According to the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security, Kaja Kallas, and former U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, “Putin can end this war” anytime he wishes. To understand why the Alaska Summit is taking place now and what is likely to emerge from it, it therefore seems logical to consider Putin’s demands.
Russia’s red lines for a durable peace were communicated most succinctly on June 14, 2024. The first is that Ukraine completely withdraw its military from the Donetsk, Lugansk, Kherson, and Zaporozhye—the four regions annexed by Russia in which fighting is still taking place; the second is that Ukraine officially declare that it does not intend to join NATO.
As soon as Ukraine fulfills these two conditions, Putin said, he would “immediately issue the order to cease fire and begin negotiations.” Tellingly, that same week, Russia announced that it was ready for a “comprehensive dialogue” with Washington to discuss, among other things, how America might help in the resolution of the Ukraine conflict.
This does not mean that Russia has abandoned its other concerns, such as the de-Nazification of Ukrainian society, preventing the emergence of a global hegemon, and creating a “common and indivisible Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community” based on the principles laid out by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s (OSCE) 2010 Summit in Astana. Only that Russia now regards these priorities as hinging on the resolution of the military conflict in Ukraine.
So why meet now? What has changed since June 2024? Simply put, recent Russian military successes, combined with the West’s failure to provide any prospect of a Ukrainian victory, have made Kiev’s defeat inevitable.
This sense of inevitability has recently been reinforced by the uncompromising response of the BRICS states—shrugging off Washington’s threat of third-party sanctions (or tariffs) on countries that continue to do business with Russia. Donald Trump’s advisors, meanwhile, likely explained to him that, in this tug-of-war, the United States was likely to suffer much more than it would gain over a conflict that was peripheral to U.S. national interests. This includes not just the risk of a more unified BRICS, but also the strong likelihood that even more of the Global South would want to join BRICS, seeing in it the foundation for a more stable and sustainable rules-based order than the one currently led by the West.
On the battlefield, Russia’s steady advances now risk overwhelming Ukraine’s eroding defenses. Since the West lacks the military, technological, or economic resources—not to mention the political will—to reverse this trajectory in the foreseeable future, Trump likely sent his trusted envoy Steve Wikoff to Moscow to see if Putin would still accept a ceasefire along the lines of what he proposed on June 14, 2024.
It appears Putin is willing to entertain a similar proposal, and this has sufficed for a meeting.
While it is unlikely that any major breakthroughs will be achieved at such a hastily convened meeting, the mere fact of it happening is leading to speculation about the winners and losers of an eventual settlement. Given the current course of the war, most observers agree that Russia and its BRICS allies have the upper hand over Ukraine and its EU allies, and Moscow wants to lock in its military victories into permanent diplomatic gains.
If a deal is concluded, America will also be able to claim at least a partial victory. Washington will finally be able to cut its losses in Ukraine, while Trump can deliver on a campaign promise to end the war, in addition to getting the EU to not only fund the war effort but also purchase American military equipment to do so! Meanwhile, the war has thoroughly vassalized Europe, and new fault lines are fracturing the political West: as the EU economies remain saddled with self-imposed restrictions on trade and energy purchases from Russia, Trump is considering ways to improve bilateral “strategic cooperation” with Russia, possibly even including energy investments.
The dramatic difference between the American and European approaches boils down to Brussels being willing to gamble all on the pursuit of victory in Ukraine, often putting European politics above real-world strategy. The EU’s hubris and ideological fixation on defeating Russia have led to unprecedented levels of support for Ukraine, without ever considering what to do if Russia is not defeated.
Now that the United States is no longer willing to support such a course, the absence of any European strategy for ending the war, along with the economic toll that the war’s funding is inflicting on social services in many countries, has led to the rise of a populist backlash that threatens to unseat several established European political parties.
Regardless of whether or not a deal is signed at this meeting, it has already had one salubrious effect: it has revealed the emptiness of the slogan “Nothing about Ukraine, without Ukraine”. It sounds appealing, but in international politics, more often than not, the opposite holds true—victors dictate terms to the defeated, with little to no regard for what the latter want.
It has often been said, though rarely by Russian spokesmen, that the war in Ukraine cannot be won on the battlefield. This is simply not true. It can be won on the battlefield, albeit at great cost. Even more importantly, developments on the battlefield always shape the political settlement.
It was obvious from the beginning that the disparity in military, economic, and demographic potentials did not favor Ukraine in its conflict with Russia. Structurally speaking, Russia is a historical middle power and a civilizational state; Ukraine is a relatively small, peripheral, and fault-line state established in 1991. Ukraine’s Western supporters, however, argued that the imbalance could be offset by Western sanctions, which would cripple the Russian economy and its military production, and by bold offensives, like the invasion of the Kursk region and the “Spiderweb” operation. In combination, it was claimed, they would sap public support and lead the Russian political leadership to reconsider its strategy in Ukraine.
Instead, in response to sanctions, Russia developed alternative payment mechanisms, new supply chains, and alternative markets that have allowed its economy to grow to the world’s fourth-largest since the war began. The recurring strikes inside Russian territory, meanwhile, have not had any impact on the Russian public’s support for Putin. Indeed, they have had a predictable rallying effect, consolidating public perceptions that this war is necessary and justified.
As a result, over time, the disparity between the two countries has only increased. This has led to truly catastrophic levels of desertions among Ukrainian soldiers (Ukrainian parliamentarians have cited figures as high as 400,000 AWOL), and to a dramatic shift in Ukrainian public opinion—69% now want peace negotiations, compared to 24% who are still willing to continue fighting, according to the latest Gallup poll—a net reversal from three years ago.
We should not expect a detailed, comprehensive peace deal for Ukraine from this U.S.-Russia summit. It would already be quite a feat if the two presidents signed a document that laid out, in broad strokes, a common vision for the future. Such a document would focus primarily on Russian-American relations, with a codicil, at best, about the steps to be taken to resolve the conflict in Ukraine.
The obvious model here is the “Basic Principles Agreement” signed in Moscow in May 1972. While not a détente per se, it served as the precursor to détente, and to the Helsinki Peace Conference of 1975, which subsequently codified these bilateral principles for all of Europe. A similarly long and laborious process of rapprochement will be needed to reconcile Russia with the global West today.
However, by at least beginning to establish a normal diplomatic framework within which to discuss U.S.-Russia relations, the United States could finally situate the conflict in Ukraine in its proper context. Ukraine, for obvious reasons, wants its interests to be the focal point of U.S.-Russia relations, and even to drag Washington and NATO into a direct confrontation with Moscow. But a global power like the United States has other priorities and competing interests, some of which require Russia’s cooperation.
The Biden Administration purposefully cultivated public confusion (“strategic ambiguity”) over Ukraine’s importance to America’s national interests, partly to cajole its allies and partly to pressure Russia. This has caused a host of problems: first, it misled Ukrainian leaders into believing that America would eventually enter the war directly on their side, encouraging their reluctance to negotiate a settlement; relatedly, it led NATO to overcommit and exhaust its own military resources, while rejecting any settlement that was not on Ukraine’s terms. This is why a preliminary peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine, initialed by both sides in Istanbul in April 2022, was scuttled.
Some will object that any agreement now smacks of “appeasement” and “another Yalta”. To them, one should simply point out that the Yalta Agreement created the postwar world order in which the United States became a superpower, the European Union was formed, and global nuclear war was averted. Those interested in a more balanced view of Yalta should take a look at Irish diplomatic historian Geoffrey Roberts’ prescient 2018 essay, “Trump Wants to Restore the U.S.-Russia Alliance”.
The choice of Alaska, once the easternmost part of the Russian Empire, as a venue for this summit is deeply symbolic. The sale of Alaska in 1867 represents an important milestone in Russian-American relations.
By giving up its huge territory in North America, Russia turned away from the overseas colonial ambitions that would plague so many other European dynasties during the latter half of the 19th and early 20th centuries, instead choosing to become a good neighbor to the United States, while at the same time relying on it as a buffer against further British imperial expansion.
At the time, few in either Russia or America understood the benefits of this, and the sale was ridiculed in the American press as “Seward’s Folly”. In retrospect, history has proved them all wrong.
If we are overly fortunate, perhaps this summit will someday also be seen as a new turning point in our relations with Russia and the beginning of a more hopeful future.
The Western powers have failed to effectively manage the increasing threat of proliferation in the Middle East. While the international community is concerned with Iran’s nuclear program, Saudi Arabia has moved forward with developing its own nuclear program, and independent studies show that Israel has longed possessed dozens of nuclear warheads. The former is a member of the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while the latter has refused to sign the international agreement.
On Middle East policy, the Biden campaign had staunchly criticized the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal and it has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier since assuming office in January 2021. However, serious obstacles remain for responsible actors in expanding non-proliferation efforts toward a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.
This panel will discuss how Western powers and multilateral institutions, such as the IAEA, can play a more effective role in managing non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Peggy Mason: Canada’s former Ambassador to the UN for Disarmament
– Mark Fitzpatrick: Associate Fellow & Former Executive Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
– Ali Vaez: Iran Project Director, International Crisis Group
– Negar Mortazavi: Journalist and Political Analyst, Host of Iran Podcast
– David Albright: Founder and President of the Institute for Science and International Security
Closing (5:45 PM – 6:00 PM ET)
What is the current economic landscape in the Middle East? While global foreign direct investment is expected to fall drastically in the post-COVID era, the World Bank reported a 5% contraction in the economic output of the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries in 2020 due to the pandemic. While oil prices are expected to rebound with normalization in demand, political instability, regional and geopolitical tensions, domestic corruption, and a volatile regulatory and legal environment all threaten economic recovery in the Middle East. What is the prospect for economic growth and development in the region post-pandemic, and how could MENA nations promote sustainable growth and regional trade moving forward?
At the same time, Middle Eastern diaspora communities have become financially successful and can help promote trade between North America and the region. In this respect, the diaspora can become vital intermediaries for advancing U.S. and Canada’s business interests abroad. Promoting business diplomacy can both benefit the MENA region and be an effective and positive way to advance engagement and achieve foreign policy goals of the North Atlantic.
This panel will investigate the trade and investment opportunities in the Middle East, discuss how facilitating economic engagement with the region can benefit Canadian and American national interests, and explore relevant policy prescriptions.
Panelists:
– Hon. Sergio Marchi: Canada’s Former Minister of International Trade
– Scott Jolliffe: Chairperson, Canada Arab Business Council
– Esfandyar Batmanghelidj: Founder and Publisher of Bourse & Bazaar
– Nizar Ghanem: Director of Research and Co-founder at Triangle
– Nicki Siamaki: Researcher at Control Risks
The Middle East continues to grapple with violence and instability, particularly in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Fueled by government incompetence and foreign interventions, terrorist insurgencies have imposed severe humanitarian and economic costs on the region. Meanwhile, regional actors have engaged in an unprecedented pursuit of arms accumulation. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have imported billions of both Western and Russian-made weapons and funded militant groups across the region, intending to contain their regional adversaries, particularly Iran. Tehran has also provided sophisticated weaponry to various militia groups across the region to strengthen its geopolitical position against Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Israel.
On the other hand, with international terrorist networks and intense regional rivalry in the Middle East, it is impractical to discuss peace and security without addressing terrorism and the arms race in the region. This panel will primarily discuss the implications of the ongoing arms race in the region and the role of Western powers and multilateral organizations in facilitating trust-building security arrangements among regional stakeholders to limit the proliferation of arms across the Middle East.
Panelists:
Luciano Zaccara: Assistant Professor, Qatar University
Dania Thafer: Executive Director, Gulf International Forum
Kayhan Barzegar: Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Science and Research Branch of Azad University
Barbara Slavin: Director of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council
Sanam Shantyaei: Senior Journalist at France24 & host of Middle East Matters
The emerging regional order in West Asia will have wide-ranging implications for global security. The Biden administration has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier, an initiative staunchly opposed by Israel, while also taking a harder line on Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen. Meanwhile, key regional actors, including Qatar, Iraq, and Oman, have engaged in backchannel efforts to bring Iran and Saudi Arabia to the negotiating table. From a broader geopolitical perspective, with the need to secure its energy imports, China is also expected to increase its footprint in the region and influence the mentioned challenges.
In this evolving landscape, Western powers will be compelled to redefine their strategic priorities and adjust their policies with the new realities in the region. In this panel, we will discuss how the West, including the United States and its allies, can utilize multilateral diplomacy with its adversaries to prevent military escalation in the region. Most importantly, the panel will discuss if a multilateral security dialogue in the Persian Gulf region, proposed by some regional actors, can help reduce tensions among regional foes and produce sustainable peace and development for the region.
Panelists:
– Abdullah Baabood: Academic Researcher and Former Director of the Centre for Gulf Studies, Qatar University
– Trita Parsi: Executive Vice-President, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
– Ebtesam Al-Ketbi: President, Emirates Policy Centre
– Jon Allen: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Israel
– Elizabeth Hagedorn: Washington correspondent for Al-Monitor
Military interventions, political and economic instabilities, and civil unrest in the Middle East have led to a global refugee crisis with an increasing wave of refugees and asylum seekers to Europe and Canada. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has, in myriad ways, exacerbated and contributed to the ongoing security threats and destabilization of the region.
While these challenges pose serious risks to Canadian security, Ottawa will also have the opportunity to limit such risks and prevent a spillover effect vis-à-vis effective humanitarian initiatives in the region. In this panel, we will primarily investigate Canada’s Middle East Strategy’s degree of success in providing humanitarian aid to the region. Secondly, the panel will discuss what programs and initiatives Canada can introduce to further build on the renewed strategy. and more specifically, how Canada can utilize its policy instruments to more effectively deal with the increasing influx of refugees from the Middle East.
Panelists:
Erica Di Ruggiero: Director of Centre for Global Health, University of Toronto
Reyhana Patel: Head of Communications & Government Relations, Islamic Relief Canada
Amir Barmaki: Former Head of UN OCHA in Iran
Catherine Gribbin: Senior Legal Advisor for International and Humanitarian Law, Canadian Red Cross
In 2016, Canada launched an ambitious five-year “Middle East Engagement Strategy” (2016-2021), committing to investing CA$3.5 billion over five years to help establish the necessary conditions for security and stability, alleviate human suffering and enable stabilization programs in the region. In the latest development, during the meeting of the Global Coalition against ISIS, Minister of Foreign Affairs Marc Garneau announced more than $43.6 million in Peace and Stabilization Operations Program funding for 11 projects in Syria and Iraq.
With Canada’s Middle East Engagement Strategy expiring this year, it is time to examine and evaluate this massive investment in the Middle East region in the past five years. More importantly, the panel will discuss a principled and strategic roadmap for the future of Canada’s short-term and long-term engagement in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Ferry de Kerckhove: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Egypt
– Dennis Horak: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
– Chris Kilford: Former Canadian Defence Attaché in Turkey, member of the national board of the Canadian International Council (CIC)
– David Dewitt: University Professor Emeritus, York University
While the United States continues to pull back from certain regional conflicts, reflected by the Biden administration’s decision to halt American backing for Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen and the expected withdrawal from Afghanistan, US troops continue to be stationed across the region. Meanwhile, Russia and China have significantly maintained and even expanded their regional activities. On one hand, the Kremlin has maintained its military presence in Syria, and on the other hand, China has signed an unprecedented 25-year strategic agreement with Iran.
As the global power structure continues to shift, it is essential to analyze the future of the US regional presence under the Biden administration, explore the emerging global rivalry with Russia and China, and at last, investigate the implications of such competition for peace and security in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Dmitri Trenin: Director of Carnegie Moscow Center
– Joost R. Hiltermann: Director of MENA Programme, International Crisis Group
– Roxane Farmanfarmaian: Affiliated Lecturer in International Relations of the Middle East and North Africa, University of Cambridge
– Andrew A. Michta: Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at Marshall Center
– Kelley Vlahos: Senior Advisor, Quincy Institute
The security architecture of the Middle East has undergone rapid transformations in an exceptionally short period. Notable developments include the United States gradual withdrawal from the region, rapprochement between Israel and some GCC states through the Abraham Accords and the rise of Chinese and Russian regional engagement.
With these new trends in the Middle East, it is timely to investigate the security implications of the Biden administration’s Middle East policy. In this respect, we will discuss the Biden team’s new approach vis-à-vis Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The panel will also discuss the role of other major powers, including China and Russia in shaping this new security environment in the region, and how the Biden administration will respond to these powers’ increasing regional presence.
Panelists:
– Sanam Vakil: Deputy Director of MENA Programme at Chatham House
– Denise Natali: Acting Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies & Director of the Center for Strategic Research, National Defense University
– Hassan Ahmadian: Professor of the Middle East and North Africa Studies, University of Tehran
– Abdulaziz Sagar: Chairman, Gulf Research Center
– Andrew Parasiliti: President, Al-Monitor
