October 7th, 2023, happened in the shadow of the Ukraine Conflict that began with the Russian invasion in February 2022. In the immediate aftermath of October 7th, many commentators sought to portray the two conflicts as essentially alike: two small nations that were also American allies, fighting against the same anti-Western forces. Russia in the case of the former; Iran and its proxies in the case of the latter. From the outset, however, it was evident that these comparisons were false or at least severely lacking. The only way these two conflicts could appear similar in the mentioned respects is if one imposes a Manichaean Cold War (or even post-Cold War) binary that divides the world into pro-American democratic allies and anti-American authoritarian adversaries. The global balance of power today, however, looks very different.
A significant fact of the early twenty-first century is the collapse of the Liberal International Order (LIO) and the emergence of a post-liberal world order. By LIO, I mean the system of states and institutions the United States and its allies established at the end of the Second World War and remade in fundamental ways in the aftermath of the Cold War. The LIO is an outgrowth of—but is not synonymous with—the Westphalian state system of 1648. While the Westphalian order was based on the idea of state sovereignty, the LIO rested on an ideological foundation that consisted of several consensuses on matters of trade, security, multilateral cooperation, and perhaps most importantly, internal political and institutional arrangements.1G. John Ikenberry argues that the LIO is “organized around economic openness, multilateral institutions, security cooperation and democratic solidarity,” in “The end of liberal international order?” International Affairs, January 2018, Vol. 94, No. 1 (January 2018), pp. 7-23, p. 7. Elsewhere he writes that the LIO consists of “open markets, international institutions, cooperative security democratic community, progressive change, collective problem solving, shared sovereignty, [and] the rule of law.” Quoted in Hans Kundnani, “What is the Liberal International Order?” German Marshall Fund of the United States (2017), http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep18909, p. 2. Ikenberry, who is generally supportive of the LIO, nonetheless admits that the LIO differs in fundamental ways from the Westphalian order, and in many respects should be seen as a geological “stratum” that was laid on top of the Westphalian system. My explanation here also relies on Michael Anton, “America and the Liberal International Order,” American Affairs, Vol. I, No. 1 (Spring 2017), pp. 113–25. Unlike the Westphalian system, therefore, which at least theoretically allowed for a sort of “multiplicity” among nations, the LIO advanced a certain universalist and melioristic ideology that classified and stratified states according to their compliance with its foundational principles.2One could, of course, make the argument that the Westphalian system promoted a kind of ideology in its espousal of the “nation-state” (however understood) as the ordering principle of international relations. Moreover, the Westphalian system was at least initially conceived as limited to the European, Christian world. For more on the Peace of Westphalia in this context, see Henry Kissinger, World Order, (New York: Penguin Press, 2014), p. 27, ff. It is from Kissinger that I borrowed my use here of the term “multiplicity.” In certain respects, the LIO could thus also be seen as anti-Westphalian, as this universalist ideology at times also actively interfered with the principles of state sovereignty. This ideology also provided the foundation and source of legitimacy for the concrete and institutional dimensions of the LIO as we know it: namely, supra- and extra-national organizations such as the United Nations, NATO, World Bank, and a vast number of NGOs, as well as the more ethereal components of the LIO, concepts like human dignity, -rights, and -freedoms.
Some scholars correctly distinguish between the LIO that was established after the Second World War and the LIO that came to exist at the end of the Cold War (LIO I + II). LIO I was a “bounded” order, limited to the Western alliance within the greater framework of the bipolar world of the Cold War. LIO II, conversely, was “unbounded” and truly international.3This is an argument developed by John J. Mearsheimer, “Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order,” International Security, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Spring 2019), pp. 7–50, p. 8, ff. LIO II also coincided with the “unipolar” era, when the United States became the most powerful country in the world. Under the “unipolar” regime, the universal classification system, inherent to liberal ideology, was subsequently deployed at the global level, giving rise to the notion that all historical roads lead to the same end.4Arta Moeini, “America the Last Ideological Empire”, Compact (July 8, 2022): https://www.compactmag.com/article/america-the-last-ideological-empire/
Yet over time, the ideas and structural apparatus that constituted the LIO took on a life of their own and began to undermine even the nations that had established and upheld this order. As some of the more perceptive critics of liberalism noted already at the end of the Cold War, there was something in the very fabric of liberal ideology that led to the creation of vast managerial bureaucracies that operated according to their own inner logic, rather than in the name of the people and countries for whom they were established in the first place.5I will mention here only the few which I found most helpful: Christopher Lasch, “The Age of Limits,” in Arthur M. Melzer, Jerry Weinberger, and M. Richard Zinman (eds.), History and the Idea of Progress, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1995), pp. 227-240; and Edward Luttwak, “Why Fascism is the Wave of the Future,” London Review of Books, Vol. 16, No. 7 (7 April 1994). Consider in this respect also the arguments provided by Alexis de Tocqueville about the relationship between modernity and centralization. Patrick Deneen’s analysis, in Why Liberalism Failed, although somewhat reductive, is nonetheless helpful in understanding some of the ways in which Tocqueville’s logic could be applied to today’s circumstances; (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2018), pp. 61-3. Consequently, they were bound to inspire strong reactions at both the national and international levels.
What we are witnessing now, therefore—both domestically and internationally—is the rejection of the ideology that gave rise to the LIO in the first place in the name of particular interests and cultural norms. Contrary to the claims of many mainstream commentators, especially when seeking to explain events such as the Ukraine Conflict or October 7th, there is nothing inherently anti-Western or anti-American in this rejection, as these trends are equally strong within the West and the United States as they are worldwide. As evidence, one may simply look to the remarks by the current Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Marco Rubio, made earlier this year:
Out of the triumphalism of the end of the […] Cold War emerged a bipartisan consensus, and this consensus was that we had reached the end of history, that all of the nations of the world would now become members of the democratic Western-led community; that a foreign policy that served the national interest could now be replaced by one that served the liberal world order; and that all mankind was now destined to abandon national sovereignty and national identity and would instead become one human family and citizens of the world. This wasn’t just a fantasy. We now know it was a dangerous delusion…The post-war global order is not just obsolete; it is now a weapon being used against us.6Marco Rubio, “Opening Remarks by Secretary of State-designate Marco Rubio Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee” (January 15, 2025), https://www.state.gov/opening-remarks-by-secretary-of-state-designate-marco-rubio-before-the-senate-foreign-relations-committee/ (last accessed August 24, 2025.
The postliberal world order that we are now entering and, in many ways, already inhabit, is thus characterized above all by the rejection of the liberal, universalist ideology. In some respects, we may therefore divide the world into guardians of the old order and partisans of the new—and in this regard, and this regard alone, the world could be described as operating within a binary structure that echoes the Cold War and immediate post-Cold War era. In all other respects, however, the world we are coming to inhabit is a more ideologically diverse, interest-based, multipolar system than we have become accustomed to over the last thirty years.
In practical terms, we should thus expect to see states retreating from universal concepts such as “human rights” and “international law”, as well as from the aforementioned institutions that derive their legitimacy from such concepts, notably the U.N. and the International Court of Justice. In their internal political configurations, we may similarly see countries moving away from the “defense of the sovereign individual” as the principle grounding government and state legitimacy and instead turn to their preliberal, civilizational roots as their guide for political action.7The reference here is to John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty (1859): “The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign” (Introduction.) Mill is, of course, heavily indebted here to older thinkers of the liberal tradition such as Hobbes and Locke.
Some scholars even argue that over the course of the twenty-first century we may even witness the advent of a new model of political organization that may one day even replace the nation-state as the foundational building block of the world system: what scholars have come to call the “Civilizational State,” a state that stands for distinct civilizational realms and their particular values, against any claims of Western universalism.8The concept was popularized by the publication of Christopher Coker, The Rise of the Civilizational State (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2019). Some of the literature on this subject includes Adrian Pabst, “The Resurgence of Great Power Politics and the Rise of the Civilizational State,” Telos (Fall 2019), no. 188: 205-210; and idem., “Renewing the West’s unique universalism,” Telos 201 (Winter 2022): 165–88; Amitav Acharya, “The Myth of the ‘Civilization State’: Rising Powers and the Cultural Challenge to World Order,” Ethics & International Affairs 34, no. 2 (2020): 139–56. For a more popular, critical treatment of the subject, see Alex Hu, “The Allure of the Civilizational State,” The National Interest (May 5, 2022): https://nationalinterest.org/feature/allure-civilizational-state-202230 (last accessed on September 6, 2025). See also the reading list at Stanford University’s “The Civilizationism Project,” at https://thecivilizationismproject.stanford.edu/. To be sure, this concept is still in need of refinement and definition, but we can already begin to see the idea of Civilizationism as perhaps the strongest driver of contemporary global affairs.9See in this regard Gregorio Bettiza, Derek Bolton, & David Lewis,” Civilizationism and the Ideological Contestation of the Liberal International Order,” International Studies Review, Vol. 25, Is. (June 2023), https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viad006; and Henry E. Hale and Marlene Laruelle, “A New Wave of Research on Civilizational Politics,” Nationalities Papers 49, no. 4 (2021), pp. 597–608, https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2020.83.
Xi Jinping in China and Vladimir Putin in Russia have for years portrayed themselves as leaders and representatives of unique civilizations, as have Narendra Modi in India and Recep Erdoğan in Turkey. Similarly, the Islamic Republic of Iran is increasingly adopting civilizational language in the aftermath of the 12-day War, connecting itself with the Persian civilization. Across Europe, we have witnessed the ascent of influential political leaders and parties seeking to defend “European Civilization” or “Judeo-Christian” civilizational norms.10Amitav Acharya (2020), as well as Bettiza et al. (2023), get into more detail about how these various leaders have summoned “civilizational norms” in their statecraft. And even in America—the former beating heart of the LIO—we see renewed emphasis on the “American Way of Life” and even “American Civilization.”11An interesting argument in this respect is Bruno Maçães, History Has Begun: The Birth of a New America, (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2020). [Maçães has written a more popular take on civilizational states in “The Attack Of The Civilization State,” Noema (June 15, 2020): https://www.noemamag.com/the-attack-of-the-civilization-state/ (last accessed on September 6, 2025.)] See also the older article by Peter O’Brien, “USA: A Civilization of its Own?.” Comparative Civilizations Review, no. 57 (2007): 6.
The most telling signal of the trajectory of international developments, however, might be observed in the formation and development of BRICS. In some respects, BRICS represents the coalition of the West’s “Others”. From an ideological perspective, BRICS is incoherent in the exact sense of the word: some of its members are autocratic and some democratic—notably India, Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia comprise some of the world’s most populous democracies. Aside from their rejection of Western hegemony, there is little shared doctrinal or ideological foundation among the members, and some hold differing and occasionally contradictory aims. They cannot even be said to stand in opposition to the United States, with whom several of its members seek to maintain positive relationships. They are even hesitant to operate in defense of one of their own members, as we saw during Israel’s 12-Day War with Iran. Yet it is exactly in their polycultural and multipolar stance that we can begin to discern the outline of the new world order. In 2025, the coalition expanded to ten members. It now represents half the world population and 41.4 percent of world GDP.12This paragraph and the details contained therein are indebted to Ted Snider, “The Yellow BRICS Road”, The American Conservative, (15 July, 2025): https://www.theamericanconservative.com/the-yellow-brics-road/; and Thomas Fazi, “The Dawn of the BRICS World Order”, UnHerd, (30 August, 2023): https://unherd.com/2023/08/the-dawn-of-the-brics-world-order/ (both last accessed on September 6, 2025.) BRICS, then, is now for all intents and purposes “the international community”. And setting the United States aside, BRICS is what we should be thinking of when referring to “world opinion”.
But what do these shifts away from the LIO and even the nation-state and toward “civilizations” portend for Israel? When all is said and done, the challenge for Israel in the coming years will likely be more internal and ideational, than external. Commentators on Israeli affairs are fond of quoting the apocryphal remark, attributed to Henry Kissinger, that “Israel has no foreign policy, only domestic politics.” But the reality seems to be exactly the opposite: in the last half-century or so, Israel has taken its bearings almost entirely from the norms and institutions of the LIO at the expense of discussions of what we may call its own civilizational values. Contrary to Kissinger’s supposed assertion, therefore, we may say that Israel has only had a foreign policy and no domestic politics.
In many ways, this was to be expected. Israel was born into the reality of the LIO, and even justified its existence upon its framework. Accordingly, Israel has always sought to be a member in good standing of the Western alliance and abide by the rules and rulings of LIO institutions (although admittedly, not always successfully).
Yet under the emerging world order, Israel may have to change. Israel cannot remain singularly wedded to and the sole defender and representative of an increasingly outdated world order.13Eran Lerman writes: “Israel is not an empire. If it conducts itself while ignoring the network of value-based and strategic, economic and cultural interdependencies with the West and the United States at its head, this could be disastrous. Our place in the world is among the broader circle of democratic nation-states — and beyond, with the even broader circle of states that are not democratic, but have tied their fate to the fate of the West. There is no hope in attempts to connect with empires that seek to fundamentally undermine the existing order — that same order within which Israel was established, became grounded, and grew stronger. […]. Neither false hopes nor existing international institutions will help. What is required is a determined and armed alliance of all who seek to stand against the anti-democratic forces of China, Russia, Iran and those who side with them, and to prevent them from reviving the days of imperial adventurism of Japan and Italy, of Hitler and of Stalin”; “The Evolving Dimensions of the World Order” (Hebrew,) Hashiloach, No. 39 (December 2024), pp. 47-66, p. 66 (my translation.) Although I agree with Lerman at face value, in my view, this text exhibits the very kind of outdated thinking regarding the contours of the international system which I have tried here to refute. The world is no longer divided into democratic and anti-democratic forces, and ideology is becoming less important as a factor in international relations. Moreover, this reliance on WWII and Cold War mythology—Japan, Italy, Hitler, Stalin— is no longer convincing to large parts of the West. On this latter point, see, inter alia, Nathan Pinkoski, “The End of the Churchill Myth”, Compact (September 17, 2024), https://www.compactmag.com/article/the-end-of-the-churchill-myth/; and Sean McMeekin, “Goodbye to the Good War”, Claremont Review of Books, Vol. XXV, No. 3 (Summer 2025), pp. 46-50. It must, above all, learn to think differently. And while it should not simply abandon the liberal standards that guided the country for the first eight decades of its existence, Israel must learn to operate according to its own unique civilizational values.
To be sure, Israel first needs to identify and articulate these values—work that will require Israelis to draw upon their rich tradition of political philosophy and their own cultural heritage. But this task of articulation and definition perhaps constitutes the most urgent task Israel must accomplish if it is to remain relevant within this emerging post-liberal global framework.
The Western powers have failed to effectively manage the increasing threat of proliferation in the Middle East. While the international community is concerned with Iran’s nuclear program, Saudi Arabia has moved forward with developing its own nuclear program, and independent studies show that Israel has longed possessed dozens of nuclear warheads. The former is a member of the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while the latter has refused to sign the international agreement.
On Middle East policy, the Biden campaign had staunchly criticized the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal and it has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier since assuming office in January 2021. However, serious obstacles remain for responsible actors in expanding non-proliferation efforts toward a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.
This panel will discuss how Western powers and multilateral institutions, such as the IAEA, can play a more effective role in managing non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Peggy Mason: Canada’s former Ambassador to the UN for Disarmament
– Mark Fitzpatrick: Associate Fellow & Former Executive Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
– Ali Vaez: Iran Project Director, International Crisis Group
– Negar Mortazavi: Journalist and Political Analyst, Host of Iran Podcast
– David Albright: Founder and President of the Institute for Science and International Security
Closing (5:45 PM – 6:00 PM ET)
What is the current economic landscape in the Middle East? While global foreign direct investment is expected to fall drastically in the post-COVID era, the World Bank reported a 5% contraction in the economic output of the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries in 2020 due to the pandemic. While oil prices are expected to rebound with normalization in demand, political instability, regional and geopolitical tensions, domestic corruption, and a volatile regulatory and legal environment all threaten economic recovery in the Middle East. What is the prospect for economic growth and development in the region post-pandemic, and how could MENA nations promote sustainable growth and regional trade moving forward?
At the same time, Middle Eastern diaspora communities have become financially successful and can help promote trade between North America and the region. In this respect, the diaspora can become vital intermediaries for advancing U.S. and Canada’s business interests abroad. Promoting business diplomacy can both benefit the MENA region and be an effective and positive way to advance engagement and achieve foreign policy goals of the North Atlantic.
This panel will investigate the trade and investment opportunities in the Middle East, discuss how facilitating economic engagement with the region can benefit Canadian and American national interests, and explore relevant policy prescriptions.
Panelists:
– Hon. Sergio Marchi: Canada’s Former Minister of International Trade
– Scott Jolliffe: Chairperson, Canada Arab Business Council
– Esfandyar Batmanghelidj: Founder and Publisher of Bourse & Bazaar
– Nizar Ghanem: Director of Research and Co-founder at Triangle
– Nicki Siamaki: Researcher at Control Risks
The Middle East continues to grapple with violence and instability, particularly in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Fueled by government incompetence and foreign interventions, terrorist insurgencies have imposed severe humanitarian and economic costs on the region. Meanwhile, regional actors have engaged in an unprecedented pursuit of arms accumulation. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have imported billions of both Western and Russian-made weapons and funded militant groups across the region, intending to contain their regional adversaries, particularly Iran. Tehran has also provided sophisticated weaponry to various militia groups across the region to strengthen its geopolitical position against Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Israel.
On the other hand, with international terrorist networks and intense regional rivalry in the Middle East, it is impractical to discuss peace and security without addressing terrorism and the arms race in the region. This panel will primarily discuss the implications of the ongoing arms race in the region and the role of Western powers and multilateral organizations in facilitating trust-building security arrangements among regional stakeholders to limit the proliferation of arms across the Middle East.
Panelists:
Luciano Zaccara: Assistant Professor, Qatar University
Dania Thafer: Executive Director, Gulf International Forum
Kayhan Barzegar: Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Science and Research Branch of Azad University
Barbara Slavin: Director of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council
Sanam Shantyaei: Senior Journalist at France24 & host of Middle East Matters
The emerging regional order in West Asia will have wide-ranging implications for global security. The Biden administration has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier, an initiative staunchly opposed by Israel, while also taking a harder line on Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen. Meanwhile, key regional actors, including Qatar, Iraq, and Oman, have engaged in backchannel efforts to bring Iran and Saudi Arabia to the negotiating table. From a broader geopolitical perspective, with the need to secure its energy imports, China is also expected to increase its footprint in the region and influence the mentioned challenges.
In this evolving landscape, Western powers will be compelled to redefine their strategic priorities and adjust their policies with the new realities in the region. In this panel, we will discuss how the West, including the United States and its allies, can utilize multilateral diplomacy with its adversaries to prevent military escalation in the region. Most importantly, the panel will discuss if a multilateral security dialogue in the Persian Gulf region, proposed by some regional actors, can help reduce tensions among regional foes and produce sustainable peace and development for the region.
Panelists:
– Abdullah Baabood: Academic Researcher and Former Director of the Centre for Gulf Studies, Qatar University
– Trita Parsi: Executive Vice-President, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
– Ebtesam Al-Ketbi: President, Emirates Policy Centre
– Jon Allen: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Israel
– Elizabeth Hagedorn: Washington correspondent for Al-Monitor
Military interventions, political and economic instabilities, and civil unrest in the Middle East have led to a global refugee crisis with an increasing wave of refugees and asylum seekers to Europe and Canada. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has, in myriad ways, exacerbated and contributed to the ongoing security threats and destabilization of the region.
While these challenges pose serious risks to Canadian security, Ottawa will also have the opportunity to limit such risks and prevent a spillover effect vis-à-vis effective humanitarian initiatives in the region. In this panel, we will primarily investigate Canada’s Middle East Strategy’s degree of success in providing humanitarian aid to the region. Secondly, the panel will discuss what programs and initiatives Canada can introduce to further build on the renewed strategy. and more specifically, how Canada can utilize its policy instruments to more effectively deal with the increasing influx of refugees from the Middle East.
Panelists:
Erica Di Ruggiero: Director of Centre for Global Health, University of Toronto
Reyhana Patel: Head of Communications & Government Relations, Islamic Relief Canada
Amir Barmaki: Former Head of UN OCHA in Iran
Catherine Gribbin: Senior Legal Advisor for International and Humanitarian Law, Canadian Red Cross
In 2016, Canada launched an ambitious five-year “Middle East Engagement Strategy” (2016-2021), committing to investing CA$3.5 billion over five years to help establish the necessary conditions for security and stability, alleviate human suffering and enable stabilization programs in the region. In the latest development, during the meeting of the Global Coalition against ISIS, Minister of Foreign Affairs Marc Garneau announced more than $43.6 million in Peace and Stabilization Operations Program funding for 11 projects in Syria and Iraq.
With Canada’s Middle East Engagement Strategy expiring this year, it is time to examine and evaluate this massive investment in the Middle East region in the past five years. More importantly, the panel will discuss a principled and strategic roadmap for the future of Canada’s short-term and long-term engagement in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Ferry de Kerckhove: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Egypt
– Dennis Horak: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
– Chris Kilford: Former Canadian Defence Attaché in Turkey, member of the national board of the Canadian International Council (CIC)
– David Dewitt: University Professor Emeritus, York University
While the United States continues to pull back from certain regional conflicts, reflected by the Biden administration’s decision to halt American backing for Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen and the expected withdrawal from Afghanistan, US troops continue to be stationed across the region. Meanwhile, Russia and China have significantly maintained and even expanded their regional activities. On one hand, the Kremlin has maintained its military presence in Syria, and on the other hand, China has signed an unprecedented 25-year strategic agreement with Iran.
As the global power structure continues to shift, it is essential to analyze the future of the US regional presence under the Biden administration, explore the emerging global rivalry with Russia and China, and at last, investigate the implications of such competition for peace and security in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Dmitri Trenin: Director of Carnegie Moscow Center
– Joost R. Hiltermann: Director of MENA Programme, International Crisis Group
– Roxane Farmanfarmaian: Affiliated Lecturer in International Relations of the Middle East and North Africa, University of Cambridge
– Andrew A. Michta: Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at Marshall Center
– Kelley Vlahos: Senior Advisor, Quincy Institute
The security architecture of the Middle East has undergone rapid transformations in an exceptionally short period. Notable developments include the United States gradual withdrawal from the region, rapprochement between Israel and some GCC states through the Abraham Accords and the rise of Chinese and Russian regional engagement.
With these new trends in the Middle East, it is timely to investigate the security implications of the Biden administration’s Middle East policy. In this respect, we will discuss the Biden team’s new approach vis-à-vis Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The panel will also discuss the role of other major powers, including China and Russia in shaping this new security environment in the region, and how the Biden administration will respond to these powers’ increasing regional presence.
Panelists:
– Sanam Vakil: Deputy Director of MENA Programme at Chatham House
– Denise Natali: Acting Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies & Director of the Center for Strategic Research, National Defense University
– Hassan Ahmadian: Professor of the Middle East and North Africa Studies, University of Tehran
– Abdulaziz Sagar: Chairman, Gulf Research Center
– Andrew Parasiliti: President, Al-Monitor
