For years, Hungary was widely regarded as the flagship of Europe’s sovereigntist movement. Whether one admired or opposed Viktor Orbán’s governments, few disputed that they represented a coherent political project built upon national sovereignty, constitutional self-government, cultural continuity, and resistance to external interference by Brussels.
Today, many observers abroad assume that little has changed. Hungary’s new Prime Minister, Péter Magyar, continues to speak the language of patriotism. To many outside Hungary, this appears to be little more than a change of leadership within the same political tradition. That conclusion is profoundly mistaken.
The Hungarian case illustrates a broader European phenomenon. Across the continent, parties have discovered that sovereigntism has become electorally attractive. Rather than confronting its arguments directly, many have adopted its vocabulary while pursuing an entirely different political project once in government. They speak the language of sovereignty while dismantling the constitutional and political structures that make independence and national self-determination actually possible. They praise national and cultural identity while allowing progressive forces to reshape the country’s cultural and educational institutions, and gradually weaken law and order.
Political labels have, therefore, become increasingly unreliable. The central question is no longer what the parties call themselves, but how they govern.
Sovereigntism is ultimately defined not by rhetoric, but by a small number of governing principles: constitutional continuity, democratic self-government, national sovereignty, respect for the nation as the primary political community, and the conviction that political authority derives from citizens rather than supranational bureaucracies.
Measured against these standards, Hungary’s new government is neither sovereigntist nor conservative. Rather, it is acutely neoliberal and globalist. Its record during its first months in office already demonstrates why.
The clearest test of any government’s political character is not its election campaign but the way it exercises power once elected. Indeed, respect for constitutional continuity has always been a defining conservative instinct.
Edmund Burke famously argued that stable constitutional orders embody the accumulated wisdom of generations and should be reformed with prudence rather than treated as instruments of immediate political convenience. Judged by this standard, the conduct of Hungary’s new government represents a sharp departure from the country’s previous constitutional practice.
Within weeks of taking office, the government initiated a series of constitutional and legislative changes aimed not merely at implementing its political program, but at reshaping the institutional foundations of the Hungarian state.
Its first major step was to launch a constitutional change that prevented the Hungarian people from re-electing Viktor Orbán as Prime Minister, regardless of whether a future electoral majority wished to return him to office.
The government then turned its attention to the Presidency. Although the Hungarian President performs a largely symbolic constitutional role, the office is intentionally designed to stand above day-to-day party politics. Yet the new government has sought to remove the incumbent without any compelling constitutional justification. If the mandate of the Head of State can be terminated simply because the government finds the office politically inconvenient, no constitutional institution can be regarded as secure.
The same pattern has continued elsewhere. The government has introduced legislation imposing a twelve-year term limit on Members of Parliament, a measure that would prevent many current opposition representatives from seeking re-election. The principle is extraordinary. In few established democracies would legislators be prohibited from standing for office solely because voters had elected them for too many consecutive terms. Such decisions belong to the electorate, not to the governing majority.
The campaign has not stopped with constitutional officeholders. Conservative civil society organisations and independent foundations have increasingly come under political pressure. Government representatives have publicly portrayed them as illegitimate political actors, proposed measures that would severely restrict their activities, and signalled their intention to bring significant parts of civil society under direct state control.
Taken together, these measures reveal a governing philosophy that treats constitutional institutions not as enduring constraints on political power, but as obstacles to be removed whenever they impede the government’s agenda. That approach reflects a profoundly different constitutional instinct from the conservative tradition, which has long regarded institutional continuity as one of the principal safeguards of political liberty.
Sovereigntism begins with a simple constitutional proposition: the nation-state remains the primary democratic community. Governments derive their legitimacy from the citizens who elect them, not from supranational institutions. International cooperation is both necessary and desirable, but it cannot replace democratic self-government.
This principle shaped Hungary’s constitutional thinking for much of the past decade and a half. The debate was never about rejecting European cooperation. It was about preserving the right of democratically elected national governments to make decisions on matters that directly affect their own citizens – migration, family policy, taxation, constitutional order, and national security.
The new government increasingly approaches these questions from a fundamentally different perspective.
Its membership in the European People’s Party (EPP) reflects a broader political choice. Today’s EPP no longer primarily defines itself as an alliance of Christian democratic and conservative parties. It has become the central pillar of the Brussels governing establishment, forming stable parliamentary majorities with the Socialists, Liberals and Greens while consistently advocating further transfers of power from the member states to European institutions.
On major constitutional questions – from expanding qualified majority voting to strengthening the Commission’s role in economic governance and foreign policy – the direction of travel has been unmistakably towards deeper political integration.
Sovereigntists may support a strong Europe, but they do not support a European superstate. They regard the European Union as a partnership of sovereign nations rather than an emerging federal polity. Political legitimacy should continue to flow upward from democratic nations, not downward from increasingly autonomous European institutions.
When Hungary’s Prime Minister appears alongside figures such as Ursula von der Leyen, Manfred Weber or Donald Tusk, the issue is not personal chemistry but political alignment. These leaders have consistently supported a vision of “never ending” European integration that regards further centralization as the answer to many of the Union’s current challenges. Hungary’s previous governments argued the opposite: that Europe’s difficulties stem not from insufficient integration, but from the steady weakening of democratic nation-states.
The contrast, therefore, is not merely rhetorical. It reflects two fundamentally different visions of Europe’s constitutional future.
This difference has already become visible in practice. The new government has signalled its willingness to implement policies that previous Hungarian governments consistently resisted because they believed they were bad policies imposed by Brussels.
It has expressed openness to implementing the EU Migration Pact after years in which Hungary argued that decisions concerning border protection, asylum, and migration policy should remain primarily the responsibility of the member states. Hungary opposed the Pact because it viewed it not as a solution, but as part of the problem.
Under the Migration Pact — imposed by the Commission on Member States — Hungary was required to either accept migrants from other EU countries or pay financial penalties instead. Concurrently, Budapest was tasked with reopening large-scale refugee camps to house asylum seekers arriving at the Hungarian border — facilities that had previously been shut down by Viktor Orbán. From a sovereignist perspective, legally dismantling a nation’s ability to defend its borders and resist external mandates crosses an unacceptable line.
Furthermore, the government announced its intention to repeal the Child Protection Act, which prohibited gender identity activism targeting minors through the school system and public educational materials. It has also indicated its willingness to revisit other measures that symbolized Hungary’s commitment to a family-centred social model. At the same time, Prime Minister Péter Magyar has stated that he is open to discussions on recognising same-sex marriage and allowing same-sex couples to adopt children in the future.
Whether one agrees or disagrees with these policies is not the central issue here. The point is that they represent a clear departure from the conservative social program that defined Hungary’s previous governments. They reflect a different understanding of the relationship between the state, the family, and the cultural foundations of society.
A similar shift is increasingly visible in the government’s broader political instincts. A recent incident illustrates the point. Not only have gender flags taken over one of Budapest’s most iconic bridges, but after a private citizen removed these flags and replaced them with Hungarian flags, prosecutors sought an unprecedented prison sentence and a substantial financial penalty.
Conservative political thought has traditionally recognized the importance of autonomous institutions that exist between the individual and the state: universities, churches, charities, foundations, educational organisations, and voluntary associations. These institutions strengthen society precisely because they are not instruments of the government of the day.
Hungary’s previous governments invested heavily in building such institutions. Their objective was not to create extensions of the state, but to strengthen the intellectual, educational, and cultural foundations of the nation through organizations capable of operating independently of day-to-day political change.
The new government has adopted a markedly different approach.
Rather than accepting the institutional pluralism inherited from previous administrations, it has sought to weaken or dismantle many of these organizations. Independent conservative foundations have become the target of sustained political attacks. Faith-based schools are openly threatened by the new Liberal Minister of Education.
The legitimacy of such non-governmental organizations has been openly questioned, proposals have been advanced to strip them of their assets, and measures have been introduced that would deprive these institutions that cannot be nationalized of the financial resources necessary to continue their work.
Every newly elected government has the right to pursue its own political priorities. It does not, however, follow that it should seek to eliminate every independent institution previously established simply because those institutions represent a different intellectual or political perspective.
The attempt to bring these institutions under direct political control is a betrayal of the ideals of democratic governance.
The spectre of digital censorship in Hungary deserves special attention, because it illustrates how the broader European framework impacts domestic political developments in member states.
Over the past several years, the European Union has significantly expanded its role in regulating online political communication. Legislative initiatives, such as the Digital Services Act (DSA) and the European Democracy Shield, have given European institutions unprecedented influence over the way political content is moderated and distributed on large digital platforms.
Supporters argue that these measures protect democratic debate from disinformation and foreign interference. Critics contend that they have also created new mechanisms through which free speech can be suppressed or its visibility substantially reduced, particularly when it challenges the prevailing political consensus within the European institutions.
The Hungarian election raised similar concerns.
Throughout the campaign, Péter Magyar and other Tisza politicians enjoyed an extraordinary level of visibility and engagement on Meta’s platforms, while pro-Fidesz content — including posts by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán — experienced a sharp and unexplained decline in reach. Shortly after the election, engagement largely returned to their previous levels. During the election campaign, the European Commission openly announced that it would launch an operation against what it called “disinformation”. Throughout the campaign, every major conservative media outlet experienced a significant decline in traffic.
The issue extends far beyond Hungary. Across Europe, democratic legitimacy hinges not just on free elections, but on whether political competition occurs on genuinely neutral platforms. When access to public debate is manipulated by opaque algorithms, private tech giants, or regulatory pressure from supranational institutions, the integrity of democratic self-government itself is compromised.
The Hungarian experience highlights a broader transformation that is now sweeping across the European continent.
For much of the past decade, the primary divide in European politics seemed relatively straightforward: sovereigntists defended the autonomy of democratic nation-states, while the political mainstream advocated for deeper integration and a larger role for supranational institutions.
However, as sovereigntism has gained electoral success across Europe, its political opponents have adapted — not by embracing its core principles, but by adopting its rhetoric. Parties that once dismissed sovereignty as outdated nationalism now talk of defending national interests. Politicians who previously criticized border controls now promise to restore order. Similarly, governments that long promoted multiculturalism and liberal politics increasingly present themselves as defenders of patriotism, Christianity, and European civilization.
In that sense, sovereigntism has already won a crucial ideological battle. Concerns regarding sovereignty, migration, democratic accountability, and cultural continuity have become too widespread to ignore. Consequently, the language of sovereigntism now carries an undeniable electoral appeal.
But engaging in similar political vocabulary doesn’t mean adherence to a shared political philosophy.
The defining question is not whether parties speak the language of conservatism, accountability, or patriotism during election campaigns. It is whether they continue to defend constitutional self-government, national sovereignty, and democratic accountability once confronted with pressure from Brussels, international organizations, financial markets, or powerful domestic interests.
That is where long-forged political identities become visible.
Hungary’s new government demonstrates how a political movement can preserve the rhetoric of sovereigntism, while undermining the constitutional foundations on which national sovereignty functions. It may continue to speak about patriotism while ceding national authority to supranational institutions. It may invoke traditional values while dismantling the legal and institutional framework that once protected them.
In short, it may speak loudly about Hungary while its actions champion the interests of the EU over those of the Hungarian people.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not reflect the views or positions of the Institute for Peace & Diplomacy.
The Institute for Peace & Diplomacy is an independent, non-partisan foreign policy think tank that serves as an open and inclusive platform for a wide range of perspectives and does not adopt institutional positions on policy matters.
The Western powers have failed to effectively manage the increasing threat of proliferation in the Middle East. While the international community is concerned with Iran’s nuclear program, Saudi Arabia has moved forward with developing its own nuclear program, and independent studies show that Israel has longed possessed dozens of nuclear warheads. The former is a member of the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while the latter has refused to sign the international agreement.
On Middle East policy, the Biden campaign had staunchly criticized the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal and it has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier since assuming office in January 2021. However, serious obstacles remain for responsible actors in expanding non-proliferation efforts toward a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.
This panel will discuss how Western powers and multilateral institutions, such as the IAEA, can play a more effective role in managing non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Peggy Mason: Canada’s former Ambassador to the UN for Disarmament
– Mark Fitzpatrick: Associate Fellow & Former Executive Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
– Ali Vaez: Iran Project Director, International Crisis Group
– Negar Mortazavi: Journalist and Political Analyst, Host of Iran Podcast
– David Albright: Founder and President of the Institute for Science and International Security
Closing (5:45 PM – 6:00 PM ET)
What is the current economic landscape in the Middle East? While global foreign direct investment is expected to fall drastically in the post-COVID era, the World Bank reported a 5% contraction in the economic output of the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries in 2020 due to the pandemic. While oil prices are expected to rebound with normalization in demand, political instability, regional and geopolitical tensions, domestic corruption, and a volatile regulatory and legal environment all threaten economic recovery in the Middle East. What is the prospect for economic growth and development in the region post-pandemic, and how could MENA nations promote sustainable growth and regional trade moving forward?
At the same time, Middle Eastern diaspora communities have become financially successful and can help promote trade between North America and the region. In this respect, the diaspora can become vital intermediaries for advancing U.S. and Canada’s business interests abroad. Promoting business diplomacy can both benefit the MENA region and be an effective and positive way to advance engagement and achieve foreign policy goals of the North Atlantic.
This panel will investigate the trade and investment opportunities in the Middle East, discuss how facilitating economic engagement with the region can benefit Canadian and American national interests, and explore relevant policy prescriptions.
Panelists:
– Hon. Sergio Marchi: Canada’s Former Minister of International Trade
– Scott Jolliffe: Chairperson, Canada Arab Business Council
– Esfandyar Batmanghelidj: Founder and Publisher of Bourse & Bazaar
– Nizar Ghanem: Director of Research and Co-founder at Triangle
– Nicki Siamaki: Researcher at Control Risks
The Middle East continues to grapple with violence and instability, particularly in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Fueled by government incompetence and foreign interventions, terrorist insurgencies have imposed severe humanitarian and economic costs on the region. Meanwhile, regional actors have engaged in an unprecedented pursuit of arms accumulation. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have imported billions of both Western and Russian-made weapons and funded militant groups across the region, intending to contain their regional adversaries, particularly Iran. Tehran has also provided sophisticated weaponry to various militia groups across the region to strengthen its geopolitical position against Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Israel.
On the other hand, with international terrorist networks and intense regional rivalry in the Middle East, it is impractical to discuss peace and security without addressing terrorism and the arms race in the region. This panel will primarily discuss the implications of the ongoing arms race in the region and the role of Western powers and multilateral organizations in facilitating trust-building security arrangements among regional stakeholders to limit the proliferation of arms across the Middle East.
Panelists:
Luciano Zaccara: Assistant Professor, Qatar University
Dania Thafer: Executive Director, Gulf International Forum
Kayhan Barzegar: Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Science and Research Branch of Azad University
Barbara Slavin: Director of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council
Sanam Shantyaei: Senior Journalist at France24 & host of Middle East Matters
The emerging regional order in West Asia will have wide-ranging implications for global security. The Biden administration has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier, an initiative staunchly opposed by Israel, while also taking a harder line on Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen. Meanwhile, key regional actors, including Qatar, Iraq, and Oman, have engaged in backchannel efforts to bring Iran and Saudi Arabia to the negotiating table. From a broader geopolitical perspective, with the need to secure its energy imports, China is also expected to increase its footprint in the region and influence the mentioned challenges.
In this evolving landscape, Western powers will be compelled to redefine their strategic priorities and adjust their policies with the new realities in the region. In this panel, we will discuss how the West, including the United States and its allies, can utilize multilateral diplomacy with its adversaries to prevent military escalation in the region. Most importantly, the panel will discuss if a multilateral security dialogue in the Persian Gulf region, proposed by some regional actors, can help reduce tensions among regional foes and produce sustainable peace and development for the region.
Panelists:
– Abdullah Baabood: Academic Researcher and Former Director of the Centre for Gulf Studies, Qatar University
– Trita Parsi: Executive Vice-President, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
– Ebtesam Al-Ketbi: President, Emirates Policy Centre
– Jon Allen: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Israel
– Elizabeth Hagedorn: Washington correspondent for Al-Monitor
Military interventions, political and economic instabilities, and civil unrest in the Middle East have led to a global refugee crisis with an increasing wave of refugees and asylum seekers to Europe and Canada. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has, in myriad ways, exacerbated and contributed to the ongoing security threats and destabilization of the region.
While these challenges pose serious risks to Canadian security, Ottawa will also have the opportunity to limit such risks and prevent a spillover effect vis-à-vis effective humanitarian initiatives in the region. In this panel, we will primarily investigate Canada’s Middle East Strategy’s degree of success in providing humanitarian aid to the region. Secondly, the panel will discuss what programs and initiatives Canada can introduce to further build on the renewed strategy. and more specifically, how Canada can utilize its policy instruments to more effectively deal with the increasing influx of refugees from the Middle East.
Panelists:
Erica Di Ruggiero: Director of Centre for Global Health, University of Toronto
Reyhana Patel: Head of Communications & Government Relations, Islamic Relief Canada
Amir Barmaki: Former Head of UN OCHA in Iran
Catherine Gribbin: Senior Legal Advisor for International and Humanitarian Law, Canadian Red Cross
In 2016, Canada launched an ambitious five-year “Middle East Engagement Strategy” (2016-2021), committing to investing CA$3.5 billion over five years to help establish the necessary conditions for security and stability, alleviate human suffering and enable stabilization programs in the region. In the latest development, during the meeting of the Global Coalition against ISIS, Minister of Foreign Affairs Marc Garneau announced more than $43.6 million in Peace and Stabilization Operations Program funding for 11 projects in Syria and Iraq.
With Canada’s Middle East Engagement Strategy expiring this year, it is time to examine and evaluate this massive investment in the Middle East region in the past five years. More importantly, the panel will discuss a principled and strategic roadmap for the future of Canada’s short-term and long-term engagement in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Ferry de Kerckhove: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Egypt
– Dennis Horak: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
– Chris Kilford: Former Canadian Defence Attaché in Turkey, member of the national board of the Canadian International Council (CIC)
– David Dewitt: University Professor Emeritus, York University
While the United States continues to pull back from certain regional conflicts, reflected by the Biden administration’s decision to halt American backing for Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen and the expected withdrawal from Afghanistan, US troops continue to be stationed across the region. Meanwhile, Russia and China have significantly maintained and even expanded their regional activities. On one hand, the Kremlin has maintained its military presence in Syria, and on the other hand, China has signed an unprecedented 25-year strategic agreement with Iran.
As the global power structure continues to shift, it is essential to analyze the future of the US regional presence under the Biden administration, explore the emerging global rivalry with Russia and China, and at last, investigate the implications of such competition for peace and security in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Dmitri Trenin: Director of Carnegie Moscow Center
– Joost R. Hiltermann: Director of MENA Programme, International Crisis Group
– Roxane Farmanfarmaian: Affiliated Lecturer in International Relations of the Middle East and North Africa, University of Cambridge
– Andrew A. Michta: Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at Marshall Center
– Kelley Vlahos: Senior Advisor, Quincy Institute
The security architecture of the Middle East has undergone rapid transformations in an exceptionally short period. Notable developments include the United States gradual withdrawal from the region, rapprochement between Israel and some GCC states through the Abraham Accords and the rise of Chinese and Russian regional engagement.
With these new trends in the Middle East, it is timely to investigate the security implications of the Biden administration’s Middle East policy. In this respect, we will discuss the Biden team’s new approach vis-à-vis Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The panel will also discuss the role of other major powers, including China and Russia in shaping this new security environment in the region, and how the Biden administration will respond to these powers’ increasing regional presence.
Panelists:
– Sanam Vakil: Deputy Director of MENA Programme at Chatham House
– Denise Natali: Acting Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies & Director of the Center for Strategic Research, National Defense University
– Hassan Ahmadian: Professor of the Middle East and North Africa Studies, University of Tehran
– Abdulaziz Sagar: Chairman, Gulf Research Center
– Andrew Parasiliti: President, Al-Monitor
