Three years after the outbreak of the devastating war in Sudan, the country now enters its fourth year of conflict with no end in sight. What began as a power struggle between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has since evolved into one of the world’s most severe humanitarian crises.
The human toll is catastrophic. It is estimated that hundreds of thousands have been killed, and millions displaced—either internally or across borders into neighbouring countries such as Chad, South Sudan, Egypt, and Ethiopia. A generation of Sudanese children faces lost education, deep trauma, and widespread malnutrition. Meanwhile, the healthcare system has all but collapsed in many areas, leaving vast segments of the population without access to even basic medical care.
State institutions have largely collapsed, leaving a governance vacuum across vast parts of the country. Administrative systems no longer function effectively, the rule of law has eroded, and public sector capacity has been severely diminished. Critical infrastructure—including roads, bridges, power grids, and water systems—has been extensively damaged or destroyed, further isolating communities and disrupting already fragile supply chains.
At the same time, the economy is in free fall. Productive sectors have collapsed, inflation has surged, and livelihoods have been wiped out. Banking and financial systems are severely disrupted, trade routes are insecure, and millions of Sudanese are now dependent on humanitarian assistance for survival.
Repeated diplomatic efforts have failed to halt the war. The Jeddah Declaration, once seen as a breakthrough for humanitarian access, faltered due to a lack of trust and genuine political will between the two parties. Violations on the ground continued unabated, exposing the limitations of agreements that are not backed by enforcement mechanisms or credible guarantees.The Manama initiative suffered a similar fate, collapsing amid internal political divisions and opposition from Islamist factions after details of the agreement became public.
More recently, a framework proposed by the “Quad” comprising the United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) sought to establish a phased approach: a three-month humanitarian truce, followed by a nine-month ceasefire, and ultimately a political process culminating in a civilian-led government.
While the proposal reflected a more structured and time-bound roadmap, it encountered significant resistance—particularly from the Sudanese government, which objected to the participation of certain regional actors, notably the UAE. This highlights how regional rivalries and mistrust continue to complicate peace efforts and hinder consensus. These repeated failures to end the war underscore a deeper structural problem: the absence of a unified national vision and the persistence of competing political and ideological agendas within Sudan’s fragmented landscape.
Meanwhile, the situation on the ground has taken a dangerous turn. The RSF’s move to establish a parallel authority in Nyala under what is referred to as TASIS, following its consolidation of control across much of Darfur and parts of Kordofan, signals a shift toward de facto territorial division. With the SAF maintaining control over central, northern, and eastern Sudan, the country is increasingly fragmented into competing zones of authority.
This dual power structure risks hardening into a permanent reality. Parallel administrations, competing economic systems, and fragmented security arrangements could entrench division and make future reunification far more difficult. Sudan’s past experience—most notably the secession of South Sudan in 2011—demonstrates how prolonged conflict and political divergence can ultimately lead to state fragmentation.
At the same time, the war is becoming increasingly regionalized. Sudan is now an arena where overlapping external interests intersect, raising the risk of a prolonged proxy conflict. Instability is spilling across borders, arms flows are increasing, and neighbouring countries are facing mounting humanitarian and security pressures. If left unchecked, Sudan’s war could destabilize the broader Sahel, the Horn of Africa, and the Red Sea region.
Against this backdrop, the Berlin Conference convened on 15 April 2026 as part of a continuing international effort, following earlier meetings in Paris (15 April 2024) and London (15 April 2025). The conference resulted in international donors pledging nearly $2 billion in humanitarian assistance to Sudan, a significant and much-needed response to a rapidly escalating crisis. While this collective commitment signals renewed global attention, the absence of the warring parties once again underscores a persistent gap between diplomatic engagement and realities on the ground.
Among these contributions, Canada’s pledge of more than $120 million in humanitarian assistance stands out as a meaningful demonstration of its commitment to the people of Sudan and the wider region. This support is both timely and essential, particularly as humanitarian needs continue to expand at an alarming pace.
Yet, the central challenge remains fragmentation—not only within Sudan, but also among international initiatives. The existence of multiple, uncoordinated tracks risks diluting pressure on the parties and prolonging the conflict. What is urgently needed is a unified and coherent international strategy that aligns political, humanitarian, and security efforts into a single, enforceable framework.
In this context, Canada has both the capacity and the responsibility to play a more active and visible role in efforts to end the war in Sudan. While its humanitarian assistance is welcome and impactful, Canada should also consolidate and expand its mediation role. This includes taking a more proactive approach to sustaining diplomatic engagement, discouraging competing mediation tracks, and supporting a unified and inclusive peace process that prioritizes Sudanese ownership while maintaining coherent international backing.
Canada’s role can therefore be strengthened across several interrelated dimensions. First, on the humanitarian front, Canada can continue to strategically target its assistance to meet urgent needs in areas such as displacement, food insecurity, and the collapse of health systems, while reinforcing the capacity of humanitarian actors operating under extremely constrained conditions.
Second, diplomatically, Canada is well positioned to help reinvigorate and align international efforts. Within multilateral frameworks such as the United Nations and the G7, it can advocate for greater coordination among key actors, and a shift away from fragmented mediation initiatives toward a single, credible negotiating track.
Third, Canada can contribute to strengthening accountability mechanisms aimed at addressing violations of international humanitarian law. Supporting documentation, investigative mechanisms, and international justice pathways would help ensure that the protection of civilians remains central to any political settlement.
Finally, Canada can play a constructive bridging role between regional and international stakeholders. By leveraging its reputation as an honest broker, it can help align the positions of African, Arab, and Western partners, reduce polarization, and promote a more coherent international response.
The priorities to end the war in Sudan are increasingly clear, but they require far greater urgency and coordination from the international community. At the most immediate level, there must be a substantial scaling-up of humanitarian assistance to address what has become one of the world’s most severe and rapidly deteriorating crises. The nearly $2 billion pledged in Berlin is an important step, but it must be rapidly mobilized and sustained to meet the scale of need.
Equally important is the need for sustained and coordinated international pressure on the warring parties to guarantee immediate, safe, and unhindered humanitarian access across all regions of Sudan. This requires moving beyond periodic calls for ceasefires toward enforceable arrangements that ensure aid corridors remain open and protected.
Beyond the immediate humanitarian imperative, the most critical strategic priority is to establish a credible and unified political pathway to end the conflict. This pathway must link ceasefire arrangements to a broader transition toward civilian governance, supported by clear benchmarks, timelines, and credible guarantees. Coordination among Sudanese civilian actors, regional organizations, and international partners is essential to avoid competing initiatives that weaken the overall process.
In addition, any sustainable settlement must be reinforced by monitoring and accountability mechanisms that deter violations and ensure compliance. Ending the war in Sudan ultimately requires not only halting hostilities, but constructing a political framework capable of delivering stability, civilian-led governance, and long-term recovery.
Ultimately, Sudan’s crisis has reached a point where international engagement can no longer remain reactive or fragmented. There is no military solution to this conflict; continued fighting will only deepen the country’s fragmentation, accelerate institutional collapse, and prolong human suffering.
But the stakes extend far beyond Sudan itself. A prolonged war risks turning the country into a persistent source of regional instability—fueling displacement, extremism, arms proliferation, and cross-border conflict. In this context, ending the war in Sudan is not merely a humanitarian imperative; it is a strategic necessity for regional and international security.
The world must therefore move from concern to decisive action. A comprehensive, inclusive, and enforceable peace process—firmly supported by a unified international effort—is no longer optional. It is the only viable path to preserving Sudan’s unity, restoring stability, and preventing a wider regional crisis. The time for Canada to act is now.
The Western powers have failed to effectively manage the increasing threat of proliferation in the Middle East. While the international community is concerned with Iran’s nuclear program, Saudi Arabia has moved forward with developing its own nuclear program, and independent studies show that Israel has longed possessed dozens of nuclear warheads. The former is a member of the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while the latter has refused to sign the international agreement.
On Middle East policy, the Biden campaign had staunchly criticized the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal and it has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier since assuming office in January 2021. However, serious obstacles remain for responsible actors in expanding non-proliferation efforts toward a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.
This panel will discuss how Western powers and multilateral institutions, such as the IAEA, can play a more effective role in managing non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Peggy Mason: Canada’s former Ambassador to the UN for Disarmament
– Mark Fitzpatrick: Associate Fellow & Former Executive Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
– Ali Vaez: Iran Project Director, International Crisis Group
– Negar Mortazavi: Journalist and Political Analyst, Host of Iran Podcast
– David Albright: Founder and President of the Institute for Science and International Security
Closing (5:45 PM – 6:00 PM ET)
What is the current economic landscape in the Middle East? While global foreign direct investment is expected to fall drastically in the post-COVID era, the World Bank reported a 5% contraction in the economic output of the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries in 2020 due to the pandemic. While oil prices are expected to rebound with normalization in demand, political instability, regional and geopolitical tensions, domestic corruption, and a volatile regulatory and legal environment all threaten economic recovery in the Middle East. What is the prospect for economic growth and development in the region post-pandemic, and how could MENA nations promote sustainable growth and regional trade moving forward?
At the same time, Middle Eastern diaspora communities have become financially successful and can help promote trade between North America and the region. In this respect, the diaspora can become vital intermediaries for advancing U.S. and Canada’s business interests abroad. Promoting business diplomacy can both benefit the MENA region and be an effective and positive way to advance engagement and achieve foreign policy goals of the North Atlantic.
This panel will investigate the trade and investment opportunities in the Middle East, discuss how facilitating economic engagement with the region can benefit Canadian and American national interests, and explore relevant policy prescriptions.
Panelists:
– Hon. Sergio Marchi: Canada’s Former Minister of International Trade
– Scott Jolliffe: Chairperson, Canada Arab Business Council
– Esfandyar Batmanghelidj: Founder and Publisher of Bourse & Bazaar
– Nizar Ghanem: Director of Research and Co-founder at Triangle
– Nicki Siamaki: Researcher at Control Risks
The Middle East continues to grapple with violence and instability, particularly in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Fueled by government incompetence and foreign interventions, terrorist insurgencies have imposed severe humanitarian and economic costs on the region. Meanwhile, regional actors have engaged in an unprecedented pursuit of arms accumulation. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have imported billions of both Western and Russian-made weapons and funded militant groups across the region, intending to contain their regional adversaries, particularly Iran. Tehran has also provided sophisticated weaponry to various militia groups across the region to strengthen its geopolitical position against Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Israel.
On the other hand, with international terrorist networks and intense regional rivalry in the Middle East, it is impractical to discuss peace and security without addressing terrorism and the arms race in the region. This panel will primarily discuss the implications of the ongoing arms race in the region and the role of Western powers and multilateral organizations in facilitating trust-building security arrangements among regional stakeholders to limit the proliferation of arms across the Middle East.
Panelists:
Luciano Zaccara: Assistant Professor, Qatar University
Dania Thafer: Executive Director, Gulf International Forum
Kayhan Barzegar: Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Science and Research Branch of Azad University
Barbara Slavin: Director of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council
Sanam Shantyaei: Senior Journalist at France24 & host of Middle East Matters
The emerging regional order in West Asia will have wide-ranging implications for global security. The Biden administration has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier, an initiative staunchly opposed by Israel, while also taking a harder line on Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen. Meanwhile, key regional actors, including Qatar, Iraq, and Oman, have engaged in backchannel efforts to bring Iran and Saudi Arabia to the negotiating table. From a broader geopolitical perspective, with the need to secure its energy imports, China is also expected to increase its footprint in the region and influence the mentioned challenges.
In this evolving landscape, Western powers will be compelled to redefine their strategic priorities and adjust their policies with the new realities in the region. In this panel, we will discuss how the West, including the United States and its allies, can utilize multilateral diplomacy with its adversaries to prevent military escalation in the region. Most importantly, the panel will discuss if a multilateral security dialogue in the Persian Gulf region, proposed by some regional actors, can help reduce tensions among regional foes and produce sustainable peace and development for the region.
Panelists:
– Abdullah Baabood: Academic Researcher and Former Director of the Centre for Gulf Studies, Qatar University
– Trita Parsi: Executive Vice-President, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
– Ebtesam Al-Ketbi: President, Emirates Policy Centre
– Jon Allen: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Israel
– Elizabeth Hagedorn: Washington correspondent for Al-Monitor
Military interventions, political and economic instabilities, and civil unrest in the Middle East have led to a global refugee crisis with an increasing wave of refugees and asylum seekers to Europe and Canada. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has, in myriad ways, exacerbated and contributed to the ongoing security threats and destabilization of the region.
While these challenges pose serious risks to Canadian security, Ottawa will also have the opportunity to limit such risks and prevent a spillover effect vis-à-vis effective humanitarian initiatives in the region. In this panel, we will primarily investigate Canada’s Middle East Strategy’s degree of success in providing humanitarian aid to the region. Secondly, the panel will discuss what programs and initiatives Canada can introduce to further build on the renewed strategy. and more specifically, how Canada can utilize its policy instruments to more effectively deal with the increasing influx of refugees from the Middle East.
Panelists:
Erica Di Ruggiero: Director of Centre for Global Health, University of Toronto
Reyhana Patel: Head of Communications & Government Relations, Islamic Relief Canada
Amir Barmaki: Former Head of UN OCHA in Iran
Catherine Gribbin: Senior Legal Advisor for International and Humanitarian Law, Canadian Red Cross
In 2016, Canada launched an ambitious five-year “Middle East Engagement Strategy” (2016-2021), committing to investing CA$3.5 billion over five years to help establish the necessary conditions for security and stability, alleviate human suffering and enable stabilization programs in the region. In the latest development, during the meeting of the Global Coalition against ISIS, Minister of Foreign Affairs Marc Garneau announced more than $43.6 million in Peace and Stabilization Operations Program funding for 11 projects in Syria and Iraq.
With Canada’s Middle East Engagement Strategy expiring this year, it is time to examine and evaluate this massive investment in the Middle East region in the past five years. More importantly, the panel will discuss a principled and strategic roadmap for the future of Canada’s short-term and long-term engagement in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Ferry de Kerckhove: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Egypt
– Dennis Horak: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
– Chris Kilford: Former Canadian Defence Attaché in Turkey, member of the national board of the Canadian International Council (CIC)
– David Dewitt: University Professor Emeritus, York University
While the United States continues to pull back from certain regional conflicts, reflected by the Biden administration’s decision to halt American backing for Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen and the expected withdrawal from Afghanistan, US troops continue to be stationed across the region. Meanwhile, Russia and China have significantly maintained and even expanded their regional activities. On one hand, the Kremlin has maintained its military presence in Syria, and on the other hand, China has signed an unprecedented 25-year strategic agreement with Iran.
As the global power structure continues to shift, it is essential to analyze the future of the US regional presence under the Biden administration, explore the emerging global rivalry with Russia and China, and at last, investigate the implications of such competition for peace and security in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Dmitri Trenin: Director of Carnegie Moscow Center
– Joost R. Hiltermann: Director of MENA Programme, International Crisis Group
– Roxane Farmanfarmaian: Affiliated Lecturer in International Relations of the Middle East and North Africa, University of Cambridge
– Andrew A. Michta: Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at Marshall Center
– Kelley Vlahos: Senior Advisor, Quincy Institute
The security architecture of the Middle East has undergone rapid transformations in an exceptionally short period. Notable developments include the United States gradual withdrawal from the region, rapprochement between Israel and some GCC states through the Abraham Accords and the rise of Chinese and Russian regional engagement.
With these new trends in the Middle East, it is timely to investigate the security implications of the Biden administration’s Middle East policy. In this respect, we will discuss the Biden team’s new approach vis-à-vis Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The panel will also discuss the role of other major powers, including China and Russia in shaping this new security environment in the region, and how the Biden administration will respond to these powers’ increasing regional presence.
Panelists:
– Sanam Vakil: Deputy Director of MENA Programme at Chatham House
– Denise Natali: Acting Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies & Director of the Center for Strategic Research, National Defense University
– Hassan Ahmadian: Professor of the Middle East and North Africa Studies, University of Tehran
– Abdulaziz Sagar: Chairman, Gulf Research Center
– Andrew Parasiliti: President, Al-Monitor
