The newly coined ‘Donroe Doctrine’ has dominated headlines in the opening weeks of 2026, as the U.S. administration dramatically escalates its efforts to reassert predominance in the Western Hemisphere. Following months of an intensifying pressure campaign against Caracas, the U.S. carried out an unprecedented military strike against Venezuela on January 3rd, resulting in the capture of President Nicolás Maduro. In its aftermath, President Trump announced his intent to oversee Venezuelan governance for the foreseeable future, appropriate its vast oil reserves, and issued subsequent sovereignty-related threats to multiple countries across the Western Hemisphere.
These actions have prompted vast global outcry and rigorous debate on their implications for Venezuela, expanding U.S. influence in the region, and further erosion of the international rules-based order. This edition of the Strategic Foresight Brief, titled ‘Operation Absolute Resolve: Hemispheric Dominance under the Monroe Doctrine”, synthesizes a range of expert analyses. While opinions differ on the immediate objectives and long-term success of the U.S. military operation, their assessments collectively highlight how the operation may reshape hemispheric security, recalibrate relationships with traditional U.S. allies, and reconfigure great-power competition in the region.
Below, find concise, policy-oriented summaries of each contributor’s insights, offering a diverse evaluation of the intervention and foresight into how a revived Monroe Doctrine may continue to take shape throughout the Western Hemisphere.
This past September, President Trump and Secretary Hegseth spoke to reporters in the Oval Office to announce the renaming of the U.S. Department of Defense to the “Department of War.” During his remarks, Hegseth stated that the “new” department would focus on “Maximum lethality, not tepid legality. Violent effect, not politically correct.”
Few lines have captured the administration’s foreign policy approach more succinctly. It is not a stretch to draw a line from such rhetoric directly to the escalating attacks by the U.S. military off the coast of Venezuela and to the eventual capture of Maduro – showcasing, both in discourse and in practice, not only a rejection but an open hostility to previously held norms and principles.
Hegseth’s Oval Office comments are but one example of increasingly illiberal discourse by various officials, feeding into a larger administration-wide foreign policy narrative that aims to minimize human rights and international law while prioritizing a more kinetic, “effective” form of amoral hard power, supposedly unencumbered by liberal norms and ethical concerns. There is now little to no gap between the bombastic rhetoric of administration officials and the policies they elect to pursue. As laid out in the recent National Security Strategy (NSS), the U.S. will leverage its hard power capabilities to “assert and enforce a ‘Trump Corollary’ to the Monroe Doctrine” – now perhaps more infamously self-coined the “Donroe Doctrine.”
Whether on the pages of the NSS or in the latest press briefing, the administration is shaping and projecting new U.S. foreign policy narratives – ones that reject the efficacy of liberal values and associated principles vis-à-vis U.S. national interests and openly challenge the norms, arrangements, and alliances forged under the international system of the past eighty years.
The attempt to disaggregate the use of power from any sense of moral restraint or related normative principles informed by liberal values may have dire consequences. With regard to Venezuela, time will tell whether this action represents an attempt at broader regime change or a transactional extraction of a world leader for greater access to resources. However, if the Trump administration judges that the Maduro operation went “well” and the U.S. Congress continues its lackluster oversight re: military force, it is pertinent to ask: What might be next on the hemispheric hard-power checklist? Greenland? Cuba?
We also must consider the broader – and potentially more dangerous – macro implications. If the U.S. abandons any semblance of support for shared norms around sovereignty and international law, both in its discourse and in its actions, it may set the stage for other great powers to more aggressively expand their own geographic spheres of influence.
The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS), which defines and prioritizes a “reasonably stable” Western Hemisphere as a core national interest of the United States, is grounded in sound, common sense logic. Hemispheric hegemony is a strategic advantage which the United States can and should protect. Despite its sensible prioritization, it is the area putting the administration’s strategic vision most at risk of drifting off course from America First principles defined in the NSS, namely “a focused definition of the national interest, a predisposition to non-interventionism, and flexible realism.”
The “Donroe Doctrine” outlines what the United States seeks in the region – a level of stability to prevent illegal migration and drugs from reaching American soil, U.S. hegemony over key locations and ability to move freely, and defense from hostile incursion. What is missing is an articulation of realistic means to achieve such ends, recognizing that the Western Hemisphere is not our only strategic priority and acknowledging that the administration is still subject to the limits of scarce resources and tradeoffs.
The lack of direction on the extent of the administration’s intervention in Venezuela and answers to questions of second and third order effects following the tactical success of Operation Absolute Resolve further underscores how the lack of alignment between ends and means increases the risk of miscalculation. The administration still has time to recalibrate to avoid repeating the mistakes the NSS warns against, and bring the Donroe Doctrine back in alignment strategically with America First core principles. Finding an off-ramp away from further military intervention is a critical first step and President Trump has already signaled a degree of temperance by calling off a second wave of attack. Additionally, how the forthcoming National Defense Strategy further contours the Donroe Doctrine will serve as a valuable directional indicator.
The recent U.S. military intervention in Venezuela, resulting in the capture of President Nicolás Maduro, represents a direct and forceful application of America’s revived Monroe Doctrine. This action, framed within a new National Security Strategy, seeks to achieve several immediate objectives: overthrowing a hostile government, seizing control of the nation’s vast oil reserves, and expelling the strategic influence of rivals like China and Russia. In the short term, this calculus may well succeed, creating the illusion of a swift and decisive victory that strengthens the U.S. position in its own Hemisphere.
However, this initial success is likely to give way to profound and enduring challenges. History suggests that foreign invasions, especially those perceived as resource grabs, ignite powerful nationalist resistance. Venezuela’s complex political landscape and history of internal strife make it a notoriously difficult country to control from the outside. The U.S. may thus find itself entangled in a protracted and costly occupation, facing an insurgency that undermines any temporary stability gained by the initial invasion.
Furthermore, the global repercussions will be severe. This blatant act of aggression has already drawn sharp condemnation from other major powers and has alienated even America’s traditional allies. This pattern of unilateral aggression has raised existential concerns among allies, exemplified by Trump’s simultaneous serious talk about annexing Greenland, a Danish territory. This has prompted Denmark’s prime minister to warn that such an action against a NATO ally would “directly end” the alliance, while European leaders united in condemning the threats. The overt pursuit of oil wealth severely damages America’s international reputation, casting it as a neo-colonial power and undermining the rules-based order it claims to uphold.
Ultimately, while the intervention achieves a narrow tactical goal, it strategically isolates the United States. It fuels long-term regional instability, accelerates the decline of American moral authority, and demonstrates that in the 21st century, raw military power alone cannot sustainably impose control or legitimacy. The long-term costs are poised to far outweigh the temporary gains.
The United States has always faced a dilemma in Latin America. If we are indifferent to the character of the regimes in our extended neighbourhood, we run the risk that rival powers and their ideologies will expand in our vicinity, to the detriment of our security. This was not only a concern at the time of the Monroe Doctrine, but it was also an inconvenience we experienced during the Cold War, when Cuba and at times other Latin American states aligned with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the United States cannot realistically transform the region’s states into a mirror image of itself through “nation-building” and “democracy promotion,” whether by hard power or soft.
The Monroe Doctrine struck a balance: We would not try to foment revolution among Europe’s Latin American colonies, but we would not countenance efforts by European powers to establish new colonies or reconquer colonies in rebellion, either. The presence of outside powers could be tolerated within the established limits; any expansion beyond those limits, or attempt to reassert such power where it had been lost, would not be countenanced.
The 2025 National Security Strategy similarly balances between the twin extremes of neglecting our interests in the region and attempting to do too much. The “Donroe Doctrine,” as President Trump himself has dubbed the principle behind the capture of Nicolas Maduro, is of a piece not only with the NSS but also with the Monroe Doctrine and its underlying principles. Venezuela under Maduro was increasingly a client and, in strategic terms, a colony of China and Russia. It was a source of much mischief to the United States, including migration and drug trafficking. Such mischief cannot be allowed to continue, or increase, under the sponsorship of powers from outside the region.
In the 21st century, effective application of the Monroe Doctrine must take account of what “colonization” now means: it means economic and ideological subordination to a faraway power, not settlement or direct political control. The “Donroe Doctrine” and National Security Strategy aim to prevent modern violations of Monroe Doctrine principles. In seeking to do this, however, policymakers must beware of the other horn of the classic dilemma. While counteracting the global influence of China and others whose interests are incompatible with our own requires the use of soft and at times hard power—with attendant advantages to U.S. economic and ideological positions (that is, in countering outside influence, we don’t create vacuum but rather fill the gap with some of our own influence)—attempts to use hard and soft power to turn Latin American states into copies us, compliant to our will, are apt to prove futile at best and counterproductive at worst, leading to anti-U.S. backlash and a greater desire for powers from outside our hemisphere to support anti-U.S. movements and states.
By removing Maduro without taking on the burden of full-scale regime change, the administration has acted in keeping with the Monroe Doctrine. Venezuela may or may not come to adopt a more democratic and liberal form of government, but even if it does not, President Trump has conveyed an important lesson not only to Venezuela but to all the region’s states that cooperation with the U.S. leads to greater security and prosperity, while hostility to the U.S. and cooperation with outside powers leads to severe consequences for the leaders responsible for such decisions.
The Trump Doctrine represents neither a return to classical isolationism nor a revival of early twentieth-century hemispheric defense. Instead, it securitizes economic competition and reframes American power around a logic of global economic great-power rivalry, in which force is used not to export ideology or uphold abstract norms, but to secure material advantage. The Western Hemisphere, in this conception, is treated less as a defensive buffer than as a strategic resource zone whose energy reserves, supply chains, and markets must remain firmly under U.S. control.
This approach marks a clear departure from the original Monroe Doctrine. Monroe’s vision was fundamentally passive and anti-imperial: it sought to keep European powers out of the Americas without committing the United States to continuous intervention or management. It rested on restraint, distance, and a narrow understanding of American interests, emphasizing non-entanglement rather than dominance.
The Roosevelt Corollary transformed this posture by justifying U.S. intervention on security and order-maintenance grounds. Roosevelt argued that chronic instability or external threats in the hemisphere could compel American action to preempt European intervention. Though imperial in effect, this logic remained fundamentally strategic: intervention was framed as a response to disorder, collapse, or security threats rather than as an assertion of permanent economic control.
The Trump Doctrine breaks decisively with both. It is neither defensive nor passive. It broadens America First by adopting the logic of regionalism and sphere of influence. This approach treats the post-liberal international system as a zero-sum arena in which access to resources, critical infrastructure, and markets defines power. Thus preventing extra-regional rivals—particularly China and Russia—from gaining economic footholds becomes a strategic end in itself. Ideology is secondary; regime type is irrelevant. What matters is compliance, deal-making, and alignment with U.S. commercial interests.
Under this doctrine, intervention need not be provoked by imminent threats or instability. Economic non-alignment alone can justify coercion. Within America’s new sphere of influence, sovereignty becomes conditional, and military power is wielded not to govern, but to enforce regional hierarchy—policing access rather than administering order. In this sense, the Trump Doctrine signals a shift from security management to resource competition by military power, with the Americas recast as an economic hinterland to be defended, disciplined, and monopolized.
Operation Absolute Resolve operationalizes the U.S. intent to revive the Monroe Doctrine, as outlined in the administration’s recent National Security Strategy. This raid sought, among other objectives, to reassert American preeminence throughout the Western Hemisphere and corrode the influence of external powers in the region. However, Trump’s unilateral aggression against Venezuela and subsequent threats toward Colombia, Mexico, Cuba, and Greenland are likely to prove counterproductive in consolidating U.S. influence. Whether these subsequent threats are substantive, for negotiation leverage or merely performative posturing, countries across the Western Hemisphere, and throughout Europe, are likely to view this as the most overt signal yet to diversify away from reliance on the United States.
Traditional U.S. allies are confronting the reality that America is abandoning its liberal international order that long ensured their collective security, toward a more unilateral, transactional, and hemispherically focused approach. They are beginning to recognize that their democratic values may no longer shield them from American imperialist impulses. This is particularly evident for Denmark and across Europe, where NATO is facing an unprecedented existential crisis. While not explicitly listed among the latest threats, this also resonates in Canada, where concerns about becoming a 51st state remain vivid in the public’s memory. Counterintuitively, Trump’s campaign of threats may therefore intensify global great-power competition, as countries pragmatically pivot away from what they perceive as an unpredictable, maximalist state. Other powers are likely to capitalize on this strategic hedging, and the result may be a more fragmented Western Hemisphere.
This escalation of the ‘Donroe Doctrine’ also foreshadows the global implications of unchecked regional ambition, as middle and great powers may be emboldened to act assertively within their spheres of influence, increasingly unconstrained by the need to justify aggression under international law. This shift may catalyze a structural transformation of the international order, rendering multilateralism, collective security, and economic stewardship increasingly obsolete.
Operation Absolute Resolve is widely considered a tactical and operational success. The United States demonstrates its ability to achieve strategic primacy through contained, limited intervention and does not commit to a long-term nation‑building project. By withdrawing from extended occupation, the U.S. administration adheres to a restrained interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. Rather than instilling a new government, Washington leverages calibrated economic incentives and selective diplomatic engagement to shape the Venezuelan political landscape in accordance with U.S. national interests.
This intervention reinforces the administration’s logic that the selective use of hard power, coupled with strategic economic coercion, can safeguard American interests without provoking insurgency or regional backlash. In response, regional countries recalibrate their behaviour to prioritize managed cooperation with Washington over potentially detrimental alignment with U.S. adversaries. The administration achieves measured influence rather than overt control, reflecting a balance between its stated “predisposition to non-interventionism” and its pursuit of American preeminence.
The United States fails to develop a credible off-ramp following its initial intervention and becomes increasingly entangled in Venezuela’s political and security dynamics. An unclear exit strategy leads Washington to drift toward a prolonged military presence and indirect (or direct) governance responsibilities. Venezuelan nationalist resentment toward U.S. imperialist and resource‑driven intervention intensifies. Prolonged U.S. occupation, coupled with weak governance and resulting power vacuums, fuels insurgency and undermines any temporary gains achieved by the initial operation.
Prolonged instability in Venezuela strains U.S. resources and fuels growing domestic political backlash, particularly among the restrainers within MAGA. Political headwinds influence voter sentiment in the 2026 midterm elections, potentially constraining the administration’s ability to sustain an aggressive regional posture.
Rather than consolidating U.S. influence, the use of hard power drives Latin American states to bolster their own military and security capabilities, while deepening ties with other great powers such as China and Russia to protect their sovereignty and economic interests.
Traditional allies, such as Canada and European countries, are directly confronted with Washington’s diminishing moral authority and increasingly transactional approach, also pivot and diversify their economic and security relationships away from the United States. Indications of this dynamic are exemplified by Prime Minister Carney’s visit to China, which resulted in a discussions on security dynamics in the Americans and a new strategic partnership with Beijing.
Smaller regional alliances form, exemplified by the deployment of European NATO member forces to Greenland amid continued U.S. threats about the territory’s status. Initial tactical victories in Venezuela, rather than reinforcing U.S. hegemony, fuel a dynamic of pragmatic realignment and allied resistance that weakens traditional security frameworks.
As the United States increasingly rejects the normative principles of the liberal international order that have underpinned global governance for more than eighty years, international law and multilateral institutions erode in authority and credibility. Operation Absolute Resolve catalyzes this shift, with the administration now aggressively advancing a revived Monroe Doctrine. This, in turn, emboldens other great powers such as China and Russia to more assertively expand their respective spheres of influence, accelerating the emergence of competing visions of power.
Countries turn toward alternative or bloc-based security arrangements and economic architectures that operate alongside, or in place of, traditional multilateral mechanisms. Under this trajectory, the U.S. push for hemispheric dominance signals a shift away from a rules-based global system toward a fragmented, multipolar order defined by competing regional hegemonies.
The Western powers have failed to effectively manage the increasing threat of proliferation in the Middle East. While the international community is concerned with Iran’s nuclear program, Saudi Arabia has moved forward with developing its own nuclear program, and independent studies show that Israel has longed possessed dozens of nuclear warheads. The former is a member of the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while the latter has refused to sign the international agreement.
On Middle East policy, the Biden campaign had staunchly criticized the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal and it has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier since assuming office in January 2021. However, serious obstacles remain for responsible actors in expanding non-proliferation efforts toward a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.
This panel will discuss how Western powers and multilateral institutions, such as the IAEA, can play a more effective role in managing non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Peggy Mason: Canada’s former Ambassador to the UN for Disarmament
– Mark Fitzpatrick: Associate Fellow & Former Executive Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
– Ali Vaez: Iran Project Director, International Crisis Group
– Negar Mortazavi: Journalist and Political Analyst, Host of Iran Podcast
– David Albright: Founder and President of the Institute for Science and International Security
Closing (5:45 PM – 6:00 PM ET)
What is the current economic landscape in the Middle East? While global foreign direct investment is expected to fall drastically in the post-COVID era, the World Bank reported a 5% contraction in the economic output of the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries in 2020 due to the pandemic. While oil prices are expected to rebound with normalization in demand, political instability, regional and geopolitical tensions, domestic corruption, and a volatile regulatory and legal environment all threaten economic recovery in the Middle East. What is the prospect for economic growth and development in the region post-pandemic, and how could MENA nations promote sustainable growth and regional trade moving forward?
At the same time, Middle Eastern diaspora communities have become financially successful and can help promote trade between North America and the region. In this respect, the diaspora can become vital intermediaries for advancing U.S. and Canada’s business interests abroad. Promoting business diplomacy can both benefit the MENA region and be an effective and positive way to advance engagement and achieve foreign policy goals of the North Atlantic.
This panel will investigate the trade and investment opportunities in the Middle East, discuss how facilitating economic engagement with the region can benefit Canadian and American national interests, and explore relevant policy prescriptions.
Panelists:
– Hon. Sergio Marchi: Canada’s Former Minister of International Trade
– Scott Jolliffe: Chairperson, Canada Arab Business Council
– Esfandyar Batmanghelidj: Founder and Publisher of Bourse & Bazaar
– Nizar Ghanem: Director of Research and Co-founder at Triangle
– Nicki Siamaki: Researcher at Control Risks
The Middle East continues to grapple with violence and instability, particularly in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Fueled by government incompetence and foreign interventions, terrorist insurgencies have imposed severe humanitarian and economic costs on the region. Meanwhile, regional actors have engaged in an unprecedented pursuit of arms accumulation. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have imported billions of both Western and Russian-made weapons and funded militant groups across the region, intending to contain their regional adversaries, particularly Iran. Tehran has also provided sophisticated weaponry to various militia groups across the region to strengthen its geopolitical position against Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Israel.
On the other hand, with international terrorist networks and intense regional rivalry in the Middle East, it is impractical to discuss peace and security without addressing terrorism and the arms race in the region. This panel will primarily discuss the implications of the ongoing arms race in the region and the role of Western powers and multilateral organizations in facilitating trust-building security arrangements among regional stakeholders to limit the proliferation of arms across the Middle East.
Panelists:
Luciano Zaccara: Assistant Professor, Qatar University
Dania Thafer: Executive Director, Gulf International Forum
Kayhan Barzegar: Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Science and Research Branch of Azad University
Barbara Slavin: Director of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council
Sanam Shantyaei: Senior Journalist at France24 & host of Middle East Matters
The emerging regional order in West Asia will have wide-ranging implications for global security. The Biden administration has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier, an initiative staunchly opposed by Israel, while also taking a harder line on Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen. Meanwhile, key regional actors, including Qatar, Iraq, and Oman, have engaged in backchannel efforts to bring Iran and Saudi Arabia to the negotiating table. From a broader geopolitical perspective, with the need to secure its energy imports, China is also expected to increase its footprint in the region and influence the mentioned challenges.
In this evolving landscape, Western powers will be compelled to redefine their strategic priorities and adjust their policies with the new realities in the region. In this panel, we will discuss how the West, including the United States and its allies, can utilize multilateral diplomacy with its adversaries to prevent military escalation in the region. Most importantly, the panel will discuss if a multilateral security dialogue in the Persian Gulf region, proposed by some regional actors, can help reduce tensions among regional foes and produce sustainable peace and development for the region.
Panelists:
– Abdullah Baabood: Academic Researcher and Former Director of the Centre for Gulf Studies, Qatar University
– Trita Parsi: Executive Vice-President, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
– Ebtesam Al-Ketbi: President, Emirates Policy Centre
– Jon Allen: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Israel
– Elizabeth Hagedorn: Washington correspondent for Al-Monitor
Military interventions, political and economic instabilities, and civil unrest in the Middle East have led to a global refugee crisis with an increasing wave of refugees and asylum seekers to Europe and Canada. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has, in myriad ways, exacerbated and contributed to the ongoing security threats and destabilization of the region.
While these challenges pose serious risks to Canadian security, Ottawa will also have the opportunity to limit such risks and prevent a spillover effect vis-à-vis effective humanitarian initiatives in the region. In this panel, we will primarily investigate Canada’s Middle East Strategy’s degree of success in providing humanitarian aid to the region. Secondly, the panel will discuss what programs and initiatives Canada can introduce to further build on the renewed strategy. and more specifically, how Canada can utilize its policy instruments to more effectively deal with the increasing influx of refugees from the Middle East.
Panelists:
Erica Di Ruggiero: Director of Centre for Global Health, University of Toronto
Reyhana Patel: Head of Communications & Government Relations, Islamic Relief Canada
Amir Barmaki: Former Head of UN OCHA in Iran
Catherine Gribbin: Senior Legal Advisor for International and Humanitarian Law, Canadian Red Cross
In 2016, Canada launched an ambitious five-year “Middle East Engagement Strategy” (2016-2021), committing to investing CA$3.5 billion over five years to help establish the necessary conditions for security and stability, alleviate human suffering and enable stabilization programs in the region. In the latest development, during the meeting of the Global Coalition against ISIS, Minister of Foreign Affairs Marc Garneau announced more than $43.6 million in Peace and Stabilization Operations Program funding for 11 projects in Syria and Iraq.
With Canada’s Middle East Engagement Strategy expiring this year, it is time to examine and evaluate this massive investment in the Middle East region in the past five years. More importantly, the panel will discuss a principled and strategic roadmap for the future of Canada’s short-term and long-term engagement in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Ferry de Kerckhove: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Egypt
– Dennis Horak: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
– Chris Kilford: Former Canadian Defence Attaché in Turkey, member of the national board of the Canadian International Council (CIC)
– David Dewitt: University Professor Emeritus, York University
While the United States continues to pull back from certain regional conflicts, reflected by the Biden administration’s decision to halt American backing for Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen and the expected withdrawal from Afghanistan, US troops continue to be stationed across the region. Meanwhile, Russia and China have significantly maintained and even expanded their regional activities. On one hand, the Kremlin has maintained its military presence in Syria, and on the other hand, China has signed an unprecedented 25-year strategic agreement with Iran.
As the global power structure continues to shift, it is essential to analyze the future of the US regional presence under the Biden administration, explore the emerging global rivalry with Russia and China, and at last, investigate the implications of such competition for peace and security in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Dmitri Trenin: Director of Carnegie Moscow Center
– Joost R. Hiltermann: Director of MENA Programme, International Crisis Group
– Roxane Farmanfarmaian: Affiliated Lecturer in International Relations of the Middle East and North Africa, University of Cambridge
– Andrew A. Michta: Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at Marshall Center
– Kelley Vlahos: Senior Advisor, Quincy Institute
The security architecture of the Middle East has undergone rapid transformations in an exceptionally short period. Notable developments include the United States gradual withdrawal from the region, rapprochement between Israel and some GCC states through the Abraham Accords and the rise of Chinese and Russian regional engagement.
With these new trends in the Middle East, it is timely to investigate the security implications of the Biden administration’s Middle East policy. In this respect, we will discuss the Biden team’s new approach vis-à-vis Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The panel will also discuss the role of other major powers, including China and Russia in shaping this new security environment in the region, and how the Biden administration will respond to these powers’ increasing regional presence.
Panelists:
– Sanam Vakil: Deputy Director of MENA Programme at Chatham House
– Denise Natali: Acting Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies & Director of the Center for Strategic Research, National Defense University
– Hassan Ahmadian: Professor of the Middle East and North Africa Studies, University of Tehran
– Abdulaziz Sagar: Chairman, Gulf Research Center
– Andrew Parasiliti: President, Al-Monitor
