The Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP) is often discussed in the context of a naval procurement program. However, the decision that Ottawa is facing has far more important implications than merely replacing the aging submarines that the Royal Canadian Navy is currently operating. With the possibility of acquiring 12 submarines, the CPSP represents a structural choice that would shape Canada’s defence industrial base, its maritime posture across three oceans, and its strategic partnerships for decades.
Among the potential suppliers, South Korea, through submarines developed by Hanwha Ocean, has emerged as a serious contender. Germany, too, remains a formidable competitor with its long-standing reputation in design and export through Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems (TKMS). Should South Korea win the deal, it will produce strategic consequences that meaningfully differ from a European solution. Beyond the mere capability of the platform, these knock-on effects would reflect South Korea’s structural attributes within its industrial ecosystem and the changing geopolitical context in the Indo-Pacific region.
The most immediate distinguishing feature is industrial momentum. South Korea is among the few countries that maintain an active and sustained submarine production line. For the past 30 years, South Korea’s submarine industry has preserved an uninterrupted construction cycle while transitioning from license production to fully indigenous design. This continuity has created an experienced workforce that remains actively engaged in submarine production, supported by a mature supply chain network and digitized shipbuilding infrastructure.
These features are important for Canada, as submarine procurement programs occasionally suffer from industrial restart problems. If production lines become dormant between projects, technical expertise withers and engineering knowledge must be rebuilt, resulting in significant cost increases and delays. By contrast, cooperation with South Korea would link Canada to an industrial ecosystem that is already building submarines on an ongoing basis. Practically, this would reduce schedule risk and accelerate delivery timelines. If the contract is signed somewhere within this decade, it becomes realistically possible to deliver the first submarine to the Royal Canadian Navy by the early 2030s, helping Canada avoid a capability gap when Canada’s current submarine fleet reaches retirement.
Another underappreciated element is the digital architecture that increasingly characterizes South Korea’s naval programs. South Korea’s shipbuilding industry has invested in an AI integration that could effectively simulate, upgrade, and maintain digital engineering, modular subsystem integration, as well as complex naval platforms. For Canada, which will operate such submarines for the next several decades, this attribute has important implications from a life-cycle perspective. By enabling incremental upgrades of software, sensors, and payload systems without massive structural changes, the digitized design structure reduces modernization costs and complexity. Throughout the roughly 30 years of service life, it could lead to savings of billions of dollars in retrofit costs.
The economic impact of the CPSP would be substantial regardless of the supplier. The acquisition phase of 12 submarines could plausibly fall in the tens of billions of Canadian dollars, while the life-cycle cost for 30 years may approach CAD $60 billion. Under Canada’s Industrial and Technological Benefits Policy, contracts of such magnitude would typically create domestic economic activity equivalent to the contract value. Eventually, this program could stimulate tens of billions of dollars in Canadian industrial participation.
What makes the South Korean option distinctive is the potential integration of Canadian firms into the broader Indo-Pacific shipbuilding industrial ecosystem. South Korea possesses one of the world’s largest commercial shipbuilding industries and produces a significant share of global commercial vessels and advanced maritime platforms. By interconnecting Canadian firms to this ecosystem, the CPSP would enable Canadian suppliers to join global maritime supply chains instead of being confined to a single domestic program. With the passage of time, this could lead to the emergence of Canadian firms that specialize in underwater systems, acoustic software, simulation technology, and naval digital engineering.
Meanwhile, the strategic implications of a Korean partnership far exceed its economic dimensions. Canada’s geographical characteristics indicate that its navy should operate across the Atlantic, Pacific, and the Arctic, yet the current fleet is too small to maintain a simultaneous, sustained presence across multiple operational theatres. A twelve-submarine fleet would change this operational calculus. Even after accounting for maintenance cycles, Canada could conduct operations in the Arctic while continuously deploying its submarines on both coasts.
In this context, South Korea could be considered a particularly valuable partner, since it is situated at the very center of the changing security structure of the Indo-Pacific. Canada’s Indo-Pacific strategy underscores deepened cooperation with regional middle powers that share an interest in maintaining maritime stability. Massive industrial cooperation with South Korea would both strengthen Canada’s presence in this strategic environment and complement its existing commitment to NATO.
The implications of such a partnership could be understood across three distinctive time horizons. In the short term — roughly from 2026 to 2032 — the most immediate effects would appear in the industrial and institutional realms. Canadian shipyards, engineering firms, and defence exporters would start to integrate into the CPSP supply chain. Infrastructure modernization would advance in naval bases, including Halifax and Esquimalt, while the Royal Canadian Navy would expand its submarine training pipeline. Economically, this phase could create several thousand high-skilled jobs annually while injecting several billion dollars into Canada’s maritime industrial sector.
In the mid-term period — which spans from 2032 to 2040 — the first submarines would be delivered to the Canadian navy while its operational capacity gradually expands. As additional submarines enter service, Canada would acquire the capability to maintain a sustained underwater presence across multiple operational theatres simultaneously. This would reinforce Canada’s contribution to NATO operations in the Atlantic while enabling a more credible naval presence in the Indo-Pacific. In this phase, Canadian companies involved in submarine maintenance and system integration could mature into specialized industrial actors that possess potential export opportunities.
The long-term impact, extending beyond 2040, could be even more consequential. By that time, Canada may possess a fully developed submarine support industrial ecosystem that could maintain advanced underwater platforms for decades. This capability could heighten industrial resilience in an era of increasing geopolitical uncertainty while reinforcing Canada’s technological sovereignty in a strategically critical domain. Continuous cooperation with South Korea would also deepen the strategic relationship between the two countries, strengthening middle-power cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.
Germany’s submarine industry is highly respected, and its participation in the CPSP itself well indicates the seriousness of the Canadian procurement process. However, the strategic logic of the South Korean option lies not simply in platform design but in broader structural advantages: industrial continuity, digital naval engineering, integration into the Indo-Pacific supply chain, and a strategic partnership with one of the most technologically advanced maritime powers in Asia.
Ultimately, the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project will determine whether Canada merely replaces an aging fleet or fully utilizes this opportunity to transform its maritime posture. In that sense, selecting South Korea as a partner has greater implications than simply introducing new submarines. It will be a choice that would restructure Canada’s naval capabilities, strengthen its industrial base, and reinforce Canada’s strategic presence across the Indo-Pacific and the Arctic for the coming decades.
The Western powers have failed to effectively manage the increasing threat of proliferation in the Middle East. While the international community is concerned with Iran’s nuclear program, Saudi Arabia has moved forward with developing its own nuclear program, and independent studies show that Israel has longed possessed dozens of nuclear warheads. The former is a member of the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while the latter has refused to sign the international agreement.
On Middle East policy, the Biden campaign had staunchly criticized the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal and it has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier since assuming office in January 2021. However, serious obstacles remain for responsible actors in expanding non-proliferation efforts toward a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.
This panel will discuss how Western powers and multilateral institutions, such as the IAEA, can play a more effective role in managing non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Peggy Mason: Canada’s former Ambassador to the UN for Disarmament
– Mark Fitzpatrick: Associate Fellow & Former Executive Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
– Ali Vaez: Iran Project Director, International Crisis Group
– Negar Mortazavi: Journalist and Political Analyst, Host of Iran Podcast
– David Albright: Founder and President of the Institute for Science and International Security
Closing (5:45 PM – 6:00 PM ET)
What is the current economic landscape in the Middle East? While global foreign direct investment is expected to fall drastically in the post-COVID era, the World Bank reported a 5% contraction in the economic output of the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries in 2020 due to the pandemic. While oil prices are expected to rebound with normalization in demand, political instability, regional and geopolitical tensions, domestic corruption, and a volatile regulatory and legal environment all threaten economic recovery in the Middle East. What is the prospect for economic growth and development in the region post-pandemic, and how could MENA nations promote sustainable growth and regional trade moving forward?
At the same time, Middle Eastern diaspora communities have become financially successful and can help promote trade between North America and the region. In this respect, the diaspora can become vital intermediaries for advancing U.S. and Canada’s business interests abroad. Promoting business diplomacy can both benefit the MENA region and be an effective and positive way to advance engagement and achieve foreign policy goals of the North Atlantic.
This panel will investigate the trade and investment opportunities in the Middle East, discuss how facilitating economic engagement with the region can benefit Canadian and American national interests, and explore relevant policy prescriptions.
Panelists:
– Hon. Sergio Marchi: Canada’s Former Minister of International Trade
– Scott Jolliffe: Chairperson, Canada Arab Business Council
– Esfandyar Batmanghelidj: Founder and Publisher of Bourse & Bazaar
– Nizar Ghanem: Director of Research and Co-founder at Triangle
– Nicki Siamaki: Researcher at Control Risks
The Middle East continues to grapple with violence and instability, particularly in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Fueled by government incompetence and foreign interventions, terrorist insurgencies have imposed severe humanitarian and economic costs on the region. Meanwhile, regional actors have engaged in an unprecedented pursuit of arms accumulation. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have imported billions of both Western and Russian-made weapons and funded militant groups across the region, intending to contain their regional adversaries, particularly Iran. Tehran has also provided sophisticated weaponry to various militia groups across the region to strengthen its geopolitical position against Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Israel.
On the other hand, with international terrorist networks and intense regional rivalry in the Middle East, it is impractical to discuss peace and security without addressing terrorism and the arms race in the region. This panel will primarily discuss the implications of the ongoing arms race in the region and the role of Western powers and multilateral organizations in facilitating trust-building security arrangements among regional stakeholders to limit the proliferation of arms across the Middle East.
Panelists:
Luciano Zaccara: Assistant Professor, Qatar University
Dania Thafer: Executive Director, Gulf International Forum
Kayhan Barzegar: Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Science and Research Branch of Azad University
Barbara Slavin: Director of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council
Sanam Shantyaei: Senior Journalist at France24 & host of Middle East Matters
The emerging regional order in West Asia will have wide-ranging implications for global security. The Biden administration has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier, an initiative staunchly opposed by Israel, while also taking a harder line on Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen. Meanwhile, key regional actors, including Qatar, Iraq, and Oman, have engaged in backchannel efforts to bring Iran and Saudi Arabia to the negotiating table. From a broader geopolitical perspective, with the need to secure its energy imports, China is also expected to increase its footprint in the region and influence the mentioned challenges.
In this evolving landscape, Western powers will be compelled to redefine their strategic priorities and adjust their policies with the new realities in the region. In this panel, we will discuss how the West, including the United States and its allies, can utilize multilateral diplomacy with its adversaries to prevent military escalation in the region. Most importantly, the panel will discuss if a multilateral security dialogue in the Persian Gulf region, proposed by some regional actors, can help reduce tensions among regional foes and produce sustainable peace and development for the region.
Panelists:
– Abdullah Baabood: Academic Researcher and Former Director of the Centre for Gulf Studies, Qatar University
– Trita Parsi: Executive Vice-President, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
– Ebtesam Al-Ketbi: President, Emirates Policy Centre
– Jon Allen: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Israel
– Elizabeth Hagedorn: Washington correspondent for Al-Monitor
Military interventions, political and economic instabilities, and civil unrest in the Middle East have led to a global refugee crisis with an increasing wave of refugees and asylum seekers to Europe and Canada. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has, in myriad ways, exacerbated and contributed to the ongoing security threats and destabilization of the region.
While these challenges pose serious risks to Canadian security, Ottawa will also have the opportunity to limit such risks and prevent a spillover effect vis-à-vis effective humanitarian initiatives in the region. In this panel, we will primarily investigate Canada’s Middle East Strategy’s degree of success in providing humanitarian aid to the region. Secondly, the panel will discuss what programs and initiatives Canada can introduce to further build on the renewed strategy. and more specifically, how Canada can utilize its policy instruments to more effectively deal with the increasing influx of refugees from the Middle East.
Panelists:
Erica Di Ruggiero: Director of Centre for Global Health, University of Toronto
Reyhana Patel: Head of Communications & Government Relations, Islamic Relief Canada
Amir Barmaki: Former Head of UN OCHA in Iran
Catherine Gribbin: Senior Legal Advisor for International and Humanitarian Law, Canadian Red Cross
In 2016, Canada launched an ambitious five-year “Middle East Engagement Strategy” (2016-2021), committing to investing CA$3.5 billion over five years to help establish the necessary conditions for security and stability, alleviate human suffering and enable stabilization programs in the region. In the latest development, during the meeting of the Global Coalition against ISIS, Minister of Foreign Affairs Marc Garneau announced more than $43.6 million in Peace and Stabilization Operations Program funding for 11 projects in Syria and Iraq.
With Canada’s Middle East Engagement Strategy expiring this year, it is time to examine and evaluate this massive investment in the Middle East region in the past five years. More importantly, the panel will discuss a principled and strategic roadmap for the future of Canada’s short-term and long-term engagement in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Ferry de Kerckhove: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Egypt
– Dennis Horak: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
– Chris Kilford: Former Canadian Defence Attaché in Turkey, member of the national board of the Canadian International Council (CIC)
– David Dewitt: University Professor Emeritus, York University
While the United States continues to pull back from certain regional conflicts, reflected by the Biden administration’s decision to halt American backing for Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen and the expected withdrawal from Afghanistan, US troops continue to be stationed across the region. Meanwhile, Russia and China have significantly maintained and even expanded their regional activities. On one hand, the Kremlin has maintained its military presence in Syria, and on the other hand, China has signed an unprecedented 25-year strategic agreement with Iran.
As the global power structure continues to shift, it is essential to analyze the future of the US regional presence under the Biden administration, explore the emerging global rivalry with Russia and China, and at last, investigate the implications of such competition for peace and security in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Dmitri Trenin: Director of Carnegie Moscow Center
– Joost R. Hiltermann: Director of MENA Programme, International Crisis Group
– Roxane Farmanfarmaian: Affiliated Lecturer in International Relations of the Middle East and North Africa, University of Cambridge
– Andrew A. Michta: Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at Marshall Center
– Kelley Vlahos: Senior Advisor, Quincy Institute
The security architecture of the Middle East has undergone rapid transformations in an exceptionally short period. Notable developments include the United States gradual withdrawal from the region, rapprochement between Israel and some GCC states through the Abraham Accords and the rise of Chinese and Russian regional engagement.
With these new trends in the Middle East, it is timely to investigate the security implications of the Biden administration’s Middle East policy. In this respect, we will discuss the Biden team’s new approach vis-à-vis Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The panel will also discuss the role of other major powers, including China and Russia in shaping this new security environment in the region, and how the Biden administration will respond to these powers’ increasing regional presence.
Panelists:
– Sanam Vakil: Deputy Director of MENA Programme at Chatham House
– Denise Natali: Acting Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies & Director of the Center for Strategic Research, National Defense University
– Hassan Ahmadian: Professor of the Middle East and North Africa Studies, University of Tehran
– Abdulaziz Sagar: Chairman, Gulf Research Center
– Andrew Parasiliti: President, Al-Monitor
