When Mark Carney met Lee Jae-myung on the sidelines of APEC in Gyeongju, Ottawa and Seoul signed the landmark Security and Defence Cooperation Partnership (SDCP). The agreement marked a decisive move to channel middle-power alignment into structured, enduring security cooperation. With great-power rivalry intensifying and regional deterrence gaps widening, the two countries have built political momentum to operationalize shared strategic interests across security domains.
The SDCP provides a roadmap to institutionalize Canada–Korea security cooperation. It builds on both governments’ Indo-Pacific strategies, Canada’s North Korea sanctions surveillance operation (Operation NEON), and South Korea’s international maritime law experience and contribution to regional security. The prime objective is not to overlap with U.S. leadership or create new talking shops, but to rapidly reinforce middle-power capability where it matters.
Although middle powers have limited material resources at their disposal, their institutional influence outsizes them. Their comparative advantage lies not in coercion, but in norm-setting, coalition building, and developing practical institutions. There are three reasons why Canada and South Korea should move from rhetoric to action on the SDCP framework.
First, strategic demand is higher than ever. Maritime gray-zone coercion, illicit shipping, cyber penetration, disinformation, and rapid militarization of dual-use technology have all outpaced legacy security systems.
Second, complementarity between the two countries is clear. South Korea offers combat-credible military capability, rapid defence hardware production capacity, and growing cyber and space capabilities. Meanwhile, Canada has NATO–Five Eyes linkages, expertise in Arctic design, and accessibility to the North American industrial and innovation network.
Third, both governments’ cooperative security efforts possess a high degree of legitimacy. Anchoring their respective foreign policies in multilateralism and law—most notably UNCLOS and U.N. sanctions—it is easy to expand new initiatives to their allies and regional partners.
Security should be treated as an ecosystem; it includes maritime awareness, logistics, compatibility among allies, resilience in cyber and space, and the defence industrial base that sustains them. In order to have a practical effect between two geographically remote democratic countries, a function-oriented, modular approach is needed. In other words, it needs to initiate where incentives align and expand once the values are validated. Four domains are particularly promising.
Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) should be the key focus of cooperation, as noted by the SDCP. Ottawa and Seoul should exchange unclassified data on trade chokepoints, energy flows, illicit fishing, and environmental risks, and produce a joint quarterly report to establish a common baseline. Afterwards, this cooperation could expand to include Canada’s Operation NEON through the sharing satellite and coast guard radar data. In the long run, it could further evolve into trilateral or minilateral formats with the U.S., Japan, and Australia.
At the operational level, a Canada–South Korea anti-submarine warfare (ASW) task group could be linked to existing U.S.–Japan maritime exercises and surveillance networks and eventually connect Canadian frigates with South Korea’s missile-alert assets. Minesweeping exercises, where South Korea has an edge, could be added to enhance operational trust. Furthermore, planning for common port usage in South Korea or other third countries like India and Southeast Asia would secure a logistics foundation that could be expanded during crises.
The second pillar is interoperability as stressed by the SDCP. If the Canada–Korea military support framework propels efforts to co-produce NATO-standardized items in Canadian factories with South Korean designs, it could reduce Seoul’s political burdens, enhance accessibility for allies, and strengthen logistics channels. Joint training should be expanded. By leveraging its status as a United Nations Command (UNC) sending state, Canada could participate in U.S.–ROK combined exercises, beginning with command-post exercises and expanding to live elements. At the same time, if Japan–ROK radar and Canada’s space-based sensors are fused and early warning data are integrated, missile tracking and maritime targeting would be improved even without formal NORAD reform.
The third pillar is the domain of emerging cyber, space, and hybrid threats identified by the SDCP. By institutionalizing a cyber-policy dialogue, both countries could create a regular lane for information sharing, joint exercises, and officer exchanges. A small bilateral cyber team could respond to port logistics ransomware or satellite uplink hardening.
In the cognitive field, Ottawa and Seoul should establish real-time disinformation analysis or response mechanisms through diplomatic channels. Embassy-based early-horizon scanning paired with secure hotlines could swiftly counter hostile narratives. In this domain, Canada could act as a facilitator by sharing its experience with South Korea, garnered through the Five Eyes community.
The space domain should be further developed as a formal area of cooperation. Co-management of small satellites for maritime surveillance and joint declarations on responsible actions in space could provide both practical and symbolic benefits. Canada’s expertise in space robotics—represented by the Canadarm—could be aligned with the Korea Aerospace Administration (KASA) to advance dual-use projects and shape international norms.
The fourth pillar is industrial and technological cooperation. The Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP) represents a crucial opportunity. South Korean shipyards could provide modular designs that could be optimized for Arctic operations, and co-production with Canadian shipyards would ensure technology transfer, job creation, and sustained political commitment to enduring security cooperation.
Durability should also be internalized from the early stage. By establishing a joint logistics hub in Busan and Ulsan for NATO-compatible fleets, joint submarine efforts could provide predictive maintenance, digital twins, and modular spares. Simply put, by combining Canada’s life-cycle management capability with South Korea’s mass production capacity, CPSP’s costs could be reduced while combat readiness would be strengthened.
In addition, investments in future technologies, including AI-enabled anti-submarine warfare, autonomous maritime robots, and resilience in rare-earth supply chains, should be advanced through a U.S.–Canada–ROK trilateral innovation hub.
Such agendas accompany risks. China and Russia could define Canada–South Korea cooperation as an encirclement strategy, and ASEAN could hedge against perceived blocs. Furthermore, historical issues between Japan and South Korea could complicate trilateral cooperation. The lack of an information protection agreement and differences in doctrine and governance remain obstacles.
To mitigate such risks, the two countries should present early outputs as public goods — such as joint reports on illicit fishing and environmental monitoring — and quietly reinforce dual-use information sharing. Track 1.5 and Track 2 dialogues that involve think tanks, industry, and retired officials can cultivate the groundwork and backchannels to engage regional partners. Signing an information protection agreement and establishing a bilateral security coordination office offer another means to resolve institutional barriers.
In the short term (0–12 months), Ottawa and Seoul should first sign an information protection agreement, then institutionalize and expand Canada-South Korea cyber policy dialogue — all of which are supported by the recently signed SDCP. Both countries should also publish their first MDA report and declare a NATO-standardized production framework.
In the mid-term (within 2 years), the two countries could expand operational MDA and dispatch Canadian personnel to U.S.–ROK combined exercises. Ottawa and Seoul can simultaneously work towards signing a logistics hub agreement and pilot early-warning data fusion activities.
Meanwhile, in the long term (3 years and beyond), the Canada–ROK ASW task group should conduct periodic surveillance, initiate joint port management, launch the trilateral innovation hub, and initiate AI- and robotics-related projects. These efforts would all fulfill the early commitments signalled by the SDCP framework.
If the aforementioned roadmap is implemented, Canada and the ROK would operationalize the SDCP and close the gap between two geographically distant democracies with connected capabilities. Canada would be able to demonstrate its Indo-Pacific Strategy through a frontline partner that has combat-tested forces and rapid manufacturing capability. South Korea would secure a NATO partner and diversify its supply chain and defence-industrial partnerships, which are also sought by Ottawa.
Ottawa and Seoul have the means and now the security framework to generate a new layer of deterrence that is distributed yet resilient and politically durable. The stress test for middle powers is not to outspend or outgun great powers, but to out-organize them. In that sense, for Canada and South Korea, the time to start that process is now.
The Western powers have failed to effectively manage the increasing threat of proliferation in the Middle East. While the international community is concerned with Iran’s nuclear program, Saudi Arabia has moved forward with developing its own nuclear program, and independent studies show that Israel has longed possessed dozens of nuclear warheads. The former is a member of the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while the latter has refused to sign the international agreement.
On Middle East policy, the Biden campaign had staunchly criticized the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal and it has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier since assuming office in January 2021. However, serious obstacles remain for responsible actors in expanding non-proliferation efforts toward a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.
This panel will discuss how Western powers and multilateral institutions, such as the IAEA, can play a more effective role in managing non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Peggy Mason: Canada’s former Ambassador to the UN for Disarmament
– Mark Fitzpatrick: Associate Fellow & Former Executive Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
– Ali Vaez: Iran Project Director, International Crisis Group
– Negar Mortazavi: Journalist and Political Analyst, Host of Iran Podcast
– David Albright: Founder and President of the Institute for Science and International Security
Closing (5:45 PM – 6:00 PM ET)
What is the current economic landscape in the Middle East? While global foreign direct investment is expected to fall drastically in the post-COVID era, the World Bank reported a 5% contraction in the economic output of the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries in 2020 due to the pandemic. While oil prices are expected to rebound with normalization in demand, political instability, regional and geopolitical tensions, domestic corruption, and a volatile regulatory and legal environment all threaten economic recovery in the Middle East. What is the prospect for economic growth and development in the region post-pandemic, and how could MENA nations promote sustainable growth and regional trade moving forward?
At the same time, Middle Eastern diaspora communities have become financially successful and can help promote trade between North America and the region. In this respect, the diaspora can become vital intermediaries for advancing U.S. and Canada’s business interests abroad. Promoting business diplomacy can both benefit the MENA region and be an effective and positive way to advance engagement and achieve foreign policy goals of the North Atlantic.
This panel will investigate the trade and investment opportunities in the Middle East, discuss how facilitating economic engagement with the region can benefit Canadian and American national interests, and explore relevant policy prescriptions.
Panelists:
– Hon. Sergio Marchi: Canada’s Former Minister of International Trade
– Scott Jolliffe: Chairperson, Canada Arab Business Council
– Esfandyar Batmanghelidj: Founder and Publisher of Bourse & Bazaar
– Nizar Ghanem: Director of Research and Co-founder at Triangle
– Nicki Siamaki: Researcher at Control Risks
The Middle East continues to grapple with violence and instability, particularly in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Fueled by government incompetence and foreign interventions, terrorist insurgencies have imposed severe humanitarian and economic costs on the region. Meanwhile, regional actors have engaged in an unprecedented pursuit of arms accumulation. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have imported billions of both Western and Russian-made weapons and funded militant groups across the region, intending to contain their regional adversaries, particularly Iran. Tehran has also provided sophisticated weaponry to various militia groups across the region to strengthen its geopolitical position against Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Israel.
On the other hand, with international terrorist networks and intense regional rivalry in the Middle East, it is impractical to discuss peace and security without addressing terrorism and the arms race in the region. This panel will primarily discuss the implications of the ongoing arms race in the region and the role of Western powers and multilateral organizations in facilitating trust-building security arrangements among regional stakeholders to limit the proliferation of arms across the Middle East.
Panelists:
Luciano Zaccara: Assistant Professor, Qatar University
Dania Thafer: Executive Director, Gulf International Forum
Kayhan Barzegar: Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Science and Research Branch of Azad University
Barbara Slavin: Director of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council
Sanam Shantyaei: Senior Journalist at France24 & host of Middle East Matters
The emerging regional order in West Asia will have wide-ranging implications for global security. The Biden administration has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier, an initiative staunchly opposed by Israel, while also taking a harder line on Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen. Meanwhile, key regional actors, including Qatar, Iraq, and Oman, have engaged in backchannel efforts to bring Iran and Saudi Arabia to the negotiating table. From a broader geopolitical perspective, with the need to secure its energy imports, China is also expected to increase its footprint in the region and influence the mentioned challenges.
In this evolving landscape, Western powers will be compelled to redefine their strategic priorities and adjust their policies with the new realities in the region. In this panel, we will discuss how the West, including the United States and its allies, can utilize multilateral diplomacy with its adversaries to prevent military escalation in the region. Most importantly, the panel will discuss if a multilateral security dialogue in the Persian Gulf region, proposed by some regional actors, can help reduce tensions among regional foes and produce sustainable peace and development for the region.
Panelists:
– Abdullah Baabood: Academic Researcher and Former Director of the Centre for Gulf Studies, Qatar University
– Trita Parsi: Executive Vice-President, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
– Ebtesam Al-Ketbi: President, Emirates Policy Centre
– Jon Allen: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Israel
– Elizabeth Hagedorn: Washington correspondent for Al-Monitor
Military interventions, political and economic instabilities, and civil unrest in the Middle East have led to a global refugee crisis with an increasing wave of refugees and asylum seekers to Europe and Canada. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has, in myriad ways, exacerbated and contributed to the ongoing security threats and destabilization of the region.
While these challenges pose serious risks to Canadian security, Ottawa will also have the opportunity to limit such risks and prevent a spillover effect vis-à-vis effective humanitarian initiatives in the region. In this panel, we will primarily investigate Canada’s Middle East Strategy’s degree of success in providing humanitarian aid to the region. Secondly, the panel will discuss what programs and initiatives Canada can introduce to further build on the renewed strategy. and more specifically, how Canada can utilize its policy instruments to more effectively deal with the increasing influx of refugees from the Middle East.
Panelists:
Erica Di Ruggiero: Director of Centre for Global Health, University of Toronto
Reyhana Patel: Head of Communications & Government Relations, Islamic Relief Canada
Amir Barmaki: Former Head of UN OCHA in Iran
Catherine Gribbin: Senior Legal Advisor for International and Humanitarian Law, Canadian Red Cross
In 2016, Canada launched an ambitious five-year “Middle East Engagement Strategy” (2016-2021), committing to investing CA$3.5 billion over five years to help establish the necessary conditions for security and stability, alleviate human suffering and enable stabilization programs in the region. In the latest development, during the meeting of the Global Coalition against ISIS, Minister of Foreign Affairs Marc Garneau announced more than $43.6 million in Peace and Stabilization Operations Program funding for 11 projects in Syria and Iraq.
With Canada’s Middle East Engagement Strategy expiring this year, it is time to examine and evaluate this massive investment in the Middle East region in the past five years. More importantly, the panel will discuss a principled and strategic roadmap for the future of Canada’s short-term and long-term engagement in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Ferry de Kerckhove: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Egypt
– Dennis Horak: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
– Chris Kilford: Former Canadian Defence Attaché in Turkey, member of the national board of the Canadian International Council (CIC)
– David Dewitt: University Professor Emeritus, York University
While the United States continues to pull back from certain regional conflicts, reflected by the Biden administration’s decision to halt American backing for Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen and the expected withdrawal from Afghanistan, US troops continue to be stationed across the region. Meanwhile, Russia and China have significantly maintained and even expanded their regional activities. On one hand, the Kremlin has maintained its military presence in Syria, and on the other hand, China has signed an unprecedented 25-year strategic agreement with Iran.
As the global power structure continues to shift, it is essential to analyze the future of the US regional presence under the Biden administration, explore the emerging global rivalry with Russia and China, and at last, investigate the implications of such competition for peace and security in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Dmitri Trenin: Director of Carnegie Moscow Center
– Joost R. Hiltermann: Director of MENA Programme, International Crisis Group
– Roxane Farmanfarmaian: Affiliated Lecturer in International Relations of the Middle East and North Africa, University of Cambridge
– Andrew A. Michta: Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at Marshall Center
– Kelley Vlahos: Senior Advisor, Quincy Institute
The security architecture of the Middle East has undergone rapid transformations in an exceptionally short period. Notable developments include the United States gradual withdrawal from the region, rapprochement between Israel and some GCC states through the Abraham Accords and the rise of Chinese and Russian regional engagement.
With these new trends in the Middle East, it is timely to investigate the security implications of the Biden administration’s Middle East policy. In this respect, we will discuss the Biden team’s new approach vis-à-vis Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The panel will also discuss the role of other major powers, including China and Russia in shaping this new security environment in the region, and how the Biden administration will respond to these powers’ increasing regional presence.
Panelists:
– Sanam Vakil: Deputy Director of MENA Programme at Chatham House
– Denise Natali: Acting Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies & Director of the Center for Strategic Research, National Defense University
– Hassan Ahmadian: Professor of the Middle East and North Africa Studies, University of Tehran
– Abdulaziz Sagar: Chairman, Gulf Research Center
– Andrew Parasiliti: President, Al-Monitor
