In a significant development last week, President Trump confirmed his outreach to Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, proposing negotiations over Tehran’s nuclear program, as his preferred option over military action. This outreach happens at the time that Iran continues to accelerate its uranium enrichment, now nearing weapons-grade levels, according to the United Nations’ nuclear watchdog.
More importantly, Iran’s Supreme Leader has publicly dismissed the possibility of direct talks despite such diplomatic gesture from Washington. This rejection is likely the impetus behind Trump’s request for Putin’s assistance in facilitating engagement and discussions with Iran on its nuclear issue and network of regional proxies.
To deconstruct the latest developments and navigate the potential scenarios ahead, this edition of the Strategic Foresight Brief (SFB), titled ‘Trump 2.0 & Iran’s Nuclear Question in the New Middle East‘, synthesizes insights from our recent high-level closed-door briefing on the very same topic. This edition is a product of inclusive engagement with a diverse group of diplomats, lawmakers, policymakers, academics, and analysts with deep knowledge of the issue, representing the views of the United States, Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, China, and several European countries.
Below, SFB presents a detailed exploration of the multifaceted issues at play, accompanied by expert commentaries that offer a deep dive into the nuanced dynamics and strategic calculations that could shape the future of the Middle East security order. These insights focus on pragmatic ways to diplomatically address the Iranian nuclear issue, critical for regional stability and preventing conflicts in an already volatile region.
This year, the Iranian leadership and the superpowers will face a historic decision point regarding the future of Tehran’s nuclear program. Any decision made will have significant implications not only on Iran’s nuclear ambitions but also on the future of the Iranian regime.
All this, when in the background, the barrier of fear in Israel regarding the attack in Iran was broken following the attack on October 26. This fact, along with the collapse of the Axis of Resistance and the severe damage suffered by Iran’s air defence system, dramatically increases the likelihood of kinetic action on the part of Israel against Iran’s nuclear sites (especially given the reports that Iran is considering moving towards building a nuclear bomb) if the negotiations between the US and Iran collapse.
In any scenario, Israel must not act alone and must maintain close coordination with the American administration, mainly because the United States can fatally damage Iran’s nuclear facilities. Moreover, independent action by Israel without coordination with Washington could lead to a severe crisis between the two countries amid President Trump’s basic desire to find a peaceful way out of the situation with Iran.
Initial expectations for a change in the Trump 2.0 approach towards Iran did not materialize. While reverting to past policies, including the Maximum Pressure, Trump is expecting a different Iranian reaction. The Supreme Leader of Iran, however, responded to his re-imposition of the Maximum Pressure by cautioning against engaging him, deeming trusting him an irrational choice. As such, with Trump’s initial steps, the window for Iran-U.S. diplomacy is closing.
If he genuinely seeks an engagement and eyes a potential deal with Iran, it would be wise to attribute past mistakes to Mike Pompeo and John Bolton and announce his intent for more serious engagement. Focusing on the Maximum Pressure would end any possibility for diplomacy, with Iran responding to pressure with counter-pressure.
To keep the diplomatic window open, Trump should declare that the Maximum Pressure is already in place, suggesting that he is not to ratchet it up and that he is willing to observe 2231 once a deal is reached. In addition to giving time to diplomacy, this will alleviate some of Tehran’s mistrust of the framework of such an engagement.
Thirdly, Trump lacks credibility in Tehran, and his past behaviour toward Iran as well as U.S. allies hinders direct engagement with him. Therefore, credible and interested mediators should be activated in the agreement. Two credible mediators could be Saudi Arabia or Russia. While each has its own priorities, they can provide the necessary groundwork for bringing both sides closer.
Iran’s accelerated uranium enrichment, close to weapons-grade levels, raises regional tensions, particularly under renewed U.S. “maximum pressure” and threats of Israeli preemptive strikes. From a Saudi perspective, this escalation poses threats to Gulf stability, especially as Riyadh seeks to balance security interests with economic diversification. Saudi Arabia’s recent offer to mediate between Tehran and Washington shows a pragmatic approach, hoping to alleviate tensions that may fuel a nuclear arms race—potentially forcing Riyadh to pursue its own nuclear aspirations in return.
Forward-looking analysis suggests Iran’s increase in enrichment is a bargaining chip to counter U.S. sanctions and Israeli threats, but it could mobilize regional adversaries against Tehran. Israel’s likely assault, estimated at a matter of months, may cause short-term interruption to Iran’s program but trigger a broader conflict that could consume Saudi Arabia’s allies. Saudi Arabia sees diplomacy as crucial to preserving its strategic position and avoiding entanglement in a destabilizing conflict.
Practical recommendations are for Saudi Arabia to intensify mediating efforts, leveraging its détente with Iran to demand a freeze on enrichment in exchange for sanctions relief. Riyadh should also coordinate with the U.S. to ensure any Israeli action is restrained, prioritizing a regional security framework that curbs proliferation without military escalation.
Trump has made a convincing case that he wants a deal with Iran rather than confrontation. He has gone out of his way to avoid insulting rhetoric, he’s disavowed regime change and declared nuclear weapons as his only red line. Yet, this unique window of opportunity is closing fast mainly because Trump isn’t paying attention. Iran policy is once again falling into the hands of the neocons who sabotaged Trump’s hope to reach a deal with Iran during his first term – and now war is lurking around the corner once again.
Trump should remedy this immediately by 1) Appointing an Iran envoy and instructing that envoy to begin preliminary talks with Tehran as soon as possible, 2) Trump should try to reach an immediate agreement with Tehran on the parameters of the deal combined with a freeze on escalation. This could take shape in the form of Trump putting an end to the maximum pressure in exchange for Iran ceasing the acceleration of its nuclear advances, 3) Trump should then seek before October (deadline for snapback sanction mechanism) a larger deal with Iran that entails stricter nuclear restrictions in return for complete sanctions relief – including primary US sanctions.
In his inaugural address, Trump declared, “My proudest legacy will be that of a peacemaker and unifier.” He has a unique opportunity to strike a deal with Tehran, one no other U.S. president has had. But if he delegated Iran policy to the hawks in the NSC, opportunity would turn into crisis, and his legacy may shift from peace to war.
For the E3 (France, Germany, UK), preventing a catastrophic nuclear crisis is paramount. However, unlike in 2018, when Europe attempted to counteract the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, there is now less appetite for an agreement with Tehran in Paris, Berlin, London, or Brussels than in Washington.
European governments have increasingly approached Iran’s nuclear issue as deeply entangled with its military ties to Russia, Tehran’s support for non-state actors across the region, and the human rights situation in the country. This post-2022 EU approach has made diplomatic engagement with Iran much more difficult.
To move forward, Europe must revert to its core principle of treating the nuclear file as a separate track from other concerns. A singular focus on nuclear non-proliferation will provide a more realistic framework for diplomacy. Trump’s transactional nature creates an opening for negotiation, but Europe must ensure that any agreement upholds strong non-proliferation commitments rather than becoming a fragile arrangement vulnerable to shifting political tides.
Europe should work closely with Gulf partners, particularly Qatar and Oman—both of whom have direct channels with Tehran—as well as Saudi Arabia, which has played a growing role in regional diplomacy with Iran. Europe should leverage the new diplomatic shifts in the Gulf to build a verifiable agreement that ensures the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program through expanded monitoring and limitations in exchange for sanctions relief and Iran’s inclusion in regional integration efforts.
The Trump administration’s second term has ushered in a pivotal shift in its approach toward Iran, moving from a maximalist approach to a more diplomatic one aimed at securing what he calls a “verified nuclear peace agreement” with the Islamic Republic. Trump’s direct outreach to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei for direct talks reflects this new approach, which is also aligned with the administration’s “peace through strength” doctrine, where reinstating the “maximum pressure campaign” is understood as the strength piece in its Iran policy.
Yet, this outreach comes at a time when Iran continues to accelerate its uranium enrichment, nearing weapons-grade levels, and the Supreme Leader has continuously dismissed the prospect of direct talks with Washington. In response, Trump has sought Putin’s assistance in facilitating engagement with Iran, recognizing that working with Iran’s strategic partners like Russia may be necessary to bring Tehran to the negotiating table.
While Iran’s nuclear program is now the primary issue for Trump, the challenge extends far beyond uranium enrichment. Iran’s continued support for its network of so-called ‘Axis of Resistance’, and advanced missile and drone programs remain other areas of concern, not only for the US and Israel but also for Europeans, and many Arab nations in the region.
From Iran’s perspective, these issues have become increasingly interconnected, particularly in the wake of its weakened regional deterrence following setbacks in Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza, as well as its demonstrated vulnerability to Israeli attacks deep within its borders. As a result, Iran has integrated its nuclear deterrence strategy into its broader regional deterrence framework, aiming to enhance both its defensive and offensive capabilities in response to its evolving threat perception.
This was not the case in 2015 when the negotiating parties had the luxury to compartmentalize the nuclear issue from other challenges with Iran, allowing for a nuclear-focused agreement. Moving forward, reaching a comprehensive deal that addresses both nuclear and non-nuclear concerns is far more complex with the Islamic Republic.
Domestically, the Supreme Leader’s continued dominance in decision-making and his resistance to direct talks with the US remain a major obstacle, which is unlikely to shift unless Trump’s rhetorical and diplomatic overtures are reinforced by concrete actions — such as unfreezing a portion of Iran’s frozen assets held in Qatar or Iraq.
It is important to note that Trump’s direct outreach to Khamenei is quite similar to Obama’s approach that opened the direct communication channel between Tehran and Washington and ultimately led to a nuclear agreement. In this vein, understanding Khamenei’s deep-seated mistrust stemming from the entire process — both in the lead-up to and aftermath of the deal — will be crucial in shaping a more effective engagement strategy with Iran. Thus, direct outreach with no tangible trust-building measures will no longer resonate with Tehran.
Beyond the U.S.-Iran dynamic, regional and global powers play a decisive role in shaping the outcome of nuclear negotiations. The involvement of Russia, China, and the European Union each brings distinct strategic calculations that could either advance or hinder diplomatic progress. At the same time, the Gulf States, particularly Saudi Arabia and Qatar, have growing stakes in the nuclear issue, seeking stability while positioning themselves as potential mediators in U.S.-Iran discussions – positive developments that were non-existent during the Obama administration.
Amidst all this, the most pressing concern remains the possibility of an Israeli preemptive strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities — a move that could force the U.S. to intervene militarily to defend Israel against Iran’s retaliatory response and ignite a broader regional conflict — a scenario that the Trump administration is trying to avoid.
What is clear is the need for a pragmatic, nuanced, and forward-looking strategy — one that President Trump, perhaps more than any of his predecessors, is uniquely positioned to pursue. By leveraging his strong political capital both domestically and internationally, he has the opportunity to engage in unconventional diplomacy with Iran.
This Strategic Foresight Brief delves deeper into the challenges outlined above, structured across six key sections, and explores potential pathways for a diplomatic resolution to Iran’s nuclear program.
Looking ahead, any new agreement must address both nuclear and regional security concerns while prioritizing tangible incentives over continued pressure to bring Iran to the negotiating table. Regional actors, particularly the Gulf States, will play a crucial role in shaping confidence-building measures and establishing a durable framework for regional de-escalation and nuclear non-proliferation.
The involvement of key international stakeholders, particularly Russia and China, will also influence Iran’s strategic calculations and determine the feasibility of a diplomatic breakthrough. Initial steps toward de-escalation could include unfreezing Iranian assets and implementing targeted sanctions relief in exchange for enhanced nuclear monitoring and a temporary pause in uranium enrichment — facilitated through backchannel diplomacy.
At the same time, addressing Iran’s nuclear ambitions requires a comprehensive strategy that accounts for its evolving security posture, advanced missile and drone capabilities, and shifting regional alliances. Unlike in 2015, Iran’s leadership now views its nuclear program as a central pillar of its deterrence strategy, particularly in response to its weakened regional influence — further complicating negotiations.
The challenge lies in formulating a diplomatic approach that strikes a balance between security concerns and political realities — one that prevents Iran from developing nuclear weapons while providing sufficient incentives to keep Tehran engaged and compliant. This is particularly critical as the absence of meaningful diplomatic openings before October could heighten the risk of regional instability. While uncertainties persist, a diplomatic breakthrough remains possible — one that upholds nuclear non-proliferation, reinforces regional security, and mitigates the risk of another costly and endless war in the Middle East.
The Western powers have failed to effectively manage the increasing threat of proliferation in the Middle East. While the international community is concerned with Iran’s nuclear program, Saudi Arabia has moved forward with developing its own nuclear program, and independent studies show that Israel has longed possessed dozens of nuclear warheads. The former is a member of the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while the latter has refused to sign the international agreement.
On Middle East policy, the Biden campaign had staunchly criticized the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal and it has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier since assuming office in January 2021. However, serious obstacles remain for responsible actors in expanding non-proliferation efforts toward a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.
This panel will discuss how Western powers and multilateral institutions, such as the IAEA, can play a more effective role in managing non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Peggy Mason: Canada’s former Ambassador to the UN for Disarmament
– Mark Fitzpatrick: Associate Fellow & Former Executive Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
– Ali Vaez: Iran Project Director, International Crisis Group
– Negar Mortazavi: Journalist and Political Analyst, Host of Iran Podcast
– David Albright: Founder and President of the Institute for Science and International Security
Closing (5:45 PM – 6:00 PM ET)
What is the current economic landscape in the Middle East? While global foreign direct investment is expected to fall drastically in the post-COVID era, the World Bank reported a 5% contraction in the economic output of the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries in 2020 due to the pandemic. While oil prices are expected to rebound with normalization in demand, political instability, regional and geopolitical tensions, domestic corruption, and a volatile regulatory and legal environment all threaten economic recovery in the Middle East. What is the prospect for economic growth and development in the region post-pandemic, and how could MENA nations promote sustainable growth and regional trade moving forward?
At the same time, Middle Eastern diaspora communities have become financially successful and can help promote trade between North America and the region. In this respect, the diaspora can become vital intermediaries for advancing U.S. and Canada’s business interests abroad. Promoting business diplomacy can both benefit the MENA region and be an effective and positive way to advance engagement and achieve foreign policy goals of the North Atlantic.
This panel will investigate the trade and investment opportunities in the Middle East, discuss how facilitating economic engagement with the region can benefit Canadian and American national interests, and explore relevant policy prescriptions.
Panelists:
– Hon. Sergio Marchi: Canada’s Former Minister of International Trade
– Scott Jolliffe: Chairperson, Canada Arab Business Council
– Esfandyar Batmanghelidj: Founder and Publisher of Bourse & Bazaar
– Nizar Ghanem: Director of Research and Co-founder at Triangle
– Nicki Siamaki: Researcher at Control Risks
The Middle East continues to grapple with violence and instability, particularly in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Fueled by government incompetence and foreign interventions, terrorist insurgencies have imposed severe humanitarian and economic costs on the region. Meanwhile, regional actors have engaged in an unprecedented pursuit of arms accumulation. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have imported billions of both Western and Russian-made weapons and funded militant groups across the region, intending to contain their regional adversaries, particularly Iran. Tehran has also provided sophisticated weaponry to various militia groups across the region to strengthen its geopolitical position against Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Israel.
On the other hand, with international terrorist networks and intense regional rivalry in the Middle East, it is impractical to discuss peace and security without addressing terrorism and the arms race in the region. This panel will primarily discuss the implications of the ongoing arms race in the region and the role of Western powers and multilateral organizations in facilitating trust-building security arrangements among regional stakeholders to limit the proliferation of arms across the Middle East.
Panelists:
Luciano Zaccara: Assistant Professor, Qatar University
Dania Thafer: Executive Director, Gulf International Forum
Kayhan Barzegar: Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Science and Research Branch of Azad University
Barbara Slavin: Director of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council
Sanam Shantyaei: Senior Journalist at France24 & host of Middle East Matters
The emerging regional order in West Asia will have wide-ranging implications for global security. The Biden administration has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier, an initiative staunchly opposed by Israel, while also taking a harder line on Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen. Meanwhile, key regional actors, including Qatar, Iraq, and Oman, have engaged in backchannel efforts to bring Iran and Saudi Arabia to the negotiating table. From a broader geopolitical perspective, with the need to secure its energy imports, China is also expected to increase its footprint in the region and influence the mentioned challenges.
In this evolving landscape, Western powers will be compelled to redefine their strategic priorities and adjust their policies with the new realities in the region. In this panel, we will discuss how the West, including the United States and its allies, can utilize multilateral diplomacy with its adversaries to prevent military escalation in the region. Most importantly, the panel will discuss if a multilateral security dialogue in the Persian Gulf region, proposed by some regional actors, can help reduce tensions among regional foes and produce sustainable peace and development for the region.
Panelists:
– Abdullah Baabood: Academic Researcher and Former Director of the Centre for Gulf Studies, Qatar University
– Trita Parsi: Executive Vice-President, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
– Ebtesam Al-Ketbi: President, Emirates Policy Centre
– Jon Allen: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Israel
– Elizabeth Hagedorn: Washington correspondent for Al-Monitor
Military interventions, political and economic instabilities, and civil unrest in the Middle East have led to a global refugee crisis with an increasing wave of refugees and asylum seekers to Europe and Canada. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has, in myriad ways, exacerbated and contributed to the ongoing security threats and destabilization of the region.
While these challenges pose serious risks to Canadian security, Ottawa will also have the opportunity to limit such risks and prevent a spillover effect vis-à-vis effective humanitarian initiatives in the region. In this panel, we will primarily investigate Canada’s Middle East Strategy’s degree of success in providing humanitarian aid to the region. Secondly, the panel will discuss what programs and initiatives Canada can introduce to further build on the renewed strategy. and more specifically, how Canada can utilize its policy instruments to more effectively deal with the increasing influx of refugees from the Middle East.
Panelists:
Erica Di Ruggiero: Director of Centre for Global Health, University of Toronto
Reyhana Patel: Head of Communications & Government Relations, Islamic Relief Canada
Amir Barmaki: Former Head of UN OCHA in Iran
Catherine Gribbin: Senior Legal Advisor for International and Humanitarian Law, Canadian Red Cross
In 2016, Canada launched an ambitious five-year “Middle East Engagement Strategy” (2016-2021), committing to investing CA$3.5 billion over five years to help establish the necessary conditions for security and stability, alleviate human suffering and enable stabilization programs in the region. In the latest development, during the meeting of the Global Coalition against ISIS, Minister of Foreign Affairs Marc Garneau announced more than $43.6 million in Peace and Stabilization Operations Program funding for 11 projects in Syria and Iraq.
With Canada’s Middle East Engagement Strategy expiring this year, it is time to examine and evaluate this massive investment in the Middle East region in the past five years. More importantly, the panel will discuss a principled and strategic roadmap for the future of Canada’s short-term and long-term engagement in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Ferry de Kerckhove: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Egypt
– Dennis Horak: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
– Chris Kilford: Former Canadian Defence Attaché in Turkey, member of the national board of the Canadian International Council (CIC)
– David Dewitt: University Professor Emeritus, York University
While the United States continues to pull back from certain regional conflicts, reflected by the Biden administration’s decision to halt American backing for Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen and the expected withdrawal from Afghanistan, US troops continue to be stationed across the region. Meanwhile, Russia and China have significantly maintained and even expanded their regional activities. On one hand, the Kremlin has maintained its military presence in Syria, and on the other hand, China has signed an unprecedented 25-year strategic agreement with Iran.
As the global power structure continues to shift, it is essential to analyze the future of the US regional presence under the Biden administration, explore the emerging global rivalry with Russia and China, and at last, investigate the implications of such competition for peace and security in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Dmitri Trenin: Director of Carnegie Moscow Center
– Joost R. Hiltermann: Director of MENA Programme, International Crisis Group
– Roxane Farmanfarmaian: Affiliated Lecturer in International Relations of the Middle East and North Africa, University of Cambridge
– Andrew A. Michta: Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at Marshall Center
– Kelley Vlahos: Senior Advisor, Quincy Institute
The security architecture of the Middle East has undergone rapid transformations in an exceptionally short period. Notable developments include the United States gradual withdrawal from the region, rapprochement between Israel and some GCC states through the Abraham Accords and the rise of Chinese and Russian regional engagement.
With these new trends in the Middle East, it is timely to investigate the security implications of the Biden administration’s Middle East policy. In this respect, we will discuss the Biden team’s new approach vis-à-vis Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The panel will also discuss the role of other major powers, including China and Russia in shaping this new security environment in the region, and how the Biden administration will respond to these powers’ increasing regional presence.
Panelists:
– Sanam Vakil: Deputy Director of MENA Programme at Chatham House
– Denise Natali: Acting Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies & Director of the Center for Strategic Research, National Defense University
– Hassan Ahmadian: Professor of the Middle East and North Africa Studies, University of Tehran
– Abdulaziz Sagar: Chairman, Gulf Research Center
– Andrew Parasiliti: President, Al-Monitor
