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The Next Phase of the Iran War: Infrastructure as the Battlefield?

Infrastructure warfare could escalate the U.S.-Iran war into a broader contest of mutually assured infrastructure destruction with global repercussions.​
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The United States and Israel’s coordinated campaign against Iran was based on a simple underlying assumption, of targeting the Iranian senior leadership followed by several days of intense bombardment, resulting in the collapse of submission of the Islamic Republic. The strategy was rooted in the theories of decapitation, one that disrupts command-and-control resulting in system collapse. The war did not unfold the way Washington expected. Iran did not collapse. There was no state failure.

It can be argued that Iran’s response surprised nearly everyone at the White House and even President Donald Trump. Tehran expanded the battlefield and redirected its fire toward American military bases across the Persian Gulf. The strikes signaled a deliberate shift in Iranian strategic calculus: a recognition that fighting on Washington’s preferred terms, in a direct and conventional exchange of military power, was a losing plan. 

Tehran also demonstrated a capacity for resilience that Washington previously underestimated. Built on a combination of asymmetric strategies and what might be called “weaponized geography” — i.e., the strategic use of territorial depth, chokepoints, and regional positioning to offset conventional military disadvantages — Iran relied on hardened command networks, decentralized logistics, and indigenous capacity to absorb punishment. 

Together, these elements preserved sufficient institutional coherence for the state to continue functioning. At its high-intensity, kinetic phase, the war has, for now, ended without a decisive strategic outcome. Iran points to its control over the Strait of Hormuz and its ability to impose pressure on global markets. The United States and Israel highlight the serious damage inflicted on Iran’s military infrastructure and leadership networks.

The conflict has entered a new phase: a test of endurance. The dominant logic of this new phase is strategic attrition. While Iran has attempted to leverage Hormuz to disrupt the flow of global energy, the United States, by contrast, has moved towards a fierce blockade aimed at squeezing its economy into submission. This dynamic has resulted in a spiral where Iran squeezes the global economy; and in turn, the United States squeezes Iran’s domestic economy, with both sides seeking to erode the other’s capacity for resistance.

This competition for endurance misses a crucial point: the next round of hostilities will not look like the last one, nor will it be focused on military targets alone. It will not be defined primarily by decapitation strikes or conventional bombardment, but rather the systematic targeting of infrastructure. This shift reflects a deeper transformation in how this war is being conceptualized. 

This competition for endurance misses a crucial point: the next round of hostilities will not look like the last one, nor will it be focused on military targets alone. It will not be defined primarily by decapitation strikes or conventional bombardment, but rather the systematic targeting of infrastructure. This shift reflects a deeper transformation in how this war is being conceptualized. 

In classical warfare, the primary objective was the destruction of the enemy’s military capabilities. In the emerging doctrine of infrastructure warfare, the target is not the military capability; rather, it is the nervous system of state power — with energy networks, electricity grids and transmission lines, transportation systems, industrial capacity, water systems, health supply chains, and public services becoming the central nodes of conflict. Destroying them disrupts the entire architecture of modern governance and economic life. Its strategic purpose is to hollow out the institutional capacity of a government and to force it into a condition of managed dysfunction from which recovery is slow, costly, and politically destabilizing. The upshot is systemic paralysis. Donald Trump’s rhetoric about returning Iran “to the Stone Age” should, therefore, not be read as mere bluster, but as a reflection of this strategic logic. 

This approach stems in part from the perceived failure of U.S.-Israel’s earlier decapitation strategy. Infrastructure destruction is a mechanism for undermining governance capacity through a three-tiered interconnected pathway. First, it weakens the economic foundations of the state. Strikes on energy facilities, industrial plants, transportation networks, and electricity grids reduce production, disrupt supply chains, and generate inflationary pressures. As economic activity contracts, state revenues decline, constraining the fiscal resources required to provide public goods and sustain state functions.

Second, such strikes aim to degrade administrative and governance capacity. Modern states rely on communication systems, transportation networks, data infrastructure, and operational facilities to coordinate policy and deliver services. When these systems are disrupted, government agencies and state institutions face growing difficulties in coordinating policies, implementing decisions, managing crises, and maintaining effective control across the territory.

Third, failing institutions and modern state capacity undermine societal resilience. When electricity fails, water systems break down, medical supply chains are disrupted, and housing is destroyed, civilians bear the immediate costs. Beyond material hardship, prolonged disruption generates social discontent, weakens public confidence, and erodes the social cohesion necessary for political stability. The result is not just hardship, but also a cumulative erosion of social stability and trust, creating a tinderbox for civil war and even Syrianization.

The core mechanism of such a war on infrastructure is to create a self-reinforcing feedback loop of degradation,  economic disruption that weakens state institutions and fuels social unrest, and a social unrest that further increases pressure on the state rendering the weakened state incapacitated. Systematically weakening state capacities leads not only to a reduction in existing efficiency, but also to a weakening of the institutions that a state needs to maintain order. 

This dynamic gradually moves the targeted country towards “state failure”. In this situation, the state does not simply disappear, but it becomes increasingly incapable of governing effectively and protecting its monopoly on violence. Public services deteriorate, economic activity declines, and political authority fragments. From Washington’s perspective, the rationale to conduct a large-scale campaign targeting Iran’s infrastructure is clear. If direct military pressure and decapitation strategies failed to produce the desired outcome of changing Tehran’s behavior, then a broader campaign of systemic disruption may be seen as the next step. One that could force Iran’s surviving leadership back to the negotiating table under far more severe conditions.

Such a strategy also serves a domestic political purpose for Donald Trump. If efforts to achieve regime change or fully secure the Strait of Hormuz fall short, an infrastructure campaign provides an alternative narrative of success. By demonstrating substantial damage to Iran’s economic and industrial capabilities, the administration could claim to have significantly weakened the country’s ability to function, even if the Islamic Republic remains intact. Infrastructure warfare thus becomes not only an instrument of coercion, but also a means of creating a politically acceptable pathway to de-escalation, while preserving the appearance of strategic achievement. 

Infrastructure warfare thus becomes not only an instrument of coercion, but also a means of creating a politically acceptable pathway to de-escalation, while preserving the appearance of strategic achievement. 

The risks of such a strategy, however, are considerable. Infrastructure warfare is inherently difficult to contain once initiated. Iran would be unlikely to absorb such attacks without asymmetric and perhaps disproportionate retaliation, further regionalizing the conflict. Its geographic position and established capabilities would enable it to target not only Israeli and American interests, but also the critical infrastructure of their partners in the Persian Gulf, particularly the UAE. Energy installations, ports, desalination facilities, and logistics networks could all become targets, transforming the conflict into a broader contest of mutual infrastructure disruption.

The consequences of such an escalation would extend far beyond the immediate combatants. The Persian Gulf is a vital hub of the global economy, and disruptions to its energy infrastructure would reverberate worldwide. Oil prices would likely skyrocket, supply chains would face renewed pressure, and financial markets could experience significant volatility. The global economic impact of destroyed infrastructure in the Middle East would, therefore, not be confined to the region alone, but felt across the international system.

For instance, the Persian Gulf also sits at the heart of global fertilizer trade, especially in ammonia and urea, thanks to its gas-fed petrochemical base. Roughly one-fifth of global fertilizer flows pass through the region, including about 15% of ammonia trade and a disproportionately large share of urea exports, in some estimates approaching half of globally traded volumes. Disruptions in these supply chains can translate into reduced agricultural output globally. This creates a cascading effect from energy shocks to food insecurity. Unlike oil, which can be partially offset through strategic reserves, disruptions in agricultural inputs are time-sensitive and harder to substitute. Miss a planting cycle, and the effects can persist for years. The result is not just inflation, but structural inflation around the world, driven by reduced productive capacity rather than temporary price spikes. 

For the United States and its allies, this presents a dilemma. Infrastructure warfare may offer a pathway to pressure Iran, but it also risks triggering a broader systemic crisis. Nevertheless, as the conflict evolves, the tools of pressure are changing. The battlefield is shifting from frontlines to foundations.

The third phase of the U.S. military offensive, if it comes, will be an infrastructure war that is systematic, structurally targeted, and designed to compress Iran’s governance capacity until the calculus of negotiation changes. At that point, Iran will have little to lose. Iran’s likely retaliation, through asymmetric strikes, regional escalation, or attacks on the GCC vulnerabilities, would complete this cycle, underscoring how infrastructure warfare risks producing reciprocal escalation rather than strategic compellence.

Once that phase begins, it will be far harder to control.

Authors
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Arsham Reisinezhad
Dr. Arsham Reisinezhad is a Senior Lecturer in Business and Economics at Regent College London and a Research Fellow at the University of Essex.
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Arash Reisinezhad
Dr. Arash Reisinezhad is a Visiting Assistant Professor at the Fletcher School of Law and Public Diplomacy at Tufts University and Visiting Fellow at the Middle East Centre at the London School of Economics and Political Science.
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