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Trump 2.0 and Iran: Nuclear Escalation, Geopolitical Risks and Diplomatic Possibilities

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The following commentary is part of ‘Trump 2.0 and Iran’s Nuclear Question in the New Middle East‘, a symposium from IPD’s Strategic Foresight Brief.

The Trump administration’s second term has ushered in a pivotal shift in its approach toward Iran, moving from a maximalist approach to a more diplomatic one aimed at securing what he calls a “verified nuclear peace agreement” with the Islamic Republic. Trump’s direct outreach to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei for direct talks reflects this new approach, which is also aligned with the administration’s “peace through strength” doctrine, where reinstating the “maximum pressure campaign” is understood as the strength piece in its Iran policy.

Yet, this outreach comes at a time when Iran continues to accelerate its uranium enrichment, nearing weapons-grade levels, and the Supreme Leader has continuously dismissed the prospect of direct talks with Washington. In response, Trump has sought Putin’s assistance in facilitating engagement with Iran, recognizing that working with Iran’s strategic partners like Russia may be necessary to bring Tehran to the negotiating table.

While Iran’s nuclear program is now the primary issue for Trump, the challenge extends far beyond uranium enrichment. Iran’s continued support for its network of so-called ‘Axis of Resistance’, and advanced missile and drone programs remain other areas of concern, not only for the US and Israel but also for Europeans, and many Arab nations in the region.

From Iran’s perspective, these issues have become increasingly interconnected, particularly in the wake of its weakened regional deterrence following setbacks in Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza, as well as its demonstrated vulnerability to Israeli attacks deep within its borders. As a result, Iran has integrated its nuclear deterrence strategy into its broader regional deterrence framework, aiming to enhance both its defensive and offensive capabilities in response to its evolving threat perception.

This was not the case in 2015 when the negotiating parties had the luxury to compartmentalize the nuclear issue from other challenges with Iran, allowing for a nuclear-focused agreement. Moving forward, reaching a comprehensive deal that addresses both nuclear and non-nuclear concerns is far more complex with the Islamic Republic.

Domestically, the Supreme Leader’s continued dominance in decision-making and his resistance to direct talks with the US remain a major obstacle, which is unlikely to shift unless Trump’s rhetorical and diplomatic overtures are reinforced by concrete actions — such as unfreezing a portion of Iran’s frozen assets held in Qatar or Iraq.

Iran has integrated its nuclear deterrence strategy into its broader regional deterrence framework, aiming to enhance both its defensive and offensive capabilities in response to its evolving threat perception.

It is important to note that Trump’s direct outreach to Khamenei is quite similar to Obama’s approach that opened the direct communication channel between Tehran and Washington and ultimately led to a nuclear agreement. In this vein, understanding Khamenei’s deep-seated mistrust stemming from the entire process — both in the lead-up to and aftermath of the deal — will be crucial in shaping a more effective engagement strategy with Iran. Thus, direct outreach with no tangible trust-building measures will no longer resonate with Tehran.

Beyond the U.S.-Iran dynamic, regional and global powers play a decisive role in shaping the outcome of nuclear negotiations. The involvement of Russia, China, and the European Union each brings distinct strategic calculations that could either advance or hinder diplomatic progress. At the same time, the Gulf States, particularly Saudi Arabia and Qatar, have growing stakes in the nuclear issue, seeking stability while positioning themselves as potential mediators in U.S.-Iran discussions – positive developments that were non-existent during the Obama administration.

Amidst all this, the most pressing concern remains the possibility of an Israeli preemptive strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities — a move that could force the U.S. to intervene militarily to defend Israel against Iran’s retaliatory response and ignite a broader regional conflict — a scenario that the Trump administration is trying to avoid.

What is clear is the need for a pragmatic, nuanced, and forward-looking strategy — one that President Trump, perhaps more than any of his predecessors, is uniquely positioned to pursue. By leveraging his strong political capital both domestically and internationally, he has the opportunity to engage in unconventional diplomacy with Iran.

This Strategic Foresight Brief delves deeper into the challenges outlined above, structured across six key sections, and explores potential pathways for a diplomatic resolution to Iran’s nuclear program.

The Evolving U.S. Strategy on Iran Under Trump 2.0

Transactional Foreign Policy

Unlike Trump’s first term, when maximum pressure was a dominant tool in both rhetoric and action, Trump 2.0 is expected to take an even more transactional and diplomatic approach while keeping the rhetoric mostly the same, mainly for domestic political purposes.

Deal-making vs. History-making

Trump 2.0 prioritizes deal-making and history-making over a long-term Middle East policy aimed at re-shaping a new regional order, which is what Israel pursues and stands in contrast with Trump’s plan for Iran.

Key Figures in Trump’s Team

The administration is shaping up with new non-traditional foreign policy voices—figures with business, defence, and intelligence backgrounds rather than career diplomats. This makes it more complex for many parties including Iranians to engage and influence, using traditional tactics and contacts.

Sanctions and Pressure

The U.S. under Trump 2.0 will continue sanctions pressure, following the Biden Administration approach while considering targeting China and India to limit their purchase of Iranian oil, for increased pressure to bring Iranians to the negotiating table. Yet, the extent of enforcement remains unclear and it will be more difficult to enforce this time around, considering the US-China increasing tensions and competition in recent year.

The Complexity of Iran’s Nuclear Issue – No Longer Just About Enrichment

Interlinked Nature of the Iran Nuclear Issue

Any future negotiations will have to address broader security concerns, beyond nuclear enrichment. Iran’s nuclear program is no longer viewed in isolation by many actors including the Europeans. They are deeply intertwined with:
1

Iran’s supply of drones and missiles used by Russia in war in Ukraine.
2

Iran’s capacity and capability to impose costs on adversaries, whether unilaterally or through its so-called axis of resistance network, remain solid despite recent setbacks in the Levant region.
3

Human rights concerns and detention of foreign nationals as bargaining chips for prisoners exchange of Iranians detained in the West.

Iran’s Domestic Political Shifts & Negotiation Posture

Pezeshkian Pro-Engagement Agenda

The death of President Raisi, economic conditions, disappointment in Raisi's “Look to the East” policy and its failure to bring about economic dividends helped revive the reformist voices and led Masoud Pezeshkian, a leading moderate figure, seen as more open to engaging the West and lifting sanctions, elected as President in Iran.

Supreme Leader-backed Administration

Amid the internal power struggle around the Supreme Leader’s succession, Pezeskian’s profile, as a non-cleric politician with no political leadership ambition, makes him more trusted within the system and less risk-averse to break taboos and cross redlines – an important personal feature neither of former Iranian presidents brought to the table.

'Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake'

There is a belief within Iranian strategic circles that the West is divided—with domestic political infighting in the US and Europe as well as increasing tensions within the alliances —which incentivizes Iran to "wait out" the situation before making concessions.

Iran’s Underestimated Pain Threshold

Despite dire economic conditions at home, Iran is not desperate for a deal as reflected in the Iranian Supreme Leader’s latest remarks and has historically been willing to absorb economic hardship to sustain its policy positions on many issues including its nuclear program. They will only engage in talks when the perceived benefits of negotiations outweigh the costs, which is when Tehran feels more confident about its position at the negotiating table.

Diplomatic Tradecraft Imbalance

Iranian negotiators outmatch their Western counterparts, in experience due to their longevity in government and continued involvement in the nuclear and security files. The frequent rotation of EU and U.S. negotiators, coupled with Trump’s non-traditional foreign policy team will put the Western negotiators at a disadvantage.

The Role of Global Powers

GCC Role in Future Negotiations

The Gulf states, once passive observers, are now active stakeholders in shaping Iran’s nuclear future, emphasizing diplomatic engagement, economic leverage, and regional security mechanisms.

Saudi Arabia’s Pragmatic Stance on Iran

Unlike in 2015, Saudi Arabia is no longer fundamentally opposed to a new nuclear agreement. This is mainly driven by two factors; 1) The 2019 Aramco attacks and the lack of a U.S. military response reinforced the idea that confrontation with Iran carries high risks without guaranteed Western security backing and 2) The Saudi Vision 2030 require national and regional stability to attract foreign investment and proceed with its ambitious plans.

GCC’s Unique Position

Saudi Arabia and the UAE have become more open to engaging with Iran to establish a balanced non-proliferation framework tied to regional security guarantees — objectives that align with Trump’s preferred approach to an agreement with Iran. Meanwhile, Qatar and Oman, long-standing diplomatic intermediaries between Tehran and Washington, remain well-positioned to facilitate indirect U.S.-Iran talks, providing a crucial channel for trust-building and progress toward eventual direct negotiations.

The Regional Nuclear Proliferation Risk

If Iran develops nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and even Turkey may pursue their nuclear capabilities. However, Turkey is believed to have little to no ambition to go on the nuclear path given its membership in NATO.

The Role of the GCC in Future Iran Talks

The EU’s Position

European actors remain invested in non-proliferation efforts but lack leverage following the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA combined with increased uncertainty around the Trump negotiating strategy with Iran — one that leans toward direct engagement with Tehran without Europeans involved.

Economic Disappointment with China

While Iran under Raisi’s foreign policy vision of 'Look to the East' has strengthened ties with Russia and China, it has not translated into significant economic benefits — especially from China due to U.S. secondary sanctions, with the Gulf states remaining more attractive for Russians and Chinese investment

Historical Trust Issues with Russia

Despite Iran’s costly military support for Russia in the Ukraine war resulting in an unprecedented downgrade of its relations with Europe, Moscow has not yet provided Tehran with the advanced fighter jets that Iran desperately needs, especially following Israeli strikes. Beyond this specific example, Iranians have consistently viewed their relations with Russia with a great deal of distrust, referencing many historical events in both pre and post-Islamic Revolution periods. Now with the US-Russia talks on Ukraine shaping up rapidly and Trump’s outreach to Putin for support on Iran, Tehran increasingly fears that its nuclear program may soon be used by Moscow as a bargaining chip to get more concessions on Ukraine and NATO, which is far more vital and strategic for Russians than their partnership with the Islamic Republic.

The Likelihood and Consequences of an Israeli Strike

Netanyahu’s Double Win Strategy on Iran

Despite reports suggesting an imminent Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, some intelligence analysts see this as a familiar tactic Netanyahu has employed with every U.S. administration. This strategy presents a win-win scenario for Israel—either compelling the U.S. to support a strike on Iran’s nuclear sites, which Israel cannot execute alone, or leveraging the threat of military action to secure increased security and military assistance from Washington. Given the reluctance of any U.S. president, including Trump, to initiate another endless war in the Middle East, this approach serves as a strategic pressure tool for Israel.

Challenges of Israeli Military Operations

Without direct U.S. military support, Israel’s ability to inflict lasting damage on Iran’s nuclear program is significantly constrained. Iran’s nuclear infrastructure is deeply fortified underground, making it resistant to conventional bunker-buster bombs. Some military analysts argue that only a tactical nuclear strike could guarantee the destruction of Iran’s nuclear sites. However, such an option remains both politically unfeasible and technically challenging, given the dispersed nature of Iran’s nuclear facilities across multiple geographic locations. Moreover, a military strike would likely trigger a fundamental shift in Iran’s nuclear doctrine, rallying political elites and the public support around the weaponization of its program. With Iran already possessing the know-how knowledge and capacity, rebuilding its nuclear infrastructure would become a matter of time rather than capability.

Potential Iranian Retaliation

Despite regional setbacks, Iran maintains a robust deterrence capability, strengthened by its advanced nuclear, missile, drone, naval, and cyber programs. Tehran remains capable of striking targets inside Israel by overwhelming its air defense systems—a response it views as a credible countermeasure if Israel launches preemptive strikes on its nuclear facilities. Unlike previous limited retaliations, Iran could escalate by deploying a significantly larger barrage of missiles from multiple directions, increasing the likelihood of penetrating Israeli defenses. Such an escalation could rapidly ignite a broader conflict, drawing in the U.S. and other actors while destabilizing Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, as well as disrupting maritime security in the Gulf of Aden, the Persian Gulf, and the Gulf of Oman.

Possible Pathways to a New Agreement with Iran

Iran’s Preferred Strategies

At present, Iran’s establishment appears to be weighing two strategic options, shaped by its economic resilience and the level of international pressure. The first is to adopt a wait-and-see approach, similar to its strategy under the Biden administration, sustaining its economy while maintaining its nuclear threshold status without provoking regional escalations—essentially outlasting Trump’s second term. The second option is to pursue a North Korea-style agreement, offering Trump a symbolic diplomatic victory while securing key concessions. This would allow Iran to deter potential Israeli strikes, retain much of its nuclear infrastructure and enrichment capacity, regain access to some of its frozen assets, and continue exporting oil to China and other key markets, all while avoiding full-scale confrontation.

Trump’s 'Verified Nuclear Deal' Approach

Any future Trump-led agreement with Iran is likely to mirror the 2013 Joint Plan of Action—an interim framework that preceded the JCPOA—though with a longer timeline for trust-building and negotiations. Under this model, Iran could agree to enhanced nuclear monitoring and inspections, alongside a temporary pause in uranium enrichment, in exchange for partial sanctions relief and access to a portion of its frozen assets held in Qatar or Iraq. This phased approach would allow both sides to test compliance while laying the groundwork for a more comprehensive deal.

Regionalizing the New Iran Deal

GCC countries, which stand to be directly affected by escalating tensions between Tehran and Washington, have a strategic opportunity to play a central role in shaping a new agreement with Iran—one that aligns with their national security and economic interests. As key regional stakeholders, they can serve as facilitators, mediators, and guarantors throughout the negotiation process, supporting backchannel diplomacy and embedding regional confidence-building measures into the deal’s framework. Their involvement could extend to the implementation and enforcement phases by investing in Iran’s economy, leveraging their diplomatic ties with the Trump administration to advocate for phased sanctions relief, and ensuring compliance mechanisms that foster long-term stability.

Region-Led Collective Security System

A new agreement could be structured around the formation of a regional collective security framework, incorporating a nuclear safeguards mechanism under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to ensure structured monitoring and verification among regional actors. To encourage Iran’s commitment to nuclear transparency, elements from its Hormuz Peace Endeavor (HOPE) initiative could be integrated into the deal, particularly provisions emphasizing non-aggression and the rejection of coalitions or alliances directed against any regional state. This approach could help build trust, reduce security tensions, and foster a more sustained diplomatic engagement within the region supported by the international community.

Conclusion

Looking ahead, any new agreement must address both nuclear and regional security concerns while prioritizing tangible incentives over continued pressure to bring Iran to the negotiating table. Regional actors, particularly the Gulf States, will play a crucial role in shaping confidence-building measures and establishing a durable framework for regional de-escalation and nuclear non-proliferation.

The involvement of key international stakeholders, particularly Russia and China, will also influence Iran’s strategic calculations and determine the feasibility of a diplomatic breakthrough. Initial steps toward de-escalation could include unfreezing Iranian assets and implementing targeted sanctions relief in exchange for enhanced nuclear monitoring and a temporary pause in uranium enrichment — facilitated through backchannel diplomacy.

At the same time, addressing Iran’s nuclear ambitions requires a comprehensive strategy that accounts for its evolving security posture, advanced missile and drone capabilities, and shifting regional alliances. Unlike in 2015, Iran’s leadership now views its nuclear program as a central pillar of its deterrence strategy, particularly in response to its weakened regional influence — further complicating negotiations.

The challenge lies in formulating a diplomatic approach that strikes a balance between security concerns and political realities — one that prevents Iran from developing nuclear weapons while providing sufficient incentives to keep Tehran engaged and compliant. This is particularly critical as the absence of meaningful diplomatic openings before October could heighten the risk of regional instability. While uncertainties persist, a diplomatic breakthrough remains possible — one that upholds nuclear non-proliferation, reinforces regional security, and mitigates the risk of another costly and endless war in the Middle East.

Author
Younes Zangiabadi Square
Younes Zangiabadi
Younes Zangiabadi is the Executive Director of the Institute for Peace & Diplomacy.
Panel 4: Pathways to Manage Non-Proliferation in the Middle East (4:30 PM - 5:45 PM ET)

The Western powers have failed to effectively manage the increasing threat of proliferation in the Middle East. While the international community is concerned with Iran’s nuclear program, Saudi Arabia has moved forward with developing its own nuclear program, and independent studies show that Israel has longed possessed dozens of nuclear warheads. The former is a member of the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while the latter has refused to sign the international agreement. 

On Middle East policy, the Biden campaign had staunchly criticized the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal and it has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier since assuming office in January 2021. However, serious obstacles remain for responsible actors in expanding non-proliferation efforts toward a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East. 

This panel will discuss how Western powers and multilateral institutions, such as the IAEA, can play a more effective role in managing non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East.  

Panelists:

– Peggy Mason: Canada’s former Ambassador to the UN for Disarmament

– Mark Fitzpatrick: Associate Fellow & Former Executive Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)

– Ali Vaez: Iran Project Director, International Crisis Group

– Negar Mortazavi: Journalist and Political Analyst, Host of Iran Podcast

– David Albright: Founder and President of the Institute for Science and International Security

 

Closing (5:45 PM – 6:00 PM ET)

Panel 3: Trade and Business Diplomacy in the Middle East (3:00 PM - 4:15 PM ET)

What is the current economic landscape in the Middle East? While global foreign direct investment is expected to fall drastically in the post-COVID era, the World Bank reported a 5% contraction in the economic output of the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries in 2020 due to the pandemic. While oil prices are expected to rebound with normalization in demand, political instability, regional and geopolitical tensions, domestic corruption, and a volatile regulatory and legal environment all threaten economic recovery in the Middle East. What is the prospect for economic growth and development in the region post-pandemic, and how could MENA nations promote sustainable growth and regional trade moving forward?

At the same time, Middle Eastern diaspora communities have become financially successful and can help promote trade between North America and the region. In this respect, the diaspora can become vital intermediaries for advancing U.S. and Canada’s business interests abroad. Promoting business diplomacy can both benefit the MENA region and be an effective and positive way to advance engagement and achieve foreign policy goals of the North Atlantic.

This panel will investigate the trade and investment opportunities in the Middle East, discuss how facilitating economic engagement with the region can benefit Canadian and American national interests, and explore relevant policy prescriptions.

Panelists:

– Hon. Sergio Marchi: Canada’s Former Minister of International Trade

– Scott Jolliffe: Chairperson, Canada Arab Business Council

– Esfandyar Batmanghelidj: Founder and Publisher of Bourse & Bazaar

– Nizar Ghanem: Director of Research and Co-founder at Triangle

– Nicki Siamaki: Researcher at Control Risks

Panel 2: Arms Race and Terrorism in the Middle East (12:00 PM - 1:15 PM ET)

The Middle East continues to grapple with violence and instability, particularly in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Fueled by government incompetence and foreign interventions, terrorist insurgencies have imposed severe humanitarian and economic costs on the region. Meanwhile, regional actors have engaged in an unprecedented pursuit of arms accumulation. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have imported billions of both Western and Russian-made weapons and funded militant groups across the region, intending to contain their regional adversaries, particularly Iran. Tehran has also provided sophisticated weaponry to various militia groups across the region to strengthen its geopolitical position against Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Israel. 

On the other hand, with international terrorist networks and intense regional rivalry in the Middle East, it is impractical to discuss peace and security without addressing terrorism and the arms race in the region. This panel will primarily discuss the implications of the ongoing arms race in the region and the role of Western powers and multilateral organizations in facilitating trust-building security arrangements among regional stakeholders to limit the proliferation of arms across the Middle East.

 

Panelists:

Luciano Zaccara: Assistant Professor, Qatar University

Dania Thafer: Executive Director, Gulf International Forum

Kayhan Barzegar: Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Science and Research Branch of Azad University

Barbara Slavin: Director of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council

Sanam Shantyaei: Senior Journalist at France24 & host of Middle East Matters

Panel 1: Future of Diplomacy and Engagement in the Middle East (10:30 AM-11:45 AM ET)

The emerging regional order in West Asia will have wide-ranging implications for global security. The Biden administration has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier, an initiative staunchly opposed by Israel, while also taking a harder line on Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen. Meanwhile, key regional actors, including Qatar, Iraq, and Oman, have engaged in backchannel efforts to bring Iran and Saudi Arabia to the negotiating table. From a broader geopolitical perspective, with the need to secure its energy imports, China is also expected to increase its footprint in the region and influence the mentioned challenges. 

In this evolving landscape, Western powers will be compelled to redefine their strategic priorities and adjust their policies with the new realities in the region. In this panel, we will discuss how the West, including the United States and its allies, can utilize multilateral diplomacy with its adversaries to prevent military escalation in the region. Most importantly, the panel will discuss if a multilateral security dialogue in the Persian Gulf region, proposed by some regional actors, can help reduce tensions among regional foes and produce sustainable peace and development for the region. 

Panelists:

– Abdullah Baabood: Academic Researcher and Former Director of the Centre for Gulf Studies, Qatar University

– Trita Parsi: Executive Vice-President, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft

– Ebtesam Al-Ketbi: President, Emirates Policy Centre​

– Jon Allen: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Israel

– Elizabeth Hagedorn: Washington correspondent for Al-Monitor

Panel 4: Humanitarian Diplomacy: An Underused Foreign Policy Tool in the Middle East (4:30 PM - 5:30 PM ET)

Military interventions, political and economic instabilities, and civil unrest in the Middle East have led to a global refugee crisis with an increasing wave of refugees and asylum seekers to Europe and Canada. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has, in myriad ways, exacerbated and contributed to the ongoing security threats and destabilization of the region.

While these challenges pose serious risks to Canadian security, Ottawa will also have the opportunity to limit such risks and prevent a spillover effect vis-à-vis effective humanitarian initiatives in the region. In this panel, we will primarily investigate Canada’s Middle East Strategy’s degree of success in providing humanitarian aid to the region. Secondly, the panel will discuss what programs and initiatives Canada can introduce to further build on the renewed strategy. and more specifically, how Canada can utilize its policy instruments to more effectively deal with the increasing influx of refugees from the Middle East. 

 

Panelists:

Erica Di Ruggiero: Director of Centre for Global Health, University of Toronto

Reyhana Patel: Head of Communications & Government Relations, Islamic Relief Canada

Amir Barmaki: Former Head of UN OCHA in Iran

Catherine Gribbin: Senior Legal Advisor for International and Humanitarian Law, Canadian Red Cross

Panel 3: A Review of Canada’s Middle East Engagement and Defense Strategy (3:00 PM - 4:15 PM ET)

In 2016, Canada launched an ambitious five-year “Middle East Engagement Strategy” (2016-2021), committing to investing CA$3.5 billion over five years to help establish the necessary conditions for security and stability, alleviate human suffering and enable stabilization programs in the region. In the latest development, during the meeting of the Global Coalition against ISIS, Minister of Foreign Affairs Marc Garneau announced more than $43.6 million in Peace and Stabilization Operations Program funding for 11 projects in Syria and Iraq.

With Canada’s Middle East Engagement Strategy expiring this year, it is time to examine and evaluate this massive investment in the Middle East region in the past five years. More importantly, the panel will discuss a principled and strategic roadmap for the future of Canada’s short-term and long-term engagement in the Middle East.

Panelists:

– Ferry de Kerckhove: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Egypt

– Dennis Horak: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia

– Chris Kilford: Former Canadian Defence Attaché in Turkey, member of the national board of the Canadian International Council (CIC)

– David Dewitt: University Professor Emeritus, York University

Panel 2: The Great Power Competition in the Middle East (12:00 PM - 1:15 PM ET)

While the United States continues to pull back from certain regional conflicts, reflected by the Biden administration’s decision to halt American backing for Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen and the expected withdrawal from Afghanistan, US troops continue to be stationed across the region. Meanwhile, Russia and China have significantly maintained and even expanded their regional activities. On one hand, the Kremlin has maintained its military presence in Syria, and on the other hand, China has signed an unprecedented 25-year strategic agreement with Iran.

As the global power structure continues to shift, it is essential to analyze the future of the US regional presence under the Biden administration, explore the emerging global rivalry with Russia and China, and at last, investigate the implications of such competition for peace and security in the Middle East.

Panelists:

– Dmitri Trenin: Director of Carnegie Moscow Center

– Joost R. Hiltermann: Director of MENA Programme, International Crisis Group

– Roxane Farmanfarmaian: Affiliated Lecturer in International Relations of the Middle East and North Africa, University of Cambridge

– Andrew A. Michta: Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at Marshall Center

– Kelley Vlahos: Senior Advisor, Quincy Institute

Panel 1: A New Middle East Security Architecture in the Making (10:30 AM -11:45 AM ET)

The security architecture of the Middle East has undergone rapid transformations in an exceptionally short period. Notable developments include the United States gradual withdrawal from the region, rapprochement between Israel and some GCC states through the Abraham Accords and the rise of Chinese and Russian regional engagement.

With these new trends in the Middle East, it is timely to investigate the security implications of the Biden administration’s Middle East policy. In this respect, we will discuss the Biden team’s new approach vis-à-vis Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The panel will also discuss the role of other major powers, including China and Russia in shaping this new security environment in the region, and how the Biden administration will respond to these powers’ increasing regional presence.

 

Panelists:

– Sanam Vakil: Deputy Director of MENA Programme at Chatham House

– Denise Natali: Acting Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies & Director of the Center for Strategic Research, National Defense University

– Hassan Ahmadian: Professor of the Middle East and North Africa Studies, University of Tehran

– Abdulaziz Sagar: Chairman, Gulf Research Center

– Andrew Parasiliti: President, Al-Monitor