Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi lands in Canada this week for the first time in a decade. He arrives at a moment when Ottawa’s foreign policy is undergoing seismic changes under the leadership of Prime Minister Mark Carney. Both sides seek to build on the recently inked Strategic Partnership and to settle trade and political differences.
As Carney has promised to approach the world with ‘principled pragmatism’, he has tasked Foreign Minister Anita Anand to update Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and dispatched several cabinet members to China to lay the conditions for greater economic engagement. It also comes as Ottawa faces a review of the Canada-U.S.-Mexico trade agreement, where Washington is looking to elevate its vision of ‘America First’ economics. The talks will also address a fraying global order as war proliferates in the Middle East and as multilateralism faces mounting crises.
This symposium brings together Canadian and Chinese experts to understand the outlook for where relations are heading and how principled pragmatism, U.S. ties, and shared interests are shaping a new direction.
But engagement should not be confused with convergence. Canada needs disciplined dialogue on three tracks: economic irritants including trade, agriculture and energy; security concerns including foreign interference and consular cases; and emerging-issue governance including climate, AI and crisis management. Security boundaries must remain firm.
Beijing will view Canada as a useful G7, CPTPP, North American and Arctic interlocutor, and as a test case: can China stabilize ties with a close U.S. ally while Washington and Beijing explore their own “constructive strategic stability” agenda? It will also probe whether Ottawa’s post-“rupture” diversification rhetoric creates genuine space.
The right frame is compartmentalized engagement: neither decoupling nor embrace, but practical channels that widen Canada’s agency without creating new dependencies. Canada’s goal is not to pivot from Washington to Beijing, but to ensure neither capital defines its choices.
After Carney took office, China and Canada have engaged in pragmatic cooperation, and China-Canada relations shows a trend of stabilization following a period of decline. In January 2026, Carney paid an official visit to China, during which the leaders of both countries issued a joint statement and announced the establishment of a ‘new strategic partnership’. The two sides signed the China-Canada Economic and Trade Cooperation Roadmap, which covers 28 specific measures across eight areas.
In May 2026, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Canada at the invitation of his Canadian counterpart represents the two countries’ further efforts to implement the consensus reached by two leaders in January and to consolidate the positive momentum in China-Canada relations.
Canada’s adjustment of its policy toward China reflects the Carney government’s strategic vision to improve bilateral relations by enhancing economic engagements. The Carney government prioritized protecting and advancing Canada’s economic interests as the core objective of its foreign policy, emphasizing economic cooperation in its approach to China and strengthening economic and trade ties as the driver to improve bilateral relations.
Carney has advocated a ‘values-based realism’ approach, combining principles and pragmatism in foreign policy. In practice, the Carney government has downplayed ‘values-oriented diplomacy’ while stressing pragmatic economic and trade cooperation grounded in shared interests. The Carney government’s stance toward China helps foster a healthy, stable, and sustainable China-Canada relations.
Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Canada should be understood less as a full reset than as a cautious attempt to rebuild channels after several difficult years. The relationship is unlikely to return quickly to the optimism of earlier ‘strategic partnership’ language, but the visit can still help stabilize expectations, restore working-level communication, and identify areas where practical cooperation remains possible.
From Beijing’s perspective, Canada is viewed both as an important bilateral partner and as part of a broader Western policy environment shaped heavily by U.S.-China competition. This creates a structural constraint: even when Beijing sees value in improving ties with Ottawa, it will remain attentive to whether Canada can exercise sufficient diplomatic autonomy on issues such as trade, technology, Taiwan, and human rights.
For Canada, the challenge is to pursue engagement without ignoring real differences. A more realistic path forward would be selective cooperation—on trade, energy transition, climate, public health, and people-to-people exchanges—combined with clearer mechanisms for managing disputes. The visit may not transform the relationship, but it can mark a useful step toward a more disciplined and predictable form of engagement.
The May 28-30 visit by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi is a necessary and important follow-up to Prime Minister Carney’s visit to China in January. The January visit laid the groundwork for a reset in bilateral relations but further work is needed to maintain momentum and solidify agreements. Wang’s visit should be seen in that context.
His visit comes in the aftermath of the visit by Donald Trump to Beijing. That visit accomplished little in concrete terms but confirmed a willingness for dialogue and continued engagement by both parties. Wang’s visit to Ottawa is consistent with this broad understanding to find and develop areas of mutual benefit. However, one element of Trump’s visit was the issuance of “warnings” by Beijing regarding relations with Taiwan, particularly with respect to U.S. arms sales.
During Wang’s visit, Canada needs to stand by and reaffirm if necessary its longstanding “one China” policy, including its commitment to maintaining economic, cultural and people-to-people ties with Taiwan. This includes parliamentary exchanges conducted by individual Members of Parliament. It also includes a commitment to freedom of navigation in internationally recognized waterways which, among others, include the Taiwan Strait.
Since Prime Minister Carney’s January visit to Beijing, both political officials and civil servants have been actively working to implement the consensus reached during his meeting with President Xi. Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s meeting with Minister Anand is thus a natural milestone in the path to not only normalizing but also deepening bilateral relations.
However, this path is a perilous one where the destination is not yet defined nor the arrival guaranteed. Canada-China relations will come under the microscope whenever the USMCA review discussions commence. Indeed, one reason why Mexico has had more traction with the U.S. in trade talks is that they have taken a tougher stance vis-à-vis China, including through tariffs that entered into force in January.
Canada adopted a completely different approach, recognizing that increasing trade with China and determining for itself the nature of its relationship with China will be key to maintaining real autonomy and sovereignty. In this sense, Minister Wang’s visit is of critical importance. Canada alone cannot set the terms of the relationship; China has its own interests and ideas on what it wants from Canada. The two sides will need to find a compromise on outstanding trade irritants, particularly delinking the agricultural and steel trade.
This visit then provides an opportunity for senior leadership to frankly discuss current progress and provide direction on sensitive issues. So, while it is possible there may be some minor announcements coming out of this visit, the real outcomes will remain behind the scenes as both sides work to deliver tangible benefits and increase political trust before China hosts the APEC summit in November.
Prime Minister Carney’s visit to China in January 2026 signalled Canada’s openness to recalibrating relations with the People’s Republic of China following a rocky decade. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Canada this week provides an opportunity for China to demonstrate that it can and will adjust its tone in engaging with Canada: how the visit is seen publicly matters as much as what is discussed behind closed doors with Foreign Minister Anita Anand and senior Canadian officials.
This visit will demonstrate whether the Chinese government has recognized the need for nuanced Chinese messaging to the Canadian public, who remain divided on whether Canada-China rapprochement is a good idea.
During Wang Yi’s previous visit to Canada in 2016, he left an indelible impression during a joint press conference with then Foreign Minister Stephane Dion by publicly upbraiding Canadian journalists who had asked him an unwelcome question about China’s human rights record.
While the external narrative projected by the PRC in 2016 was conditioned by wolf warrior diplomacy, Wang Yi needs to demonstrate sensitivity at this delicate juncture in Canadian public opinion regarding early steps in bilateral rapprochement. Canadians attuned to the chequered history of Canada-China relations over the past decade will be watching closely to see if Wang projects a persuasive narrative regarding China’s willingness to nurture more constructive relations with Canada.
Concerns among the Canadian public regarding allegations of foreign interference in Canada and about what China considers sensitive internal matters cannot simply be brushed away. This means that public perception in Canada of visits like Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s carries at least as much weight as whatever official announcements proclaim. This visit offers a chance to nuance official Chinese messaging, recognizing its potential impact on Canadian public opinion on the value of improving Canada-China relations.
Wang Yi’s visit is widely regarded as a key follow-up to the Carney-Xi meeting in January. Beyond technical issues such as the mutual reduction of tariffs and discussions surrounding imports of Chinese electric vehicles, the broader significance of the visit is strategic. Both sides increasingly recognize the need for stable relations during a period of uncertainty under the Trump administration in the United States. China seeks to maintain normal bilateral and multilateral relations with Canada, while Canada views China as an important component of its trade diversification strategy.
Improved relations with China could provide Canada with greater strategic flexibility and bargaining space ahead of upcoming CUSMA renegotiations and amid ongoing global supply chain uncertainty, if managed carefully. The Carney government has already made trade diversification a strategic priority and has taken significant steps over the past year to accelerate that pivot. Pursuing deeper economic engagement with China may anger the Trump administration and complicate the forthcoming CUSMA negotiations, but it appears to be a deliberate choice that Ottawa increasingly sees as both necessary and strategically justified.
In reality, the Trump administration would likely remain dissatisfied with many aspects of Canada’s trade positioning regardless. Moreover, recent developments in U.S.-China relations appear to reinforce the logic behind Canada’s diversification strategy. The outcomes of Trump’s recent visit to Beijing — including the establishment of the U.S.-China Board of Trade and the continuation of a trade truce aimed at preventing a deeper economic rupture — suggest that a protracted trade war serves no country’s interests. Even Washington recognizes the necessity of maintaining some level of economic accommodation with China. This strengthens the Carney government’s argument that Canada should continue pursuing a diversified trade strategy despite geopolitical pressures. From Ottawa’s perspective, reducing overdependence on a single market is increasingly seen not simply as an economic objective, but as a matter of strategic resilience.
China clearly recognizes the difficult position Canada faces in managing trade relations with the Trump administration, as well as Ottawa’s broader strategy of trade diversification. Beijing increasingly views Canada as an important strategic and trading partner as well as a valuable multilateral actor, recognizing Carney as a leading voice for middle powers following his recent speeches and policy shifts. Against this backdrop, China appears interested in stabilizing and strengthening relations with Canada, not only for economic reasons but also because Canada can play a broader role in middle power diplomacy and multilateral cooperation during a period of global uncertainty.
At the same time, Beijing likely sees an opportunity to better manage longstanding bilateral tensions — including issues related to Taiwan, China’s political interference in Canada, and human rights — in order to maintain a more stable and forward-looking Canada-China relationship.
Wang Yi’s trip to Canada is fundamentally an implementation tour. The heavy lifting was done during PM Carney’s January visit, which secured the headline deal — Canada’s removal of the 100% EV surtax (replaced by a 49,000-unit quota) in exchange for China’s rollback of retaliatory tariffs on canola, pork, and seafood, plus a sector-by-sector roadmap signed by the two commerce ministries.
Wang’s job in Ottawa is operational: unblock specific friction points that include canola, timelines for removing phytosanitary and anti-dumping trade barriers, quota administration, and restarting the upgraded ministerial-level Joint Economy and Trade Commission. Energy and climate cooperation, where China is already the top buyer of Canadian crude via the Trans Mountain expansion, will be the quietest but most bankable track.
The momentum is genuinely better than at any point since 2016, but it won’t be linear. Carney has a clear strategic rationale — diversification away from an erratic U.S. trade policy and the looming CUSMA renewal fight — but domestic pushback won’t vanish. Ontario’s auto interests and the entrenched ‘values-versus-trade’ frame will keep the EV-quota file under constant political fire.
The Chinese side will engage pragmatically, but expects predictable implementation, not performative scrutiny every quarter. Expect slow, sequenced progress: agriculture and energy first, critical minerals and investment screening later, with political differences managed separately via restored dialogue mechanisms.
That’s the defining constraint. Ottawa is watching the Trump-Xi channel anxiously because any U.S.-China accommodation could carry a hidden price tag for Canada at the CUSMA table, which would be the exact nightmare of the ‘poison pill’ era. Carney’s bet is that Canada’s middle power interests require strategic autonomy, not choosing sides: deepen practical cooperation with Beijing where it lowers costs and opens markets, while keeping defence and NATO commitments intact. The art of the reset is ensuring that Canada’s diversification does not require Washington’s permission, which means moving fast enough on deliverables before the U.S. renegotiation leverage peaks.
When China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi visits Ottawa this week, he will visit a country whose circumstances have vastly changed since his last visit in 2017. China’s fortunes have also changed. The solid Western consensus that sustained Canadian foreign policy since the Second World War has been badly corroded by the America First doctrine of the erstwhile leading power and core of the Western consensus.
The erosion of the West in some ways favours China’s rise, but in others, like the fragmentation of a once solid frame of multilateralized free trade, risks China’s economic prospects and forces it to expend diplomatic capital to maintain a stable order in which to thrive. While there are a number of bilateral issues that Canada and China seek to resolve, the most important subject on our mutual agenda is the maintenance of a global order under threat.
In the Middle East, war lingers and festers, and China has been a stalwart backer of the mediation efforts by Pakistan. In Central Africa, an Ebola epidemic spreads unchecked by the cooperative engagement between the U.S. and China that ended the last major Ebola outbreak. Global warming provokes extreme weather phenomena unseen in historic times, while the world’s leading economic power promotes climate denialism.
Canada and China must engage in the urgent but patient work to mend the frayed fabric of an interconnected world and work to press forward multilateral solutions to global problems.
China’s resumption of high-level visits to Canada is a sign of confidence that Mark Carney’s diplomacy has created a much more stable footing to advance shared interests. The Economic and Trade Cooperation Roadmap signed off this past January frames next steps in this week’s talks and anchors the top objectives of Carney’s leadership.
With the CUSMA review approaching, securing Chinese trade and investment commitments would give substance to the economic diversification benchmarks set by Ottawa. That the Trump administration also came calling to Beijing this month to make headway on restoring Chinese purchases of American oil, bulk volume pledges on agricultural imports, and constituting a Board of Trade and Board of Investment adds a sense of urgency for Canada. U.S. efforts have the potential to not only crowd out Canadian market share in key exports, but also compete with the government’s endeavours to attract Chinese capital.
Growing bilateral trade with China 50% by the end of this decade and doubling non-U.S. exports over the next 10 years are two federal targets that go hand-in-hand. Big-ticket trade infrastructure investments, including new oil and gas pipelines and port capacity expansions, underwrite the road to achieving these goals. Wang Yi’s visit will also create the conditions to clarify Canada’s business environment, expectations for reciprocal trade terms, and white lists for permissible commercial engagement.
Ties with China have been characterized by their entanglement with Canada-U.S. relations over the past decade. Carney’s diplomatic persistence and trust-building with Beijing go some ways to dislodge these perceptions. An interest-based approach widens Canada’s room with China to not only work on joint priorities, but to constructively manage real differences.
The Western powers have failed to effectively manage the increasing threat of proliferation in the Middle East. While the international community is concerned with Iran’s nuclear program, Saudi Arabia has moved forward with developing its own nuclear program, and independent studies show that Israel has longed possessed dozens of nuclear warheads. The former is a member of the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while the latter has refused to sign the international agreement.
On Middle East policy, the Biden campaign had staunchly criticized the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal and it has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier since assuming office in January 2021. However, serious obstacles remain for responsible actors in expanding non-proliferation efforts toward a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.
This panel will discuss how Western powers and multilateral institutions, such as the IAEA, can play a more effective role in managing non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Peggy Mason: Canada’s former Ambassador to the UN for Disarmament
– Mark Fitzpatrick: Associate Fellow & Former Executive Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
– Ali Vaez: Iran Project Director, International Crisis Group
– Negar Mortazavi: Journalist and Political Analyst, Host of Iran Podcast
– David Albright: Founder and President of the Institute for Science and International Security
Closing (5:45 PM – 6:00 PM ET)
What is the current economic landscape in the Middle East? While global foreign direct investment is expected to fall drastically in the post-COVID era, the World Bank reported a 5% contraction in the economic output of the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries in 2020 due to the pandemic. While oil prices are expected to rebound with normalization in demand, political instability, regional and geopolitical tensions, domestic corruption, and a volatile regulatory and legal environment all threaten economic recovery in the Middle East. What is the prospect for economic growth and development in the region post-pandemic, and how could MENA nations promote sustainable growth and regional trade moving forward?
At the same time, Middle Eastern diaspora communities have become financially successful and can help promote trade between North America and the region. In this respect, the diaspora can become vital intermediaries for advancing U.S. and Canada’s business interests abroad. Promoting business diplomacy can both benefit the MENA region and be an effective and positive way to advance engagement and achieve foreign policy goals of the North Atlantic.
This panel will investigate the trade and investment opportunities in the Middle East, discuss how facilitating economic engagement with the region can benefit Canadian and American national interests, and explore relevant policy prescriptions.
Panelists:
– Hon. Sergio Marchi: Canada’s Former Minister of International Trade
– Scott Jolliffe: Chairperson, Canada Arab Business Council
– Esfandyar Batmanghelidj: Founder and Publisher of Bourse & Bazaar
– Nizar Ghanem: Director of Research and Co-founder at Triangle
– Nicki Siamaki: Researcher at Control Risks
The Middle East continues to grapple with violence and instability, particularly in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Fueled by government incompetence and foreign interventions, terrorist insurgencies have imposed severe humanitarian and economic costs on the region. Meanwhile, regional actors have engaged in an unprecedented pursuit of arms accumulation. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have imported billions of both Western and Russian-made weapons and funded militant groups across the region, intending to contain their regional adversaries, particularly Iran. Tehran has also provided sophisticated weaponry to various militia groups across the region to strengthen its geopolitical position against Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Israel.
On the other hand, with international terrorist networks and intense regional rivalry in the Middle East, it is impractical to discuss peace and security without addressing terrorism and the arms race in the region. This panel will primarily discuss the implications of the ongoing arms race in the region and the role of Western powers and multilateral organizations in facilitating trust-building security arrangements among regional stakeholders to limit the proliferation of arms across the Middle East.
Panelists:
Luciano Zaccara: Assistant Professor, Qatar University
Dania Thafer: Executive Director, Gulf International Forum
Kayhan Barzegar: Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Science and Research Branch of Azad University
Barbara Slavin: Director of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council
Sanam Shantyaei: Senior Journalist at France24 & host of Middle East Matters
The emerging regional order in West Asia will have wide-ranging implications for global security. The Biden administration has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier, an initiative staunchly opposed by Israel, while also taking a harder line on Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen. Meanwhile, key regional actors, including Qatar, Iraq, and Oman, have engaged in backchannel efforts to bring Iran and Saudi Arabia to the negotiating table. From a broader geopolitical perspective, with the need to secure its energy imports, China is also expected to increase its footprint in the region and influence the mentioned challenges.
In this evolving landscape, Western powers will be compelled to redefine their strategic priorities and adjust their policies with the new realities in the region. In this panel, we will discuss how the West, including the United States and its allies, can utilize multilateral diplomacy with its adversaries to prevent military escalation in the region. Most importantly, the panel will discuss if a multilateral security dialogue in the Persian Gulf region, proposed by some regional actors, can help reduce tensions among regional foes and produce sustainable peace and development for the region.
Panelists:
– Abdullah Baabood: Academic Researcher and Former Director of the Centre for Gulf Studies, Qatar University
– Trita Parsi: Executive Vice-President, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
– Ebtesam Al-Ketbi: President, Emirates Policy Centre
– Jon Allen: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Israel
– Elizabeth Hagedorn: Washington correspondent for Al-Monitor
Military interventions, political and economic instabilities, and civil unrest in the Middle East have led to a global refugee crisis with an increasing wave of refugees and asylum seekers to Europe and Canada. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has, in myriad ways, exacerbated and contributed to the ongoing security threats and destabilization of the region.
While these challenges pose serious risks to Canadian security, Ottawa will also have the opportunity to limit such risks and prevent a spillover effect vis-à-vis effective humanitarian initiatives in the region. In this panel, we will primarily investigate Canada’s Middle East Strategy’s degree of success in providing humanitarian aid to the region. Secondly, the panel will discuss what programs and initiatives Canada can introduce to further build on the renewed strategy. and more specifically, how Canada can utilize its policy instruments to more effectively deal with the increasing influx of refugees from the Middle East.
Panelists:
Erica Di Ruggiero: Director of Centre for Global Health, University of Toronto
Reyhana Patel: Head of Communications & Government Relations, Islamic Relief Canada
Amir Barmaki: Former Head of UN OCHA in Iran
Catherine Gribbin: Senior Legal Advisor for International and Humanitarian Law, Canadian Red Cross
In 2016, Canada launched an ambitious five-year “Middle East Engagement Strategy” (2016-2021), committing to investing CA$3.5 billion over five years to help establish the necessary conditions for security and stability, alleviate human suffering and enable stabilization programs in the region. In the latest development, during the meeting of the Global Coalition against ISIS, Minister of Foreign Affairs Marc Garneau announced more than $43.6 million in Peace and Stabilization Operations Program funding for 11 projects in Syria and Iraq.
With Canada’s Middle East Engagement Strategy expiring this year, it is time to examine and evaluate this massive investment in the Middle East region in the past five years. More importantly, the panel will discuss a principled and strategic roadmap for the future of Canada’s short-term and long-term engagement in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Ferry de Kerckhove: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Egypt
– Dennis Horak: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
– Chris Kilford: Former Canadian Defence Attaché in Turkey, member of the national board of the Canadian International Council (CIC)
– David Dewitt: University Professor Emeritus, York University
While the United States continues to pull back from certain regional conflicts, reflected by the Biden administration’s decision to halt American backing for Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen and the expected withdrawal from Afghanistan, US troops continue to be stationed across the region. Meanwhile, Russia and China have significantly maintained and even expanded their regional activities. On one hand, the Kremlin has maintained its military presence in Syria, and on the other hand, China has signed an unprecedented 25-year strategic agreement with Iran.
As the global power structure continues to shift, it is essential to analyze the future of the US regional presence under the Biden administration, explore the emerging global rivalry with Russia and China, and at last, investigate the implications of such competition for peace and security in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Dmitri Trenin: Director of Carnegie Moscow Center
– Joost R. Hiltermann: Director of MENA Programme, International Crisis Group
– Roxane Farmanfarmaian: Affiliated Lecturer in International Relations of the Middle East and North Africa, University of Cambridge
– Andrew A. Michta: Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at Marshall Center
– Kelley Vlahos: Senior Advisor, Quincy Institute
The security architecture of the Middle East has undergone rapid transformations in an exceptionally short period. Notable developments include the United States gradual withdrawal from the region, rapprochement between Israel and some GCC states through the Abraham Accords and the rise of Chinese and Russian regional engagement.
With these new trends in the Middle East, it is timely to investigate the security implications of the Biden administration’s Middle East policy. In this respect, we will discuss the Biden team’s new approach vis-à-vis Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The panel will also discuss the role of other major powers, including China and Russia in shaping this new security environment in the region, and how the Biden administration will respond to these powers’ increasing regional presence.
Panelists:
– Sanam Vakil: Deputy Director of MENA Programme at Chatham House
– Denise Natali: Acting Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies & Director of the Center for Strategic Research, National Defense University
– Hassan Ahmadian: Professor of the Middle East and North Africa Studies, University of Tehran
– Abdulaziz Sagar: Chairman, Gulf Research Center
– Andrew Parasiliti: President, Al-Monitor
