The Arctic argument—which supporters of the Type 212CD often raise—also needs a thorough review. Many of the debates are centered around the submarine’s capability to surface through Arctic ice and its manoeuvrability in littoral Arctic waters. However, Arctic submarine operations involve far more than under-ice maneuverability alone. Canada’s Arctic challenge is fundamentally about endurance, range, and sustainment.

A submarine operating in the Canadian Arctic would often have to travel enormous distances long before reaching its patrol zone. Moreover, it would need to maintain long-term deployment status under extremely unfavourable conditions while preserving logistical resilience. In general, larger submarines perform better under such circumstances. Furthermore, there is a low possibility that Canada would replicate the operational concepts of Germany or Norway in the Arctic. Canada’s Northern Archipelago is far more extensive and operationally dispersed than Northern European Arctic waters. In such an environment, the sustainability of long-range patrols would likely be prioritized over the maximization of mobility.

The industrial aspect also requires balanced assessment. Advocates of the German-Norwegian option frequently argue that the Type 212CD is more aligned with Canada’s defence industrial strategy and its deepening relationship with Europe. However, South Korea today possesses one of the world’s most active and technologically advanced submarine production ecosystems. Unlike many European shipbuilders that face competing domestic priorities and production bottlenecks, South Korean shipyards maintain high-volume naval construction capacity.

This has profound implications for Canada since one of the greatest risks facing the CPSP is schedule slippage. Canada’s existing Victoria-class submarines are rapidly aging, while delays could create serious operational gaps for the Royal Canadian Navy. South Korean shipbuilders have repeatedly proven their exceptional ability to deliver major naval platforms on time and at scale both to domestic and foreign customers.

As a matter of fact, South Korea has emerged as one of the world’s fastest-growing arms exporters thanks to production efficiency, industrial scalability, and willingness to pursue aggressive technology transfer—and recently by demonstrating the exported weapon’s capability in real life. South Korea’s defence industrial model could better meet Canada’s long-term interests than European consortiums increasingly strained by NATO’s growing rearmament demands. As European states continue increasing their defence budgets following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Germany’s shipbuilding capacity may become increasingly focused on meeting European demands first. As a result, Canada might have to compete for attention within an already overstretched European defence industrial market.

On the contrary, South Korea may view Canada as a key strategic partner in the Northern Hemisphere and therefore possess strong incentives to prioritize industrial integration and long-term cooperation with Canada.

Another argument in favour of the Type 212CD is that the relationship between Canada and the European Union could be further strengthened through frameworks such as the Canada-EU Security and Defence Partnership and the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) procurement initiative. Nonetheless, strategic diversification also carries substantial value. Canada already has institutional ties with NATO, the EU, and the broader transatlantic community. Meanwhile, the Indo-Pacific remains an area where Ottawa continues seeking lasting and sustainable defence industrial partnerships.