Tensions between the United States and Iran have entered a critical phase marked by parallel diplomatic engagement and unprecedented military signalling. Over the past weeks, Washington has significantly expanded its military presence across the Middle East, deploying advanced aircraft, naval assets, and air defence systems in what analysts describe as the largest U.S. force buildups in the region in decades. At the same time, diplomatic channels remain active, with the United States and Iran preparing for another round of negotiations focused on Tehran’s nuclear program following earlier talks in Oman and Geneva that produced limited progress but no breakthrough.
The current moment was further sharpened by President Donald Trump’s remarks at the inaugural Board of Peace conference, where he warned that Iran has roughly 10–15 days to reach a “meaningful deal” or face unspecified but serious consequences. While emphasizing that diplomacy remains his preferred option, the administration’s simultaneous military deployments signal that Washington is preparing credible coercive leverage should negotiations fail. Tehran, for its part, has reiterated that it will not initiate war but would respond forcefully to any attack, while continuing to insist on its right to maintain uranium enrichment and rejecting limitations on its missile capabilities.
Compounding the strategic uncertainty, Iran has intensified military signalling of its own, including joint naval exercises with Russia in the Gulf of Oman and efforts to strengthen its deterrent posture amid growing regional pressure. The convergence of diplomatic deadlines, forward military deployments, and heightened regional tensions has created what many observers view as one of the most volatile moments in U.S.–Iran relations since the 2025 strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities.
Against this backdrop, the Institute for Peace & Diplomacy (IPD) reached out to its network of leading Middle East and international security experts to provide forward-looking strategic assessments on the central question facing policymakers today: War or Deal with Iran? The Diplomatic Countdown amid Military Buildup. Drawing on perspectives from scholars, analysts, and practitioners across multiple regions and strategic communities, this edition of the Strategic Foresight Brief (SFB) presents a collection of expert commentaries examining the evolving crisis, the competing strategic calculations in Washington and Tehran, and the potential trajectories that could shape the next phase of Middle East security dynamics.
Together, these contributions explore the military signals, diplomatic constraints, and regional geopolitical factors that will determine whether the current crisis moves toward escalation, prolonged managed tension, or a negotiated accommodation capable of stabilizing one of the most consequential fault lines in the international system.
Although taking any military action against Iran is not in U.S. interests, President Trump has created conditions in which such action may now be inevitable.
For starters, the demands the Trump administration has reportedly made of Iran are ones that it must know Iran cannot accept. Giving up nuclear enrichment and accepting limits on its ballistic missile program would leave Iran with few defenses against a future attack. This might be tolerable if Iran’s regime also received assurances from the United States that accepting Washington’s terms would allow the country to avoid future attack. But after greenlighting Israeli airstrikes and bombing Iran during negotiations in June 2025, Washington can offer no such assurances. For Tehran, the choice may appear to be between refusing U.S. demands, maintaining its defences, and being attacked for it, or giving up its defences and being attacked later anyway. The first option is certainly more appealing, regardless of the consequences.
In leaving Iran with little room for compromise, President Trump has also backed himself into a corner by surging military hardware into the Middle East. There is now more U.S. air and naval power in the region than at any point since 2003. The current posture can likely only be sustained for so long before Trump will have to decide to make good on his threats or withdraw. Even without a clear objective, Trump may find himself pressed to act because of inertia or to preserve his credibility.
Still, nothing is certain at this point. We know from experience that Trump’s decision-making often defies expectations. He does not feel bound by the constraints or conventions that have guided other presidents. Trump does not appear to have made a final decision, so all options remain on the table.
A deal can be struck only if expectations are managed. There are limits to what can be offered on the table. Going beyond those lines would hinder diplomacy and increase the potentiality of a conflict. Washington would be wise not to try to deprive Iran of what it considers as its rights through negotiations—in the nuclear file or in other aspects pertaining to its national security. Tehran cannot sign a deal that would cripple it in the face of another aggression similar to the one in June of last year.
For a diplomatic breakthrough, there is a need for clear goals. Iran’s goal for engaging Washington is a tradeoff between nuclear transparency/limitations and sanctions relief. Washington’s goals, however, keep fluctuating between no nuclear bomb and zero enrichment, with other issues coming up every now and then. This mismatch is lethal to any understanding, let alone a deal. Iran can accommodate a no-nuclear policy for sanctions relief. Yet, if other American talking points are pushed forth, one can see the unraveling of diplomacy—and military escalation.
A deal can only be based on give-and-take. Setting deadlines and talking of the need for Iran to “capitulate” are not parameters for a deal but submission. If negotiations are aimed at Iran capitulating, then conflict is inevitable. For a more serious engagement aimed at a settlement, the U. S. needs to come to terms with the need for giving Iran what it is after—sanctions relief—for what the U. S. expects to take.
Israel and Iran hawks in Washington would advocate pressure-for-submission. Yet a policymaker needs to take their points with a big load of salt because their previous talking points of an easy win back in June 2025 and Iran being on the verge of collapse in early 2026 have been proven at odds with reality. They are anti-deal, no matter the content.
Facing wide gaps in expectations and red lines, President Trump must decide whether to risk a military campaign with uncertain strategic payoff — or pursue a limited agreement focused narrowly on constraining Iran’s nuclear program.
In the coming days, President Donald Trump may face one of the most consequential foreign policy decisions of his presidency — a decision that could shape the Middle East for years to come.
Despite an unprecedented U.S. force posture in the region, the core question is not military capability. It is a strategic purpose. Will the administration be prepared to negotiate a dramatic limitation of Iran’s nuclear program alone? Or will it insist on expanding the scope of any agreement to include ballistic missiles and Tehran’s support for regional proxies — demands that, while strategically understandable, could render diplomacy virtually impossible given Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s publicly declared red lines?
The United States retains overwhelming military superiority. It has the capacity to strike Iranian targets for weeks, degrade key elements of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and significantly damage strategic infrastructure.
But what is the endgame?
Airpower alone is unlikely to collapse the regime. Nor is it clear that a sustained military campaign would produce meaningful concessions at the negotiating table. On the contrary, escalation could harden Tehran’s posture while activating Iran’s asymmetric toolkit — precision-guided missiles, drones, cyber capabilities, and a network of regional partners capable of targeting U.S. forces and allies.
Behind the scenes, regional actors are attempting to shape Washington’s calculus.
Israel views the current moment as a rare strategic opportunity to significantly degrade Iran’s long-term capabilities and potentially weaken the regime’s internal stability. Several Gulf states, however, are deeply concerned about the consequences of a broader regional conflict — including economic disruption, energy market instability, and the unpredictable fallout of potential regime destabilization in Tehran.
Complicating matters further is a profound trust deficit. The Iranian leadership remains deeply skeptical of U.S. intentions, viewing maximalist demands as a strategy for regime weakening rather than genuine compromise. At the same time, President Trump has expressed visible frustration with Iran’s unwillingness to respond positively to American overtures.
Any pathway toward de-escalation would require a credible off-ramp — a mechanism that allows both sides to claim strategic success domestically. Designing such a framework, amid mutual suspicion and maximalist rhetoric, will be extraordinarily difficult.
Any decision – escalation or limited accommodation will have far-reaching implications: for U.S.–Israel relations, for America’s Gulf partnerships, for global energy markets, and for the internal trajectory of the Iranian regime itself.
The Middle East stands at a historic inflection point. The choice made in Washington will not simply determine the next phase of U.S.–Iran tensions, it will shape the regional balance of power for the foreseeable future.
The military tensions between the United States and Iran have escalated rapidly since mid-February, even as the two sides prepare for a third round of negotiations expected to focus on final proposals on the nuclear issue. Iran continues to insist that its nuclear program is strictly peaceful, while Washington has maintained a position opposing any enrichment on Iranian soil. In addition, the United States is likely to press for limits on Iran’s ballistic missile program—an issue Tehran has firmly rejected. Should Washington soften its positions on either enrichment or missile restrictions in the upcoming talks, the negotiations could still yield positive results.
For Iran, however, the nuclear enrichment is closely tied to national dignity, while its ballistic missile program is viewed as essential to deterrence and self-defence, making meaningful concessions on these issues highly unlikely. As a result, the current situation carries a heightened risk of military escalation, even though the underlying U.S. objective may be to use pressure and military signalling to push Iran toward a negotiated settlement.
Regionally, the Middle East increasingly appears divided into three broad camps: the countries aligned with the Abraham Accords; the so-called “resistance axis,” with Iran as its central pillar; and a third grouping—including Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Qatar, Oman, and Egypt—that has opposed Israeli military actions largely through diplomatic channels. A strike on Iran would therefore not only challenge the resistance axis but could also expose the limitations of this third camp’s diplomatic approach to regional stability. So to show American control of the situation, the US should restrain Israel rather than assist it.
This crisis is qualitatively distinct. It follows a chain of events: talks collapsed early last year; Israel struck Iranian nuclear sites last June; the United States followed with B-2 bomber attacks that degraded but did not eliminate the program. Both sides now grasp the real costs of failure, elevating strategic, domestic, and reputational stakes far beyond any prior cycle.
The U.S. posture is unambiguous and strike-ready, with the largest Middle East buildup since 2003. The USS Abraham Lincoln, positioned approximately 700km off Iran’s coast with F-35s and F-18s within striking range, is now joined by the USS Gerald R. Ford transiting toward the eastern Mediterranean, while over 50 additional F-35s, F-22s, and F-16s have flooded the region within the past 48 hours alone.
Iran stands strategically exposed, with degraded nuclear infrastructure, decapitated commanders, thousands of protesters killed in January’s uprising, with continued anti-government demonstrations, and weakened regional proxies. Geneva talks yielded cautious “guiding principles,” with Tehran reportedly offering only a 3–5 year enrichment suspension, explicitly designed to outlast Trump’s term, rather than the permanent dismantlement demanded by Washington. Simultaneous Russia-Iran naval drills in the Gulf of Oman, including anti-ship missile launches and a Russian corvette docked at Bandar Abbas, signal alignment while raising the political cost of U.S. action without providing Tehran genuine military cover.
In this context, prolonged managed escalation remains the most probable trajectory. Iran may submit a calibrated, time-buying proposal while Trump reframes interim extensions as “progress,” allowing negotiations to continue even as military forces remain forward-deployed and the risk of miscalculation steadily compounds.
Should Iran’s final proposal be judged insufficient, the likelihood of a limited U.S.–Israeli strike increases, potentially prompting Iranian retaliation against U.S. bases in the region and disruption around the Strait of Hormuz—the chokepoint through which roughly 31% of global seaborne crude transits. The diplomatic window, while narrow, remains open; however, the two sides appear closer to outright conflict than they were even a week ago.
As of writing, the regional file is defined by strategic duality. Diplomatic engagement between Washington and Tehran continues, yet U.S. force deployments to the region resemble levels not seen since 2003. Negotiation and escalation now operate in parallel, creating acute uncertainty across Gulf capitals.
More consequential is the transformation of Gulf threat perception. For decades, Iran was viewed as the principal state-based threat to Gulf security. That hierarchy has shifted. Israeli unilateral military actions following 7 October (particularly the September 2025 strike on Qatar) are increasingly regarded within Gulf policymaking circles as the most immediate threat to regional stability. Regardless of varied public rhetoric, there is a growing consensus that Israeli unilateralism reflects an attempt to impose regional hegemony through coercive force.
This reassessment coincides with Saudi–Iranian rapprochement, political transition in Damascus more aligned with Gulf interests, and Iran’s relative weakening—factors that have reduced the immediacy of the Iranian threat while elevating concern over destabilizing unilateral use of force by Israel. This is also complicated by the fact that both Israel and the Gulf states are important partners with the US, and this explains US attempts to mediate differences, especially between Qatar and Israel.
Three trajectories are plausible: a limited U.S.–Iran nuclear agreement followed by broader de-escalation; a contained military exchange preceding negotiation; or full regional confrontation. The latter would jeopardize state cohesion and development across the Gulf.
Policy must therefore support a U.S.–Iran understanding while advancing a Gulf-led regional security framework. Crucially, the sponsorship of armed non-state actors—by multiple regional states—must end. Proxy politics have undermined state centrality for over a decade. Stability is not optional; it is the prerequisite for Gulf prosperity and Vision 2030 ambitions.
Although Iran is negotiating with the United States from a position of perceived weakness, it can still generate leverage through strategy rather than escalation.
Iran has been weakened by the degradation of its “axis of resistance” — Hamas, Hezbollah, Iraqi militias and the Houthis — following joint US and Israeli actions. US “maximum pressure” sanctions continue to strain its economy, while domestic protests have challenged the regime’s legitimacy. Reliance on coercion may preserve short-term control but weakens long-term bargaining power.
A battle plan published by Tasnim outlines Iran’s preferred approach: asymmetric deterrence. Instead of defeating the US militarily, Iran would aim to make conflict costly and unpredictable through missile and drone strikes, proxy activation, cyberattacks and potential disruption of the Strait of Hormuz. The objective is to raise the price of confrontation. However, this strategy has limits: proxy networks are degraded, the US retains military superiority, and closing Hormuz would harm Iran’s own economy.
Negotiation offers a more credible path. Iran could limit uranium enrichment and place stockpiles under international supervision in exchange for structured sanctions relief. Creative mechanisms — such as a Swiss-based intermediary to manage oil sales — could give Iran economic breathing space while allowing Washington oversight.
A lasting deal would require mutual non-aggression, reduced proxy activity and broader political reform. Ultimately, negotiating from weakness demands realism, strategic leverage and mutually beneficial compromise rather than zero-sum escalation.
The Western powers have failed to effectively manage the increasing threat of proliferation in the Middle East. While the international community is concerned with Iran’s nuclear program, Saudi Arabia has moved forward with developing its own nuclear program, and independent studies show that Israel has longed possessed dozens of nuclear warheads. The former is a member of the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while the latter has refused to sign the international agreement.
On Middle East policy, the Biden campaign had staunchly criticized the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal and it has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier since assuming office in January 2021. However, serious obstacles remain for responsible actors in expanding non-proliferation efforts toward a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.
This panel will discuss how Western powers and multilateral institutions, such as the IAEA, can play a more effective role in managing non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Peggy Mason: Canada’s former Ambassador to the UN for Disarmament
– Mark Fitzpatrick: Associate Fellow & Former Executive Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
– Ali Vaez: Iran Project Director, International Crisis Group
– Negar Mortazavi: Journalist and Political Analyst, Host of Iran Podcast
– David Albright: Founder and President of the Institute for Science and International Security
Closing (5:45 PM – 6:00 PM ET)
What is the current economic landscape in the Middle East? While global foreign direct investment is expected to fall drastically in the post-COVID era, the World Bank reported a 5% contraction in the economic output of the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries in 2020 due to the pandemic. While oil prices are expected to rebound with normalization in demand, political instability, regional and geopolitical tensions, domestic corruption, and a volatile regulatory and legal environment all threaten economic recovery in the Middle East. What is the prospect for economic growth and development in the region post-pandemic, and how could MENA nations promote sustainable growth and regional trade moving forward?
At the same time, Middle Eastern diaspora communities have become financially successful and can help promote trade between North America and the region. In this respect, the diaspora can become vital intermediaries for advancing U.S. and Canada’s business interests abroad. Promoting business diplomacy can both benefit the MENA region and be an effective and positive way to advance engagement and achieve foreign policy goals of the North Atlantic.
This panel will investigate the trade and investment opportunities in the Middle East, discuss how facilitating economic engagement with the region can benefit Canadian and American national interests, and explore relevant policy prescriptions.
Panelists:
– Hon. Sergio Marchi: Canada’s Former Minister of International Trade
– Scott Jolliffe: Chairperson, Canada Arab Business Council
– Esfandyar Batmanghelidj: Founder and Publisher of Bourse & Bazaar
– Nizar Ghanem: Director of Research and Co-founder at Triangle
– Nicki Siamaki: Researcher at Control Risks
The Middle East continues to grapple with violence and instability, particularly in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Fueled by government incompetence and foreign interventions, terrorist insurgencies have imposed severe humanitarian and economic costs on the region. Meanwhile, regional actors have engaged in an unprecedented pursuit of arms accumulation. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have imported billions of both Western and Russian-made weapons and funded militant groups across the region, intending to contain their regional adversaries, particularly Iran. Tehran has also provided sophisticated weaponry to various militia groups across the region to strengthen its geopolitical position against Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Israel.
On the other hand, with international terrorist networks and intense regional rivalry in the Middle East, it is impractical to discuss peace and security without addressing terrorism and the arms race in the region. This panel will primarily discuss the implications of the ongoing arms race in the region and the role of Western powers and multilateral organizations in facilitating trust-building security arrangements among regional stakeholders to limit the proliferation of arms across the Middle East.
Panelists:
Luciano Zaccara: Assistant Professor, Qatar University
Dania Thafer: Executive Director, Gulf International Forum
Kayhan Barzegar: Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Science and Research Branch of Azad University
Barbara Slavin: Director of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council
Sanam Shantyaei: Senior Journalist at France24 & host of Middle East Matters
The emerging regional order in West Asia will have wide-ranging implications for global security. The Biden administration has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier, an initiative staunchly opposed by Israel, while also taking a harder line on Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen. Meanwhile, key regional actors, including Qatar, Iraq, and Oman, have engaged in backchannel efforts to bring Iran and Saudi Arabia to the negotiating table. From a broader geopolitical perspective, with the need to secure its energy imports, China is also expected to increase its footprint in the region and influence the mentioned challenges.
In this evolving landscape, Western powers will be compelled to redefine their strategic priorities and adjust their policies with the new realities in the region. In this panel, we will discuss how the West, including the United States and its allies, can utilize multilateral diplomacy with its adversaries to prevent military escalation in the region. Most importantly, the panel will discuss if a multilateral security dialogue in the Persian Gulf region, proposed by some regional actors, can help reduce tensions among regional foes and produce sustainable peace and development for the region.
Panelists:
– Abdullah Baabood: Academic Researcher and Former Director of the Centre for Gulf Studies, Qatar University
– Trita Parsi: Executive Vice-President, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
– Ebtesam Al-Ketbi: President, Emirates Policy Centre
– Jon Allen: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Israel
– Elizabeth Hagedorn: Washington correspondent for Al-Monitor
Military interventions, political and economic instabilities, and civil unrest in the Middle East have led to a global refugee crisis with an increasing wave of refugees and asylum seekers to Europe and Canada. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has, in myriad ways, exacerbated and contributed to the ongoing security threats and destabilization of the region.
While these challenges pose serious risks to Canadian security, Ottawa will also have the opportunity to limit such risks and prevent a spillover effect vis-à-vis effective humanitarian initiatives in the region. In this panel, we will primarily investigate Canada’s Middle East Strategy’s degree of success in providing humanitarian aid to the region. Secondly, the panel will discuss what programs and initiatives Canada can introduce to further build on the renewed strategy. and more specifically, how Canada can utilize its policy instruments to more effectively deal with the increasing influx of refugees from the Middle East.
Panelists:
Erica Di Ruggiero: Director of Centre for Global Health, University of Toronto
Reyhana Patel: Head of Communications & Government Relations, Islamic Relief Canada
Amir Barmaki: Former Head of UN OCHA in Iran
Catherine Gribbin: Senior Legal Advisor for International and Humanitarian Law, Canadian Red Cross
In 2016, Canada launched an ambitious five-year “Middle East Engagement Strategy” (2016-2021), committing to investing CA$3.5 billion over five years to help establish the necessary conditions for security and stability, alleviate human suffering and enable stabilization programs in the region. In the latest development, during the meeting of the Global Coalition against ISIS, Minister of Foreign Affairs Marc Garneau announced more than $43.6 million in Peace and Stabilization Operations Program funding for 11 projects in Syria and Iraq.
With Canada’s Middle East Engagement Strategy expiring this year, it is time to examine and evaluate this massive investment in the Middle East region in the past five years. More importantly, the panel will discuss a principled and strategic roadmap for the future of Canada’s short-term and long-term engagement in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Ferry de Kerckhove: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Egypt
– Dennis Horak: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
– Chris Kilford: Former Canadian Defence Attaché in Turkey, member of the national board of the Canadian International Council (CIC)
– David Dewitt: University Professor Emeritus, York University
While the United States continues to pull back from certain regional conflicts, reflected by the Biden administration’s decision to halt American backing for Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen and the expected withdrawal from Afghanistan, US troops continue to be stationed across the region. Meanwhile, Russia and China have significantly maintained and even expanded their regional activities. On one hand, the Kremlin has maintained its military presence in Syria, and on the other hand, China has signed an unprecedented 25-year strategic agreement with Iran.
As the global power structure continues to shift, it is essential to analyze the future of the US regional presence under the Biden administration, explore the emerging global rivalry with Russia and China, and at last, investigate the implications of such competition for peace and security in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Dmitri Trenin: Director of Carnegie Moscow Center
– Joost R. Hiltermann: Director of MENA Programme, International Crisis Group
– Roxane Farmanfarmaian: Affiliated Lecturer in International Relations of the Middle East and North Africa, University of Cambridge
– Andrew A. Michta: Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at Marshall Center
– Kelley Vlahos: Senior Advisor, Quincy Institute
The security architecture of the Middle East has undergone rapid transformations in an exceptionally short period. Notable developments include the United States gradual withdrawal from the region, rapprochement between Israel and some GCC states through the Abraham Accords and the rise of Chinese and Russian regional engagement.
With these new trends in the Middle East, it is timely to investigate the security implications of the Biden administration’s Middle East policy. In this respect, we will discuss the Biden team’s new approach vis-à-vis Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The panel will also discuss the role of other major powers, including China and Russia in shaping this new security environment in the region, and how the Biden administration will respond to these powers’ increasing regional presence.
Panelists:
– Sanam Vakil: Deputy Director of MENA Programme at Chatham House
– Denise Natali: Acting Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies & Director of the Center for Strategic Research, National Defense University
– Hassan Ahmadian: Professor of the Middle East and North Africa Studies, University of Tehran
– Abdulaziz Sagar: Chairman, Gulf Research Center
– Andrew Parasiliti: President, Al-Monitor
