Canada has long been considered a relatively secure country: it does not face an immediate invasion threat, shares a stable border with the United States, and relishes the advantages of being geographically remote from the world’s major conflict zones. However, this overall picture is changing. Canada now encounters growing security pressure across the Arctic, the Euro-Atlantic, and the Indo-Pacific.
The Arctic is no longer a distant rear area. Melting sea ice, Russia’s military activities, China’s interest in the Northern Sea Route and its resources, and the increasing military importance of polar surveillance have all made Canada’s northern approaches strategically sensitive. Meanwhile, the war in Ukraine has intensified NATO-driven pressure on Canada to raise defence spending, replenish defence stockpiles and modernize its military as reflected in Inflection Point 2025, the Canadian Army Modernization Framework. Canada’s Indo-Pacific strategy, too, reflects Ottawa’s growing recognition that the security of the Pacific directly affects its national interest. In other words, Canada is fast turning into a security actor that must engage the Arctic, the Atlantic, and the Pacific.
These developments are creating opportunities for long-term defence cooperation with key allies. Japan and South Korea stand out as especially promising partners. Both countries are advanced industrial democracies, US treaty allies, and major security actors in the Indo-Pacific with naturally complementary roles. Japan offers advanced maritime sensors, missiles, aerospace, and undersea technology. Tokyo’s recent decision to lift its ban on lethal weapons has made this equation more important, since it can now become a proactive defence industrial partner. On the other hand, South Korea increasingly provides export platforms with scale, tempo, affordable prices, and proven capabilities.
The strongest prospects for South Korea-Canada cooperation lie in four urgent Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) capacity gaps. The first is artillery, where Canada faces both a capability and capacity issue. This gap reflects a broader structural problem within the CAF. The Canadian Armed Forces are relatively small in size and are generally designed to contribute to NATO and allied operations rather than to sustain high-intensity combat independently. As a result, Canada’s artillery, air defense, ammunition stockpiles, and heavy combat enablers remain limited in comparison with the requirements of a protracted major-power conflict. Ukraine has demonstrated the importance of mobile artillery, rocket systems, munitions, and their survivability. In that context, South Korea’s K9 self-propelled artillery and K10 ammunition resupply vehicle (ARV) can be highly relevant. The K9 has already proven its credibility in Europe, including in cold-weather operational environments, which could help Canada reduce its reliance on older towed artillery systems and move toward more mobile and survivable self-propelled platforms.
The second area is long-range firepower. If Canada wishes to reinforce its contribution to NATO and strengthen deterrence in northern and Pacific scenarios, South Korea’s K239 Chunmoo self-propelled multiple rocket system (MLRS) can be suggested as a complementary system. Here, political narrative matters. The South Korean MLRS system should not be portrayed as a replacement for US equipment, but instead proposed as an additional alliance capability that reduces the burden on excessively strained Western production lines.
The third area is short-range air defence and counter-drone protection. Like many NATO countries, Canada needs to restructure its tactical air defence against drones, helicopters, cruise missiles, and other low-altitude threats. South Korean systems could help fill Canada’s tactical low-tier air-defence gap, which is distinct from the broader NORAD modernization agenda.
The fourth and likely the most substantial cooperation area is submarines. Canada requires a long-range, under-ice-capable conventional submarine that could be operated across the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Arctic. South Korea’s KSS-III submarines are an attractive option thanks to the combination of in-service design, critical shipbuilding capacity, and a potentially shorter delivery time. The South Korean proposal becomes even more convincing if it includes not only the submarine platform itself, but also maintenance within Canada, industrial participation, and full life-cycle upgrades.
Japan’s new export policy enables it to cooperate more seriously with Canada in the fields of maritime systems, sensors, anti-air and missile defence, undersea surveillance, ship automation, and high-tech components. Japan’s recent sale of 11 upgraded Mogami-class frigates to Australia illustrates this new possibility.
For Canada, Japan’s exports could be particularly relevant in the naval and surveillance domains. Indeed, Japanese technologies related to anti-submarine warfare, ship automation, sonar, unmanned maritime systems, and missile integration could add noticeable value to Canadian naval modernization in the coming years. To be sure, Canada’s surface-combatant program has already moved in a different direction, with Ottawa committed to the River-class destroyers (RCD) based on BAE’s Type 26 design. For this reason, Canada is unlikely to offer Japan’s most immediate opportunity for frigate sales. Overall, any Japanese or South Korean missile system should demonstrate both its interceptor capabilities and its integration with the alliance command network. For Canada, interoperability might be prioritized over individual system specifications. Ottawa does not need to duplicate Tokyo and Seoul or treat them as competitors. The optimal approach for Canada would be to leverage Japanese high-end technologies and South Korean strengths in platforms, production, and maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO), while complementing existing US and NATO systems.
A practical framework could have three layers.
First, Canada and South Korea should build a capability partnership centred on short-term capacity gaps. This should prioritize artillery, counter unmanned aerial systems (C-UAS), submarines, and MRO. Since Canada greatly values domestic industrial benefits, South Korean firms should offer local assembly, maintenance hubs, Canadian suppliers, university partnerships, and Arctic testing.
Second, Japan and Canada should deepen technological cooperation. The Canada-Japan Equipment and Technology Transfer Agreement creates a useful legal foundation under which Tokyo could promote fields where it holds clear advantages, such as maritime systems, sensors, space-based surveillance, air-defence components, and undersea technologies.
Third, the three countries should consider launching a modest Canada-Japan-South Korea defence industrial dialogue to identify specific capability gaps, link Japanese and South Korean technologies to Canada’s procurement priorities, and develop pilot projects in areas such as Arctic surveillance, undersea monitoring, unmanned systems, air defense, and maintenance support. One suggestion would be establishing an “Arctic Defence Technology Lab” in Canada where Japan’s sensors, South Korean platforms, and Canadian Arctic expertise could be tested together. This would bring industrial benefits to Canada, while giving Japan and South Korea access to NATO-related markets and Arctic test data.
Such an approach would be more defensible for the Canadian government compared with simple defence procurement from abroad. A model based on co-production and joint research could be presented as rebuilding Canada’s defence capacity. For Japan, it would provide a responsible pathway toward arms exports without appearing to abandon its postwar cautiousness. As for South Korea, it could open up North American and NATO markets.
Needless to say, risks exist. Japan and South Korea might directly compete when it comes to missiles, naval systems, and electronics. Canada might hesitate to rely on Northeast Asian suppliers for Arctic and NATO missions. Undoubtedly, the United States will continue to be central to Canadian defence. Any proposal that appears to replace American systems would encounter resistance. Therefore, the key message should be complementarity, instead of substitution.
Ottawa’s problem hinges not on the fact that it lacks allies. To better manage increasing security responsibilities in the face of its limited defence industrial capabilities, Ottawa should cultivate these relationships. This could take the form of a new Defence-Industrial Triangle with Japan and South Korea. Taken together, and in coordination with the United States and NATO, a Canada-Japan-South Korea partnership could foster a resilient, interoperable, and politically sustainable defence posture for the Arctic, Pacific, and Euro-Atlantic theaters.
The Western powers have failed to effectively manage the increasing threat of proliferation in the Middle East. While the international community is concerned with Iran’s nuclear program, Saudi Arabia has moved forward with developing its own nuclear program, and independent studies show that Israel has longed possessed dozens of nuclear warheads. The former is a member of the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while the latter has refused to sign the international agreement.
On Middle East policy, the Biden campaign had staunchly criticized the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal and it has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier since assuming office in January 2021. However, serious obstacles remain for responsible actors in expanding non-proliferation efforts toward a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.
This panel will discuss how Western powers and multilateral institutions, such as the IAEA, can play a more effective role in managing non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Peggy Mason: Canada’s former Ambassador to the UN for Disarmament
– Mark Fitzpatrick: Associate Fellow & Former Executive Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
– Ali Vaez: Iran Project Director, International Crisis Group
– Negar Mortazavi: Journalist and Political Analyst, Host of Iran Podcast
– David Albright: Founder and President of the Institute for Science and International Security
Closing (5:45 PM – 6:00 PM ET)
What is the current economic landscape in the Middle East? While global foreign direct investment is expected to fall drastically in the post-COVID era, the World Bank reported a 5% contraction in the economic output of the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries in 2020 due to the pandemic. While oil prices are expected to rebound with normalization in demand, political instability, regional and geopolitical tensions, domestic corruption, and a volatile regulatory and legal environment all threaten economic recovery in the Middle East. What is the prospect for economic growth and development in the region post-pandemic, and how could MENA nations promote sustainable growth and regional trade moving forward?
At the same time, Middle Eastern diaspora communities have become financially successful and can help promote trade between North America and the region. In this respect, the diaspora can become vital intermediaries for advancing U.S. and Canada’s business interests abroad. Promoting business diplomacy can both benefit the MENA region and be an effective and positive way to advance engagement and achieve foreign policy goals of the North Atlantic.
This panel will investigate the trade and investment opportunities in the Middle East, discuss how facilitating economic engagement with the region can benefit Canadian and American national interests, and explore relevant policy prescriptions.
Panelists:
– Hon. Sergio Marchi: Canada’s Former Minister of International Trade
– Scott Jolliffe: Chairperson, Canada Arab Business Council
– Esfandyar Batmanghelidj: Founder and Publisher of Bourse & Bazaar
– Nizar Ghanem: Director of Research and Co-founder at Triangle
– Nicki Siamaki: Researcher at Control Risks
The Middle East continues to grapple with violence and instability, particularly in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Fueled by government incompetence and foreign interventions, terrorist insurgencies have imposed severe humanitarian and economic costs on the region. Meanwhile, regional actors have engaged in an unprecedented pursuit of arms accumulation. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have imported billions of both Western and Russian-made weapons and funded militant groups across the region, intending to contain their regional adversaries, particularly Iran. Tehran has also provided sophisticated weaponry to various militia groups across the region to strengthen its geopolitical position against Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Israel.
On the other hand, with international terrorist networks and intense regional rivalry in the Middle East, it is impractical to discuss peace and security without addressing terrorism and the arms race in the region. This panel will primarily discuss the implications of the ongoing arms race in the region and the role of Western powers and multilateral organizations in facilitating trust-building security arrangements among regional stakeholders to limit the proliferation of arms across the Middle East.
Panelists:
Luciano Zaccara: Assistant Professor, Qatar University
Dania Thafer: Executive Director, Gulf International Forum
Kayhan Barzegar: Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Science and Research Branch of Azad University
Barbara Slavin: Director of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council
Sanam Shantyaei: Senior Journalist at France24 & host of Middle East Matters
The emerging regional order in West Asia will have wide-ranging implications for global security. The Biden administration has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier, an initiative staunchly opposed by Israel, while also taking a harder line on Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen. Meanwhile, key regional actors, including Qatar, Iraq, and Oman, have engaged in backchannel efforts to bring Iran and Saudi Arabia to the negotiating table. From a broader geopolitical perspective, with the need to secure its energy imports, China is also expected to increase its footprint in the region and influence the mentioned challenges.
In this evolving landscape, Western powers will be compelled to redefine their strategic priorities and adjust their policies with the new realities in the region. In this panel, we will discuss how the West, including the United States and its allies, can utilize multilateral diplomacy with its adversaries to prevent military escalation in the region. Most importantly, the panel will discuss if a multilateral security dialogue in the Persian Gulf region, proposed by some regional actors, can help reduce tensions among regional foes and produce sustainable peace and development for the region.
Panelists:
– Abdullah Baabood: Academic Researcher and Former Director of the Centre for Gulf Studies, Qatar University
– Trita Parsi: Executive Vice-President, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
– Ebtesam Al-Ketbi: President, Emirates Policy Centre
– Jon Allen: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Israel
– Elizabeth Hagedorn: Washington correspondent for Al-Monitor
Military interventions, political and economic instabilities, and civil unrest in the Middle East have led to a global refugee crisis with an increasing wave of refugees and asylum seekers to Europe and Canada. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has, in myriad ways, exacerbated and contributed to the ongoing security threats and destabilization of the region.
While these challenges pose serious risks to Canadian security, Ottawa will also have the opportunity to limit such risks and prevent a spillover effect vis-à-vis effective humanitarian initiatives in the region. In this panel, we will primarily investigate Canada’s Middle East Strategy’s degree of success in providing humanitarian aid to the region. Secondly, the panel will discuss what programs and initiatives Canada can introduce to further build on the renewed strategy. and more specifically, how Canada can utilize its policy instruments to more effectively deal with the increasing influx of refugees from the Middle East.
Panelists:
Erica Di Ruggiero: Director of Centre for Global Health, University of Toronto
Reyhana Patel: Head of Communications & Government Relations, Islamic Relief Canada
Amir Barmaki: Former Head of UN OCHA in Iran
Catherine Gribbin: Senior Legal Advisor for International and Humanitarian Law, Canadian Red Cross
In 2016, Canada launched an ambitious five-year “Middle East Engagement Strategy” (2016-2021), committing to investing CA$3.5 billion over five years to help establish the necessary conditions for security and stability, alleviate human suffering and enable stabilization programs in the region. In the latest development, during the meeting of the Global Coalition against ISIS, Minister of Foreign Affairs Marc Garneau announced more than $43.6 million in Peace and Stabilization Operations Program funding for 11 projects in Syria and Iraq.
With Canada’s Middle East Engagement Strategy expiring this year, it is time to examine and evaluate this massive investment in the Middle East region in the past five years. More importantly, the panel will discuss a principled and strategic roadmap for the future of Canada’s short-term and long-term engagement in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Ferry de Kerckhove: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Egypt
– Dennis Horak: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
– Chris Kilford: Former Canadian Defence Attaché in Turkey, member of the national board of the Canadian International Council (CIC)
– David Dewitt: University Professor Emeritus, York University
While the United States continues to pull back from certain regional conflicts, reflected by the Biden administration’s decision to halt American backing for Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen and the expected withdrawal from Afghanistan, US troops continue to be stationed across the region. Meanwhile, Russia and China have significantly maintained and even expanded their regional activities. On one hand, the Kremlin has maintained its military presence in Syria, and on the other hand, China has signed an unprecedented 25-year strategic agreement with Iran.
As the global power structure continues to shift, it is essential to analyze the future of the US regional presence under the Biden administration, explore the emerging global rivalry with Russia and China, and at last, investigate the implications of such competition for peace and security in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Dmitri Trenin: Director of Carnegie Moscow Center
– Joost R. Hiltermann: Director of MENA Programme, International Crisis Group
– Roxane Farmanfarmaian: Affiliated Lecturer in International Relations of the Middle East and North Africa, University of Cambridge
– Andrew A. Michta: Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at Marshall Center
– Kelley Vlahos: Senior Advisor, Quincy Institute
The security architecture of the Middle East has undergone rapid transformations in an exceptionally short period. Notable developments include the United States gradual withdrawal from the region, rapprochement between Israel and some GCC states through the Abraham Accords and the rise of Chinese and Russian regional engagement.
With these new trends in the Middle East, it is timely to investigate the security implications of the Biden administration’s Middle East policy. In this respect, we will discuss the Biden team’s new approach vis-à-vis Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The panel will also discuss the role of other major powers, including China and Russia in shaping this new security environment in the region, and how the Biden administration will respond to these powers’ increasing regional presence.
Panelists:
– Sanam Vakil: Deputy Director of MENA Programme at Chatham House
– Denise Natali: Acting Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies & Director of the Center for Strategic Research, National Defense University
– Hassan Ahmadian: Professor of the Middle East and North Africa Studies, University of Tehran
– Abdulaziz Sagar: Chairman, Gulf Research Center
– Andrew Parasiliti: President, Al-Monitor
