The release of the Trump Administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS) coincides with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent visit to India, offering a perspective on the Ukraine-Russia conflict often missing in Western media: a Russia whose influence is not waning, coupled with an America that is pivoting away from Europe.
Prime Minister Modi and President Putin endorsed a 2030 economic plan to diversify trade and raise volumes to $100 billion, emphasizing ongoing energy cooperation. Putin assured India of “uninterrupted” oil shipments, signalling defiance toward the US, which recently imposed a 25% tariff on Indian imports linked to Russian oil.
The NSS, meanwhile, shows that the US prioritizes a rapid end to the Ukraine war to stabilize Europe and enable Ukraine’s turn away from costly war fighting. Ukraine depends on foreign aid to sustain basic government functions, and its military operations in the East are now driven almost exclusively by Western backing in the form of weapons systems, intelligence sharing, training, and logistical support. Ukraine’s ability to conduct sustained defensive and limited offensive operations hinges on the continuous provision of advanced Western capabilities, without which its conventional forces would face severe constraints in firepower, air defence, and battlefield coordination.
The scale of foreign aid relative to Ukraine’s GNI far exceeds 20 percent, a level of external dependence comparable to that of many failed or fragile states. In 2024, external financing covered roughly two-thirds of Kyiv’s budget, with the United States supplying critical systems such as Patriot and NASAMS air-defence platforms to protect population centres and infrastructure, alongside HIMARS rocket artillery that has been central to Ukraine’s capacity to strike Russian logistics, command nodes, and rear positions. European defence production is increasing but remains insufficient to meet operational demand, while Russia has fully adapted to a long-term war economy capable of sustaining high-intensity conflict.
In essence, Ukraine’s heavy reliance on the United States is neither balanced nor viable. As Washington’s aid declines, likely reinforced by a forensic audit, the burden of sustaining Ukraine’s weak economy and fragile political situation is further compounded by a major corruption scandal that has reinforced long-standing concerns among Western donors regarding governance, transparency, and the effective use of external assistance. Allegations of misappropriation of funds, elite capture, and weak oversight mechanisms undermine confidence that aid is being translated into durable institutional capacity rather than short-term stabilization.
Recall that in 2018, Trump’s Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) reported that two decades of US-led stabilization efforts —central to America’s military and foreign policy in Afghanistan — had largely failed, due in significant part to internal corruption and the misdirection and inefficiency of aid flows. Only a detailed assessment will determine whether Ukraine’s substantial aid packages are reinforcing similar structural dependencies, crowding out domestic revenue generation, institutional reform, and political accountability in ways that risk entrenching long-term reliance on external support rather than enabling sustainable post-war recovery.
Indeed, the December 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) underscores the risks inherent in proxy relationships: reliance on external powers always carries the threat of abandonment. That thin veneer of Ukrainian political and economic success which Western politicians constantly remind us of is in reality “isomorphic mimicry”: the replication of visible structures and processes, absent the capability to make them work effectively independent of outside support. The appearance of positive change can mask the absence of real functional improvement, diverting scarce resources toward non-functional activities, preventing genuine institutional changes. Considering that the West’s long-term aid agenda for Ukraine primarily facilitates war fighting, aid distortions that favour the defence and security sectors undermine efforts towards genuine political and economic reform.
Europe’s strategic problem is the failure to recognize the economic and political compromises that come with creating this dependency. Given that the region itself is undergoing declining global economic influence, making Ukraine their highest priority means challenging some of the basic tenets that have been the hallmark of the EU’s formation and development, potentially leading to political erosion, restrictions on freedom of speech, and weakened state sovereignty. Without reform, the NSS argues, Europe may be unrecognizable within two decades, and some countries could become unreliable allies.
Europe’s insecurity is most evident in its relations with Russia. Despite superior collective power (except nuclear), it treats Russia as existentially threatening yet leans heavily on US diplomacy. EU leaders remain unwilling to engage their Russia counterparts. As Secretary of State George P. Shultz once stated, “negotiations are a euphemism for capitulation if the shadow of power is not cast across the bargaining table.” Particularly for Russia, the gun is always on the table.
Under these conditions, is there much chance of a negotiated settlement to end the war? On the one hand, Russia has secured several notable tactical victories on the ground over the last 8 months at a time when there is greater resolve from the Trump administration to end the war. On the other hand, a negotiated solution that seeks to satisfy the maximalist demands of both parties (three including the EU, four including the US) appears unlikely to produce a quick resolution.
Superficially, there is little overlap in the so-called “zone of agreement.” Territorial issues remain the most politically explosive dimension of any settlement, however, distinguishing between de facto and de jure recognition offers a pragmatic pathway forward.
De facto arrangements, such as temporary administrative control, demilitarized zones, or internationally monitored ceasefire lines, can freeze contested borders without requiring Ukraine to legally concede sovereignty. Several conflicts have employed similar models to buy time for political negotiations while reducing violence. Ukraine could maintain its legal claims under international law while accepting interim governance mechanisms that prevent further bloodshed. Without such flexible arrangements, both sides remain locked in absolutist positions that make compromise nearly impossible.
Security guarantees are equally contentious but not insurmountable. Trump has already declared that Ukraine can “forget about” joining NATO. Zelensky has come to terms with this reality. However, a tailored framework, short of NATO Article 5 but stronger than existing bilateral agreements, could include coalition-based deployments, rotational training missions, and integrated air-and-missile defence networks. These deployments would be much different that an interposition force. A well-armed interposition force makes little sense in practice. Not only does Russia reject the idea, but such forces also cannot effectively prevent renewed violence. Alternative measures would enhance Ukraine’s defensive resilience without crossing Russia’s stated red lines regarding NATO enlargement.
The status of long-range missiles could be managed through conditional restrictions tied to Russian compliance, allowing Ukraine to retain deterrent capacity while limiting escalation risks. If such calibrated security assurances are dismissed, both sides will default to maximalist military strategies that prolong the conflict.
The debate over seizing or leveraging frozen Russian assets is another barrier, though viable alternatives exist. Instead of outright confiscation, which carries long-term risks for global financial stability, Western states could employ these assets as collateral for reconstruction loans or release tranches conditionally in exchange for verified Russian concessions. A key aspect of a return to economic normalization can be the controlled reintegration of Russian energy exports into the European market. These exports could be temporarily subject to a special duty, with the collected revenue allocated to Ukraine’s reconstruction fund. These approaches preserve pressure on Moscow while reducing the international legal uncertainty associated with asset seizure. Coupled with phased sanctions relief tied to compliance benchmarks, economic incentives could generate the material conditions for a sustainable ceasefire. Without recognizing these flexible mechanisms, economic warfare becomes open-ended, reducing the chances of a negotiated endgame. Looking ahead, the trajectory of the war will be shaped less by battlefield momentum than by the interaction between economic endurance, political will, and strategic patience.
Russia’s economic outlook remains uncertain: some forecasts point to meaningful deterioration by 2026 as fiscal strain, labour shortages, and sanctions compound, while others suggest a war-adapted economy capable of sustaining prolonged conflict. Should deterioration materialize, a window for a “hurting stalemate” may emerge. At present, however, there is no ripe moment compelling Moscow to accept Ukraine’s maximalist demands, particularly given Russia’s demonstrated tolerance for economic pain and its confidence that Western cohesion will erode faster than its own capacity to fight.
The more immediate strategic question is whether Ukraine and its European backers can endure a protracted conflict under conditions of declining US engagement. Continued reliance on external financing, military systems, and political cover leaves Ukraine exposed to shifts in Washington’s priorities, while Europe’s limited defence-industrial capacity and unresolved internal political tensions constrain its ability to fully assume the burden. Absent a recalibration, the current model risks deepening structural dependency rather than producing the conditions for sustainable recovery or autonomous security.
Under these constraints, a negotiated outcome, however imperfect, remains the only plausible pathway to terminating large-scale violence. Such an outcome will require moving beyond absolutist positions toward incremental, conditional arrangements that separate de facto stability from de jure resolution, pairs security assurances with restraint mechanisms, and links economic normalization to verified compliance.
Economic pressure on Russia, if it is to be effective, must be paired with credible incentives that offer a pathway back into regional and global economic systems, including phased sanctions relief and controlled reintegration of energy exports. Without these off-ramps, economic warfare becomes indefinite, thereby increasing the likelihood of escalation, fragmentation within the Western alliance, and long-term instability across Europe.
Ultimately, the war’s end will not be determined by moral clarity alone, but by strategic realism. The challenge for Ukraine, the rest of Europe, and the US is not merely to sustain resistance, but to shape an endgame that limits dependency, restores agency, and prevents the conflict from hardening into a permanent feature of Europe’s security landscape.
The Western powers have failed to effectively manage the increasing threat of proliferation in the Middle East. While the international community is concerned with Iran’s nuclear program, Saudi Arabia has moved forward with developing its own nuclear program, and independent studies show that Israel has longed possessed dozens of nuclear warheads. The former is a member of the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while the latter has refused to sign the international agreement.
On Middle East policy, the Biden campaign had staunchly criticized the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal and it has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier since assuming office in January 2021. However, serious obstacles remain for responsible actors in expanding non-proliferation efforts toward a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.
This panel will discuss how Western powers and multilateral institutions, such as the IAEA, can play a more effective role in managing non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Peggy Mason: Canada’s former Ambassador to the UN for Disarmament
– Mark Fitzpatrick: Associate Fellow & Former Executive Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
– Ali Vaez: Iran Project Director, International Crisis Group
– Negar Mortazavi: Journalist and Political Analyst, Host of Iran Podcast
– David Albright: Founder and President of the Institute for Science and International Security
Closing (5:45 PM – 6:00 PM ET)
What is the current economic landscape in the Middle East? While global foreign direct investment is expected to fall drastically in the post-COVID era, the World Bank reported a 5% contraction in the economic output of the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries in 2020 due to the pandemic. While oil prices are expected to rebound with normalization in demand, political instability, regional and geopolitical tensions, domestic corruption, and a volatile regulatory and legal environment all threaten economic recovery in the Middle East. What is the prospect for economic growth and development in the region post-pandemic, and how could MENA nations promote sustainable growth and regional trade moving forward?
At the same time, Middle Eastern diaspora communities have become financially successful and can help promote trade between North America and the region. In this respect, the diaspora can become vital intermediaries for advancing U.S. and Canada’s business interests abroad. Promoting business diplomacy can both benefit the MENA region and be an effective and positive way to advance engagement and achieve foreign policy goals of the North Atlantic.
This panel will investigate the trade and investment opportunities in the Middle East, discuss how facilitating economic engagement with the region can benefit Canadian and American national interests, and explore relevant policy prescriptions.
Panelists:
– Hon. Sergio Marchi: Canada’s Former Minister of International Trade
– Scott Jolliffe: Chairperson, Canada Arab Business Council
– Esfandyar Batmanghelidj: Founder and Publisher of Bourse & Bazaar
– Nizar Ghanem: Director of Research and Co-founder at Triangle
– Nicki Siamaki: Researcher at Control Risks
The Middle East continues to grapple with violence and instability, particularly in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Fueled by government incompetence and foreign interventions, terrorist insurgencies have imposed severe humanitarian and economic costs on the region. Meanwhile, regional actors have engaged in an unprecedented pursuit of arms accumulation. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have imported billions of both Western and Russian-made weapons and funded militant groups across the region, intending to contain their regional adversaries, particularly Iran. Tehran has also provided sophisticated weaponry to various militia groups across the region to strengthen its geopolitical position against Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Israel.
On the other hand, with international terrorist networks and intense regional rivalry in the Middle East, it is impractical to discuss peace and security without addressing terrorism and the arms race in the region. This panel will primarily discuss the implications of the ongoing arms race in the region and the role of Western powers and multilateral organizations in facilitating trust-building security arrangements among regional stakeholders to limit the proliferation of arms across the Middle East.
Panelists:
Luciano Zaccara: Assistant Professor, Qatar University
Dania Thafer: Executive Director, Gulf International Forum
Kayhan Barzegar: Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Science and Research Branch of Azad University
Barbara Slavin: Director of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council
Sanam Shantyaei: Senior Journalist at France24 & host of Middle East Matters
The emerging regional order in West Asia will have wide-ranging implications for global security. The Biden administration has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier, an initiative staunchly opposed by Israel, while also taking a harder line on Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen. Meanwhile, key regional actors, including Qatar, Iraq, and Oman, have engaged in backchannel efforts to bring Iran and Saudi Arabia to the negotiating table. From a broader geopolitical perspective, with the need to secure its energy imports, China is also expected to increase its footprint in the region and influence the mentioned challenges.
In this evolving landscape, Western powers will be compelled to redefine their strategic priorities and adjust their policies with the new realities in the region. In this panel, we will discuss how the West, including the United States and its allies, can utilize multilateral diplomacy with its adversaries to prevent military escalation in the region. Most importantly, the panel will discuss if a multilateral security dialogue in the Persian Gulf region, proposed by some regional actors, can help reduce tensions among regional foes and produce sustainable peace and development for the region.
Panelists:
– Abdullah Baabood: Academic Researcher and Former Director of the Centre for Gulf Studies, Qatar University
– Trita Parsi: Executive Vice-President, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
– Ebtesam Al-Ketbi: President, Emirates Policy Centre
– Jon Allen: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Israel
– Elizabeth Hagedorn: Washington correspondent for Al-Monitor
Military interventions, political and economic instabilities, and civil unrest in the Middle East have led to a global refugee crisis with an increasing wave of refugees and asylum seekers to Europe and Canada. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has, in myriad ways, exacerbated and contributed to the ongoing security threats and destabilization of the region.
While these challenges pose serious risks to Canadian security, Ottawa will also have the opportunity to limit such risks and prevent a spillover effect vis-à-vis effective humanitarian initiatives in the region. In this panel, we will primarily investigate Canada’s Middle East Strategy’s degree of success in providing humanitarian aid to the region. Secondly, the panel will discuss what programs and initiatives Canada can introduce to further build on the renewed strategy. and more specifically, how Canada can utilize its policy instruments to more effectively deal with the increasing influx of refugees from the Middle East.
Panelists:
Erica Di Ruggiero: Director of Centre for Global Health, University of Toronto
Reyhana Patel: Head of Communications & Government Relations, Islamic Relief Canada
Amir Barmaki: Former Head of UN OCHA in Iran
Catherine Gribbin: Senior Legal Advisor for International and Humanitarian Law, Canadian Red Cross
In 2016, Canada launched an ambitious five-year “Middle East Engagement Strategy” (2016-2021), committing to investing CA$3.5 billion over five years to help establish the necessary conditions for security and stability, alleviate human suffering and enable stabilization programs in the region. In the latest development, during the meeting of the Global Coalition against ISIS, Minister of Foreign Affairs Marc Garneau announced more than $43.6 million in Peace and Stabilization Operations Program funding for 11 projects in Syria and Iraq.
With Canada’s Middle East Engagement Strategy expiring this year, it is time to examine and evaluate this massive investment in the Middle East region in the past five years. More importantly, the panel will discuss a principled and strategic roadmap for the future of Canada’s short-term and long-term engagement in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Ferry de Kerckhove: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Egypt
– Dennis Horak: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
– Chris Kilford: Former Canadian Defence Attaché in Turkey, member of the national board of the Canadian International Council (CIC)
– David Dewitt: University Professor Emeritus, York University
While the United States continues to pull back from certain regional conflicts, reflected by the Biden administration’s decision to halt American backing for Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen and the expected withdrawal from Afghanistan, US troops continue to be stationed across the region. Meanwhile, Russia and China have significantly maintained and even expanded their regional activities. On one hand, the Kremlin has maintained its military presence in Syria, and on the other hand, China has signed an unprecedented 25-year strategic agreement with Iran.
As the global power structure continues to shift, it is essential to analyze the future of the US regional presence under the Biden administration, explore the emerging global rivalry with Russia and China, and at last, investigate the implications of such competition for peace and security in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Dmitri Trenin: Director of Carnegie Moscow Center
– Joost R. Hiltermann: Director of MENA Programme, International Crisis Group
– Roxane Farmanfarmaian: Affiliated Lecturer in International Relations of the Middle East and North Africa, University of Cambridge
– Andrew A. Michta: Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at Marshall Center
– Kelley Vlahos: Senior Advisor, Quincy Institute
The security architecture of the Middle East has undergone rapid transformations in an exceptionally short period. Notable developments include the United States gradual withdrawal from the region, rapprochement between Israel and some GCC states through the Abraham Accords and the rise of Chinese and Russian regional engagement.
With these new trends in the Middle East, it is timely to investigate the security implications of the Biden administration’s Middle East policy. In this respect, we will discuss the Biden team’s new approach vis-à-vis Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The panel will also discuss the role of other major powers, including China and Russia in shaping this new security environment in the region, and how the Biden administration will respond to these powers’ increasing regional presence.
Panelists:
– Sanam Vakil: Deputy Director of MENA Programme at Chatham House
– Denise Natali: Acting Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies & Director of the Center for Strategic Research, National Defense University
– Hassan Ahmadian: Professor of the Middle East and North Africa Studies, University of Tehran
– Abdulaziz Sagar: Chairman, Gulf Research Center
– Andrew Parasiliti: President, Al-Monitor
