President Trump arrives in Beijing for the first U.S. presidential visit to China in nearly a decade and the first of his second term. It occurs at a critical juncture as a diplomatic stalemate looms over Washington’s war in the Middle East, an energy crisis continues to reverberate throughout the global economy, and as both sides signal a desire to stabilize the Sino-American relationship.
Against this backdrop, the Institute for Peace & Diplomacy (IPD) hosts leading scholars from the U.S., China, and the world to provide forward-looking assessments on U.S.-China relations and its challenges. Drawing on a broad spectrum of perspectives, this edition of the Strategic Foresight Brief (SFB) presents a commentaries that examine the evolving crisis in the Middle East, the policy outlook in Washington and Beijing, and the future of great power competition.
Drawing on these analyses, we weigh the military signals, diplomatic initiatives, and geopolitical currents to forecast whether crisis will tip toward escalation, sustain tension, or produce a diplomatic settlement capable of stabilizing the world’s most consequential relationship.
Donald Trump and Xi Jinping will meet for their historic summit in Beijing under the large shadow cast by the ongoing Iran war, maritime conflicts in the Persian Gulf, and the worsening global energy crisis. The war will dominate the agenda — with the Washington-Tehran impasse and the U.S.’ self-inflicted strategic quagmire in the Persian Gulf having fundamentally weakened Trump’s negotiating hand.
Xi is likely prepared to leverage this American overextension by synthesizing his ‘Four-Point Plan’ for peaceful coexistence with Tehran’s specific preconditions for ending the hostilities. This China-Iran alignment stems from their fundamental opposition to Western military interventionism. Expect President Xi to emphasize the UN charter and tout China’s commitment to national sovereignty and non-interference, providing a blueprint for a new post-unipolar world order defined by regional autonomy.
By insisting on the urgency of a diplomatic settlement to prevent a global economic meltdown and framing the crisis as an opportunity for a great realignment, Beijing can propose a new Middle Eastern security architecture led by the ME5 powers — Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey and Iran — to stabilize the greater Middle East.
The proposal could hinge on China’s willingness to offer its “blessing” for Iranian sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for Iran guaranteeing maritime security and reopening the vital waterway to commercial traffic. Just as Eisenhower’s recognition of Egyptian control over the Suez Canal in 1956 provided the great power heft and the diplomatic legitimacy required to bypass Anglo-French hegemony and signal the end of Pax Britannica, Xi can use Chinese recognition of Iranian sovereignty to mark the end of unipolarity and legitimize a new global status quo.
For the Trump administration, the choice in Beijing is between continued attrition in another pointless ‘forever war’ in the Middle East or accepting an orderly exit strategy based on the post-unipolar reality. For China, the summit is an opportunity to expand its global influence from an indispensable commercial actor to a pivotal geopolitical arbiter, orchestrating a transition where enduring regional powers — rather than external hegemons — become the primary custodians of stability in their own neighborhood.
For President Donald Trump, this week’s trip to China comes at an inopportune time. He will arrive in Beijing on Wednesday weakened by the ongoing conflict in Iran which has damaged U.S. international standing and eroded his political support at home. Months ago, it seemed that Trump’s priority in China would be working toward an economic grand bargain with Chinese President Xi Jinping encompassing trade, rare earths, and advanced technologies like AI. Instead, Trump will be forced to expend time and political capital talking about the mess in the Middle East and pleading for Chinese assistance.
On this and other issues, the results of the summit are unlikely to be earth shattering. China has assiduously avoided entanglement in the war in Iran and will continue to do so. That U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent is meeting his counterpart in South Korea in the lead up to the meeting suggests that few concrete economic deliverables have been worked out, perhaps because U.S. diplomatic bandwidth has been focused elsewhere. One item to watch is whether Trump and Xi reach a new understanding, expanding opportunities for Chinese investment in the U.S. economy. Though many voices have argued against such a move, if Trump decides in favor, it would be a positive signal that he is serious about pursuing a different kind of relationship with China.
Finally, looming over the summit is the issue of Taiwan. Despite handwringing by Washington’s China hawks, major changes in U.S. Taiwan policy are unlikely this week. President Xi is more likely to use the summit to open a year-long conversation with President Trump about Taiwan, conducted over their four planned encounters. Moreover, as much as Trump does not want to antagonize China over Taiwan, he also does not want to be the president who lost Taiwan. The ideal outcome would be a new modus vivendi between the two powers over the small island, in which the United States offers China incentives to work toward peaceful resolution, while taking clear steps away from any actions that would hasten a catastrophic U.S.-China war over Taiwan.
Economic and trade ties were often described as the ballast of China-U.S. relations. Now, their stabilizing function has considerably weakened. In its place, summits between China and the United States have emerged as the true ballast, which in turn helps to anchor the stability of bilateral economic and trade ties. The meetings in San Francisco and Busan were both pivotal in stabilizing the relationship. In this regard, regardless of how much consensus Trump’s visit to China yields, the mere fact of holding the meeting itself is conducive to preventing bilateral relationship from once again deteriorating into sharp fluctuations during the tariff war.
Given the limited duration of this visit and the likelihood that Trump will be distracted by the Iran situation during the trip, the prospects for substantive breakthroughs on economic and trade front remain modest. A more realistic expectation is that both sides will continue cooperation in areas where consensus has already been reached. This includes extending the tariff truce and achieving some results on non-sensitive issues, such as increased purchases of American products.
It said that the two leaders are likely to meet in multiple occasions this year, and this summit may also serve as a beginning to explore solutions to some of the more sensitive, difficult, yet important problems, such as addressing trade and tariff issues through a multilateral perspective rather than purely bilateral one. The United States has included ‘poison pill’ clauses targeting China in trade agreements with third countries and imposed unilateral tariffs on Chinese transshipments. These issues might receive more serious consideration.
Trump’s visit to China this time is particularly significant. After years of intense competition and friction between China and the U.S., bilateral relations have entered a rare window of relaxation since the Busan summit. At the same time, the situation in the Middle East remains tense, and the global geopolitical situation has become increasingly unstable, with the world economy facing downward pressure.
The main significance lies in the strategic stability and risk management of the China-U.S. relationship. Taking this as an opportunity, both China and the U.S. have sent signals that they will strengthen strategic communication and maintain the overall stability of the bilateral relationship. This is not only a crucial step for stabilizing and regaining momentum in the China-U.S. relationship but also injects certainty into the current turbulent world.
This year is particularly special for China, as it is the starting year of the “15th Five-Year Plan” and a key year for steadily advancing the process of China-style modernization. A stable China-U.S. relationship and a favorable international strategic environment are important external supports for ensuring long-term domestic development. This year, China will host the APEC summit and the U.S. will host the G20 summit. The meeting between the two heads of state will contribute to achieving positive results for these two important conferences and play a positive role in promoting world economic growth and improving global economic governance.
The current geopolitical situation in the Middle East remains tense, with the U.S.- Israel conflict intertwined. The conflict has reached a stalemate. China adheres to a fair position in Middle East affairs and plays an indispensable mediating role. Previously, the Iranian Foreign Minister and the Crown Prince of the United Arab Emirates visited China, fully demonstrating the strategic expectations of Middle Eastern countries for China’s participation in mediation and promoting the easing of the situation.
This meeting between the leaders of China and the U.S. has provided an important political platform for strategic communication and deepening coordination of positions on hot issues in the Middle East. Against the backdrop of tense regional situations and continuous accumulation of risks, through high-level dialogues, both sides have reached consensus and managed differences, which will play a crucial role in curbing the spread of conflicts and stabilizing the overall situation in the Middle East.
U.S. President Donald Trump’s visit has been postponed once because of the war against Iran. Although there is a ceasefire in the Persian Gulf, the U.S. Navy is still in the Gulf of Oman to implement a blockade against ships to and from Iranian ports, while the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps is maintaining a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.
The main differences in the negotiation currently are that (1) Iran wants to impose a new system of passage of the Strait of Hormuz which the U.S. opposes; (2) Iran wants to end the war while the U.S. only agrees with a ceasefire; (3) the U.S. asks for the removal of all highly-enriched uranium from Iran and dismantlement of all nuclear enrichment facilities, which Iran totally refuses.
Trump swiftly called Iran’s counterproposal to the U.S. as totally unacceptable on May 11, which shows a stalemate in the negotiation. Both the U.S. and Iran consider themselves the winner of the conflict, and want to impose their will on the other side. Each is facing domestic pressure to make concessions and will pay huge political price.
Moreover, there should be a guarantor for the implementation of the items achieved through the negotiation. Iran trusts China as expressed by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi during his visit to Beijing on May 6. China always insists that the United Nations should play the major role in world peace. If there should be a qualified guarantor, it could be the UN.
On May 2, the U.S. Department of Treasure put 5 Chinese companies onto the Specially Designated Nationals sanction list because of their claimed crude oil business with Iran, while China issued a blocking ban to prohibit any recognition, enforcement, or compliance with U.S. sanctions. China agrees that the free passage of ships through the Strait of Hormuz would be positive for international trade, but enforcement by force to achieve this goal is unacceptable. China also supports the legal right of Iran to peaceful usage of nuclear energy based on Non-Proliferation Treaty regulations.
In China’s view, the main cause of tensions is the war against Iran launched by the US and Israel, so peace and diplomatic talks would be the suitable way and a better solution. If conditions permit, China would try to narrow the gaps between the two parties and facilitate the negotiations in order to realize peace and stability in the Middle East. China has long called for a new framework of regional security in the Middle East, based on a new understanding of common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security. Such a framework could contribute to improving the current chaotic situation in the Middle East.
President Xi will be meeting President Trump from a position of uncertainty. The Iran war has cast a long shadow on the bilateral relationship, and delayed long-awaited discussions on bilateral trade. The Middle East is likely to be a minor agenda item, but an important one.
The Trump-Xi summit is unlikely to resolve the Iran war, but it could establish a floor of expectations between the two leaders for what a post-war Iran and Middle East should look like. Beijing’s preference is to keep the Iran crisis out of the trade conversation and protect the bilateral agenda on technology, investment, and market access from regional spillover. Trump’s intentions are less clear. Trump could press Xi for greater Chinese cooperation in opening up the Strait of Hormuz and broader pressure on Tehran, but he should expect little.
The Trump administration believes that Beijing can do more to extract Iranian concessions or coerce Iran into restraint. Pushing on this line, however, is unlikely to produce further Chinese action. Beijing is unlikely to expend political capital, even as a mediator, where it thinks it has little leverage to begin with, particularly when it perceives the United States as the aggressor. The diverging views over Chinese leverage is perhaps one of the sharpest points of disagreement between both leaders. Any partnership Trump seeks in Beijing to end the war will run into China’s political investment in the survival of the current Iranian regime and its resistance to becoming entangled in a conflict beyond its control.
China’s position toward Iran, however, will continue to create problems with the Arab states in the Persian Gulf, who are set to attend the China-Arab States Summit taking place in China later this year. This summit sets the stage for how the Gulf states will engage China in the lead up. Iranian strikes on GCC countries in retaliation for Operation Epic Fury have forced Beijing into a careful balancing act between the Gulf states, its leading economic partners in the region, and Iran, which is actively attacking them.
From Iran’s perspective, China may be the only credible actor capable of guaranteeing any potential deal — its brokering of the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement gave Tehran a template it trusts, and Abbas Araghchi’s recent meeting with Wang Yi reinforces the direction of travel.
Western analysis, particularly in policy circles and think tanks, routinely sidelines the positions of Persian Gulf countries. Two facts matter. First, Trump exited the JCPOA without regional pushback precisely because the Gulf had been excluded from its design. Second, Gulf deterrence against Iran failed, but Gulf defense did not.
Tehran’s effort to coerce Gulf capitals into pressuring Washington collapsed; its subsequent attempt to hold the Strait of Hormuz hostage and inflict pain on the global economy also failed due to Gulf contingencies and most importantly the counter blockade the U.S. is conducting.
Gulf states blunted over 90% of Iranian attacks — missiles, drones, fighter jets, and planted sabotage cells all produced limited military effect. That has generated a real confidence shift across Gulf capitals, it’s a demonstration even small Gulf states are able to defend themselves from the most aggressive attacks not unscathed but definitely with very limited damage.
Any future agreement, whether negotiated in Beijing or elsewhere, must reckon with this. The original grievances — Iran’s support for non-state actors and interference in the internal affairs of regional states — can anchor a broader regional consensus. Exclude the Gulf, and the result will be either a weak deal or active spoilers determined to renegotiate it.
The world is undergoing profound changes and facing a series of challenges. On the one hand, countries and people all over the world have become more interconnected and interdependent, and the world has become a global community. On the other hand, the world is faced with the challenge of confrontation and division, and regional stability and peace have been seriously threatened.
Besides, different kinds of global challenges, not only the traditional challenges such as climate change and infectious diseases, but also the new frontier areas such as cybersecurity, outer space and AI are posing threats to security and even the survival of human beings in the future. No country can successfully deal with them alone. Global governance needs the joint effort and cooperation of all countries.
Against this background, relations between China and the U.S., the first and second largest economies, not only impact both countries’ interests, but also the evolution of international order and global governance. That the leaders of both countries have met and exchanged views on bilateral relations as well as major international and regional issues is undoubtedly a very positive signal. It will provide more certainty and stability to this uncertain and turbulent world.
Conversation and dialogue have always been a very important way to strengthen mutual understanding and trust, to reduce misunderstanding and misperception, and to deepen cooperation. Although China and the U.S. are different in many ways, they still share many important responsibilities and the space to cooperate. Although both countries compete in certain areas, it does not mean they cannot cooperate. Nor does it mean healthy stability with competition within proper limits is impossible. How to coexist peacefully and cooperate will test the determination and wisdom of both.
The key is to find out the right way to get along with each other and to create a new paradigm of major-country relations. The consensus the two national leaders have reached a new vision of building a constructive China-U.S. relationship of strategic stability – one that will definitely provide strategic guidance for both countries.
President Trump lands in Beijing this week for the first visit by a U.S. president to China since 2017. The threshold for success is low. Merely sustaining the trade “truce” agreed in South Korea in October would count as a win. Both sides want to keep U.S.-China relations on a stable path to afford time to strengthen their domestic economic and technological resilience. Talks leading up to the visit reportedly focused on trade, supply chain issues, and export controls. The summit, having been delayed for a month and a half, also afforded time to discuss the risks of AI development.
The Iran war is a brake on this agenda, but not a big enough one to scuttle the summit. China’s leaders would have preferred if the U.S. had not launched the war, especially owing to its baleful consequences for the energy markets. However, President Xi is unlikely to either bail the U.S. out by pressuring Iran into an American peace deal or allow the conflict to undermine the trade truce. There may be up to three more Trump-Xi meetings in 2026. The prospect of further deals will help keep the White House committed to de-escalation and diplomacy with Iran.
By stabilising its bilateral relationship with the U.S. over the coming months — especially with several high-level meetings scheduled between the two leaders throughout the year — China aims to secure a predictable external environment conducive to its long-term rise.
For Beijing, however, the stakes extend far beyond Taiwan alone. A key priority for China will also be securing firm guarantees regarding the trajectory of Japan’s remilitarisation. As Tokyo rapidly expands its military capabilities and grows increasingly vocal about its willingness to intervene in a Taiwan contingency, China will demand that Washington strictly curtail its ally’s ambitions.
On a broader geopolitical scale, Beijing is positioning itself as a responsible and stabilising great power, repeatedly calling on the international community to de-escalate the Hormuz crisis and prevent wider economic disruption. In doing so, China is drawing a stark contrast with a United States that is openly launching illegal wars, engaging in what critics describe as state terrorism, including the extrajudicial kidnapping and killing of foreign leaders and their family members.
Ultimately, the coming days are critical not only for the future of U.S.-China relations, but for the resolution of the U.S.-Israel war on Iran and the broader structure of the international order. The era of U.S. unilateralism is gasping for air in the Gulf. Armed with strategic patience and increasingly strong leverage over the crisis, China enters the Trump-Xi summit in a commanding position.
The Middle East crisis has transcended regional boundaries and become a vector of great power relations, global energy stability, maritime security, and nuclear proliferation. The Beijing summit offers a critical test for selective U.S.–China cooperation, as both powers share narrow but real incentives to prevent prolonged war.
China is cautiously deploying its diplomatic leverage to support conflict mediation, but it remains unwilling to assume ownership of talks given U.S. responsibility and the risk of entanglement. The likelihood of greater engagement tends towards Beijing facilitating rather than driving a resolution to the war in the Middle East.
The U.S. enters the summit navigating a self-created paradox that seeks Chinese assistance on Iran, but simultaneously escalates sanctions on Chinese entities that harden Beijing's position. A politically workable outcome requires China's buy-in to help bolster the diplomatic track — a modest but meaningful result.
Iran is elevating China's importance as a potential guarantor for any future deal with the United States that also redraws the Middle East's security architecture. The Strait of Hormuz has become a microcosm of overlapping great power interests, making any viable summit outcome on this question contingent on connecting discussing broader regional themes.
The Western powers have failed to effectively manage the increasing threat of proliferation in the Middle East. While the international community is concerned with Iran’s nuclear program, Saudi Arabia has moved forward with developing its own nuclear program, and independent studies show that Israel has longed possessed dozens of nuclear warheads. The former is a member of the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while the latter has refused to sign the international agreement.
On Middle East policy, the Biden campaign had staunchly criticized the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal and it has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier since assuming office in January 2021. However, serious obstacles remain for responsible actors in expanding non-proliferation efforts toward a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.
This panel will discuss how Western powers and multilateral institutions, such as the IAEA, can play a more effective role in managing non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Peggy Mason: Canada’s former Ambassador to the UN for Disarmament
– Mark Fitzpatrick: Associate Fellow & Former Executive Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
– Ali Vaez: Iran Project Director, International Crisis Group
– Negar Mortazavi: Journalist and Political Analyst, Host of Iran Podcast
– David Albright: Founder and President of the Institute for Science and International Security
Closing (5:45 PM – 6:00 PM ET)
What is the current economic landscape in the Middle East? While global foreign direct investment is expected to fall drastically in the post-COVID era, the World Bank reported a 5% contraction in the economic output of the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries in 2020 due to the pandemic. While oil prices are expected to rebound with normalization in demand, political instability, regional and geopolitical tensions, domestic corruption, and a volatile regulatory and legal environment all threaten economic recovery in the Middle East. What is the prospect for economic growth and development in the region post-pandemic, and how could MENA nations promote sustainable growth and regional trade moving forward?
At the same time, Middle Eastern diaspora communities have become financially successful and can help promote trade between North America and the region. In this respect, the diaspora can become vital intermediaries for advancing U.S. and Canada’s business interests abroad. Promoting business diplomacy can both benefit the MENA region and be an effective and positive way to advance engagement and achieve foreign policy goals of the North Atlantic.
This panel will investigate the trade and investment opportunities in the Middle East, discuss how facilitating economic engagement with the region can benefit Canadian and American national interests, and explore relevant policy prescriptions.
Panelists:
– Hon. Sergio Marchi: Canada’s Former Minister of International Trade
– Scott Jolliffe: Chairperson, Canada Arab Business Council
– Esfandyar Batmanghelidj: Founder and Publisher of Bourse & Bazaar
– Nizar Ghanem: Director of Research and Co-founder at Triangle
– Nicki Siamaki: Researcher at Control Risks
The Middle East continues to grapple with violence and instability, particularly in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Fueled by government incompetence and foreign interventions, terrorist insurgencies have imposed severe humanitarian and economic costs on the region. Meanwhile, regional actors have engaged in an unprecedented pursuit of arms accumulation. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have imported billions of both Western and Russian-made weapons and funded militant groups across the region, intending to contain their regional adversaries, particularly Iran. Tehran has also provided sophisticated weaponry to various militia groups across the region to strengthen its geopolitical position against Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Israel.
On the other hand, with international terrorist networks and intense regional rivalry in the Middle East, it is impractical to discuss peace and security without addressing terrorism and the arms race in the region. This panel will primarily discuss the implications of the ongoing arms race in the region and the role of Western powers and multilateral organizations in facilitating trust-building security arrangements among regional stakeholders to limit the proliferation of arms across the Middle East.
Panelists:
Luciano Zaccara: Assistant Professor, Qatar University
Dania Thafer: Executive Director, Gulf International Forum
Kayhan Barzegar: Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Science and Research Branch of Azad University
Barbara Slavin: Director of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council
Sanam Shantyaei: Senior Journalist at France24 & host of Middle East Matters
The emerging regional order in West Asia will have wide-ranging implications for global security. The Biden administration has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier, an initiative staunchly opposed by Israel, while also taking a harder line on Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen. Meanwhile, key regional actors, including Qatar, Iraq, and Oman, have engaged in backchannel efforts to bring Iran and Saudi Arabia to the negotiating table. From a broader geopolitical perspective, with the need to secure its energy imports, China is also expected to increase its footprint in the region and influence the mentioned challenges.
In this evolving landscape, Western powers will be compelled to redefine their strategic priorities and adjust their policies with the new realities in the region. In this panel, we will discuss how the West, including the United States and its allies, can utilize multilateral diplomacy with its adversaries to prevent military escalation in the region. Most importantly, the panel will discuss if a multilateral security dialogue in the Persian Gulf region, proposed by some regional actors, can help reduce tensions among regional foes and produce sustainable peace and development for the region.
Panelists:
– Abdullah Baabood: Academic Researcher and Former Director of the Centre for Gulf Studies, Qatar University
– Trita Parsi: Executive Vice-President, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
– Ebtesam Al-Ketbi: President, Emirates Policy Centre
– Jon Allen: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Israel
– Elizabeth Hagedorn: Washington correspondent for Al-Monitor
Military interventions, political and economic instabilities, and civil unrest in the Middle East have led to a global refugee crisis with an increasing wave of refugees and asylum seekers to Europe and Canada. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has, in myriad ways, exacerbated and contributed to the ongoing security threats and destabilization of the region.
While these challenges pose serious risks to Canadian security, Ottawa will also have the opportunity to limit such risks and prevent a spillover effect vis-à-vis effective humanitarian initiatives in the region. In this panel, we will primarily investigate Canada’s Middle East Strategy’s degree of success in providing humanitarian aid to the region. Secondly, the panel will discuss what programs and initiatives Canada can introduce to further build on the renewed strategy. and more specifically, how Canada can utilize its policy instruments to more effectively deal with the increasing influx of refugees from the Middle East.
Panelists:
Erica Di Ruggiero: Director of Centre for Global Health, University of Toronto
Reyhana Patel: Head of Communications & Government Relations, Islamic Relief Canada
Amir Barmaki: Former Head of UN OCHA in Iran
Catherine Gribbin: Senior Legal Advisor for International and Humanitarian Law, Canadian Red Cross
In 2016, Canada launched an ambitious five-year “Middle East Engagement Strategy” (2016-2021), committing to investing CA$3.5 billion over five years to help establish the necessary conditions for security and stability, alleviate human suffering and enable stabilization programs in the region. In the latest development, during the meeting of the Global Coalition against ISIS, Minister of Foreign Affairs Marc Garneau announced more than $43.6 million in Peace and Stabilization Operations Program funding for 11 projects in Syria and Iraq.
With Canada’s Middle East Engagement Strategy expiring this year, it is time to examine and evaluate this massive investment in the Middle East region in the past five years. More importantly, the panel will discuss a principled and strategic roadmap for the future of Canada’s short-term and long-term engagement in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Ferry de Kerckhove: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Egypt
– Dennis Horak: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
– Chris Kilford: Former Canadian Defence Attaché in Turkey, member of the national board of the Canadian International Council (CIC)
– David Dewitt: University Professor Emeritus, York University
While the United States continues to pull back from certain regional conflicts, reflected by the Biden administration’s decision to halt American backing for Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen and the expected withdrawal from Afghanistan, US troops continue to be stationed across the region. Meanwhile, Russia and China have significantly maintained and even expanded their regional activities. On one hand, the Kremlin has maintained its military presence in Syria, and on the other hand, China has signed an unprecedented 25-year strategic agreement with Iran.
As the global power structure continues to shift, it is essential to analyze the future of the US regional presence under the Biden administration, explore the emerging global rivalry with Russia and China, and at last, investigate the implications of such competition for peace and security in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Dmitri Trenin: Director of Carnegie Moscow Center
– Joost R. Hiltermann: Director of MENA Programme, International Crisis Group
– Roxane Farmanfarmaian: Affiliated Lecturer in International Relations of the Middle East and North Africa, University of Cambridge
– Andrew A. Michta: Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at Marshall Center
– Kelley Vlahos: Senior Advisor, Quincy Institute
The security architecture of the Middle East has undergone rapid transformations in an exceptionally short period. Notable developments include the United States gradual withdrawal from the region, rapprochement between Israel and some GCC states through the Abraham Accords and the rise of Chinese and Russian regional engagement.
With these new trends in the Middle East, it is timely to investigate the security implications of the Biden administration’s Middle East policy. In this respect, we will discuss the Biden team’s new approach vis-à-vis Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The panel will also discuss the role of other major powers, including China and Russia in shaping this new security environment in the region, and how the Biden administration will respond to these powers’ increasing regional presence.
Panelists:
– Sanam Vakil: Deputy Director of MENA Programme at Chatham House
– Denise Natali: Acting Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies & Director of the Center for Strategic Research, National Defense University
– Hassan Ahmadian: Professor of the Middle East and North Africa Studies, University of Tehran
– Abdulaziz Sagar: Chairman, Gulf Research Center
– Andrew Parasiliti: President, Al-Monitor
