As the humanitarian crisis in Gaza continues to worsen, France and Saudi Arabia co-organized a UN summit last week to discuss the viability of Palestinian statehood as part of a broader peaceful settlement process. Coinciding with France’s announcement of its intention to recognize Palestine at the upcoming UN General Assembly, the summit aimed to revive global momentum for a two-state solution.
The summit concluded with the release of a seven-page ‘New York Declaration’, endorsed by seventeen countries, the Arab League, and the European Union. The declaration affirmed a shared commitment to the establishment of an independent, sovereign, economically viable, and democratic Palestinian state. It also called on Israeli leadership to make a clear and unequivocal commitment to the two-state solution, including the formal recognition of a sovereign Palestinian state. It called for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza, the lifting of the humanitarian blockade, and a halt to all settlement activity, land confiscation, and annexation measures in the occupied Palestinian territories.
This edition of the Strategic Foresight Brief, titled ‘The Palestinian State: Will the UN’s Two-State Summit Revive the Peace Process?’, gathers a range of expert perspectives on the broader implications of the summit. Contributors assess its symbolic weight, the credibility of its commitments, and its potential to reset stalled diplomacy.
With the UN General Assembly approaching in September — and both Canada and the United Kingdom now having conditionally pledged recognition of Palestinian statehood — the summit may mark the start of a shift in international engagement. Yet major obstacles remain, including the absence of enforcement mechanisms and the boycott of the summit by Israel and the United States.
Below, you’ll find concise, policy-oriented summaries of each contributor’s insights. Together, they offer a nuanced evaluation of the summit and actionable recommendations for how states can use multilateral forums to advance peace amid the ongoing conflict.
The Saudi-France-led UN conference marks a bold push for a two-state solution, underscoring that recognizing a Palestinian state is a critical but insufficient step toward peace. Spearheaded by Saudi Arabia’s resolute leadership under Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud (MBS) and France’s response to Gaza’s humanitarian crisis, the initiative addresses the glaring imbalance in negotiating power between a dominant Israel and a weakened Palestinian side. The timing is urgent — Gaza’s mass starvation and civilian suffering are a “disgrace to humanity” that demands immediate action. History will judge the world’s response.
MBS’s unwavering stance — no normalization with Israel without a Palestinian state — firmly rejects the “Sadat moment” that Israelis hope for and propagate. This resolute position, a cornerstone of Saudi policy, signals an uncompromising commitment to Palestinian statehood, prioritizing justice over premature diplomatic concessions. Backed by France’s plan to recognize Palestine in September, this move creates vital leverage for Palestinians. The conference is both symbolic and practical, laying a foundation for negotiations. Saudi Arabia, aiming to lead the Arab world and bolster its economy, and France, striving to guide Europe toward justice, are rallying global support, with nations like Norway and Spain already aligned. The hope is to spark widespread recognition, driving momentum for change.
Yet, significant obstacles remain. Israel’s rejection of a Palestinian state, supported by steadfast U.S. backing, obstructs progress, blocking UN efforts, ceasefires, and aid to Gaza. This perpetuates the crisis, making peace elusive. The U.S. and Israel’s claim that the conference aids Hamas complicates matters, though France’s shift could inspire other European nations, especially since the U.S. has not retaliated against France. However, Europe’s right-left political divides may require further tragedy to shift—a grim prospect.
Last week, Prime Minister Mark Carney announced that Canada would recognize Palestine as a state. Why did he do it and why now? There were essentially two reasons for joining France and the UK in taking this decision, and I believe others like Australia and New Zealand will soon follow suit.
First, given recent statements and actions by the current Israeli government, it was becoming clear that the hopes of a two-state solution, a basic tenet of the Middle East policies of all Western governments, were beginning to fade. Israel’s longest-serving Prime Minister has always been opposed to two states, and he made that abundantly clear when he told the media at a White House dinner two weeks ago that he will never accept a Palestinian state side by side with Israel.
More importantly perhaps, have been the statements and actions of Netanyahu’s two far right messianic ministers, Itamar Ben Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, who have been advocating for total annexation of the West Bank, resettlement of parts of Gaza, and have paved the way for the largest expansion of illegal settlements in the West Bank in Israel’s history. Previous declarations by Canada, the UK and France and other declarations by Canada with various other countries that followed have expressed grave concern about the future of the two-state solution. Canada imposed sanctions on the ministers mentioned above.
This statement of recognition was meant, therefore, to send a signal to Palestinians, to Israel, and to the world that Canada has not given up on the two-state paradigm. Canada continues to believe that the only way for the 7.5 million Jews and the 7.5 million Palestinians who share the land there, and neither is going away, to live in peace, safety and stability, is for both Israelis and Palestinians to have their own states.
The second reason Canada and the others moved now (and the UK made it most explicit by conditioning its recognition on Israel’s actions) was the fact that the humanitarian crisis in Gaza had come to a disastrous head. Not only had some 60,000 Palestinians been killed, including almost 18,000 children and thousands of innocent men and women, but the effects of an eleven-week humanitarian siege placed by Israel on the Gaza Strip had left thousands of Palestinians facing malnutrition and starvation. The photos of starving children, reminiscent of scenes from the Biafra crisis, were appearing in major media worldwide.
As a result, Canada and others wanted to send a clear signal to the Netanyahu government that enough was enough. Will Canada’s declaration bring about two states tomorrow? No. Will the decision to declare Palestine a state change Bibi Netanyahu’s policies? Perhaps not immediately. Nonetheless, Canada and others had and have an obligation to make their voices heard. They should have been done earlier, and if there is no change in Israeli policy, more actions should be taken.
Nothing above should, however, be in any way seen as absolving the terrorist organization Hamas from the horrific war crimes it committed on October 7 in southern Israel and the crimes it continues to commit by holding 50 Israeli hostages, and by exposing its own people to a brutal war that it started and could end now.
It’s clear that the past 21 months of trauma have produced pain. But the status quo changes when pain is married to gain. I think it’s morally defeatist to say that there will never be a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, the October 7 attack and Israel’s response may have irreversibly traumatized both parties at least for the medium term. And the takeaway here is going to be quite clear: Israelis and Palestinians are going to say to one another, “You know, the problem is not that we don’t understand one another. The problem is that we understand one another only too well.”
As for the conflict itself, since engaging in foreign policy matters, I’ve concluded that people have two choices. You can make a judgment that you’re going to root for one side or the other. Or you can acknowledge that this enduring calamity is a competition between two justices, as can be seen from the slogan adopted by both, “From the River to the Sea”. It will be resolved or won’t be resolved based on leaders who are prepared to recognize that each side has mutual needs and requirements which need to be satisfied.
This conflict is also not easily capable of objective analysis. We are all the sum totals of our experiences, of our backgrounds, of our sensitivities, of our sensibilities, and of our prejudices. What is prejudice? It’s a prejudgment. I would argue that the best you can do is make allowances for the prejudgments that you have, set them aside in an effort to try to understand the narratives and the motivations of Palestinians and of Israelis.
This is critically important if we are ever going to have a chance to resolve and to work towards a conflict-ending resolution. And we need honest brokers who use their leverage in a balanced manner. Perhaps the moment is now.
There are good reasons to be skeptical about the prospects of the French and Saudi-led UN summit on Palestine bringing meaningful change. After all, there is no shortage of summits and conferences that lead nowhere, particularly on Israel and Palestine. It was originally scheduled to be held in mid-June and be chaired by French President Emmanuel Macron and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. France was likely also going to recognize Palestine at the summit. But Israel’s war of aggression against Iran on June 13 forced the organizers to postpone – and downgrade – the meeting. It was held at the ministerial level, and the participation of civil society groups was eliminated.
Moreover, the final document has several weaknesses. While it calls for a “time-bound” process to implement a Palestinian state, it leaves the timeframe undefined, whereas it was originally slated to list a three-year schedule. Moreover, per the insistence of Saudi Arabia in particular, the document does not call for multilateral sanctions against Israel if it doesn’t abide by its legal obligations to end the occupation. It is difficult to see Israel abiding by international law if it faces no consequences when it doesn’t.
Still, the initiative is valuable because the world has, for more than two decades, pretended that the Oslo process is still ongoing. This dead process prevented, as a result, an alternative multilateral pathway toward resolving the conflict from emerging. The UN summit can bring about a new process centred on taking irreversible steps toward implementing – rather than negotiating – a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders.
Furthermore, the summit document connects the establishment of a Palestinian state with the creation of an inclusive security architecture. This connection should be made stronger and should be pursued in tandem. However, Israel’s inclusion must be contingent upon the establishment of a Palestinian state. This would offer Israel the opportunity to become fully integrated in the region’s security and would go beyond all previous incentives for Israel – the 2002 Saudi peace plan offered recognition, and the Abraham Accords offered normalization.
None offered Israel the ultimate security guarantee – full integration into the region’s security architecture. But the entry fee is that Israel ends the occupation and allows for a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders.
Following the recent UN two-state summit, Canada has announced its conditional intention to recognize Palestinian statehood at the upcoming United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in September.
France, the first G7 country to commit to recognizing Palestinian statehood at the UNGA, has signalled important leadership. Meanwhile, Canada, as this year’s G7 president, continues to hedge. Rather than taking a proactive stance or shaping the discourse, Canada has waited for others to act before cautiously following suit.
Prime Minister Mark Carney has stated that Canada’s recognition depends on commitments from the Palestinian Authority to implement significant governance reforms, hold general elections in 2026 that exclude Hamas, and agree to the full demilitarization of a future Palestinian state.
Imposing such terms amid an unfolding humanitarian catastrophe risks setting the peace process up for failure. It is unrealistic to expect meaningful reform and an electoral process amid ongoing war and occupation. As long as stark power imbalances with Israel persist, genuine progress toward peace will remain unattainable. This approach effectively turns statehood into an unattainable bargaining chip, with Palestinians bearing the cost and Hamas further empowered as a result.
Although Canada publicly pledged humanitarian aid and support for Palestinian Authority reform, recent reports reveal that arms exports to Israel continue despite a publicly announced ban. This glaring contradiction in Canadian foreign policy exposes the continuation of its status quo policy that undermines the two-state solution and peaceful coexistence. Canada cannot credibly advocate for a ceasefire while materially supporting Israeli forces that impede its implementation. Without a fully enforced arms ban and credible accountability mechanisms, Canada’s recognition risks being seen as symbolic rather than substantive.
Unequivocal recognition of Palestinian statehood could provide a vital foundation for inclusive dialogue and long-term reform. As G7 President, Prime Minister Mark Carney has both an opportunity and a responsibility to galvanize broader international efforts toward a meaningful two-state solution — if paired with consistent policies that uphold international law and accountability. This would reinforce Canada’s credibility as an independent, principled global actor while distinguishing itself from Washington’s increasingly hawkish stance.
While a growing number of states have committed to recognizing Palestinian statehood, there is a lack of alignment on timing, preconditions, or strategic intent. The United Kingdom has tied recognition to Israel’s failure to agree to a ceasefire. Canada has made its support conditional on governance reforms and demilitarization. France, meanwhile, has pledged unequivocal recognition. While the Arab League is united in its support for Palestinian statehood, member states differ significantly in their engagement with Israel and their approaches to Palestinian political factions. This fragmentation risks diluting the collective political weight of recognition and undermining its potential to serve as effective diplomatic leverage.
To maximize impact ahead of the UNGA, countries may focus on building coordinated coalitions with clear, shared guidelines that define what recognition entails, how it will support the peace process, and what institutional reforms will be supported in parallel. A harmonized approach can help turn recognition from a symbolic gesture into a strategic tool for renewing diplomacy and resetting expectations on all sides, especially if complemented by a follow-up summit that convenes the heads of state from Europe, Canada, and the Middle East to guide ongoing progress toward negotiated peace.
To mitigate the risks associated with this likely scenario, the summit’s call for a ‘time-bound’ process must be made credible, with a clear timetable and enforceable diplomatic consequences. For instance, states must commit to tangible measures such as political isolation, suspension of preferential trade agreements or suspension of diplomatic relations, should Israel continue the bombings, settlements expansion, obstruction of humanitarian aid and ceasefire.
States recognizing Palestinian statehood should explicitly link their recognition at the UNGA to a defined mediation pathway, potentially anchored in Egypt’s reconstruction plan. Immediate priorities include securing a durable ceasefire and facilitating humanitarian aid, followed by coordinated political and financial support for Palestinian governance reforms. Sustained, concrete commitments from international actors are essential to translate recognition into meaningful progress on the ground.
All steps in the mediation process must be governed by clear timelines and accountability mechanisms, with monitoring systems and consequences for violations. These efforts can proceed in parallel with advocating for full Palestinian statehood at the UN, replacing the current observer status.
First, a durable ceasefire in Gaza is the linchpin for any negotiated peace process in this conflict. Potentially mediated through a joint U.S.-Saudi-Egyptian-Qatari effort, it must hold steadily over the following months to enable unhindered humanitarian aid delivery and reconstruction of critical infrastructure in Gaza.
Secondly, as a key trust-building measure, the release of all Israeli hostages held by Hamas should immediately occur under international supervision. In parallel, Israel would reciprocate by releasing a substantial number of Palestinian prisoners, with particular focus on minors and political detainees. These actions, combined with stringent security guarantees, would create an atmosphere more conducive to peace negotiations.
Finally, as the humanitarian crisis begins to ease and hostages are freed, mediators can support the phased implementation of security provisions outlined in the New York Declaration, including the demilitarization of Hamas, the establishment of a provisional government, and holding elections in Gaza. Achieving this will require persistent diplomacy and close coordination among regional and international actors with both Israelis and Palestinians.
The governance of Gaza would temporarily transition to the Palestinian Authority, supported by international partners to bolster administrative capacity and legitimacy. International monitoring or a temporary UN peacekeeping mission — as proposed in the summit — could be deployed to key locations to oversee security and reassure all parties involved. This presence would provide reassurance that commitments from all parties involved are upheld and reduce the risk of renewed hostilities.
Simultaneously, there needs to be a restoration and strengthening of security coordination between the Israeli Defence Forces and the Palestinian Authority to prevent security vacuums exploitable by spoilers in Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories.
Ultimately, there should be international support for Palestinian political reconciliation efforts to unify governance structures in the post-Hamas era. National elections should be conducted to renew political legitimacy and reinforce institutional capacity for long-term reform and stability.
In response to multilateral efforts toward negotiated peace, Israel intensifies military bombardments aimed at retaking all of Gaza, worsening the humanitarian crisis, and fueling the forced displacement of Palestinians. As a result, ceasefire efforts fail again, with the Palestinian Authority’s position further undermined while Hamas or new armed resistance groups gain legitimacy as an alternative to failed diplomacy. Given Israel’s continued military escalation in the West Bank and reported plans to occupy the entire Gaza Strip, this scenario is highly plausible.
Regional actors must move beyond fragmented, bilateral arrangements and work collectively to articulate an inclusive regional security architecture that offers a credible alternative to Prime Minister Netanyahu’s vision of an Israeli hegemonic security order in the Middle East.
This new framework should provide Israel with the opportunity for full diplomatic normalization, regional integration, and economic cooperation, but only if it is anchored in the end of the occupation, the recognition of a sovereign Palestinian state on the 1967 borders with mutually agreed land adjustments, and binding commitments to uphold the security and rights of both Israelis and Palestinians.
Unlike past normalization efforts — such as the Abraham Accords — which offered Israel substantial diplomatic and economic benefits without addressing Palestinian statehood, this approach would make integration inseparable from accountability. The bypassing of the Palestinian question in those previous frameworks did not bring stability; rather, it fed into the chain of events that culminated in the October 7 attacks and the subsequent wars stretching from Gaza and Lebanon to Syria, Yemen, and even direct confrontations between Iran and Israel since 2023.
An inclusive security order needs enforceable mechanisms, including verifiable security assurances, binding economic agreements, and diplomatic guarantees, that prevent backsliding and hold all parties accountable for their commitments. The goal is not to return to the old cycle of ceasefires and flare-ups, but to establish a system in which the incentives for inclusive security outweigh the security dominance.
The Western powers have failed to effectively manage the increasing threat of proliferation in the Middle East. While the international community is concerned with Iran’s nuclear program, Saudi Arabia has moved forward with developing its own nuclear program, and independent studies show that Israel has longed possessed dozens of nuclear warheads. The former is a member of the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while the latter has refused to sign the international agreement.
On Middle East policy, the Biden campaign had staunchly criticized the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal and it has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier since assuming office in January 2021. However, serious obstacles remain for responsible actors in expanding non-proliferation efforts toward a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.
This panel will discuss how Western powers and multilateral institutions, such as the IAEA, can play a more effective role in managing non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Peggy Mason: Canada’s former Ambassador to the UN for Disarmament
– Mark Fitzpatrick: Associate Fellow & Former Executive Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
– Ali Vaez: Iran Project Director, International Crisis Group
– Negar Mortazavi: Journalist and Political Analyst, Host of Iran Podcast
– David Albright: Founder and President of the Institute for Science and International Security
Closing (5:45 PM – 6:00 PM ET)
What is the current economic landscape in the Middle East? While global foreign direct investment is expected to fall drastically in the post-COVID era, the World Bank reported a 5% contraction in the economic output of the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries in 2020 due to the pandemic. While oil prices are expected to rebound with normalization in demand, political instability, regional and geopolitical tensions, domestic corruption, and a volatile regulatory and legal environment all threaten economic recovery in the Middle East. What is the prospect for economic growth and development in the region post-pandemic, and how could MENA nations promote sustainable growth and regional trade moving forward?
At the same time, Middle Eastern diaspora communities have become financially successful and can help promote trade between North America and the region. In this respect, the diaspora can become vital intermediaries for advancing U.S. and Canada’s business interests abroad. Promoting business diplomacy can both benefit the MENA region and be an effective and positive way to advance engagement and achieve foreign policy goals of the North Atlantic.
This panel will investigate the trade and investment opportunities in the Middle East, discuss how facilitating economic engagement with the region can benefit Canadian and American national interests, and explore relevant policy prescriptions.
Panelists:
– Hon. Sergio Marchi: Canada’s Former Minister of International Trade
– Scott Jolliffe: Chairperson, Canada Arab Business Council
– Esfandyar Batmanghelidj: Founder and Publisher of Bourse & Bazaar
– Nizar Ghanem: Director of Research and Co-founder at Triangle
– Nicki Siamaki: Researcher at Control Risks
The Middle East continues to grapple with violence and instability, particularly in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Fueled by government incompetence and foreign interventions, terrorist insurgencies have imposed severe humanitarian and economic costs on the region. Meanwhile, regional actors have engaged in an unprecedented pursuit of arms accumulation. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have imported billions of both Western and Russian-made weapons and funded militant groups across the region, intending to contain their regional adversaries, particularly Iran. Tehran has also provided sophisticated weaponry to various militia groups across the region to strengthen its geopolitical position against Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Israel.
On the other hand, with international terrorist networks and intense regional rivalry in the Middle East, it is impractical to discuss peace and security without addressing terrorism and the arms race in the region. This panel will primarily discuss the implications of the ongoing arms race in the region and the role of Western powers and multilateral organizations in facilitating trust-building security arrangements among regional stakeholders to limit the proliferation of arms across the Middle East.
Panelists:
Luciano Zaccara: Assistant Professor, Qatar University
Dania Thafer: Executive Director, Gulf International Forum
Kayhan Barzegar: Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Science and Research Branch of Azad University
Barbara Slavin: Director of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council
Sanam Shantyaei: Senior Journalist at France24 & host of Middle East Matters
The emerging regional order in West Asia will have wide-ranging implications for global security. The Biden administration has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier, an initiative staunchly opposed by Israel, while also taking a harder line on Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen. Meanwhile, key regional actors, including Qatar, Iraq, and Oman, have engaged in backchannel efforts to bring Iran and Saudi Arabia to the negotiating table. From a broader geopolitical perspective, with the need to secure its energy imports, China is also expected to increase its footprint in the region and influence the mentioned challenges.
In this evolving landscape, Western powers will be compelled to redefine their strategic priorities and adjust their policies with the new realities in the region. In this panel, we will discuss how the West, including the United States and its allies, can utilize multilateral diplomacy with its adversaries to prevent military escalation in the region. Most importantly, the panel will discuss if a multilateral security dialogue in the Persian Gulf region, proposed by some regional actors, can help reduce tensions among regional foes and produce sustainable peace and development for the region.
Panelists:
– Abdullah Baabood: Academic Researcher and Former Director of the Centre for Gulf Studies, Qatar University
– Trita Parsi: Executive Vice-President, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
– Ebtesam Al-Ketbi: President, Emirates Policy Centre
– Jon Allen: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Israel
– Elizabeth Hagedorn: Washington correspondent for Al-Monitor
Military interventions, political and economic instabilities, and civil unrest in the Middle East have led to a global refugee crisis with an increasing wave of refugees and asylum seekers to Europe and Canada. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has, in myriad ways, exacerbated and contributed to the ongoing security threats and destabilization of the region.
While these challenges pose serious risks to Canadian security, Ottawa will also have the opportunity to limit such risks and prevent a spillover effect vis-à-vis effective humanitarian initiatives in the region. In this panel, we will primarily investigate Canada’s Middle East Strategy’s degree of success in providing humanitarian aid to the region. Secondly, the panel will discuss what programs and initiatives Canada can introduce to further build on the renewed strategy. and more specifically, how Canada can utilize its policy instruments to more effectively deal with the increasing influx of refugees from the Middle East.
Panelists:
Erica Di Ruggiero: Director of Centre for Global Health, University of Toronto
Reyhana Patel: Head of Communications & Government Relations, Islamic Relief Canada
Amir Barmaki: Former Head of UN OCHA in Iran
Catherine Gribbin: Senior Legal Advisor for International and Humanitarian Law, Canadian Red Cross
In 2016, Canada launched an ambitious five-year “Middle East Engagement Strategy” (2016-2021), committing to investing CA$3.5 billion over five years to help establish the necessary conditions for security and stability, alleviate human suffering and enable stabilization programs in the region. In the latest development, during the meeting of the Global Coalition against ISIS, Minister of Foreign Affairs Marc Garneau announced more than $43.6 million in Peace and Stabilization Operations Program funding for 11 projects in Syria and Iraq.
With Canada’s Middle East Engagement Strategy expiring this year, it is time to examine and evaluate this massive investment in the Middle East region in the past five years. More importantly, the panel will discuss a principled and strategic roadmap for the future of Canada’s short-term and long-term engagement in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Ferry de Kerckhove: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Egypt
– Dennis Horak: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
– Chris Kilford: Former Canadian Defence Attaché in Turkey, member of the national board of the Canadian International Council (CIC)
– David Dewitt: University Professor Emeritus, York University
While the United States continues to pull back from certain regional conflicts, reflected by the Biden administration’s decision to halt American backing for Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen and the expected withdrawal from Afghanistan, US troops continue to be stationed across the region. Meanwhile, Russia and China have significantly maintained and even expanded their regional activities. On one hand, the Kremlin has maintained its military presence in Syria, and on the other hand, China has signed an unprecedented 25-year strategic agreement with Iran.
As the global power structure continues to shift, it is essential to analyze the future of the US regional presence under the Biden administration, explore the emerging global rivalry with Russia and China, and at last, investigate the implications of such competition for peace and security in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Dmitri Trenin: Director of Carnegie Moscow Center
– Joost R. Hiltermann: Director of MENA Programme, International Crisis Group
– Roxane Farmanfarmaian: Affiliated Lecturer in International Relations of the Middle East and North Africa, University of Cambridge
– Andrew A. Michta: Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at Marshall Center
– Kelley Vlahos: Senior Advisor, Quincy Institute
The security architecture of the Middle East has undergone rapid transformations in an exceptionally short period. Notable developments include the United States gradual withdrawal from the region, rapprochement between Israel and some GCC states through the Abraham Accords and the rise of Chinese and Russian regional engagement.
With these new trends in the Middle East, it is timely to investigate the security implications of the Biden administration’s Middle East policy. In this respect, we will discuss the Biden team’s new approach vis-à-vis Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The panel will also discuss the role of other major powers, including China and Russia in shaping this new security environment in the region, and how the Biden administration will respond to these powers’ increasing regional presence.
Panelists:
– Sanam Vakil: Deputy Director of MENA Programme at Chatham House
– Denise Natali: Acting Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies & Director of the Center for Strategic Research, National Defense University
– Hassan Ahmadian: Professor of the Middle East and North Africa Studies, University of Tehran
– Abdulaziz Sagar: Chairman, Gulf Research Center
– Andrew Parasiliti: President, Al-Monitor
