So, the lies are finally falling away. For years, the United States has carefully cloaked its imperial conduct in the language of liberal internationalism — spreading democracy, upholding a rules-based order, and promoting peace. But in reality, anyone paying attention always knew the truth. Realists — from Robert D. Kaplan to my colleague Arta Moeini — have long acknowledged that the United States has been an empire in all but name. The only difference now is that America’s actions are finally aligning with that reality. The farce is ending.
Of course, it took time to reach this point. For decades, Washington’s elite seemed content to maintain the fiction that American power was a purely benevolent force, as though its vast network of military bases, trade dependencies, and “partnerships” were merely the byproducts of its moral leadership. Many within this elite even sincerely believed it. Yet, with the re-emergence of geopolitics and great power competition, the script changed.
Under the first Trump and then the Biden administration, the signs were there: a hardening stance toward China, deepening involvement in Ukraine — both before and after the 2022 war — and the quiet but unmistakable reassertion of “discipline” over wayward allies. With Trump’s second term — his inauguration itself resembling an imperial coronation, marked by a blunt assertion of national interest — the shift to raw power has become even more explicit. America is shedding its moralistic disguise and wielding its influence more openly — because it must.
This shift isn’t just pragmatic; it’s existential. In a world where challengers like China and Russia seek to upend, or at least reshape, the post-1945 international order, the imperial core has little choice but to embrace its role. For those of us who have long understood this dynamic, there is a grim satisfaction in watching the façade crack.
Welcome to Imperial America. Now let’s discuss what that really means.
The post-Cold War unipolar moment afforded America the luxury of playing the magnanimous hegemon. Military interventions in the Middle East, humanitarian missions in the Balkans, and the expansion of NATO were justified as essential to a rules-based order meant to ensure global stability. In practice, these efforts often served to extend American influence — but under the pretense of altruism and the spread of liberal values, which were widely regarded as morally and ideologically superior, promising material prosperity. Today, that pretense is increasingly difficult to sustain.
America is weaker now than it was at the height of its post-Soviet dominance. Decades of global crusades to reshape the world in its own image — through wars, nation-building, and globalization — have exacted a steep toll. Trillions of dollars spent on conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere yielded little beyond exhaustion at home and skepticism abroad. Washington’s lofty rhetoric about democracy and human rights often bred chaos rather than stability while securitizing the U.S. government, and an increasingly polarized domestic audience grew utterly disillusioned with financing the empire’s ambitions — no president since George W. Bush has been elected without pledging to end these “endless wars.” Blood and treasure were lost far beyond what any tangible gains could justify, and the imperial core began to hollow out.
Image Credit: USAF
America’s industrial base has atrophied, sacrificed on the altar of globalization and financialization. Factories shut down, jobs moved overseas, and Wall Street reaped the rewards of capital unmoored from real productivity. The shift toward a service- and finance-based economy enriched the elite but gutted the middle class. Meanwhile, various ideological experiments — often framed as moral imperatives — fractured the social cohesion necessary to sustain a unified empire. The country that emerged from these decades of overreach and internal division is still powerful, yes, but it is no longer invincible. And its rivals have taken notice.
China, emboldened by decades of economic growth and strategic patience, is asserting itself openly. Gone is Deng Xiaoping’s maxim of “hiding your strength and biding your time.” From the Belt and Road Initiative to the militarization of the South China Sea, China is carving out its own sphere of influence — one rooted in economic dependencies and strategic leverage. Meanwhile, Russia — economically constrained but geopolitically audacious — seeks to reclaim its historical sphere of influence. Its military campaign in Ukraine is a direct challenge to the post-Cold War settlement in Europe — a defiant statement that Moscow will not be made subservient to a foreign order.
These major powers are joined by an array of middle powers eager to assert themselves in their respective regions. India, Iran, Brazil, and Turkey, to name a few, are navigating this shifting order with ambitions of their own. Turkey, in particular, has been remarkably assertive, leveraging the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria to expand its regional influence, backing Azerbaijan’s victory over Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh, supporting the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan, and positioning itself as a key diplomatic player in the Ukraine-Russia conflict. Under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Ankara’s ambitions hint at a neo-Ottoman revival — seeking not only to lead the Turkic world from Anatolia to Central Asia but also to assert itself as the foremost power in the broader Muslim world.
The result is a world no longer defined by a single hegemon under supposedly unipolar conditions but one where the United States must contend with a polycentric reality. Against this backdrop, America’s old posture of largesse — funding the defense of wealthy allies, indulging the excesses of junior partners, and spreading the gospel of democracy at its own expense — has become untenable.
In such a world, America must curtail its “generosity”. It can no longer afford to sustain allies who mistake dependence for autonomy or bankroll causes that yield no strategic return. The empire’s mask is slipping, revealing the raw calculus of power beneath. Maintaining U.S. dominance requires disciplining allies who overreach or underperform, refocusing resources on the empire’s core interests, and shedding commitments that are not mutually beneficial.
This is the logic of great power behavior: not the pretense of shared values or the illusion of partnership, but a recalibration of priorities to secure the imperial core. It is neither sentimental nor noble, but it is necessary — and it is already underway.
At present, this dynamic is most visible in America’s relations with its allies. For all the talk of sacred alliances and equal partnerships, the blunt reality of U.S. power is that most of its allies are deeply dependent on Washington. Their security — and, indirectly, their relative prosperity — hinges on American guarantees. Yet many of these states maintain the illusion of full sovereignty, as though they are free to chart their own diplomatic course. In other words, they see their relationship with Washington as a partnership of equals. It is not. They are, in essence, satrapies in a sprawling empire, dependent on the center for their survival.
The very suggestion of such dependency is taboo in diplomatic circles, among foreign policy elites, or even in polite society. To call allied and partnered countries “client states”, “satrapies”, or even “vassals” is to breach every norm of diplomatic discourse. For decades, this reality has been veiled behind euphemisms like “shared values”, “mutual interests”, and “transatlantic unity”. Yet as conditions worsen and Washington imposes its will more frequently and unabashedly, these contradictions become harder to ignore. The notion that various states operate as fully sovereign actors persists only because admitting otherwise would force uncomfortable questions — in the United States and abroad — about the true nature of American power and whether these arrangements genuinely benefit all involved.
The European Union offers a case study of this disjunction. For decades, Europe has been sheltered by an American security umbrella, allowing it to underinvest in its own defense while pursuing ambitious domestic policies and a generous welfare state. Even after the Russia-Ukraine war exposed the continent’s vulnerability, most European states have dragged their feet on increasing defense spending to meet NATO commitments. Germany, the economic engine of the EU, has consistently failed to meet its pledged 2 percent GDP defense spending target, and its much-touted Zeitenwende (“watershed”) has yielded little beyond lofty promises thus far. In fact, German military readiness has deteriorated since 2022. Meanwhile, France continues to champion the idea of “strategic autonomy” — a vision of Europe as a self-reliant global actor that exists more in speeches than in reality. And this is without mentioning that its own “velvet empire” in West Africa is rapidly unraveling. This illusion of independence persists even as American weapons, intelligence, and logistics continue to serve as the backbone of European security.
This dynamic extends far beyond the Atlanticist West. In Asia, countries like Japan and South Korea remain heavily reliant on the United States to deter China and North Korea, yet only recently have they begun more serious steps toward rearmament. South Korea, for instance, has long hedged between Washington and Beijing, often downplaying its dependence on U.S. military support. In the Middle East, Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states routinely test the limits of American patience — entertaining Chinese partnerships and pursuing independent policies while expecting Washington to remain the ultimate guarantor of their security.
The recent ceasefire in Gaza between Israel and Hamas offers a stark illustration of this imperial reality. For months, the Biden administration’s appeals to international law and moral suasion fell on deaf ears in Israel. Embattled domestically and emboldened by Washington’s unconditional military support, Benjamin Netanyahu pursued his objectives with relative impunity. Yet the Gaza ceasefire was not the product of negotiation or legal arbitration — it came only when bipartisan Washington decided it had seen enough.
The White House’s reported pressure to restore calm in Gaza was less a diplomatic request than an imperial directive. America, Israel’s ultimate security guarantor, reminded Netanyahu where real power lies. The tools of empire — military aid, economic leverage, and the implicit threat of withdrawal — proved far more effective than the high-minded language of international norms. This is no anomaly but rather a demonstration of how power shapes state relations in practice: raw power, not principle, determines outcomes.
What unites all these examples is the shared reluctance of America’s allies and client states to acknowledge their subservient position within Washington’s orbit. Even Great Britain, with its much-vaunted “special relationship” with the United States, is beginning to see the old façade crumble. Donald Trump, for instance, has already exercised an informal “veto” over the UK’s decision to cede sovereignty of the contested Chagos Islands to Mauritius. The uncomfortable truth — as Russian President Vladimir Putin so crassly but accurately put it in 2015 — is that “the United States does not need allies, it needs vassals.”
Disagreeable as it may sound, our adversaries have a point. Many countries are, in reality, not peers but vassals, tethered to an imperial center that secures their position in a dangerous world. This relationship, though disguised as something else, has arguably been mutually beneficial in many ways. Yet the days of indulging the illusions of autonomy are coming to an end.
Washington is slowly coming to grips with the fact that if America is to maintain its credibility as a great power, it must assert control over its “provinces” — whether in Europe, the Middle East, or Asia. And nowhere is this shift more apparent than in America’s own hemisphere.
As the United States asserts power more openly over its clients, it is also confronting the limits of its influence. The reality of multipolar competition, coupled with America’s weakened strategic position after decades of overextension, has made it clear that the imperial center cannot sustain the order as before. The United States remains a global power, but it must redefine the scope of its geopolitical ambitions. As such, Washington is quietly shifting its strategy. The result is the emerging “American Sphere Doctrine” that revolves around three key elements: (1) shedding unsustainable peripheral commitments, (2) ensuring that allies and partners shoulder a greater share of the burden, and (3) consolidating its sphere of influence in its near abroad.
The first element is evident in America’s reluctant yet deliberate downscaling of involvement in areas it cannot realistically sustain. Take NATO’s ambitions to expand into Georgia. Once touted as a lynchpin of European security, this idea is quietly fading into irrelevance. The 2008 Russo-Georgian War, Georgia’s geopolitical vulnerability and proximity to Russia, and the contentious legacy of recent pro-democracy protests — or attempts at a color revolution, depending on one’s perspective — have demonstrated that integrating the small Caucasian nation into NATO entails far more risk than reward. Today, Washington pays lip service to Georgia’s aspirations while tacitly acknowledging that the country lies beyond the realistic boundaries of American security guarantees.
A similar recalibration is unfolding with regard to Ukraine. While the Biden administration funneled billions in military assistance to Kyiv in its war against Russia, the conflict has laid bare the limits of American (and European) commitment. The faltering Ukrainian advance and waning public support in the West have revealed that Washington’s support is not boundless. Trump’s Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, underscored this reality in a speech on February 12, stating that “returning to Ukraine’s pre-2014 borders is an unrealistic objective” and that “as part of any security guarantee, there will not be U.S. troops deployed to Ukraine.”
Calculations are underway regarding how much more aid to Ukraine can be justified before the empire must inevitably redirect its focus. As brutal as this may sound, Ukraine’s fate hinges not on lofty principles of sovereignty or democracy but on whether its struggle aligns with America’s interests.
In the Indo-Pacific, the situation is no less revealing. Taiwan, long a lynchpin of U.S. strategy in the region, remains a flashpoint in the great power contest with China. However, in recent years, Washington’s posture has undergone subtle shifts. While military support for Taiwan has increased, there are also signs that the United States is laying the groundwork to eventually scale back its involvement. Efforts to coordinate allies like Japan, South Korea, and Australia reflect a broader strategy to construct a regional security architecture capable of operating with greater autonomy from American forces. The United States is not exactly abandoning Taiwan, but it is quietly hedging against the day when defending the island becomes prohibitively costly or requires American boots on the ground.
The second element — burden-sharing — is evident in Washington’s ramped-up efforts to compel client states to shoulder a greater share of the imperial burden. Nowhere is this more apparent than in Europe. The war in Ukraine has intensified pressure on NATO allies to increase defense spending, with mixed results. Germany’s half-hearted pledges and continued foot-dragging underscore the challenges facing this transition — but even these tentative increases signal how Europe is forced to reconceive its security paradigm. The new Trump administration has been even more explicit about U.S. demands. Hegseth’s recent remarks left little doubt on this front:
Safeguarding European security must be an imperative for European members of NATO. As part of this Europe must provide the overwhelming share of future lethal and nonlethal aid to Ukraine. Members of this Contact Group must meet the moment. This means: Donating more ammunition and equipment. Leveraging comparative advantages. Expanding your defense industrial base. And importantly, leveling with your citizens about the threat facing Europe. Part of this is speaking frankly with your people about how this threat can only be met by spending more on defense. 2 [percent GDP spending] is not enough; President Trump has called for 5 [percent], and I agree. […] We’re also here today to directly and unambiguously express that stark strategic realities prevent the United States of America from being primarily focused on the security of Europe. […] Our transatlantic alliance has endured for decades. And we fully expect that it will be sustained for generations to come. But this won’t just happen. It will require our European allies to step into the arena and take ownership of conventional security on the continent.
In other words, the era of free-riding on American largesse is drawing to a close, as Washington makes it clear that its European allies must assume greater responsibility for defending the Western world’s eastern frontiers.
In the Indo-Pacific, burden-sharing has already become a pillar of U.S. strategy. The Quad, AUKUS, and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework are designed to coordinate allies and partners in countering China’s rise. This is not mere multilateralism; it is an imperial calculus. By building coalitions, the United States can project power more efficiently, relying on key regional actors to shoulder responsibilities that were once its own.
Further west, the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), increasingly dubbed the “New Golden Road”, exemplifies this approach. By creating a trade and infrastructure network that spans continents and provides a clear alternative to China’s Belt and Road (BRI), Washington seeks to bind its allies, partners, and vassals into a system of mutual dependence — one that ultimately advances American priorities. Trump himself reaffirmed his commitment to this initiative in his February 13 press conference with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, stating “we agreed to work together to help build one of the greatest trade routes in all of history. It will run from India to Israel to Italy and onward to the United States, connecting our partners by ports, railways, and undersea cables — many, many undersea cables.”
Finally, the third and most important element of the American Sphere Doctrine is the United States’ growing emphasis on its own hemisphere. The emerging polycentric system has reinforced the Western Hemisphere’s position as the cornerstone of America’s empire, with the Atlantic Ocean as its natural strategic backyard — the domain it must secure at all costs, where its dominance remains non-negotiable.
This shift first became apparent with the Biden administration’s Partnership for Atlantic Cooperation — a broad tentative framework aimed at strengthening economic, technological, and security ties not only across the Atlantic with Europe but also with Latin America and West Africa. While this initiative currently lacks substance — it remains, like most memorandums of understanding, an empty shell awaiting real commitments — the move nonetheless serves as a demarcation line. In other words, it explicitly extends beyond the traditional Monroe Doctrine — the nineteenth-century policy that sought to exclude external powers from the Americas — by redefining America’s sphere of influence to encompass the entirety of the Atlantic Ocean.
This Monroe+ framework reflects a growing recognition among foreign policy analysts of a strategic shift, with some explicitly backing it. While not yet formally articulated, the logic behind this doctrine is evident in recent U.S. actions. From resisting Chinese influence in Latin America to revitalizing ties with key regional partners, Washington is sending a message: the Western Hemisphere falls within its exclusive sphere of influence, and external rivals are unwelcome.
This shift is now accelerating under the Trump administration. Pete Hegseth was unequivocal about the realignment in his recent visit to Europe, stating, “The United States faces consequential threats to our homeland. We must — and we are — focusing on the security of our own borders.”
Even more blunt was U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio. In his first public interview as Secretary of State with Megyn Kelly, Rubio openly acknowledged that “it’s not normal for the world to simply have a unipolar power” and that “eventually you were going to reach back to a point where you had a multipolar world, multi-great powers in different parts of the planet.” He also stated outright that the administration’s goal over the next four years is to secure the Western Hemisphere and advance U.S. national interests — from the Arctic to Central America, Africa, and the Indo-Pacific. The very next day, Rubio delivered a speech bluntly titled “An Americas First Policy”, opening with: “When Donald Trump won his sweeping victory in November, he received a mandate to put America first. In the realm of diplomacy, this means paying closer attention to our own neighborhood — the Western Hemisphere.”
The new direction originates from the Oval Office. Donald Trump’s pronouncements, often dismissed as erratic and uncouth, suggest an intuitive grasp of the evolving global strategic landscape. His calls to acquire Greenland from Denmark hint at the growing strategic relevance of the Arctic and its proximity to the Atlantic, as well as an unstated intention to revive the GIUK Gap as a geopolitical boundary for America’s redefined sphere of influence. His interest in reestablishing U.S. dominion over the Panama Canal, which some argue is slipping under Chinese influence, underscores a recognition that America must control the critical chokepoints of its sphere of influence. Even Trump’s effort to rename the Gulf of Mexico the “Gulf of America” was not merely a whim, but a calculated rhetorical, and even psychological, assertion of U.S. dominance over the Western Hemisphere.
Contrary to what Trump’s critics may think, there appears to be a method — and strategic rationale — to the president’s supposed “madness”.
In recent years it has become a popular parlor game among Washington D.C. conservatives (and those of a more classicist inclination) to ask: where does the United States stand in Rome’s transition from republic to empire? Is America still in the days of the Gracchi, when populists challenged the entrenched rule of self-enriching patricians but the republic endured? Or have we reached the era of Sulla, when a strongman overturns the old order while claiming to restore it? Perhaps we are already in the time of the First Triumvirate, with Donald Trump, J.D. Vance, and Elon Musk as modern parallels to Pompey, Caesar, and Crassus. Or maybe Trump himself is a post-Rubicon Caesar, having cast the die and seized Rome, intent on ushering in a new order.
Such speculation may seem fanciful, but Trump’s second inauguration speech provided the clearest answer yet. The intended spirit of the event was unambiguous: it was meant to signal to Americans not a republic in decline, but an empire reasserting itself. The occasion felt less like a democratic ritual and more like an imperial coronation. Depending on one’s perspective, Trump’s speech evoked either a triumphant restoration or was a harbinger of upheaval. Certain phrases stood out to those attuned to the Roman comparisons: “This nation will never bow to global tribunals,” “A new American age begins today,” and “The forgotten citizen will rule again, not faceless bureaucrats.”
These are the words of a popular ruler no longer willing to surrender his authority, a Commander-in-Chief boldly asserting his dominion. What followed immediately confirmed the shift: a torrent of executive orders, issued with the decisive confidence of an emperor. Among them: declaring a national border emergency, designating drug cartels as terrorist organizations, imposing a ninety-day freeze on all foreign aid, and formally withdrawing the United States from both the Paris Climate Agreement and the World Health Organization. Then there were the symbolic acts — no less significant than the policy decrees: ordering that the Gulf of Mexico be renamed the Gulf of America, and directing federal agencies to propose new civic architecture guidelines favoring classical styles, a pointed affirmation of the Roman tradition Trump’s rise embodies for some.
The weeks since Trump’s inauguration have only further reinforced the imperial nature of this ongoing “transition”. The most striking and acerbic example came with the princeps iuventutis… I mean, Vice President J.D. Vance’s speech at this year’s Munich Security Conference — an address that left attendees “silent, stunned, and steaming.” European leaders felt openly demeaned. One senior EU diplomat complained that Vance “lectured us, he humiliated us.” Unfortunately for the Europeans… this was precisely the intent. They were being deliberately rebuked for what the Trump administration — and the broader MAGA movement — deem the European establishment’s political, ideological, and even moral failures.
There are, and will continue to be, divergent views on the speech — its tone, its content, and its implications. But, above all, what it signifies is the imbalance of power. As noted economist Adam Tooze, a self-described “left-liberal” and pro-European, observes:
[Vance’s] barbs were against the liberals, but what he was really saying was that in terms of mainstream European opinion, he and the Trump administration are [seen as the] enemy. And yet, they are, in terms of the US constitution, democratically legitimate. They have a mandate. The first past the post system makes that a clearer mandate than any German politician has enjoyed since Adenauer in his heyday. Added to which, as everyone at [Munich Security Conference] is painfully aware, this “foreign country”, the USA, is Europe’s security provider and despite the warning signs of the last decade Europe has done precious little to gain independence.
This closely reflects reality: beneath all the hand-wringing and angry reactions from Europeans, there is a fundamental impotence — and U.S. officials are acutely aware of it. “What,” Americans ask, “will Europeans do in response?” Will they finally rearm and take responsibility for their own defense? Will they be honest with their voters that les trente glorieuses of the unipolar era is now over, and that an age of hardship has begun? Will they embrace “strategic autonomy” in a serious manner, or will they continue to rely on an American security umbrella they publicly resent yet privately refuse to relinquish?
Either way, the Trump administration has made its point. The speech was not a diplomatic blunder but a calculated assertion of supremacy — an unambiguous declaration that the Atlantic order is a hierarchy, not a partnership of equals. German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier, in a measured response, expressed concern over the Trump administration’s worldview, warning that “a lack of rules must not become the model for reorganizing the world.” But Steinmeier’s lament for the rules-based order only underscored Europe’s broader predicament. The rules he defends were, after all, written upon the foundation of American power. The United States is increasingly convinced that Europe lacks the will or strength to uphold those rules independently. For all the indignation over Washington’s tone, and all the rhetoric about European sovereignty and unity, the reality remains: the United States is shifting its posture, while Europe clings to the illusion of a status quo that no longer exists. The imperial capital has spoken; the satrapies must now decide how to respond.
Such actions and pronouncements, alongside numerous others in recent years, demonstrate a clear turn toward prioritizing national self-interest. The emerging American Sphere Doctrine thus reflects America’s pragmatic recognition of its own constraints. The United States, while still immensely powerful, is no longer omnipotent. The days of unchallenged global hegemony are over, and Washington must adapt and make difficult choices about where to invest its resources. Reducing its global military footprint to consolidate its own sphere, compelling allies and partners to share the burden, and securing the Western Hemisphere and its critical chokepoints are not acts of retreat but of deliberate strategic realignment. In a world of rising powers and greater geopolitical uncertainty, the empire must fortify its core if it hopes to endure.
As the world fretfully watches this “Great Transition”, defenders of the old order must brace for a new reality. By abandoning moralism and ideology for interest, the American empire has found renewed vigor. Washington is no longer concealing its superior power — it is openly asserting it. The logic driving this change, though vexing to many, is sound. By redefining its ambitions and recalibrating its commitments, the United States is positioning itself not to retreat but to survive — and even thrive — in the new age of empires. The question now is not whether this shift can be reversed, but how the new Imperial America will wield its power — and what it will demand from those living in its shadow.
The Western powers have failed to effectively manage the increasing threat of proliferation in the Middle East. While the international community is concerned with Iran’s nuclear program, Saudi Arabia has moved forward with developing its own nuclear program, and independent studies show that Israel has longed possessed dozens of nuclear warheads. The former is a member of the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while the latter has refused to sign the international agreement.
On Middle East policy, the Biden campaign had staunchly criticized the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal and it has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier since assuming office in January 2021. However, serious obstacles remain for responsible actors in expanding non-proliferation efforts toward a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.
This panel will discuss how Western powers and multilateral institutions, such as the IAEA, can play a more effective role in managing non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Peggy Mason: Canada’s former Ambassador to the UN for Disarmament
– Mark Fitzpatrick: Associate Fellow & Former Executive Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
– Ali Vaez: Iran Project Director, International Crisis Group
– Negar Mortazavi: Journalist and Political Analyst, Host of Iran Podcast
– David Albright: Founder and President of the Institute for Science and International Security
Closing (5:45 PM – 6:00 PM ET)
What is the current economic landscape in the Middle East? While global foreign direct investment is expected to fall drastically in the post-COVID era, the World Bank reported a 5% contraction in the economic output of the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries in 2020 due to the pandemic. While oil prices are expected to rebound with normalization in demand, political instability, regional and geopolitical tensions, domestic corruption, and a volatile regulatory and legal environment all threaten economic recovery in the Middle East. What is the prospect for economic growth and development in the region post-pandemic, and how could MENA nations promote sustainable growth and regional trade moving forward?
At the same time, Middle Eastern diaspora communities have become financially successful and can help promote trade between North America and the region. In this respect, the diaspora can become vital intermediaries for advancing U.S. and Canada’s business interests abroad. Promoting business diplomacy can both benefit the MENA region and be an effective and positive way to advance engagement and achieve foreign policy goals of the North Atlantic.
This panel will investigate the trade and investment opportunities in the Middle East, discuss how facilitating economic engagement with the region can benefit Canadian and American national interests, and explore relevant policy prescriptions.
Panelists:
– Hon. Sergio Marchi: Canada’s Former Minister of International Trade
– Scott Jolliffe: Chairperson, Canada Arab Business Council
– Esfandyar Batmanghelidj: Founder and Publisher of Bourse & Bazaar
– Nizar Ghanem: Director of Research and Co-founder at Triangle
– Nicki Siamaki: Researcher at Control Risks
The Middle East continues to grapple with violence and instability, particularly in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Fueled by government incompetence and foreign interventions, terrorist insurgencies have imposed severe humanitarian and economic costs on the region. Meanwhile, regional actors have engaged in an unprecedented pursuit of arms accumulation. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have imported billions of both Western and Russian-made weapons and funded militant groups across the region, intending to contain their regional adversaries, particularly Iran. Tehran has also provided sophisticated weaponry to various militia groups across the region to strengthen its geopolitical position against Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Israel.
On the other hand, with international terrorist networks and intense regional rivalry in the Middle East, it is impractical to discuss peace and security without addressing terrorism and the arms race in the region. This panel will primarily discuss the implications of the ongoing arms race in the region and the role of Western powers and multilateral organizations in facilitating trust-building security arrangements among regional stakeholders to limit the proliferation of arms across the Middle East.
Panelists:
Luciano Zaccara: Assistant Professor, Qatar University
Dania Thafer: Executive Director, Gulf International Forum
Kayhan Barzegar: Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Science and Research Branch of Azad University
Barbara Slavin: Director of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council
Sanam Shantyaei: Senior Journalist at France24 & host of Middle East Matters
The emerging regional order in West Asia will have wide-ranging implications for global security. The Biden administration has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier, an initiative staunchly opposed by Israel, while also taking a harder line on Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen. Meanwhile, key regional actors, including Qatar, Iraq, and Oman, have engaged in backchannel efforts to bring Iran and Saudi Arabia to the negotiating table. From a broader geopolitical perspective, with the need to secure its energy imports, China is also expected to increase its footprint in the region and influence the mentioned challenges.
In this evolving landscape, Western powers will be compelled to redefine their strategic priorities and adjust their policies with the new realities in the region. In this panel, we will discuss how the West, including the United States and its allies, can utilize multilateral diplomacy with its adversaries to prevent military escalation in the region. Most importantly, the panel will discuss if a multilateral security dialogue in the Persian Gulf region, proposed by some regional actors, can help reduce tensions among regional foes and produce sustainable peace and development for the region.
Panelists:
– Abdullah Baabood: Academic Researcher and Former Director of the Centre for Gulf Studies, Qatar University
– Trita Parsi: Executive Vice-President, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
– Ebtesam Al-Ketbi: President, Emirates Policy Centre
– Jon Allen: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Israel
– Elizabeth Hagedorn: Washington correspondent for Al-Monitor
Military interventions, political and economic instabilities, and civil unrest in the Middle East have led to a global refugee crisis with an increasing wave of refugees and asylum seekers to Europe and Canada. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has, in myriad ways, exacerbated and contributed to the ongoing security threats and destabilization of the region.
While these challenges pose serious risks to Canadian security, Ottawa will also have the opportunity to limit such risks and prevent a spillover effect vis-à-vis effective humanitarian initiatives in the region. In this panel, we will primarily investigate Canada’s Middle East Strategy’s degree of success in providing humanitarian aid to the region. Secondly, the panel will discuss what programs and initiatives Canada can introduce to further build on the renewed strategy. and more specifically, how Canada can utilize its policy instruments to more effectively deal with the increasing influx of refugees from the Middle East.
Panelists:
Erica Di Ruggiero: Director of Centre for Global Health, University of Toronto
Reyhana Patel: Head of Communications & Government Relations, Islamic Relief Canada
Amir Barmaki: Former Head of UN OCHA in Iran
Catherine Gribbin: Senior Legal Advisor for International and Humanitarian Law, Canadian Red Cross
In 2016, Canada launched an ambitious five-year “Middle East Engagement Strategy” (2016-2021), committing to investing CA$3.5 billion over five years to help establish the necessary conditions for security and stability, alleviate human suffering and enable stabilization programs in the region. In the latest development, during the meeting of the Global Coalition against ISIS, Minister of Foreign Affairs Marc Garneau announced more than $43.6 million in Peace and Stabilization Operations Program funding for 11 projects in Syria and Iraq.
With Canada’s Middle East Engagement Strategy expiring this year, it is time to examine and evaluate this massive investment in the Middle East region in the past five years. More importantly, the panel will discuss a principled and strategic roadmap for the future of Canada’s short-term and long-term engagement in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Ferry de Kerckhove: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Egypt
– Dennis Horak: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
– Chris Kilford: Former Canadian Defence Attaché in Turkey, member of the national board of the Canadian International Council (CIC)
– David Dewitt: University Professor Emeritus, York University
While the United States continues to pull back from certain regional conflicts, reflected by the Biden administration’s decision to halt American backing for Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen and the expected withdrawal from Afghanistan, US troops continue to be stationed across the region. Meanwhile, Russia and China have significantly maintained and even expanded their regional activities. On one hand, the Kremlin has maintained its military presence in Syria, and on the other hand, China has signed an unprecedented 25-year strategic agreement with Iran.
As the global power structure continues to shift, it is essential to analyze the future of the US regional presence under the Biden administration, explore the emerging global rivalry with Russia and China, and at last, investigate the implications of such competition for peace and security in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Dmitri Trenin: Director of Carnegie Moscow Center
– Joost R. Hiltermann: Director of MENA Programme, International Crisis Group
– Roxane Farmanfarmaian: Affiliated Lecturer in International Relations of the Middle East and North Africa, University of Cambridge
– Andrew A. Michta: Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at Marshall Center
– Kelley Vlahos: Senior Advisor, Quincy Institute
The security architecture of the Middle East has undergone rapid transformations in an exceptionally short period. Notable developments include the United States gradual withdrawal from the region, rapprochement between Israel and some GCC states through the Abraham Accords and the rise of Chinese and Russian regional engagement.
With these new trends in the Middle East, it is timely to investigate the security implications of the Biden administration’s Middle East policy. In this respect, we will discuss the Biden team’s new approach vis-à-vis Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The panel will also discuss the role of other major powers, including China and Russia in shaping this new security environment in the region, and how the Biden administration will respond to these powers’ increasing regional presence.
Panelists:
– Sanam Vakil: Deputy Director of MENA Programme at Chatham House
– Denise Natali: Acting Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies & Director of the Center for Strategic Research, National Defense University
– Hassan Ahmadian: Professor of the Middle East and North Africa Studies, University of Tehran
– Abdulaziz Sagar: Chairman, Gulf Research Center
– Andrew Parasiliti: President, Al-Monitor
