Last week, Ottawa hosted South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Hyun and Minister of National Defence Ahn Gyuback, kickstarting talks to negotiate a Defence Cooperation Agreement. Prime Minister Mark Carney’s summit with President Lee Jae-myung in Gyeongju last autumn marked a decisive acceleration of ties. Confronting rising protectionism and geopolitical instability, the two leaders launched a Security and Defence Cooperation Partnership. These steps have broadened the scope for bilateral engagement, particularly as the need for diversifying defence partnerships grows more acute.
In the months since, Ottawa and Seoul have made strides to build on integration. Carney’s government has appealed for Korean auto sector investment while Seoul is carrying out a whole-of-government effort to secure a deal on Canadian submarine modernization. At the same time, a sharpening imperative for Canada to diversify its strategic partnerships has driven Ottawa’s commitment to double non-U.S. trade, leaving room for both sides to leverage their free trade agreement and explore broader multilateral trade architecture.
Against this backdrop, this edition of the Strategic Foresight Brief, titled ‘Common Dangers and Common Causes: Canada and South Korea Join Hands‘, convenes twelve experts from Canada and South Korea to assess where relations stand and where they are heading. The symposium offers joint perspectives from Canada and South Korea that examine the international challenges compelling greater diplomatic engagement, defence-industrial collaboration, and middle power alignment. All agree that the window for developing the depth of bilateral ties is wider than ever.
Our world has confronted unprecedented challenges since the post-war order was established around 80 years ago. The New Cold War mechanism is more unpredictable as time goes by, as a hegemonic power is reluctant to provide security public goods to the world, and a rule-based order is seriously damaged. To top it off, an era of war is approaching, as shown by the rise of numerous wars and military confrontations, including the most recent Operation Epic Fury.
How can these puzzles be addressed? Great powers alone make it hard to tackle these challenges in a situation where their confrontations aggravate the current rules-based order. This explains why robust and strong powers such as Korea and Canada should hurry to be more responsible by stopping further damage to international regimes and institutions like the United Nations and, more broadly, by preserving a liberal international order. Korea and Canada are not simply middle powers but responsible strong powers from the standpoint of both willingness and capability.
To that end, Korea and Canada should bolster their cooperation both bilaterally and minilaterally. When it comes to bilateral cooperation between Korea and Canada, they should enhance their cooperation on various agendas, such as the defence industry, stability in the Indo-Pacific, North Korea’s policy, and the global supply chain. Korea and Canada, as major powers in the world, also need to seize the initiative of minilateral platforms, which are being weakened under the recalculated strategic and diplomatic formula boasted by the Trump administration. Enhanced cooperation between Korea and Canada is expected to contribute to preserving the current order, creating synergy that can revitalize alliances.
The concept of a “middle power” is, at its core, rooted in size — states that are neither great powers nor small states, but occupy an intermediate position in material capabilities. Countries such as Canada and Australia helped shape the modern meaning of the term, coupling material middle status with a reputation for liberal democratic governance and active support for a rules-based order. In Japan and South Korea, the idea has likewise been used to conceptualize national positioning, although in Japan there has long been debate over whether a country of its economic scale and technological capacity should be categorized as a middle power at all. South Korea, by contrast, embraced the concept more readily, yet in recent years has sought to reinterpret it — sometimes translating it as junggangguk (“middle- strong state”) — to reflect its growing capabilities and strategic ambitions.
At Davos 2026, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney urged middle powers to act together, warning that in a fractured world, those not “at the table” risk ending up “on the menu.” His appeal captures the urgency of the moment. Within only two months of the year’s start, regime upheaval in Venezuela and the targeted removal of Iran’s Supreme Leader have heightened global instability. For South Korea and Japan, the pressures are even more immediate: North Korea’s advancing nuclear arsenal and China’s rapid power expansion leave little strategic latitude. Their alliance with the United States is not discretionary but indispensable.
Still, middle power identity is not defined by size alone. It also implies responsible conduct and coalition-building. In domains such as energy security and defence — where strategic interests largely converge and mutual trust is high — closer cooperation between South Korea and Canada could serve as a practical anchor for credible middle power solidarity in an increasingly volatile world.
Canada and the Republic of Korea sit at the hinge of the North Pacific — advanced, trade-dependent middle powers navigating a more fragmented and transactional order. In this environment, relevance will not come from rhetorical alignment or nostalgic multilateralism, but from disciplined coalitions built around converging interests — a logic consistent with Prime Minister Mark Carney’s call for a more agile middle-power statecraft grounded in variable geometry.
Canada-Korea relations are well suited to this model. Security cooperation provides a durable foundation. Canada’s long-standing contribution to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula — including sustained participation in UN sanctions implementation and monitoring against North Korea through Operation NEON — demonstrates that Ottawa’s commitment is operational, not symbolic. That credibility matters in Seoul.
The recently signed defence agreement and a potential submarine partnership reflect deeper industrial and technological convergence in maritime resilience and defence capability. Beyond defence, cooperation in nuclear energy, hydrogen, critical minerals, semiconductors, AI governance and food security underscores a broader reality: Economic security and national sovereignty are increasingly intertwined.
Dense people-to-people ties — from a vibrant quarter-of-a-million-strong Korean community in Canada to expanding student, research and tourism flows — provide societal ballast that strengthens trust over time.
Canada’s deepening partnership with Japan reinforces the broader North Pacific architecture within which this relationship sits. Yet Korea occupies a distinct place within it: technologically sophisticated, industrially complementary and central to supply-chain resilience.
In a harder world, middle powers shape outcomes not by hedging, but by building trusted strategic networks, bilaterally and in multilateral settings. Canada and Korea have the capacity — and the opportunity — to lead in constructing them.
Seoul views expanding defence cooperation with Canada — and especially the submarine project — as strategically timely. It aligns with South Korea’s push to become a more capable maritime security contributor while deepening ties with a like-minded G7 partner whose geography spans the Indo-Pacific and the Arctic. A submarine partnership would be more than a procurement deal: it would signal long-term interoperability, shared undersea awareness, and an industrial relationship that can endure beyond electoral cycles.
Domestically, Seoul’s interests include sustaining its shipbuilding and defence-industrial base, moving up the value chain in high-end naval platforms, and creating stable production pipelines that support jobs and technology development. Internationally, Seoul gains a pathway to broaden its network beyond the traditional U.S.-centric hub by building resilience through trusted middle-power partnerships. For both countries, diversification means reducing single-market and single-supplier exposure, improving supply-chain security, and creating more options to respond to coercion and maritime risks in an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific.
Today’s security consists of food, energy, cyber, and traditional defence as elements essential to maintaining a functioning country. To achieve this goal, working together with partner countries is essential. Climate change, which is opening up Arctic areas, together with changes in the international environment, now offer windows of opportunity for Canada and Korea to go beyond the traditional relationship.
The Canadian submarine patrol project, in this sense, is just one aspect of the momentum bringing about change. Both Korea and Canada share a range of issues that, despite different origins, converge toward similar resolutions, including future energy, population and urban clusters, industrial production, and climate change adaptation. Together, both countries can expand the horizon of cooperation beyond a simple trade partnership.
The recent signing of an agreement between Canada and the Republic of Korea at the Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting in Ottawa to exchange and protect classified military and defence information is another welcome, concrete building block toward improved bilateral cooperation. It builds on the Canada-Korea Security and Defence Cooperation Partnership launched in October of last year and will strengthen the possibilities for collaboration in military procurement and investment.
As middle powers with a long history of cooperation dating back to Canadian participation in the Korean conflict, Canada and Korea have shared interests in promoting stability in the Asia-Pacific region and in cooperating across a range of security issues, ranging from energy security to AI governance to resilient supply chains and procurement and investment.
At a time when the international rules-based trading order is under extreme stress, strong, complementary economies like Korea and Canada can work together to maintain predictable mutually beneficial trade, both through the existing Canada-Korea FTA and by working toward Korean accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Korea’s accession would provide further impetus toward making the CPTPP a model framework for responsible rules-based global trade. It is important that Canada and Korea continue to deepen their dialogue to realize the full potential of a partnership that has strong foundations but which could and should be taken to the next level.
The prospective Korea-Canada submarine partnership is not merely a defence contract. It is a strategic decision with implications for the security architecture of the North Pacific.
For Canada, acquiring a reliable and combat-credible submarine fleet is essential to safeguarding Arctic approaches and maintaining operational relevance in an era of renewed great-power competition. For Korea, the bid reflects an unprecedented level of governmental commitment that is financial, industrial, and political.
South Korea’s KSS-III submarine is a proven platform. It has been delivered on schedule and within budget for the Republic of Korea Navy, demonstrating credible performance and industrial maturity. That reliability is central to the Korean offer, even as some in Seoul question the scale of long-term economic commitments involved. Yet this will not be an easy decision for Ottawa. Germany’s Type 212CD, co-developed by TKMS for Germany and Norway, represents a formidable next-generation concept, emphasizing advanced stealth design and acoustic signature reduction. It embodies Europe’s evolving undersea warfare doctrine.
Ultimately, Canada’s choice will signal more than technical preference. It will reflect how Ottawa balances industrial partnership, alliance diversification, technological risk, and delivery certainty. In a changing order, strategic reliability may prove not to be enough against a next-generation design.
If Canada were to select South Korea as its partner in the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project, the implications would extend beyond the mere procurement of a platform. Such a decision would reflect how Ottawa is adapting to the increasingly interconnected security environment between the Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific.
While faced with Russia’s reemerging maritime aggressiveness in the Atlantic and Arctic, Canada has pronounced a more proactive Indo-Pacific strategy in recent years. Although originating from geographically remote regions, such pressures are strategically not isolated. They stem from a broader pattern of strategic simultaneity where developments in Europe and Northeast Asia are influencing each other. In this context, procurement choices have geopolitical implications.
A partnership with South Korea would indicate diversifying Canada’s defence industrial base while maintaining deep integration within the NATO framework. South Korea’s advanced conventional submarine capability, paired with its expandable shipbuilding capacity, complements Canada’s institutional strength within the Atlantic alliance. Such cooperation would increase Canada’s strategic flexibility and production resilience, rather than replacing its traditional relationship with Europe.
Equally significant, closer maritime and industrial cooperation would create structural linkages when middle powers are expected to contribute more to durable and credible deterrence — which would correspond with Prime Minister Carney’s speech in Davos. In an era defined by multi-theater risk, the ability to connect regions — industrially, operationally, and diplomatically — would prove as consequential as the platform themselves.
Global economic order is being reshaped by economic security concerns, industrial policy competition, and a renewed emphasis on national resilience. In this context, closer alignment between Canada and South Korea reflects not only structural change but renewed political momentum. Following the formation of South Korea’s new government and a rapid succession of high-level meetings between the two leaders, expectations for deeper bilateral cooperation have increased on both sides.
The complementarities between the two economies are particularly evident across critical minerals, defence industrial cooperation, and artificial intelligence. Canada’s resource base can reinforce South Korea’s advanced manufacturing and battery industries, strengthening supply chain resilience. In defence and maritime security, closer industrial collaboration, technology sharing, and structured R&D partnerships could anchor longer-term strategic alignment. In artificial intelligence, Canada’s research depth and talent pool align naturally with South Korea’s applied innovation capacity and industrial scale, creating space for joint positioning within emerging AI value chains.
South Korea’s need to diversify export exposure and manage U.S.–China competition intersects with Canada’s effort to advance its Indo-Pacific strategy. Consolidated through existing frameworks, deeper cooperation would reflect strategic adaptation — a model of middle-power coordination in an era of managed interdependence.
Canada–Korea defence‑industry cooperation is emerging at a moment when both countries are seeking to align economic resilience with broader strategic objectives. Recent announcements highlight that Korea has activated a coordinated whole‑of‑government framework to support long‑term defence‑industrial partnerships abroad, particularly in Canada. This signals Seoul’s commitment to deeper collaboration with trusted partners like Canada. In parallel, Ottawa continues to underline that major capability decisions must deliver sustainable domestic economic value and industrial participation, arguably now as critical as platform performance itself.
It is worth highlighting that this approach resonates with a Pearsonian tradition in Canadian foreign policy. Economic engagement and shared institutional development have long been understood as essential foundations of long‑term security between middle power partners. Applying that logic today, Canada–Korea collaboration looks to move beyond single procurement programs, focusing instead on durable industrial linkages that strengthen resilience across domains, industries, and economies.
Beyond submarines, opportunities exist in sustainment, advanced manufacturing, training, and innovation. These are domains where Canadian and Korean strengths are naturally complementary. As both countries diversify partnerships in response to shifting geopolitical and supply‑chain pressures, though exerted by different entities, deepening economic‑security cooperation offers a principled, future‑focused path forward in an increasingly realist environment.
In this sense, strengthening Canada–Korea defence‑industrial ties goes beyond the transactional. Rather, it reflects a broader Canadian approach of leveraging economic partnerships as a pillar of stability and strategic confidence.
Last week, Canada and the Republic of Korea held their second 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministers meeting in Ottawa to implement the Canada-Republic of Korea Security and Defence Cooperation Partnership announced during Prime Minister Carney’s official visit to South Korea last October. This meeting further deepens and consolidates the comprehensive strategic partnership Canada and the Republic of Korea agreed to in 2022.
This partnership, based on shared values and a shared outlook, looks to consolidate ties and increase synergies at a moment of heightened international tension and instability. It implements the middle power vision to preserve and enhance global order articulated by Prime Minister Carney in his January speech at Davos. Deepening mutual defence cooperation is a tangible investment in greater resilience facing uncertain global threats. Both sides reiterated their support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and independence and decried North Korea’s alignment in support of the Russian aggressor.
The meeting moved forward commitments towards greater defence co-production and armed forces interoperability, with an agreement on the sharing and protection of military and defence classified information. It also worked towards the establishment of an action plan to implement the Defence Cooperation Partnership. This will open the door to highly anticipated cooperation and collaboration in defence production, which will yield significant dividends to enhance the ambitious defence investments committed to by Canada.
Canada has access to the critical minerals South Korea needs to enhance its own security resilience and South Korea has the defence production capacity Canada can rely on to efficiently build up its defence resources. We are fully aligned in strategic values, and complementary in capacity.
Efforts in Seoul and Ottawa to build a more institutionalized partnership are a sign that a fraying global order has created greater incentives for countries caught in the middle to pool their strengths. Canada’s overdue attention towards this front is compensating for lost ground. While a free trade framework has long existed, the current push moves beyond this and towards deepening alignment across strategic economic sectors.
As Ottawa appears to be at the tail end of diminishing returns from North American supply chain integration, industrial cooperation is an underdeveloped area of the commercial relationship that Seoul is equipped to meet. Whether it is auto manufacturing, shipbuilding, or defence sector localization, there is clear room to cultivate Canada-Korea integration with the market depth, technological co-development, and labour force participation that Ottawa traditionally seeks south of the border. The challenge is whether Canadian policymakers are prepared to commit the capital and political will required to genuinely become a Pacific-facing economy.
Recent diplomatic milestones suggest that the Carney and Lee governments are mobilizing more focus than was previously possible. As traditional partnerships face increasing stress tests, Canada and South Korea are pursuing cooperation that is only natural when middle powers face shrinking room to act. Ottawa and Seoul must ensure that the momentum of the past year is not limited to a reactive response to global circumstances. Instead, it must lay the foundation for a multidimensional relationship that will outlast any single election cycle.
The Western powers have failed to effectively manage the increasing threat of proliferation in the Middle East. While the international community is concerned with Iran’s nuclear program, Saudi Arabia has moved forward with developing its own nuclear program, and independent studies show that Israel has longed possessed dozens of nuclear warheads. The former is a member of the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while the latter has refused to sign the international agreement.
On Middle East policy, the Biden campaign had staunchly criticized the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal and it has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier since assuming office in January 2021. However, serious obstacles remain for responsible actors in expanding non-proliferation efforts toward a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.
This panel will discuss how Western powers and multilateral institutions, such as the IAEA, can play a more effective role in managing non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Peggy Mason: Canada’s former Ambassador to the UN for Disarmament
– Mark Fitzpatrick: Associate Fellow & Former Executive Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
– Ali Vaez: Iran Project Director, International Crisis Group
– Negar Mortazavi: Journalist and Political Analyst, Host of Iran Podcast
– David Albright: Founder and President of the Institute for Science and International Security
Closing (5:45 PM – 6:00 PM ET)
What is the current economic landscape in the Middle East? While global foreign direct investment is expected to fall drastically in the post-COVID era, the World Bank reported a 5% contraction in the economic output of the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries in 2020 due to the pandemic. While oil prices are expected to rebound with normalization in demand, political instability, regional and geopolitical tensions, domestic corruption, and a volatile regulatory and legal environment all threaten economic recovery in the Middle East. What is the prospect for economic growth and development in the region post-pandemic, and how could MENA nations promote sustainable growth and regional trade moving forward?
At the same time, Middle Eastern diaspora communities have become financially successful and can help promote trade between North America and the region. In this respect, the diaspora can become vital intermediaries for advancing U.S. and Canada’s business interests abroad. Promoting business diplomacy can both benefit the MENA region and be an effective and positive way to advance engagement and achieve foreign policy goals of the North Atlantic.
This panel will investigate the trade and investment opportunities in the Middle East, discuss how facilitating economic engagement with the region can benefit Canadian and American national interests, and explore relevant policy prescriptions.
Panelists:
– Hon. Sergio Marchi: Canada’s Former Minister of International Trade
– Scott Jolliffe: Chairperson, Canada Arab Business Council
– Esfandyar Batmanghelidj: Founder and Publisher of Bourse & Bazaar
– Nizar Ghanem: Director of Research and Co-founder at Triangle
– Nicki Siamaki: Researcher at Control Risks
The Middle East continues to grapple with violence and instability, particularly in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Fueled by government incompetence and foreign interventions, terrorist insurgencies have imposed severe humanitarian and economic costs on the region. Meanwhile, regional actors have engaged in an unprecedented pursuit of arms accumulation. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have imported billions of both Western and Russian-made weapons and funded militant groups across the region, intending to contain their regional adversaries, particularly Iran. Tehran has also provided sophisticated weaponry to various militia groups across the region to strengthen its geopolitical position against Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Israel.
On the other hand, with international terrorist networks and intense regional rivalry in the Middle East, it is impractical to discuss peace and security without addressing terrorism and the arms race in the region. This panel will primarily discuss the implications of the ongoing arms race in the region and the role of Western powers and multilateral organizations in facilitating trust-building security arrangements among regional stakeholders to limit the proliferation of arms across the Middle East.
Panelists:
Luciano Zaccara: Assistant Professor, Qatar University
Dania Thafer: Executive Director, Gulf International Forum
Kayhan Barzegar: Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Science and Research Branch of Azad University
Barbara Slavin: Director of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council
Sanam Shantyaei: Senior Journalist at France24 & host of Middle East Matters
The emerging regional order in West Asia will have wide-ranging implications for global security. The Biden administration has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier, an initiative staunchly opposed by Israel, while also taking a harder line on Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen. Meanwhile, key regional actors, including Qatar, Iraq, and Oman, have engaged in backchannel efforts to bring Iran and Saudi Arabia to the negotiating table. From a broader geopolitical perspective, with the need to secure its energy imports, China is also expected to increase its footprint in the region and influence the mentioned challenges.
In this evolving landscape, Western powers will be compelled to redefine their strategic priorities and adjust their policies with the new realities in the region. In this panel, we will discuss how the West, including the United States and its allies, can utilize multilateral diplomacy with its adversaries to prevent military escalation in the region. Most importantly, the panel will discuss if a multilateral security dialogue in the Persian Gulf region, proposed by some regional actors, can help reduce tensions among regional foes and produce sustainable peace and development for the region.
Panelists:
– Abdullah Baabood: Academic Researcher and Former Director of the Centre for Gulf Studies, Qatar University
– Trita Parsi: Executive Vice-President, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
– Ebtesam Al-Ketbi: President, Emirates Policy Centre
– Jon Allen: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Israel
– Elizabeth Hagedorn: Washington correspondent for Al-Monitor
Military interventions, political and economic instabilities, and civil unrest in the Middle East have led to a global refugee crisis with an increasing wave of refugees and asylum seekers to Europe and Canada. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has, in myriad ways, exacerbated and contributed to the ongoing security threats and destabilization of the region.
While these challenges pose serious risks to Canadian security, Ottawa will also have the opportunity to limit such risks and prevent a spillover effect vis-à-vis effective humanitarian initiatives in the region. In this panel, we will primarily investigate Canada’s Middle East Strategy’s degree of success in providing humanitarian aid to the region. Secondly, the panel will discuss what programs and initiatives Canada can introduce to further build on the renewed strategy. and more specifically, how Canada can utilize its policy instruments to more effectively deal with the increasing influx of refugees from the Middle East.
Panelists:
Erica Di Ruggiero: Director of Centre for Global Health, University of Toronto
Reyhana Patel: Head of Communications & Government Relations, Islamic Relief Canada
Amir Barmaki: Former Head of UN OCHA in Iran
Catherine Gribbin: Senior Legal Advisor for International and Humanitarian Law, Canadian Red Cross
In 2016, Canada launched an ambitious five-year “Middle East Engagement Strategy” (2016-2021), committing to investing CA$3.5 billion over five years to help establish the necessary conditions for security and stability, alleviate human suffering and enable stabilization programs in the region. In the latest development, during the meeting of the Global Coalition against ISIS, Minister of Foreign Affairs Marc Garneau announced more than $43.6 million in Peace and Stabilization Operations Program funding for 11 projects in Syria and Iraq.
With Canada’s Middle East Engagement Strategy expiring this year, it is time to examine and evaluate this massive investment in the Middle East region in the past five years. More importantly, the panel will discuss a principled and strategic roadmap for the future of Canada’s short-term and long-term engagement in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Ferry de Kerckhove: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Egypt
– Dennis Horak: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
– Chris Kilford: Former Canadian Defence Attaché in Turkey, member of the national board of the Canadian International Council (CIC)
– David Dewitt: University Professor Emeritus, York University
While the United States continues to pull back from certain regional conflicts, reflected by the Biden administration’s decision to halt American backing for Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen and the expected withdrawal from Afghanistan, US troops continue to be stationed across the region. Meanwhile, Russia and China have significantly maintained and even expanded their regional activities. On one hand, the Kremlin has maintained its military presence in Syria, and on the other hand, China has signed an unprecedented 25-year strategic agreement with Iran.
As the global power structure continues to shift, it is essential to analyze the future of the US regional presence under the Biden administration, explore the emerging global rivalry with Russia and China, and at last, investigate the implications of such competition for peace and security in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Dmitri Trenin: Director of Carnegie Moscow Center
– Joost R. Hiltermann: Director of MENA Programme, International Crisis Group
– Roxane Farmanfarmaian: Affiliated Lecturer in International Relations of the Middle East and North Africa, University of Cambridge
– Andrew A. Michta: Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at Marshall Center
– Kelley Vlahos: Senior Advisor, Quincy Institute
The security architecture of the Middle East has undergone rapid transformations in an exceptionally short period. Notable developments include the United States gradual withdrawal from the region, rapprochement between Israel and some GCC states through the Abraham Accords and the rise of Chinese and Russian regional engagement.
With these new trends in the Middle East, it is timely to investigate the security implications of the Biden administration’s Middle East policy. In this respect, we will discuss the Biden team’s new approach vis-à-vis Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The panel will also discuss the role of other major powers, including China and Russia in shaping this new security environment in the region, and how the Biden administration will respond to these powers’ increasing regional presence.
Panelists:
– Sanam Vakil: Deputy Director of MENA Programme at Chatham House
– Denise Natali: Acting Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies & Director of the Center for Strategic Research, National Defense University
– Hassan Ahmadian: Professor of the Middle East and North Africa Studies, University of Tehran
– Abdulaziz Sagar: Chairman, Gulf Research Center
– Andrew Parasiliti: President, Al-Monitor
