Prime Minister Mark Carney’s January 2026 visit to Beijing lands at a moment of active recalibration in Canada’s China policy. Ottawa is reassessing its electric vehicle tariffs under mounting industry and trade pressure, while Carney’s APEC meeting with President Xi Jinping in Gyeongju signalled a tentative reopening of top-level political channels. At the same time, a revived ‘Americas First’ posture in Washington and looming CUSMA renegotiations are compressing Canada’s strategic options. Against this backdrop, the Carney’s efforts appear to be a deliberate effort to rebalance Canada’s economic and diplomatic positioning in a more transactional and fragmented global order.
This edition of the Strategic Foresight Brief, titled ‘Carney Heads to China: Changing Course in a Changing World‘ convenes fifteen experts from Canada and China to assess what this visit signals about the direction of Canadian foreign policy. Drawing on experience spanning federal cabinet, diplomatic advisory roles, trans-Pacific business leadership, and academia, contributors examine the expectations surrounding the visit, the constraints shaping it, and the outcomes that would constitute meaningful progress.
The symposium reflects a range of perspectives. Some contributors view the visit as a long-overdue course correction, others caution that engagement without clarity risks strategic drift. All underscore the need for sharper alignment between economic pragmatism, national security concerns, and Canada’s values-based commitments.
Taken together, experts offer a timely evaluation of Carney’s Beijing visit and a broader reflection on how Canada is navigating a changing world order where managing complexity, rather than choosing sides, may increasingly define effective statecraft.
Prime Minister Carney’s visit to China is a critically important undertaking, given that our bilateral relationship had been allowed to languish by the previous government. Indeed, it has been almost 10 years since our leaders have met. That is no way to grow and sustain such a key partnership.
While China’s politics and global interventions are imperfect, we cannot afford to isolate or be indifferent to this vast economic power. Canada needs to constructively engage and work with China, as we did before. If we do not, we will be the ones to suffer the most. Thus, Carney is wise to make this a priority early in the new year.
It also comes in the wake of continued destabilizing economic and political actions by Donald Trump. Not only has he imposed illegal tariffs on some of our country’s key sectors, but he continues to muse about Canada becoming the 51st State. And the latter now takes on greater concern after the U.S. incursion into Venezuela, and the threats being levelled at other sovereign nations. Therefore, it makes the trip to Beijing all the more essential and strategic.
After a wasted decade, it is impossible for Carney and Xi to tackle all the irritants over night. In fact, for me, the most important task is for the two leaders to establish a solid rapport based on mutual trust and understanding. This is central to the two nations successfully re-engaging politically and economically. Without a firm and respectful relationship at the top, our ministers, officials, and business leaders will be unable to forge new protocols.
With this rapprochement towards China, and more recently with India, as well as with other allies in Europe and Asia, our PM is astutely strengthening our non-US relationships, so as to protect our prosperity and standing in the world.
Mark Carney’s visit to China confirms the realist turn in Canada’s foreign policy and a break with the Trudeau government. Gradually, pencil in hand, Mark Carney is methodically sketching, on the great map of the world, the new contours of Canadian foreign policy. These have been taking shape since he came to power nearly a year ago and stand in sharp contrast to the framework imposed by Chrystia Freeland when she led Canadian diplomacy. A Carney doctrine is taking shape.
Ms. Freeland had adopted the discourse then in vogue in Washington regarding so-called authoritarian powers—not Saudi Arabia or Israel, which were deemed too useful to our interests, but rather Russia and China, now seen as regimes to be isolated. The objective was to build around them a coalition of democracies, an airtight wall designed to prevent any “contamination.” Within the Trudeau government, there was even talk of dramatically reducing our ties with China, and even with India. This policy was a failure.
Mark Carney, a true “man of the world,” quickly understood that the world had changed—dramatically so. Over the course of visits to four continents and hundreds of interactions with international leaders, he succeeded where Trudeau had failed: restoring Canada’s place on the international stage. A return grounded in realism, not in the promotion of a fantasized world.
Carney has rolled out a resolutely pragmatic agenda aimed at making Canada a genuine nation, mindful of its identity and its own interests, rather than a post-national state open to all winds and lacking substance.
The vocabulary has also changed. China is no longer presented as an “enemy,” as it had been in a policy guidance document by a former Chief of the Defence Staff without government approval, but as a “strategic partner,” which represents a genuine revolution.
It now remains to be seen whether this visit will lead to a positive evolution in relations with China. That is the key issue.
La visite de Mark Carney en Chine vient confirmer le tournant réaliste de la politique étrangère du Canada et une rupture par rapport au gouvernement Trudeau. Petit à petit, fusain à la main, Mark Carney dessine méthodiquement, sur la grande carte du monde, les nouveaux contours de la politique étrangère canadienne. Ceux- ci prennent forme depuis son arrivée au pouvoir il y a près d’un an et contrastent nettement avec le cadre imposé par Chrystia Freeland lorsqu’elle dirigeait la diplomatie canadienne. Une doctrine Carney est en train de naître.
Mme Freeland avait adopté le discours en vogue à Washington concernant les puissances dites autoritaires, non pas l’Arabie saoudite ou Israël, trop utiles à nos intérêts, mais bien la Russie et la Chine, désormais perçues comme des régimes à isoler. L’objectif était de construire autour d’eux une coalition de démocraties, un mur étanche destiné à éviter toute « contamination ». Au sein du gouvernement Trudeau, on parlait même de réduire dramatiquement nos liens avec la Chine, voire avec l’Inde. Cette politique a été un échec.
Mark Carney, cet « homme du monde », a rapidement compris que le monde avait changé et de manière dramatique. Au cours de ses visites sur quatre continents et de ses centaines d’interactions avec des dirigeants internationaux, il a réussi là où Trudeau avait échoué : réinstaller le Canada sur la scène internationale. Un retour fondé sur le réalisme, et non sur la promotion d’un monde fantasmé.
Carney a déployé un programme résolument pragmatique visant à faire du Canada une véritable nation, soucieuse de son identité et de ses intérêts propres, plutôt qu’un État postnational ouvert à tous les vents et dépourvu de consistance.
Le vocabulaire a également changé. La Chine n’est plus présentée comme un « ennemi », ainsi qu’elle l’avait été dans un document d’orientation politique de l’ancien chef d’état-major des Forces armées et ce, sans l’aval du gouvernement, mais comme un « partenaire stratégique », ce qui représente une véritable révolution.
Il faudra maintenant voir si cette visite fera évoluer positivement les relations avec la Chine. C’est tout l’enjeu.
In recent years, Canada’s status as a middle power has gradually weakened. Since taking office, Prime Minister Carney has put an emphasis on enhancing Canada’s global standing. Middle powers become significant participants in the international system by contributing to regional or global order. Their global standing stems not only from material capabilities relative to other nations — such as resource endowments and economic strength — but also from the potential roles they can play within the international community.
Facing rising complexity and uncertainty in the international landscape, how Canada conducts itself in third-party affairs or global issues remains critically important. This directly impacts the strength of its middle-power status and its ability to build a more balanced Canada-U.S. relationship under the pressure of Trump’s tariffs. With the context of deepening strategic competition between China and the US, Canada, like other nations, faces mounting pressure from the U.S. side. China-U.S. strategic competition will will persist for a long period of time. However, the major driving force of Canada’s China policy remains Canada’s own national interests, not anything else.
Facing strategic competition between China and the United States, how Canada navigates its relationship with China serves as a litmus test for validating and strengthening its status as a middle power. The resumption of China-Canada diplomatic dialogue reflects Canada’s efforts to explore its position within the U.S.-led alliance system. Currently, China and Canada have just reopened diplomatic channels for dialogue and communication, and the future will usher in a period of repositioning. Fragmented and piecemeal diplomatic exchanges cannot sustain the long-term positive development of bilateral relations. Only by reaching pragmatic economic and trade agreements can the two countries generate the endogenous momentum for enduring cooperation.
Building upon the foundation of the Canadian Prime Minister’s visit to China, if both sides focus on areas of consensus and shared interests to tangibly advance the restoration of economic and trade exchanges, it will not only facilitate the return of China-Canada relations to a healthy, stable, and sustainable trajectory but also help consolidate Canada’s identity as a middle power. Moreover, it will contribute to Canada’s efforts to establish a more balanced relationship with the United States.
In traveling to Beijing, Prime Minister Carney faces two challenges: resetting Canada-China relations and determining just how much policy independence he really has.
The former should be relatively easy. Ambassador Wang Di has said that if Canada removes its tariffs on Chinese EVs, his country would reciprocate by lifting theirs on Canadian agricultural products. Manitoba and Saskatchewan welcome this approach. Meanwhile, Canada’s domestic EV strategy has been pretty disastrous. Despite government support of $52.5 billion to catalyze investments of $46.1 billion, the Canadian EV market has been plagued by high costs and falling sales. Many of the proposed investments have been put on hold and the government has postponed its mandate for all cars sold in 2035 to be EVs.
As Premier Smith described this bizarre state of affairs, “We’ve got a 100 percent tax on EV vehicles from China that no one’s buying in order to protect an EV industry in Ontario that doesn’t exist. And in return, we are seeing punishment on pork and canola in our western provinces, which are products people do want.”
So, can Prime Minister Carney just simply remove the EV tariffs? Canada’s cutting the tariffs is unlikely to make President Trump happy and it would turn up the pressure during the sensitive CUSMA review period. There is, however, a way out. Canada and China have taken each other to the WTO with respect to the legitimacy of their tariffs, all of which are likely inconsistent with the countries’ WTO obligations. Should both countries be directed to remove their tariffs, Canada could credibly tell the U.S. that it had no choice.
Both Prime Minister Carney and President Xi are eager to uphold the remnants of the rules-based international order. Perhaps they can establish a friendly rapport and bide their time while the WTO process works in their favour.
Carney will be the first Prime Minister to visit China since 2017, which in itself is a major reset. Events have persuaded Canadians that rapid and sustained trade diversification is essential to Canada’s continued independence. Prime Minister Carney characterized his visit to Beijing as an effort “to broaden the role of China in Canada’s diversified global engagement alongside Europe and emerging markets.“
The opportunities are very significant but the kicker is that rapid diversification will require a much heightened level of attention and effort from both business and all levels of government. For decades the federal government has lacked continuity in its efforts to support Canadian interests and business in China. A revolving door of Canadian ministers and their officials, often in new portfolios, seemed to make each ministerial visit to Beijing a “new start” with little in the way of sustained follow-up on agreed initiatives.
Bilaterally, both China and Canada will have to come to terms with what the other means by “interference”. Positions of both sides need to be addressed with respect. In terms of the visit, PM Carney is likely to handle the issue adroitly. The U.S. has repeatedly warned Canada against engaging with China. PM Carney’s China visit and the (potential) lifting of Canadian tariffs on China’s EVs takes place at an exceptional moment – the U.S. pivot from global primacy to the Western Hemisphere. This isolationist and exclusionary focus, reflected in the U.S. National Security Strategy, the action against Venezuela, and the “need to take Greenland” all highlight the diversification imperative facing Canada.
Fortunately, China is also in a bind. Using tariffs and other bilateral measures as a big stick, Washington is pressuring all its trading partners to cut China out of their trade and investment flows. While unlikely to be successful, in near-term this is highly damaging both to China and to world trade. Canada-China relations have been chilly for years and China has multiple global sources of virtually all Canada’s exports, but this risk-filled moment for China favours working with Canada.
PM Carney was quick to recognize the challenges that confront Canada in a rapidly changing world order. We can expect the PM to go well-prepared, to engage productively with President Xi and to insist on the fullest possible follow-up on return to Ottawa — all essential elements in achieving an ambitious agenda.
Prime Minister Carney’s early visit to China is a welcome step in getting the bilateral relationship back on a more productive plane and in pursuing Canada’s goal of greater trade diversification. Normally, prime ministerial visits are negotiated and planned months in advance to ensure a suitable set of “deliverables” justifying the visit and ensuring its success. However, this time it has been just over two months since Mr. Carney met Xi Jinping on the margins of the APEC Leaders’ meeting in South Korea leaving little time to resolve the most thorny issues, such as Chinese retaliatory tariffs on Canadian agricultural products (as a result of our 100% tariffs on Chinese EVs) and China’s proclivity to interfere with the Chinese diaspora in Canada.
While high-level official delegations from Ottawa have been in Beijing recently to help prepare the ground, given the short lead time it is unlikely there will be any major breakthroughs on the respective tariff issues, although there will be discussion of these topics and likely some form of ongoing review and negotiation. That is an insufficient deliverable for the visit, but there will likely be announcements related to energy exports, particularly LNG, bearing in mind that PetroChina is one of the investors in LNG Canada and Sinopec has been negotiating to secure supply from the Cedar LNG project expected to come on stream in 2028.
In addition, China has become a major buyer of Canadian crude facilitated by the expanded capacity of the TMX pipeline. There may be an offtake agreement. Energy will be the focus along with further dialogue to resolve other trade issues. While some reference to security issues is inevitable, this will not be a major focus and the language of the communique will be carefully negotiated to avoid putting Canada in the crosshairs of any US-China security issues.
Having indicated that it wants to reduce reliance on Canadian imports the U.S. can hardly object if Canada seeks alternative export markets, including in China, something the U.S. is itself doing. This visit will set the stage for further bilateral negotiations on trade including possibly a future visit to Canada by Chinese Premier Li Qiang.
The symbolism of Prime Minister Mark Carney’s trip to China is significant, as it signals an effort to reset a long-strained relationship and usher in a phase of closer bilateral engagement. While both sides will have worked industriously behind the scenes to reach some common ground, expectations for headline-grabbing breakthroughs should remain measured. Some compromises may be possible, but a full resolution of trade frictions, particularly over Chinese electric vehicles and Canadian agricultural exports, remains challenging in the near term.
The more attainable area of progress lies in energy cooperation. As China seeks to secure reliable supplies of conventional energy and Canada looks to expand and diversify its export markets, energy trade represents a clear shared interest. Recent U.S. moves to assert control over Venezuela’s vast oil reserves add further urgency, with near – and long-term implications for both China and Canada that could accelerate cooperation in this area. Beyond energy, the leaders may also announce broad agreements aimed at improving overall relationships, strengthening dialogue mechanisms, and deepening trade and people-to-people ties.
Re-engaging China at the highest leadership level forms part of Canada’s broader effort to rethink its economic strategy and international positioning amid a profound shift in U.S. politics and Canada–U.S. relations under a second Trump administration. For China, hosting the Canadian leader aligns with intensified diplomatic efforts to cultivate a more favourable international environment as it prepares to launch its 15th Five-Year Plan, the blueprint for its next phase of economic and social development. In this context, the timing of PM Carney’s trip is particularly opportune.
The most significant deliverable from PM Carney’s visit to China could be a formal, mutual acknowledgment of a stabilized bilateral relationship. While such stabilization may be interpreted differently by each side—whether as a renewed strategic partnership or a looser framework—it would nevertheless provide a basis for constructive approaches to resolving disputed issues, including Canada’s tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles and China’s retaliatory measures on Canadian canola and other agricultural products.
Further cooperation on energy and natural resources—including oil, liquefied natural gas, uranium and so on—as well as agricultural products would align closely with the Carney government’s priorities of positioning Canada as an “energy superpower,” diversifying trade, and doubling trade with partners beyond the United States.
Additional cooperation in services such as education, clean energy, green finance, tourism, environmental technologies, and climate-related solutions could also be advanced. These economically meaningful yet less security-sensitive areas have traditionally constituted the foundation of cooperation between the two countries, even during periods of strained bilateral relations.
Strategic necessity on both sides defines the cooperative foundation of this visit. For Canada, external pressures have accelerated this strategic recalibration. Its relationship with the United States—and the economic challenges posed by new U.S. tariffs—forms the critical international context shaping this trip. The return of Donald Trump to the White House has reintroduced an unpredictable approach to trade, with renewed tariffs on Canadian steel and aluminum, lumber, and other products, as well as fresh uncertainty surrounding potentially contentious CUSMA renegotiations. This environment presents a major hurdle that will need to be carefully managed for talks with China to succeed.
For China, expectations are broadly similar: politically and strategically stable cooperation as the essence of bilateral relations, ideally through a return to the 2005 strategic framework, alongside expanded cooperation in energy, agriculture, and climate-related issues. One objective China continues to pursue—but is unlikely to achieve during this visit—is Canada’s endorsement of China’s application to join the CPTPP. Canada is unable to offer such support in the near term, as it would imply trade negotiations with a non-market economy and could trigger the CUSMA “poison pill” clause that allows parties to withdraw from the agreement. Instead, this issue may be addressed only in vague language, framed around renewing the spirit of the 2005 strategic partnership.
Balancing economically realistic reengagement with concerns over national security, human rights, and foreign interference remains the central challenge of the visit. This is the trickiest aspect of the trip—and has long been the most difficult dimension of Canada–China relations. Ultimately, the priority will be to restore regular communication at all levels, clearly signal areas of cooperation, and reach a shared understanding that political disagreements should not spill over into economic engagement.
It’s not hyperbole to claim that Prime Minister Carney’s trip to China is critical for Canada’s future. Generally speaking, a leader’s visit isn’t a big deal, but this trip comes at unique moment in history. Canada-China relations have been in rough shape since December 2018 when Canada followed through on a U.S. request to extradite Huawei’s Meng Wanzhou. While that is often cited as the turning point, the reality is that relationship was already in choppy waters beforehand as Canada – and other liberal market democracies – were struggling to reconcile the geopolitical implications of China’s rise and its multifaceted impact on relations.
The second coming of Donald Trump has again altered this trajectory – but it hasn’t completed overturned it. We’re clearly entering a new era of international relations where Canada is at an inflection point that will determine the extent that it can control its destiny. To be clear, this visit will not decide everything. Rather it will set the direction for the next several months as Canada and China try to find a way to resolve their current dispute while putting the relationship on stronger footing for the long-term. The obvious wrinkle in this plan is U.S.’ inward turn to dominate the Western hemisphere. A successful outcome will be walking the tight rope of expanding the zone of cooperation with China while not encroaching on the unclear bounds of U.S. sensitivities.
In this interdependent and geopolitically fraught world, the immediate potential for Canada-China relations is framed by Canada-U.S. relations. Amidst this pessimistic background is a cause for optimism: Prime Minister Carney appears to be attuned to these high stakes and has demonstrated himself to be a leader of reasoned compromise.
Prime Minister Mark Carney’s upcoming four-day visit to China sends a strong signal of a potential reset in Canada–China relations and builds on a series of recent high-level contacts that have already begun to shift the bilateral dynamic.
Carney met with Chinese Premier Li Qiang in New York at the United Nations General Assembly last September, where Li expressed China’s willingness to pursue “more active and practical efforts” to improve ties with Canada and deepen mutually beneficial cooperation through dialogue and consultation. Carney also met with Chinese President Xi Jinping on the margins of the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting in Gyeongju, South Korea, accepted Xi’s invitation to visit China, and both sides agreed to work constructively to resolve outstanding trade irritants and explore cooperation across areas like agriculture, energy and manufacturing.
China’s diplomatic gestures—including comments from Canada’s ambassador highlighting rapid progress in advancing bilateral ties—underscore Beijing’s interest in strengthening economic engagement with Ottawa. Given this positive momentum and repeated high-level contacts, there is every reason to expect Carney’s visit to yield tangible deliverables (though the extent remain to be seen) on market access, investment facilitation, and sector-specific agreements such as China’s tariffs on the few agricultural products. The deliverables could help anchor the relationship in practical gains rather than rhetoric.
Stronger Canada–China economic ties are particularly timely as Canada intensifies efforts to diversify its trade partnerships amid unpredictable U.S. trade policy, and both countries navigate trade frictions with the United States. With visible benefits on the table, rallying domestic support and gradually shifting public opinion becomes more feasible, creating the political space for a more stable and mutually beneficial bilateral relationship to grow.
When I published Follow the Leader, Lose the Region in 2023, I argued that Canada’s approach to Beijing had become overly derivative of Washington’s, leaving Ottawa strategically constrained across trade, energy, and diplomacy. In isolating China within a broader Indo-Pacific strategy as a matter of principle rather than practice, Canada increased its dependency on U.S. leadership while unnecessarily narrowing its diplomatic and economic options with the world’s second-largest economy. In consultations with Global Affairs Canada at the time, I questioned whether a sustained diplomatic break with Beijing was viable; assurances that Canada could separate its Indo-Pacific and China strategies have proven difficult to realize in practice.
Mark Carney’s visit to Beijing reflects an implicit recognition of this reality. Any meaningful Canadian strategy toward the Asia-Pacific must include functional relations with China. Public reporting suggests discussions will focus on trade, energy, agriculture, and international security, with a particular emphasis on reducing Canada’s overreliance on the United States rather than pursuing formal market integration. Given USMCA constraints, a free trade agreement is off the table, making targeted progress on agriculture—especially Chinese duties on canola—and selective market access more plausible. China may also press for reduced Canadian tariffs on electric vehicles, which could offer tangible benefits for Canadian consumers.
If successful, the visit would signal a pragmatic recalibration: one that restores diplomatic flexibility, supports Canadian economic interests, and modestly strengthens Ottawa’s bargaining position within the North American trade relationship.
It has been over nine years since Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s last official visit to China. Over this long span, Canada-China relations have weathered significant ups and downs, and it is believed that both sides have drawn profound lessons and experience from this period.
Compared to nine years ago, the current international geopolitical landscape has undergone a profound transformation. 2026 brings immense external pressures and challenges upon Canada, including the renegotiation of USMCA. China is also actively pursuing a strategy of diversifying its trade partners to mitigate global supply chain uncertainties. Against this backdrop, advancing pragmatic cooperation holds significant strategic value for both nations.
With Mr. Carney’s visit to China, there is a resounding call from various sectors in both countries to restart pragmatic dialogue. The Canadian side has highlighted cornerstone sectors such as trade, traditional energy, and agriculture prior to the trip. For me, beyond basic commodity trading, several high-potential areas stand out for detailed collaboration: such as green finance, clean technology, agricultural tech, food safety, the “silver economy”, winter sports, and people-to-people exchanges in education and tourism.
The two sides can achieve substantive breakthroughs in areas directly affecting public welfare such as visa facilitation, the resumption of direct flights, and cultural exchanges — these will undoubtedly inject strong momentum into substantively warming bilateral relations.
PM Mark Carney’s multi-day visit to China is likely to focus on practical cooperation rather than symbolic outcomes. The most plausible deliverables could be in the energy sector, where Canada and China are structurally complementary and where there is timely urgency for both sides. Canada needs optionality and stable markets, and China needs diversified suppliers, particularly in the West. Rather than major announcements, the visit may produce framework agreements or renewed working-level mechanisms that enable concrete commercial and project-level cooperation over time.
The broader international environment is clearly shaping this engagement. Recent developments in Venezuela, Greenland, and Ukraine highlight growing geopolitical volatility and supply-chain uncertainty. While these issues may not be discussed explicitly, both sides will exchange perspectives in a pragmatic and discreet manner. China increasingly views Canada as a credible core-Western middle power with influence in peacekeeping and multilateral institutions. Canada, in turn, sees China as both an important market and a form of strategic hedging amid more unilateral U.S. actions toward Latin America and even close allies.
The main challenge is not political will, but execution. Regulatory complexity, red tape, and project efficiency will determine whether cooperation moves beyond signaling. Both countries recognize the urgency of working together; success will depend on credible follow-up, disciplined project management, and a focus on tangible outcomes rather than rhetoric.
Given that PM Carney’s visit to China spans three days, we can expect the bilateral reset agenda to be both strategic and tangible. It will be strategic because both sides, through several high-level meetings since last fall, have emphasized the global context of the relationship. It will be tangible because Canada seeks to de-escalate trade tensions, which may lead to mutual agreements to reduce tariffs. This could range from potential adjustments to Canada’s 100 percent levies on electric vehicles to reductions in China’s retaliatory tariffs on Canadian agricultural and seafood products. We can also anticipate broader framework agreements covering areas such as energy and environmental cooperation, joint climate action, and people-to-people projects.
Canada has faced U.S. pressure since the Trump administration launched its global trade war, leaving Ottawa uncertain about the timing and terms of a potential CUSMA renegotiation. Consequently, diversifying trade has become a clear priority for Carney. The U.S. would likely view closer Canada-China ties with displeasure. If the first Trump presidency is any guide, Washington could act to constrain Canada’s relations with China, as seen with the “poison pill” clause inserted into the current CUSMA. Therefore, Carney may use this trip not only for trade diversification but also as potential leverage in future negotiations with the U.S. This adds a layer of strategic complexity that extends beyond simply restoring trade with China.
The first hurdle is moving beyond the framework and mindset of Canada’s 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy which remains the guiding document for much of the government and bureaucracy in dealing with China. The IPS was drafted when Ottawa largely subordinated its strategic interests to those of the U.S. and when Canada-China relations were at a low point. The second hurdle is overcoming ideological resistance from Canadian policy elites and mainstream media, who have grown hostile to any reset of relations with China. This will require Carney to demonstrate strategic determination and issue firm policy instructions to the bureaucracy. Finally, even a successful Carney-Xi summit yielding strong outcomes and consensus would require detailed follow-up to work out complex policy and project-level cooperation.
After 8 years, Canada’s Prime Minister is headed to Beijing. Eight years in which the ground has shifted, not just in Canada’s relationship with China, but in Canada’s relationship with the world, especially our nearest neighbour and senior ally. Eight years ago the agenda was the opening of negotiations on a free trade agreement. Today, the fervent wish is to restore something like normal trade relations. Even this is a steep hill to climb.
Canadians, with reason, approach China with a bitter aftertaste, but they face the world with apprehension and are eager to seek stability and the prospect of diversified trade wherever they can. China is the world’s largest trading power and the world’s second-largest economy. When number one threatens to shut you out, it would be foolish not to turn to number two. This is something Mr. Carney is keenly aware of.
The challenge of securing a market in a country with a trillion-dollar trade surplus, the largest of any country in history, is huge in itself. The challenge of doing so in the face of a number one trading partner that looks askance at any country seeking closer ties with its geopolitical rival and one with which it hopes to secure privileged access is near insurmountable. Canada’s key card is energy exports, including the same heavy oil that the U.S. seeks to secure for itself from Venezuela, and LNG where the U.S. looks to compete with us.
None of this requires abandoning Canadian values. We will agree to disagree and protect Canadian security just as China prioritizes its own national security as its highest value. What is required is respect, and respect for differences, within a common understanding that maintains our values and upholds the rights and interests of our citizens. There is no room in the current global configuration to preach from a stance of moral superiority. China shares an interest in maintaining global order. President Xi Jinping is well aware of the precarity of the global order and knows that China’s current trade posture is unsustainable. That is the basic point of our bilateral and multilateral engagement and the starting point to resolving the difficult challenges that face our bilateral trade and investment interests.
The Western powers have failed to effectively manage the increasing threat of proliferation in the Middle East. While the international community is concerned with Iran’s nuclear program, Saudi Arabia has moved forward with developing its own nuclear program, and independent studies show that Israel has longed possessed dozens of nuclear warheads. The former is a member of the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while the latter has refused to sign the international agreement.
On Middle East policy, the Biden campaign had staunchly criticized the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal and it has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier since assuming office in January 2021. However, serious obstacles remain for responsible actors in expanding non-proliferation efforts toward a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.
This panel will discuss how Western powers and multilateral institutions, such as the IAEA, can play a more effective role in managing non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Peggy Mason: Canada’s former Ambassador to the UN for Disarmament
– Mark Fitzpatrick: Associate Fellow & Former Executive Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
– Ali Vaez: Iran Project Director, International Crisis Group
– Negar Mortazavi: Journalist and Political Analyst, Host of Iran Podcast
– David Albright: Founder and President of the Institute for Science and International Security
Closing (5:45 PM – 6:00 PM ET)
What is the current economic landscape in the Middle East? While global foreign direct investment is expected to fall drastically in the post-COVID era, the World Bank reported a 5% contraction in the economic output of the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries in 2020 due to the pandemic. While oil prices are expected to rebound with normalization in demand, political instability, regional and geopolitical tensions, domestic corruption, and a volatile regulatory and legal environment all threaten economic recovery in the Middle East. What is the prospect for economic growth and development in the region post-pandemic, and how could MENA nations promote sustainable growth and regional trade moving forward?
At the same time, Middle Eastern diaspora communities have become financially successful and can help promote trade between North America and the region. In this respect, the diaspora can become vital intermediaries for advancing U.S. and Canada’s business interests abroad. Promoting business diplomacy can both benefit the MENA region and be an effective and positive way to advance engagement and achieve foreign policy goals of the North Atlantic.
This panel will investigate the trade and investment opportunities in the Middle East, discuss how facilitating economic engagement with the region can benefit Canadian and American national interests, and explore relevant policy prescriptions.
Panelists:
– Hon. Sergio Marchi: Canada’s Former Minister of International Trade
– Scott Jolliffe: Chairperson, Canada Arab Business Council
– Esfandyar Batmanghelidj: Founder and Publisher of Bourse & Bazaar
– Nizar Ghanem: Director of Research and Co-founder at Triangle
– Nicki Siamaki: Researcher at Control Risks
The Middle East continues to grapple with violence and instability, particularly in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Fueled by government incompetence and foreign interventions, terrorist insurgencies have imposed severe humanitarian and economic costs on the region. Meanwhile, regional actors have engaged in an unprecedented pursuit of arms accumulation. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have imported billions of both Western and Russian-made weapons and funded militant groups across the region, intending to contain their regional adversaries, particularly Iran. Tehran has also provided sophisticated weaponry to various militia groups across the region to strengthen its geopolitical position against Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Israel.
On the other hand, with international terrorist networks and intense regional rivalry in the Middle East, it is impractical to discuss peace and security without addressing terrorism and the arms race in the region. This panel will primarily discuss the implications of the ongoing arms race in the region and the role of Western powers and multilateral organizations in facilitating trust-building security arrangements among regional stakeholders to limit the proliferation of arms across the Middle East.
Panelists:
Luciano Zaccara: Assistant Professor, Qatar University
Dania Thafer: Executive Director, Gulf International Forum
Kayhan Barzegar: Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Science and Research Branch of Azad University
Barbara Slavin: Director of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council
Sanam Shantyaei: Senior Journalist at France24 & host of Middle East Matters
The emerging regional order in West Asia will have wide-ranging implications for global security. The Biden administration has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier, an initiative staunchly opposed by Israel, while also taking a harder line on Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen. Meanwhile, key regional actors, including Qatar, Iraq, and Oman, have engaged in backchannel efforts to bring Iran and Saudi Arabia to the negotiating table. From a broader geopolitical perspective, with the need to secure its energy imports, China is also expected to increase its footprint in the region and influence the mentioned challenges.
In this evolving landscape, Western powers will be compelled to redefine their strategic priorities and adjust their policies with the new realities in the region. In this panel, we will discuss how the West, including the United States and its allies, can utilize multilateral diplomacy with its adversaries to prevent military escalation in the region. Most importantly, the panel will discuss if a multilateral security dialogue in the Persian Gulf region, proposed by some regional actors, can help reduce tensions among regional foes and produce sustainable peace and development for the region.
Panelists:
– Abdullah Baabood: Academic Researcher and Former Director of the Centre for Gulf Studies, Qatar University
– Trita Parsi: Executive Vice-President, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
– Ebtesam Al-Ketbi: President, Emirates Policy Centre
– Jon Allen: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Israel
– Elizabeth Hagedorn: Washington correspondent for Al-Monitor
Military interventions, political and economic instabilities, and civil unrest in the Middle East have led to a global refugee crisis with an increasing wave of refugees and asylum seekers to Europe and Canada. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has, in myriad ways, exacerbated and contributed to the ongoing security threats and destabilization of the region.
While these challenges pose serious risks to Canadian security, Ottawa will also have the opportunity to limit such risks and prevent a spillover effect vis-à-vis effective humanitarian initiatives in the region. In this panel, we will primarily investigate Canada’s Middle East Strategy’s degree of success in providing humanitarian aid to the region. Secondly, the panel will discuss what programs and initiatives Canada can introduce to further build on the renewed strategy. and more specifically, how Canada can utilize its policy instruments to more effectively deal with the increasing influx of refugees from the Middle East.
Panelists:
Erica Di Ruggiero: Director of Centre for Global Health, University of Toronto
Reyhana Patel: Head of Communications & Government Relations, Islamic Relief Canada
Amir Barmaki: Former Head of UN OCHA in Iran
Catherine Gribbin: Senior Legal Advisor for International and Humanitarian Law, Canadian Red Cross
In 2016, Canada launched an ambitious five-year “Middle East Engagement Strategy” (2016-2021), committing to investing CA$3.5 billion over five years to help establish the necessary conditions for security and stability, alleviate human suffering and enable stabilization programs in the region. In the latest development, during the meeting of the Global Coalition against ISIS, Minister of Foreign Affairs Marc Garneau announced more than $43.6 million in Peace and Stabilization Operations Program funding for 11 projects in Syria and Iraq.
With Canada’s Middle East Engagement Strategy expiring this year, it is time to examine and evaluate this massive investment in the Middle East region in the past five years. More importantly, the panel will discuss a principled and strategic roadmap for the future of Canada’s short-term and long-term engagement in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Ferry de Kerckhove: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Egypt
– Dennis Horak: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
– Chris Kilford: Former Canadian Defence Attaché in Turkey, member of the national board of the Canadian International Council (CIC)
– David Dewitt: University Professor Emeritus, York University
While the United States continues to pull back from certain regional conflicts, reflected by the Biden administration’s decision to halt American backing for Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen and the expected withdrawal from Afghanistan, US troops continue to be stationed across the region. Meanwhile, Russia and China have significantly maintained and even expanded their regional activities. On one hand, the Kremlin has maintained its military presence in Syria, and on the other hand, China has signed an unprecedented 25-year strategic agreement with Iran.
As the global power structure continues to shift, it is essential to analyze the future of the US regional presence under the Biden administration, explore the emerging global rivalry with Russia and China, and at last, investigate the implications of such competition for peace and security in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Dmitri Trenin: Director of Carnegie Moscow Center
– Joost R. Hiltermann: Director of MENA Programme, International Crisis Group
– Roxane Farmanfarmaian: Affiliated Lecturer in International Relations of the Middle East and North Africa, University of Cambridge
– Andrew A. Michta: Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at Marshall Center
– Kelley Vlahos: Senior Advisor, Quincy Institute
The security architecture of the Middle East has undergone rapid transformations in an exceptionally short period. Notable developments include the United States gradual withdrawal from the region, rapprochement between Israel and some GCC states through the Abraham Accords and the rise of Chinese and Russian regional engagement.
With these new trends in the Middle East, it is timely to investigate the security implications of the Biden administration’s Middle East policy. In this respect, we will discuss the Biden team’s new approach vis-à-vis Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The panel will also discuss the role of other major powers, including China and Russia in shaping this new security environment in the region, and how the Biden administration will respond to these powers’ increasing regional presence.
Panelists:
– Sanam Vakil: Deputy Director of MENA Programme at Chatham House
– Denise Natali: Acting Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies & Director of the Center for Strategic Research, National Defense University
– Hassan Ahmadian: Professor of the Middle East and North Africa Studies, University of Tehran
– Abdulaziz Sagar: Chairman, Gulf Research Center
– Andrew Parasiliti: President, Al-Monitor
