The Trump-Xi summit in Beijing produced no signed framework, no joint communique on technology, and no new architecture for governing the most consequential competitive domain of the coming decade. What it produced, instead, was a signal: that both governments recognize AI as something other than a purely bilateral trade irritant, and that the conversation about limits, however vague, has begun. Whether that conversation amounts to anything substantive is a different question entirely, and the answer is not obviously reassuring.
Trade dominated the headlines coming out of the summit, and the deeper technological tensions between the two superpowers remained largely unresolved. This is not accidental. AI governance is structurally harder to negotiate than tariff schedules. It involves capabilities that are simultaneously dual-use, rapidly evolving, and deeply tied to each side’s broader strategic posture. When President Trump, asked about what kinds of guardrails were discussed, offered little specifics beyond describing them as the “guardrails that we talk about all the time,” and when pressed on whether the risks included biological, nuclear, or cyber dimensions, simply nodded and said, “Could be, yeah,”1The Hill, “Donald Trump teases US, China cooperation on AI safety regulations,” May 16, 2026. https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/5880013-donald-trump-xi-jinping-china-summit-ai-guardrails/ it became clear that the conceptual work of defining a common problem had not yet been done. That may be precisely the point. Dialogue on AI governance creates optionality. It does not foreclose competition, and in the current political environment, both sides have strong incentives to preserve the ambiguity.
The backdrop to these conversations is a competitive landscape that has shifted faster than most observers anticipated. Stanford researchers concluded in this year’s annual AI report that the performance gap between U.S. and Chinese AI models has effectively closed,2CNBC, “Trump and Xi face a test over AI control,” May 11, 2026. https://www.cnbc.com/2026/05/11/trump-and-xi-face-a-test-over-ai-control.html a finding that reconfigures the strategic calculus on both sides. When one party believes it is falling behind, safety dialogues look like delay tactics. When the gap narrows, both parties face a different kind of pressure: the risk that neither can afford to allow the other to weaponize frontier capabilities without any understanding of what constitutes a red line. Modern AI models are the most powerful cybersecurity and hacking weapons ever created, and they are doubling in capability every four months. This is not a domain where the luxury of extended diplomatic process exists.
The CFR analysis prepared ahead of the summit articulated the core dilemma with precision. The Chinese government’s AI priorities are primarily driven by the risks of falling further behind the United States, not the risks posed by non-state actors using dangerous models.3Council on Foreign Relations, Chris McGuire, “How Trump Should Approach AI Talks With China: Targeted Dialogue, Maximum Pressure,” May 10, 2026. https://www.cfr.org/articles/how-trump-should-approach-ai-talks-with-china-targeted-dialogue-maximum-pressure This framing matters because it implies that the two sides are not, in fact, negotiating about the same problem. The United States, at least rhetorically, frames AI guardrails in terms of catastrophic misuse risks: biosecurity, autonomous cyber operations, AI-enabled weapons of mass destruction. China enters these conversations with a different primary concern, one centered on closing a capability gap that it views as a structural disadvantage.
The 2024 dialogue under President Biden illustrated this divergence clearly: the United States sent leading technical experts who outlined areas of shared catastrophic risk, while the Chinese government sent diplomats who focused their remarks on U.S. export controls on AI chips.4Council on Foreign Relations, Chris McGuire, “How Trump Should Approach AI Talks With China: Targeted Dialogue, Maximum Pressure,” May 10, 2026. https://www.cfr.org/articles/how-trump-should-approach-ai-talks-with-china-targeted-dialogue-maximum-pressure That pattern is unlikely to have changed materially. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent captured the asymmetric posture when he framed the U.S. willingness to discuss AI safety by noting that the United States could afford to hold such dialogues “because we are in the lead.”5ResultSense, “US-China agree AI guardrails at Beijing summit, Bessent says,” May 15, 2026. https://www.resultsense.com/news/2026-05-15-us-china-ai-guardrails-bessent-beijing/ That framing is honest about the power dynamics, but it also reveals why the talks are unlikely to produce binding commitments in the near term. Dialogue from a position of declared superiority is not the same as dialogue from a position of shared vulnerability.
There is, nonetheless, a narrower space for genuine convergence. Both the United States and China share an interest in preventing the release of AI models with dangerous capabilities by non-state actors. If a non-state actor used an AI model to develop a biological weapon, the risks would be catastrophic for both countries.6Council on Foreign Relations, Chris McGuire, “How Trump Should Approach AI Talks With China: Targeted Dialogue, Maximum Pressure,” May 10, 2026. https://www.cfr.org/articles/how-trump-should-approach-ai-talks-with-china-targeted-dialogue-maximum-pressure This is not a hypothetical threat that either government can dismiss. Frontier AI models, once released into a sufficiently permissive ecosystem, can be fine-tuned for malicious purposes in ways that no bilateral export control regime can fully contain. The question is whether this shared vulnerability is sufficient to generate the kind of institutional architecture that would actually reduce risk, or whether it simply provides a rhetorical basis for ongoing, inconclusive engagement.
CSIS analysts noted that the summit revealed how little progress has been made on the most consequential dimensions of U.S.-China competition: AI, cyber operations, export controls, and digital sovereignty.7Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Trump-Xi 2026 Summit.” https://www.csis.org/programs/trump-xi-2026-summit That assessment is sobering, but it is also incomplete. The absence of a signed framework is not the same as the absence of progress. The fact that both governments are now treating AI governance as a legitimate diplomatic topic, rather than simply a domain of unrestricted competition, represents a shift in the conceptual framing of the relationship. Frameworks rarely precede conversations; they codify them.
What is genuinely uncertain is whether the current moment resembles the early phases of nuclear arms control, when nascent dialogue eventually produced verifiable treaties, or whether it more closely resembles the long, inconclusive history of cyber norms discussions, where shared vocabulary has not translated into shared constraints. The structural differences are real. Nuclear arsenals were countable. AI capabilities are not. Verification was difficult but tractable. For AI, the challenge of verification is of a different order entirely, and any agreement that cannot be verified will struggle to hold under strategic pressure.
For those working in AI governance and technology policy, the Beijing summit should be read neither as a breakthrough nor as a failure. It is an early, tentative signal that the two governments most capable of setting norms for frontier AI development recognize that the absence of any dialogue carries its own risks. The hard work is in determining what a meaningful guardrail actually means in an era of rapidly improving capabilities, diffuse deployment, and genuinely misaligned strategic incentives. That work has not yet begun in earnest. But the conversation, at least, is now officially on the agenda.
For those working in AI governance and technology policy, the Beijing summit should be read neither as a breakthrough nor as a failure. It is an early, tentative signal that the two governments most capable of setting norms for frontier AI development recognize that the absence of any dialogue carries its own risks. The hard work is in determining what a meaningful guardrail actually means in an era of rapidly improving capabilities, diffuse deployment, and genuinely misaligned strategic incentives. That work has not yet begun in earnest. But the conversation, at least, is now officially on the agenda.
The Western powers have failed to effectively manage the increasing threat of proliferation in the Middle East. While the international community is concerned with Iran’s nuclear program, Saudi Arabia has moved forward with developing its own nuclear program, and independent studies show that Israel has longed possessed dozens of nuclear warheads. The former is a member of the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while the latter has refused to sign the international agreement.
On Middle East policy, the Biden campaign had staunchly criticized the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal and it has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier since assuming office in January 2021. However, serious obstacles remain for responsible actors in expanding non-proliferation efforts toward a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.
This panel will discuss how Western powers and multilateral institutions, such as the IAEA, can play a more effective role in managing non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Peggy Mason: Canada’s former Ambassador to the UN for Disarmament
– Mark Fitzpatrick: Associate Fellow & Former Executive Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
– Ali Vaez: Iran Project Director, International Crisis Group
– Negar Mortazavi: Journalist and Political Analyst, Host of Iran Podcast
– David Albright: Founder and President of the Institute for Science and International Security
Closing (5:45 PM – 6:00 PM ET)
What is the current economic landscape in the Middle East? While global foreign direct investment is expected to fall drastically in the post-COVID era, the World Bank reported a 5% contraction in the economic output of the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries in 2020 due to the pandemic. While oil prices are expected to rebound with normalization in demand, political instability, regional and geopolitical tensions, domestic corruption, and a volatile regulatory and legal environment all threaten economic recovery in the Middle East. What is the prospect for economic growth and development in the region post-pandemic, and how could MENA nations promote sustainable growth and regional trade moving forward?
At the same time, Middle Eastern diaspora communities have become financially successful and can help promote trade between North America and the region. In this respect, the diaspora can become vital intermediaries for advancing U.S. and Canada’s business interests abroad. Promoting business diplomacy can both benefit the MENA region and be an effective and positive way to advance engagement and achieve foreign policy goals of the North Atlantic.
This panel will investigate the trade and investment opportunities in the Middle East, discuss how facilitating economic engagement with the region can benefit Canadian and American national interests, and explore relevant policy prescriptions.
Panelists:
– Hon. Sergio Marchi: Canada’s Former Minister of International Trade
– Scott Jolliffe: Chairperson, Canada Arab Business Council
– Esfandyar Batmanghelidj: Founder and Publisher of Bourse & Bazaar
– Nizar Ghanem: Director of Research and Co-founder at Triangle
– Nicki Siamaki: Researcher at Control Risks
The Middle East continues to grapple with violence and instability, particularly in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Fueled by government incompetence and foreign interventions, terrorist insurgencies have imposed severe humanitarian and economic costs on the region. Meanwhile, regional actors have engaged in an unprecedented pursuit of arms accumulation. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have imported billions of both Western and Russian-made weapons and funded militant groups across the region, intending to contain their regional adversaries, particularly Iran. Tehran has also provided sophisticated weaponry to various militia groups across the region to strengthen its geopolitical position against Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Israel.
On the other hand, with international terrorist networks and intense regional rivalry in the Middle East, it is impractical to discuss peace and security without addressing terrorism and the arms race in the region. This panel will primarily discuss the implications of the ongoing arms race in the region and the role of Western powers and multilateral organizations in facilitating trust-building security arrangements among regional stakeholders to limit the proliferation of arms across the Middle East.
Panelists:
Luciano Zaccara: Assistant Professor, Qatar University
Dania Thafer: Executive Director, Gulf International Forum
Kayhan Barzegar: Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Science and Research Branch of Azad University
Barbara Slavin: Director of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council
Sanam Shantyaei: Senior Journalist at France24 & host of Middle East Matters
The emerging regional order in West Asia will have wide-ranging implications for global security. The Biden administration has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier, an initiative staunchly opposed by Israel, while also taking a harder line on Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen. Meanwhile, key regional actors, including Qatar, Iraq, and Oman, have engaged in backchannel efforts to bring Iran and Saudi Arabia to the negotiating table. From a broader geopolitical perspective, with the need to secure its energy imports, China is also expected to increase its footprint in the region and influence the mentioned challenges.
In this evolving landscape, Western powers will be compelled to redefine their strategic priorities and adjust their policies with the new realities in the region. In this panel, we will discuss how the West, including the United States and its allies, can utilize multilateral diplomacy with its adversaries to prevent military escalation in the region. Most importantly, the panel will discuss if a multilateral security dialogue in the Persian Gulf region, proposed by some regional actors, can help reduce tensions among regional foes and produce sustainable peace and development for the region.
Panelists:
– Abdullah Baabood: Academic Researcher and Former Director of the Centre for Gulf Studies, Qatar University
– Trita Parsi: Executive Vice-President, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
– Ebtesam Al-Ketbi: President, Emirates Policy Centre
– Jon Allen: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Israel
– Elizabeth Hagedorn: Washington correspondent for Al-Monitor
Military interventions, political and economic instabilities, and civil unrest in the Middle East have led to a global refugee crisis with an increasing wave of refugees and asylum seekers to Europe and Canada. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has, in myriad ways, exacerbated and contributed to the ongoing security threats and destabilization of the region.
While these challenges pose serious risks to Canadian security, Ottawa will also have the opportunity to limit such risks and prevent a spillover effect vis-à-vis effective humanitarian initiatives in the region. In this panel, we will primarily investigate Canada’s Middle East Strategy’s degree of success in providing humanitarian aid to the region. Secondly, the panel will discuss what programs and initiatives Canada can introduce to further build on the renewed strategy. and more specifically, how Canada can utilize its policy instruments to more effectively deal with the increasing influx of refugees from the Middle East.
Panelists:
Erica Di Ruggiero: Director of Centre for Global Health, University of Toronto
Reyhana Patel: Head of Communications & Government Relations, Islamic Relief Canada
Amir Barmaki: Former Head of UN OCHA in Iran
Catherine Gribbin: Senior Legal Advisor for International and Humanitarian Law, Canadian Red Cross
In 2016, Canada launched an ambitious five-year “Middle East Engagement Strategy” (2016-2021), committing to investing CA$3.5 billion over five years to help establish the necessary conditions for security and stability, alleviate human suffering and enable stabilization programs in the region. In the latest development, during the meeting of the Global Coalition against ISIS, Minister of Foreign Affairs Marc Garneau announced more than $43.6 million in Peace and Stabilization Operations Program funding for 11 projects in Syria and Iraq.
With Canada’s Middle East Engagement Strategy expiring this year, it is time to examine and evaluate this massive investment in the Middle East region in the past five years. More importantly, the panel will discuss a principled and strategic roadmap for the future of Canada’s short-term and long-term engagement in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Ferry de Kerckhove: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Egypt
– Dennis Horak: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
– Chris Kilford: Former Canadian Defence Attaché in Turkey, member of the national board of the Canadian International Council (CIC)
– David Dewitt: University Professor Emeritus, York University
While the United States continues to pull back from certain regional conflicts, reflected by the Biden administration’s decision to halt American backing for Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen and the expected withdrawal from Afghanistan, US troops continue to be stationed across the region. Meanwhile, Russia and China have significantly maintained and even expanded their regional activities. On one hand, the Kremlin has maintained its military presence in Syria, and on the other hand, China has signed an unprecedented 25-year strategic agreement with Iran.
As the global power structure continues to shift, it is essential to analyze the future of the US regional presence under the Biden administration, explore the emerging global rivalry with Russia and China, and at last, investigate the implications of such competition for peace and security in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Dmitri Trenin: Director of Carnegie Moscow Center
– Joost R. Hiltermann: Director of MENA Programme, International Crisis Group
– Roxane Farmanfarmaian: Affiliated Lecturer in International Relations of the Middle East and North Africa, University of Cambridge
– Andrew A. Michta: Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at Marshall Center
– Kelley Vlahos: Senior Advisor, Quincy Institute
The security architecture of the Middle East has undergone rapid transformations in an exceptionally short period. Notable developments include the United States gradual withdrawal from the region, rapprochement between Israel and some GCC states through the Abraham Accords and the rise of Chinese and Russian regional engagement.
With these new trends in the Middle East, it is timely to investigate the security implications of the Biden administration’s Middle East policy. In this respect, we will discuss the Biden team’s new approach vis-à-vis Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The panel will also discuss the role of other major powers, including China and Russia in shaping this new security environment in the region, and how the Biden administration will respond to these powers’ increasing regional presence.
Panelists:
– Sanam Vakil: Deputy Director of MENA Programme at Chatham House
– Denise Natali: Acting Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies & Director of the Center for Strategic Research, National Defense University
– Hassan Ahmadian: Professor of the Middle East and North Africa Studies, University of Tehran
– Abdulaziz Sagar: Chairman, Gulf Research Center
– Andrew Parasiliti: President, Al-Monitor
