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), in collaboration with the Offices of Senator Yuen Pau Woo and Mohammad Al Zaibak, hosted the Parliamentary Symposium, ‘The Future of Middle Powers After the Rupture: Perspectives from Canada and Beyond’. This symposium convened over 90 participants, including parliamentarians, ambassadors, government officials, academics, industry leaders, and civil society professionals, to examine how Canada and other middle powers can balance national interests and core values while preserving strategic autonomy in an increasingly competitive global landscape. The impetus for this symposium arose following Prime Minister Mark Carney’s address at the World Economic Forum in Davos this year, where he argued that the post-WWII ‘rules-based’ international order is undergoing a profound rupture, driven by intensifying great-power competition, weaponized economic interdependence, and rising geopolitical fragmentation. He argued that this rupture has placed new pressure on middle powers to work collectively, preserve global stability, and help prevent the further erosion of multilateral governance frameworks. As a response, he advanced a foreign policy doctrine of “variable geometry,” through which middle powers pursue ad hoc, issue-specific coalitions based on shared interests rather than fixed alignments. This symposium examined the merits of this doctrine and how it might be operationalized by Canada and other middle powers around the world.Across both panels, it was acknowledged that Canadian foreign policy has long benefited from a U.S.-led global system structured to advantage Western powers. Panelists argued that now, amid global fragmentation, Canada must reassess the realities of its security, sovereignty, and range of viable international partnerships.
Panelists broadly welcomed Prime Minister Carney’s foreign policy doctrine of variable geometry, albeit questioning its novelty as a concept. Many noted that countries, particularly in the Global South, have long pursued issue-specific coalitions and strategic hedging as a matter of necessity in an increasingly multipolar world. Moreover, actors in the Global South have likewise long identified the inconsistencies, inequities, and double standards embedded in the post-war liberal international order.
From this vantage point, the significance of the Davos speech lay less in the originality of its insights than in the fact that they were articulated by a G7 leader, especially a Canadian leader, whose foreign policy has long been perceived globally as an extension of American statecraft.
It was emphasized that countries with experience in flexible alliances — including those represented at the symposium such as ambassadors from Türkiye, Indonesia, Brazil, and South Africa — offer valuable models for Canada as it recalibrates its foreign policy posture.
A broad consensus emerged that traditional conceptualizations of middle powers are often ambiguous, and that many attributes typically associated with them can also be found in smaller states. Guyana was cited as an example: the development of its offshore petroleum resources has drawn engagement from both the United States and China, thereby increasing its agency vis-à-vis great powers.
As such, one panelist conceptualized variable geometry through the lens of agency within great-power competition between Washington and Beijing. The term “geopolitical hinging” was introduced, distinguished from hedging on the grounds that hedging carries an inherent connotation of potential loss. In this framing, states are positioned between both powers and may gain greater agency by maintaining flexible relationships with each. Those with greater latitude to engage with Washington and Beijing are therefore better able to navigate an emerging world order.
Others described middle powers through inherent qualities, emphasizing attributes such as regional influence, geographic positioning, institutional depth, or diplomatic leverage.
Many raised that Canada has traditionally defined suitable middle-power partners on the basis of “like-mindedness” or shared values. Discussants underscored that this approach to coalition-building may risk reinforcing notions of Western moral superiority embedded in the old order, while overlooking grievances that have contributed to the current rupture in the international system.
It was asserted that a broader conception of variable geometry does not entail a retreat from Canadian values in foreign policy. These values remain genuine sources of soft power and diplomatic capital. Nonetheless, some insisted that focusing exclusively on partnerships grounded in liberal democratic values risks overlooking other shared priorities, including economic and social welfare, technological progress, cultural protection, and public safety. It may also risk exacerbating the very hypocrisy in the international order that Prime Minister Carney highlighted in Davos.
The discussion maintained, therefore, that Canada’s approach to variable geometry should remain flexible, open, and inclusive. These issue-based coalitions may also include great powers, in areas where they are willing to contribute constructively.
The World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Electronic Commerce (ECA) was cited as a practical proof of concept: 66 countries — including China (but not the United States) — reached an interim agreement on the sidelines of the WTO Ministerial Conference, demonstrating that viable issue-based coalitions can be assembled, can include major powers selectively, and can function outside established institutional frameworks. It was suggested that well-constructed coalitions could serve as bridges with great powers.
To mitigate the challenges of the current geopolitical juncture, panelists identified two key priorities for Canada: (1) strengthening domestic policies and (2) middle power coalition-building.
There was broad agreement that Ottawa must first strengthen its domestic economic and defence capacity at home to be able to exercise greater agency abroad. It was argued that Canada must reassess its industrial policy, address persistent productivity gaps, and strengthen its sovereign capabilities. Several practical starting points were identified, including reducing interprovincial trade barriers, improving coordination across government departments and agencies, and pursuing deeper trade diversification. It was raised that Canada does not lack strategic assets; rather, the challenge lies in translating them into durable strategic advantages.
It was noted that many of the global networks on which Canada depends remain structurally shaped by the United States. These include cloud infrastructure, major software platforms, communications infrastructure such as undersea cables and low-Earth-orbit satellites, and critical semiconductor and computing technologies. Dependence on these systems creates strategic vulnerabilities, particularly when great powers or major technology companies are willing to exploit these chokepoints for coercive purposes. Without corrective action, these digital vulnerabilities are likely to deepen as technological disruption accelerates and digital systems become increasingly central to economic competitiveness, security, and governance.
Assessing Canada’s international position, the discussion underscored that Canada must clearly identify its core interests and tangible capabilities on the world stage and then leverage these diplomatic assets to “move the margins.” Examples cited include its critical mineral endowments, energy resources, strong institutions, and political capital.
Panelists also cautioned that self-strengthening alone is insufficient to build a stronger world order. If pursued in isolation, domestic resilience strategies could contribute to further fragmentation of the international system. For this reason, they insisted that efforts to strengthen sovereign capabilities must be linked to broader international transformation through mutual assistance, institutional cooperation, and coalition-building among middle powers. In this view, variable geometry should be understood as a means of connecting national resilience with collective action.
For example, it was suggested that Canada’s continued cuts to development funding and international assistance could be short-sighted. Instead of limiting engagement to countries that are currently deemed ‘middle-powers’, Canada should invest in states that may become more influential actors in the future. Early engagement can foster mutually beneficial relationships and yield longer-term strategic advantages.
While Carney’s speech was prudent in acknowledging the double standards embedded in the old world order, it was argued that this speech failed to address how the powers that benefited from and sustained that order—including Canada—intend to redress its inequities.
Although multilateral institutions are increasingly constrained by political deadlock, it was argued that middle powers should not abandon them in favour of pursuing variable geometry. Rather, a significant role for middle powers should continue to advocate for institutional reforms in multilateral institutions, including within the World Trade Organization, the United Nations, and the UN Security Council. It was also noted that variable geometry will only be effective if its members are prepared to support one another both privately and publicly, thereby building collective leverage and enabling them to resist pressure from great powers.
It was put forward that Canada can leverage its soft power and diplomatic credibility to champion institutional reform while simultaneously engaging in new minilateral partnerships, ensuring that variable geometry complements rather than replaces multilateralism.
The Western powers have failed to effectively manage the increasing threat of proliferation in the Middle East. While the international community is concerned with Iran’s nuclear program, Saudi Arabia has moved forward with developing its own nuclear program, and independent studies show that Israel has longed possessed dozens of nuclear warheads. The former is a member of the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while the latter has refused to sign the international agreement.
On Middle East policy, the Biden campaign had staunchly criticized the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal and it has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier since assuming office in January 2021. However, serious obstacles remain for responsible actors in expanding non-proliferation efforts toward a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.
This panel will discuss how Western powers and multilateral institutions, such as the IAEA, can play a more effective role in managing non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Peggy Mason: Canada’s former Ambassador to the UN for Disarmament
– Mark Fitzpatrick: Associate Fellow & Former Executive Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
– Ali Vaez: Iran Project Director, International Crisis Group
– Negar Mortazavi: Journalist and Political Analyst, Host of Iran Podcast
– David Albright: Founder and President of the Institute for Science and International Security
Closing (5:45 PM – 6:00 PM ET)
What is the current economic landscape in the Middle East? While global foreign direct investment is expected to fall drastically in the post-COVID era, the World Bank reported a 5% contraction in the economic output of the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries in 2020 due to the pandemic. While oil prices are expected to rebound with normalization in demand, political instability, regional and geopolitical tensions, domestic corruption, and a volatile regulatory and legal environment all threaten economic recovery in the Middle East. What is the prospect for economic growth and development in the region post-pandemic, and how could MENA nations promote sustainable growth and regional trade moving forward?
At the same time, Middle Eastern diaspora communities have become financially successful and can help promote trade between North America and the region. In this respect, the diaspora can become vital intermediaries for advancing U.S. and Canada’s business interests abroad. Promoting business diplomacy can both benefit the MENA region and be an effective and positive way to advance engagement and achieve foreign policy goals of the North Atlantic.
This panel will investigate the trade and investment opportunities in the Middle East, discuss how facilitating economic engagement with the region can benefit Canadian and American national interests, and explore relevant policy prescriptions.
Panelists:
– Hon. Sergio Marchi: Canada’s Former Minister of International Trade
– Scott Jolliffe: Chairperson, Canada Arab Business Council
– Esfandyar Batmanghelidj: Founder and Publisher of Bourse & Bazaar
– Nizar Ghanem: Director of Research and Co-founder at Triangle
– Nicki Siamaki: Researcher at Control Risks
The Middle East continues to grapple with violence and instability, particularly in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Fueled by government incompetence and foreign interventions, terrorist insurgencies have imposed severe humanitarian and economic costs on the region. Meanwhile, regional actors have engaged in an unprecedented pursuit of arms accumulation. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have imported billions of both Western and Russian-made weapons and funded militant groups across the region, intending to contain their regional adversaries, particularly Iran. Tehran has also provided sophisticated weaponry to various militia groups across the region to strengthen its geopolitical position against Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Israel.
On the other hand, with international terrorist networks and intense regional rivalry in the Middle East, it is impractical to discuss peace and security without addressing terrorism and the arms race in the region. This panel will primarily discuss the implications of the ongoing arms race in the region and the role of Western powers and multilateral organizations in facilitating trust-building security arrangements among regional stakeholders to limit the proliferation of arms across the Middle East.
Panelists:
Luciano Zaccara: Assistant Professor, Qatar University
Dania Thafer: Executive Director, Gulf International Forum
Kayhan Barzegar: Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Science and Research Branch of Azad University
Barbara Slavin: Director of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council
Sanam Shantyaei: Senior Journalist at France24 & host of Middle East Matters
The emerging regional order in West Asia will have wide-ranging implications for global security. The Biden administration has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier, an initiative staunchly opposed by Israel, while also taking a harder line on Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen. Meanwhile, key regional actors, including Qatar, Iraq, and Oman, have engaged in backchannel efforts to bring Iran and Saudi Arabia to the negotiating table. From a broader geopolitical perspective, with the need to secure its energy imports, China is also expected to increase its footprint in the region and influence the mentioned challenges.
In this evolving landscape, Western powers will be compelled to redefine their strategic priorities and adjust their policies with the new realities in the region. In this panel, we will discuss how the West, including the United States and its allies, can utilize multilateral diplomacy with its adversaries to prevent military escalation in the region. Most importantly, the panel will discuss if a multilateral security dialogue in the Persian Gulf region, proposed by some regional actors, can help reduce tensions among regional foes and produce sustainable peace and development for the region.
Panelists:
– Abdullah Baabood: Academic Researcher and Former Director of the Centre for Gulf Studies, Qatar University
– Trita Parsi: Executive Vice-President, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
– Ebtesam Al-Ketbi: President, Emirates Policy Centre
– Jon Allen: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Israel
– Elizabeth Hagedorn: Washington correspondent for Al-Monitor
Military interventions, political and economic instabilities, and civil unrest in the Middle East have led to a global refugee crisis with an increasing wave of refugees and asylum seekers to Europe and Canada. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has, in myriad ways, exacerbated and contributed to the ongoing security threats and destabilization of the region.
While these challenges pose serious risks to Canadian security, Ottawa will also have the opportunity to limit such risks and prevent a spillover effect vis-à-vis effective humanitarian initiatives in the region. In this panel, we will primarily investigate Canada’s Middle East Strategy’s degree of success in providing humanitarian aid to the region. Secondly, the panel will discuss what programs and initiatives Canada can introduce to further build on the renewed strategy. and more specifically, how Canada can utilize its policy instruments to more effectively deal with the increasing influx of refugees from the Middle East.
Panelists:
Erica Di Ruggiero: Director of Centre for Global Health, University of Toronto
Reyhana Patel: Head of Communications & Government Relations, Islamic Relief Canada
Amir Barmaki: Former Head of UN OCHA in Iran
Catherine Gribbin: Senior Legal Advisor for International and Humanitarian Law, Canadian Red Cross
In 2016, Canada launched an ambitious five-year “Middle East Engagement Strategy” (2016-2021), committing to investing CA$3.5 billion over five years to help establish the necessary conditions for security and stability, alleviate human suffering and enable stabilization programs in the region. In the latest development, during the meeting of the Global Coalition against ISIS, Minister of Foreign Affairs Marc Garneau announced more than $43.6 million in Peace and Stabilization Operations Program funding for 11 projects in Syria and Iraq.
With Canada’s Middle East Engagement Strategy expiring this year, it is time to examine and evaluate this massive investment in the Middle East region in the past five years. More importantly, the panel will discuss a principled and strategic roadmap for the future of Canada’s short-term and long-term engagement in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Ferry de Kerckhove: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Egypt
– Dennis Horak: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
– Chris Kilford: Former Canadian Defence Attaché in Turkey, member of the national board of the Canadian International Council (CIC)
– David Dewitt: University Professor Emeritus, York University
While the United States continues to pull back from certain regional conflicts, reflected by the Biden administration’s decision to halt American backing for Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen and the expected withdrawal from Afghanistan, US troops continue to be stationed across the region. Meanwhile, Russia and China have significantly maintained and even expanded their regional activities. On one hand, the Kremlin has maintained its military presence in Syria, and on the other hand, China has signed an unprecedented 25-year strategic agreement with Iran.
As the global power structure continues to shift, it is essential to analyze the future of the US regional presence under the Biden administration, explore the emerging global rivalry with Russia and China, and at last, investigate the implications of such competition for peace and security in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Dmitri Trenin: Director of Carnegie Moscow Center
– Joost R. Hiltermann: Director of MENA Programme, International Crisis Group
– Roxane Farmanfarmaian: Affiliated Lecturer in International Relations of the Middle East and North Africa, University of Cambridge
– Andrew A. Michta: Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at Marshall Center
– Kelley Vlahos: Senior Advisor, Quincy Institute
The security architecture of the Middle East has undergone rapid transformations in an exceptionally short period. Notable developments include the United States gradual withdrawal from the region, rapprochement between Israel and some GCC states through the Abraham Accords and the rise of Chinese and Russian regional engagement.
With these new trends in the Middle East, it is timely to investigate the security implications of the Biden administration’s Middle East policy. In this respect, we will discuss the Biden team’s new approach vis-à-vis Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The panel will also discuss the role of other major powers, including China and Russia in shaping this new security environment in the region, and how the Biden administration will respond to these powers’ increasing regional presence.
Panelists:
– Sanam Vakil: Deputy Director of MENA Programme at Chatham House
– Denise Natali: Acting Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies & Director of the Center for Strategic Research, National Defense University
– Hassan Ahmadian: Professor of the Middle East and North Africa Studies, University of Tehran
– Abdulaziz Sagar: Chairman, Gulf Research Center
– Andrew Parasiliti: President, Al-Monitor
