The signing of a U.S.-Iran memorandum of understanding (MOU) marks the most significant diplomatic breakthrough between Washington and Tehran in years. After months of war, a fragile ceasefire, and repeated rounds of failed or postponed negotiations, both sides have finally agreed to a framework intended to prevent renewed conflict. President Donald Trump hailed the agreement as proof that “peace through strength” had worked, while Vice President J.D. Vance described it as an opportunity to make progress on both the nuclear issue and regional stability. Iranian officials likewise presented the agreement as a diplomatic success, emphasizing sanctions relief, the release of frozen assets, and recognition of Iran’s security concerns. Meanwhile, negotiators from both sides gathered in Switzerland to address the technical and political issues left unresolved by the agreement itself.
Signed during the G7 summit after months of negotiations, the fourteen-point document is less a comprehensive peace settlement than a political framework intended to prevent renewed conflict. However, the agreement’s greatest significance may not lie in what it resolves, but in what it leaves unresolved. The central challenge is whether the agreement can survive implementation. The same factors that repeatedly derailed negotiations, such as deep mutual distrust, competing interpretations of obligations, domestic political pressures, disputes over sanctions relief, unresolved nuclear questions, continuing instability in Lebanon, and disagreement over the future of the Strait of Hormuz, remain firmly in place. The MOU may reduce the immediate risk of war, but it does not eliminate the underlying strategic rivalry that produced the conflict in the first place.
The lengthy negotiations underscored Washington’s aim to create a framework that would constrain Iran’s nuclear activities, reopen maritime commerce, reduce regional tensions, and provide a pathway toward a broader security arrangement. Iranian negotiators, on the other hand, sought economic relief, access to frozen assets, and recognition of Iran’s sovereignty over the Strait and its status as a major regional power. Unsurprisingly, the parties often appeared to be negotiating toward different end states. While Iran sought tangible economic benefits early in the process to demonstrate that diplomacy produced results, the United States insisted that sanctions relief should follow verifiable Iranian actions. Both sides feared being exploited by the other. Neither wanted to take that first politically risky step toward a compromise.
Added to that, the Trump administration relied heavily on a small group of political deal-makers rather than a large professional diplomatic apparatus. While this approach may have accelerated decision-making and generated momentum, it also left many technical issues unresolved until late in the process. Regional dynamics added another layer of difficulty. Throughout the negotiations, Israeli military operations against Hezbollah-linked targets in Lebanon remained a persistent source of tension. Tehran repeatedly argued that it could not be expected to make concessions while one of its principal regional partners remained under attack. Washington, by contrast, viewed the Lebanon issue as separate from the U.S.-Iran track. This disagreement contributed to multiple delays and helped explain why negotiations repeatedly appeared close to success before stalling.
Signing an agreement and sustaining it are fundamentally different challenges. The MOU rests upon a fragile foundation of strategic mistrust, with both sides deeply skeptical of the other’s intentions. Neither Washington nor Tehran fully trusts the other to implement the agreement as written. This trust deficit becomes especially dangerous when agreements contain ambiguity. Many of the issues were deferred to future technical talks, implementation committees, and follow-on negotiations. Such ambiguity may have been necessary to secure a breakthrough, but it also creates opportunities for future disputes regarding interpretation and compliance.
The first round of talks in Switzerland illustrated precisely this problem. Although the MOU has been signed, both sides remain engaged in intensive discussions over implementation. Questions involving sanctions relief, frozen assets, Lebanon, maritime access, and the nuclear program remain under negotiation. In effect, the parties have moved from negotiating an agreement to negotiating what the agreement actually entails.
The regional environment presents another danger. The agreement was negotiated between Washington and Tehran. However, many of the conflicts that helped produce the crisis involve actors who are not parties to the MOU. Israel and Hezbollah remain engaged in periodic confrontations. Lebanon continues to generate tensions capable of disrupting broader diplomatic efforts. Neither Israel nor Hezbollah signed the agreement, yet both can influence its future.
Recent developments demonstrate how quickly such pressures can spill over. Continued fighting in Lebanon has already complicated implementation discussions and prompted Iranian officials to question whether all parties are honoring their commitments. What appears to Washington as a localized security issue may be viewed in Tehran as evidence that the broader conflict remains unresolved.
Indeed, one of the most serious risks facing the agreement is the possibility that third-party actions could trigger escalation despite neither Washington nor Tehran seeking confrontation. An isolated strike, border incident, or regional crisis could quickly force both governments into politically difficult responses that place the broader diplomatic framework under strain. The Strait of Hormuz represents another potential flashpoint. Throughout the crisis, the waterway has served as both an economic lifeline and a strategic bargaining chip.
Domestic politics may ultimately prove even more important. For the Trump administration, the agreement offers a major foreign policy achievement ahead of the 2026 midterm elections. It also supports broader efforts to project stability while the United States hosts the FIFA World Cup and seeks to avoid additional disruptions to global energy markets. For Iranian leaders, economic relief and reduced military pressure provide important domestic benefits.
Both sides, therefore, face strong incentives to preserve the agreement in the short term. Nonetheless, domestic politics can be a double-edged sword. The same leaders who benefit from presenting the agreement as a success today may later face pressure from political opponents, security institutions, or skeptical constituencies if implementation becomes controversial or expected benefits fail to materialize.
The agreement could still prove more durable than many observers expect if several conditions are met. First, both sides must resist the temptation to treat implementation disputes as evidence of bad faith. Disagreements are inevitable. What matters is whether mechanisms exist to manage them without triggering escalation.
Second, regional actors such as Qatar, Oman, and Pakistan must remain actively engaged. They had a critical role in helping the parties reach an agreement, and they may prove even more important in preventing implementation disputes from escalating into larger crises.
Third, both sides will need to demonstrate flexibility regarding sequencing. The agreement will survive only if Washington and Tehran can create a mutually acceptable balance between sanctions relief and verification.
Fourth, developments in Lebanon must be prevented from derailing the broader diplomatic process. The agreement cannot become hostage to every regional crisis.
Fifth, Gulf states will require reassurance that the agreement does not come at the expense of their security. Enhanced air-defense cooperation, intelligence sharing, and credible commitments to address missile and drone threats may prove essential for maintaining regional confidence in the diplomatic process.
Finally, both governments must recognize that this MOU is not a peace treaty. It is a framework for managing competition. Expectations should therefore remain realistic. The goal is not immediate reconciliation, but the creation of rules capable of preventing rivalry from turning into war.
To this end, it is essential that both governments establish a formal dispute-resolution mechanism capable of addressing inevitable disagreements over implementation. Without such a framework, each side risks interpreting compliance through its own political lens, increasing the likelihood of future crises.
Certainly, the U.S.-Iran MOU represents a significant diplomatic achievement. It reduces the immediate risk of renewed conflict, creates channels for dialogue, and offers a roadmap for addressing some of the issues that fuelled the war. Yet agreements do not create trust. They merely provide a structure within which trust might gradually emerge.
As such, the MoU may represent the beginning of a more stable regional order. It may also prove to be merely another pause in a long-running strategic conflict. The answer will depend less on the wording of the document than on the political will of its signatories to uphold it once implementation begins.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not reflect the views or positions of the Institute for Peace & Diplomacy.
The Institute for Peace & Diplomacy is an independent, non-partisan foreign policy think tank that serves as an open and inclusive platform for a wide range of perspectives and does not adopt institutional positions on policy matters.
The Western powers have failed to effectively manage the increasing threat of proliferation in the Middle East. While the international community is concerned with Iran’s nuclear program, Saudi Arabia has moved forward with developing its own nuclear program, and independent studies show that Israel has longed possessed dozens of nuclear warheads. The former is a member of the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while the latter has refused to sign the international agreement.
On Middle East policy, the Biden campaign had staunchly criticized the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal and it has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier since assuming office in January 2021. However, serious obstacles remain for responsible actors in expanding non-proliferation efforts toward a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.
This panel will discuss how Western powers and multilateral institutions, such as the IAEA, can play a more effective role in managing non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Peggy Mason: Canada’s former Ambassador to the UN for Disarmament
– Mark Fitzpatrick: Associate Fellow & Former Executive Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
– Ali Vaez: Iran Project Director, International Crisis Group
– Negar Mortazavi: Journalist and Political Analyst, Host of Iran Podcast
– David Albright: Founder and President of the Institute for Science and International Security
Closing (5:45 PM – 6:00 PM ET)
What is the current economic landscape in the Middle East? While global foreign direct investment is expected to fall drastically in the post-COVID era, the World Bank reported a 5% contraction in the economic output of the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries in 2020 due to the pandemic. While oil prices are expected to rebound with normalization in demand, political instability, regional and geopolitical tensions, domestic corruption, and a volatile regulatory and legal environment all threaten economic recovery in the Middle East. What is the prospect for economic growth and development in the region post-pandemic, and how could MENA nations promote sustainable growth and regional trade moving forward?
At the same time, Middle Eastern diaspora communities have become financially successful and can help promote trade between North America and the region. In this respect, the diaspora can become vital intermediaries for advancing U.S. and Canada’s business interests abroad. Promoting business diplomacy can both benefit the MENA region and be an effective and positive way to advance engagement and achieve foreign policy goals of the North Atlantic.
This panel will investigate the trade and investment opportunities in the Middle East, discuss how facilitating economic engagement with the region can benefit Canadian and American national interests, and explore relevant policy prescriptions.
Panelists:
– Hon. Sergio Marchi: Canada’s Former Minister of International Trade
– Scott Jolliffe: Chairperson, Canada Arab Business Council
– Esfandyar Batmanghelidj: Founder and Publisher of Bourse & Bazaar
– Nizar Ghanem: Director of Research and Co-founder at Triangle
– Nicki Siamaki: Researcher at Control Risks
The Middle East continues to grapple with violence and instability, particularly in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Fueled by government incompetence and foreign interventions, terrorist insurgencies have imposed severe humanitarian and economic costs on the region. Meanwhile, regional actors have engaged in an unprecedented pursuit of arms accumulation. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have imported billions of both Western and Russian-made weapons and funded militant groups across the region, intending to contain their regional adversaries, particularly Iran. Tehran has also provided sophisticated weaponry to various militia groups across the region to strengthen its geopolitical position against Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Israel.
On the other hand, with international terrorist networks and intense regional rivalry in the Middle East, it is impractical to discuss peace and security without addressing terrorism and the arms race in the region. This panel will primarily discuss the implications of the ongoing arms race in the region and the role of Western powers and multilateral organizations in facilitating trust-building security arrangements among regional stakeholders to limit the proliferation of arms across the Middle East.
Panelists:
Luciano Zaccara: Assistant Professor, Qatar University
Dania Thafer: Executive Director, Gulf International Forum
Kayhan Barzegar: Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Science and Research Branch of Azad University
Barbara Slavin: Director of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council
Sanam Shantyaei: Senior Journalist at France24 & host of Middle East Matters
The emerging regional order in West Asia will have wide-ranging implications for global security. The Biden administration has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier, an initiative staunchly opposed by Israel, while also taking a harder line on Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen. Meanwhile, key regional actors, including Qatar, Iraq, and Oman, have engaged in backchannel efforts to bring Iran and Saudi Arabia to the negotiating table. From a broader geopolitical perspective, with the need to secure its energy imports, China is also expected to increase its footprint in the region and influence the mentioned challenges.
In this evolving landscape, Western powers will be compelled to redefine their strategic priorities and adjust their policies with the new realities in the region. In this panel, we will discuss how the West, including the United States and its allies, can utilize multilateral diplomacy with its adversaries to prevent military escalation in the region. Most importantly, the panel will discuss if a multilateral security dialogue in the Persian Gulf region, proposed by some regional actors, can help reduce tensions among regional foes and produce sustainable peace and development for the region.
Panelists:
– Abdullah Baabood: Academic Researcher and Former Director of the Centre for Gulf Studies, Qatar University
– Trita Parsi: Executive Vice-President, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
– Ebtesam Al-Ketbi: President, Emirates Policy Centre
– Jon Allen: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Israel
– Elizabeth Hagedorn: Washington correspondent for Al-Monitor
Military interventions, political and economic instabilities, and civil unrest in the Middle East have led to a global refugee crisis with an increasing wave of refugees and asylum seekers to Europe and Canada. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has, in myriad ways, exacerbated and contributed to the ongoing security threats and destabilization of the region.
While these challenges pose serious risks to Canadian security, Ottawa will also have the opportunity to limit such risks and prevent a spillover effect vis-à-vis effective humanitarian initiatives in the region. In this panel, we will primarily investigate Canada’s Middle East Strategy’s degree of success in providing humanitarian aid to the region. Secondly, the panel will discuss what programs and initiatives Canada can introduce to further build on the renewed strategy. and more specifically, how Canada can utilize its policy instruments to more effectively deal with the increasing influx of refugees from the Middle East.
Panelists:
Erica Di Ruggiero: Director of Centre for Global Health, University of Toronto
Reyhana Patel: Head of Communications & Government Relations, Islamic Relief Canada
Amir Barmaki: Former Head of UN OCHA in Iran
Catherine Gribbin: Senior Legal Advisor for International and Humanitarian Law, Canadian Red Cross
In 2016, Canada launched an ambitious five-year “Middle East Engagement Strategy” (2016-2021), committing to investing CA$3.5 billion over five years to help establish the necessary conditions for security and stability, alleviate human suffering and enable stabilization programs in the region. In the latest development, during the meeting of the Global Coalition against ISIS, Minister of Foreign Affairs Marc Garneau announced more than $43.6 million in Peace and Stabilization Operations Program funding for 11 projects in Syria and Iraq.
With Canada’s Middle East Engagement Strategy expiring this year, it is time to examine and evaluate this massive investment in the Middle East region in the past five years. More importantly, the panel will discuss a principled and strategic roadmap for the future of Canada’s short-term and long-term engagement in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Ferry de Kerckhove: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Egypt
– Dennis Horak: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
– Chris Kilford: Former Canadian Defence Attaché in Turkey, member of the national board of the Canadian International Council (CIC)
– David Dewitt: University Professor Emeritus, York University
While the United States continues to pull back from certain regional conflicts, reflected by the Biden administration’s decision to halt American backing for Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen and the expected withdrawal from Afghanistan, US troops continue to be stationed across the region. Meanwhile, Russia and China have significantly maintained and even expanded their regional activities. On one hand, the Kremlin has maintained its military presence in Syria, and on the other hand, China has signed an unprecedented 25-year strategic agreement with Iran.
As the global power structure continues to shift, it is essential to analyze the future of the US regional presence under the Biden administration, explore the emerging global rivalry with Russia and China, and at last, investigate the implications of such competition for peace and security in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Dmitri Trenin: Director of Carnegie Moscow Center
– Joost R. Hiltermann: Director of MENA Programme, International Crisis Group
– Roxane Farmanfarmaian: Affiliated Lecturer in International Relations of the Middle East and North Africa, University of Cambridge
– Andrew A. Michta: Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at Marshall Center
– Kelley Vlahos: Senior Advisor, Quincy Institute
The security architecture of the Middle East has undergone rapid transformations in an exceptionally short period. Notable developments include the United States gradual withdrawal from the region, rapprochement between Israel and some GCC states through the Abraham Accords and the rise of Chinese and Russian regional engagement.
With these new trends in the Middle East, it is timely to investigate the security implications of the Biden administration’s Middle East policy. In this respect, we will discuss the Biden team’s new approach vis-à-vis Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The panel will also discuss the role of other major powers, including China and Russia in shaping this new security environment in the region, and how the Biden administration will respond to these powers’ increasing regional presence.
Panelists:
– Sanam Vakil: Deputy Director of MENA Programme at Chatham House
– Denise Natali: Acting Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies & Director of the Center for Strategic Research, National Defense University
– Hassan Ahmadian: Professor of the Middle East and North Africa Studies, University of Tehran
– Abdulaziz Sagar: Chairman, Gulf Research Center
– Andrew Parasiliti: President, Al-Monitor
