In 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky not only abandoned NATO membership aspirations but also showed a willingness to make territorial concessions during negotiations that year. However, those talks were derailed by then-UK leader Boris Johnson. Today, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer has taken a more aggressive stance, persuading Western states such as Canada and France to align with his hardline opposition to Russia — adopting an even more hawkish approach than the U.S. by pushing for direct confrontation. Their rallying cry has become “whatever the cost” and “as long as it takes.”
Their objective is clearly not a negotiated settlement but rather to pressure reluctant states, including the U.S., into ensuring Russia gains as little as possible — even at the cost of an entrenched, prolonged proxy war. This exposes the fragile state of the Western alliance. The divergence between the U.S., some European states, and the UK highlights NATO’s struggle with balancing collective action and the strategic autonomy of its members.
Last week’s meeting between U.S. leader Donald Trump and Zelensky further underscored these differences. America’s commitment to Ukraine’s proxy war is waning, with Trump seeking to reset relations with Russia and avoid nuclear escalation. He has already declared that Ukraine can “forget about” joining NATO and remains committed to cutting aid to Kyiv
As U.S. support declines — likely reinforced by a forensic audit — the burden of sustaining Ukraine’s weak economy and fragile political system shifts primarily to Europe and Canada. Yet, this is a strain these donors may struggle to bear, especially as they face growing military spending obligations, including the push to allocate 2% of GDP, amid broader foreign aid budget cuts.
The decision to boost spending on Ukraine is problematic for four reasons. First, at issue here is the fact that the ratio of foreign aid to Ukraine’s GNI is far in excess of 20%. This measure of dependency is comparable to what many failed and fragile states receive. Canada alone has contributed 20 billion dollars towards Ukraine’s war effort; greater than the 18 billion Ottawa delivered to Kabul from 2001 to 2014.
Second, the world has witnessed an increase in armed conflicts over the last three years. At the same time the percentage of overall aid flowing to these war zones has dropped in proportion to the amount of aid flowing to Ukraine. Ukraine is consuming a disproportionate share of donor funding, leaving other crises significantly underaided, including those in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Sudan, and Gaza.
Third, skewed aid, distortions and imbalances undermine Western credibility and global standing within the “Global South.” Many non-Western nations remain indifferent to Europe’s predicament seeing the conflict as a regional war led by Western nations that have shown a high degree of hypocrisy in their response to the plight of Palestinians for example.
Fourth, the strategy of weakening Russia is at odds with Trump’s desire for a strategic reset. Trump has made it clear that the US intends to reestablish effective deterrence with Russia which eroded under former President Joe Biden. As French leader Emmanuelle Macron put it “I think he [Trump] has the deterrence capacity of the U.S. to reengage with Russia.”
Accordingly, Washington’s meeting in February with Russian officials deliberately excluded other parties and intermediaries with veto power — namely Ukraine and the EU. This process of “shortening the chain” overcomes the complexity of satisfying multiple interests simultaneously. Following initial meetings between Russia and the U.S. facilitated by Saudi Arabia, the negotiation process must be broadened to include other stakeholders including the EU and Ukraine.
However, for a lasting peace, beyond ending the violence, political compromise from all sides is essential. Putin believes the U.S. has abandoned the goal of a strategic defeat of Russia and will uphold the decision to not grant Ukraine membership in NATO – both of which are viewed as unacceptable to Moscow. Putin has already attained many of the outcomes expected under a Trump presidency short of lifting sanctions: a weakened Ukraine, reduced Western aid, and a divided North Atlantic bloc.
Concurrently, Ukraine must contend with a Trump administration that is willing and able to use Kyiv’s weaknesses to benefit Washington. Trump’s approach now extends beyond traditional geopolitical maneuvering, as his administration seeks to leverage Ukraine’s vast natural resources as a strategic asset. In turn, this leveraging is intended to soften Kyiv’s opposition to negotiation with Russia. Overall, such a strategy reflects a broader pattern where economic imperatives intersect with national security goals, revealing how resource acquisition can serve as both an end and a means in the complex landscape of international relations.
To reboot the negotiation process, Zelensky must rescind the decree banning negotiations with Putin. This decree has so far weakened the Ukrainian position considering that direct US-Russia talks are underway. When discussions ensue, whether bilaterally or in concert, first steps must include an agreement to transform a short term ceasefire into a comprehensive peace plan.
At stake is the need to increase the number of crossing points across buffer zones and lines of contact, eliminating land mines and returning people to their homelands. A comprehensive peace plan should address war-induced population displacement, ensuring the reintegration of internally displaced persons and refugees into Ukrainian and Russian society.
A second step on the agenda must be negotiating the status of territories currently under Russian control, including Donbas and Crimea. Disputed claims over these regions should include resolutions about shared commercial interests and the security of the Russian fleet at Sevastopol. A third step is to maintain secure and free access for both nations throughout the Black and Baltic Seas, unimpeded by mines, blockades and embargoes.
Both sides must be prepared to agree on the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, where minority rights are respected and enforced. The credibility and success of these crucial first steps depend on how strongly external guarantors favor one side over the other. Without security guarantees for Russia, the war will not end. In that regard, any peacekeepers deployed into Ukraine will not be the enforcers of a negotiated settlement but symbolic representations of it.
For example, the UK’s idea of unilaterally deploying a well-armed interposition force makes little sense in practice. Not only does Russia reject the idea, such a force cannot effectively prevent renewed violence. No matter how well-armed they are, there is little likelihood such forces would be given the mandate and the resources to stop renewed conflict. If these forces do become targets their presence would potentially drag Europe into direct confrontation with Russia.
Instead, credible third-party security guarantees must be jointly designed and institutionalized before deploying observers. These observers would be responsible for monitoring compliance as opposed to enforcing a settlement. Often overlooked in these discussions are key institutions like the OSCE. While the OSCE may lack military power, it has three advantages: it is not dominated by the U.S., Russia is a member and it has a capability to monitor the quality of minority rights in Ukraine.
If the ultimate EU goal is to strengthen Ukraine’s sovereignty, making the country directly dependent on a permanent external military presence suggests that it is not sovereign and incapable of providing its own deterrent force. Ukraine has a proven capacity to defend itself without occupying forces. That capability should only grow with time.
A structured timeline for peace talks is essential to maintain momentum and prevent deadlock. Over the long term, Ukraine’s path to European integration must be solidified with a clear timeline and structural commitments. By 2030, Ukraine is expected to join the European Union, marking a significant shift in the geopolitical balance of Europe. This accession could be accompanied by a robust EU commitment to post-war reconstruction, ensuring that Ukraine receives the necessary economic, institutional, and security support to stabilize and rebuild.
The EU’s financial and technical assistance should focus on infrastructure development, economic revitalization, and the strengthening of governance institutions to align Ukraine with European standards. Additionally, Ukraine must maintain a capable military force, with ongoing support for modernization and training. While Ukraine can renounce military attempts to reclaim occupied territories through force, it is unlikely to recognize Russian sovereignty over them.
These arrangements mirror other unresolved territorial disputes globally, where political and economic frameworks take precedence over immediate territorial resolutions. Ukraine’s military posture can remain defensive, ensuring deterrence against future aggression while avoiding direct military escalation.
Sanctions on Russia should be lifted in a phased manner, contingent on compliance with the agreed-upon framework. Certain restrictions could be removed immediately following a formal ceasefire, while others can be gradually eased over three years, provided Russia upholds its commitments. In addition to sanctions, Russians care far more now in the short-term about unfreezing their frozen funds by the Europeans who threaten to redirect them to Ukraine for repatriation.
A key aspect of this economic normalization can be the controlled reintegration of Russian energy exports into the European market. However, these exports could be temporarily subject to a special duty, with the collected revenue allocated to Ukraine’s reconstruction fund. This approach balances economic pragmatism with accountability, ensuring that Russia contributes indirectly to rebuilding the nation it sought to destabilize.
Internally, Ukraine must foster political pluralism and ensure the participation of parties that advocate peaceful coexistence with Russia. This includes allowing political entities supporting Russian language rights and diplomatic reconciliation to take part in elections. Moreover, state actions against the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) and restrictions on the Russian language must cease, as these measures have exacerbated societal divisions. A more inclusive approach to governance can facilitate reconciliation and undermine narratives used to justify continued external intervention.
Following the lifting of martial law, Ukraine’s return to political normalization should proceed through elections. Presidential elections in Ukraine would allow for new leadership to guide the country in the post-war period. This can be followed by parliamentary and local elections in late 2025, ensuring a democratic transition and the full reintegration of all political actors willing to operate within the framework of national unity and stability.
Finally, a broader regional security dialogue could be established, incorporating Russia into discussions on European stability to prevent future conflicts and to avoid a security order that permanently marginalizes Moscow. These measures would allow Russia to perceive security benefits while maintaining Ukraine’s sovereignty and broader European stability.
Unfortunately, Western leaders apart from Donald Trump, such as Justin Trudeau, Keir Starmer, Ursula von der Leyen and Kaja Kallas show little interest in normalising relations with Russia despite the fact that Europe and Canada, are struggling with economic decline in the face of tariffs. For Europe in particular energy shortages, demographic decline, and deindustrialization are most pressing.
The continent needs a shift in focus from military confrontation to addressing its internal economic and political challenges. This transformation is best achieved by recognising that both Ukraine and Russia are part of Europe, that peaceful coexistence is necessary, interdependence is desirable, and that shared institutions are possible.
The Western powers have failed to effectively manage the increasing threat of proliferation in the Middle East. While the international community is concerned with Iran’s nuclear program, Saudi Arabia has moved forward with developing its own nuclear program, and independent studies show that Israel has longed possessed dozens of nuclear warheads. The former is a member of the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while the latter has refused to sign the international agreement.
On Middle East policy, the Biden campaign had staunchly criticized the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal and it has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier since assuming office in January 2021. However, serious obstacles remain for responsible actors in expanding non-proliferation efforts toward a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.
This panel will discuss how Western powers and multilateral institutions, such as the IAEA, can play a more effective role in managing non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Peggy Mason: Canada’s former Ambassador to the UN for Disarmament
– Mark Fitzpatrick: Associate Fellow & Former Executive Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
– Ali Vaez: Iran Project Director, International Crisis Group
– Negar Mortazavi: Journalist and Political Analyst, Host of Iran Podcast
– David Albright: Founder and President of the Institute for Science and International Security
Closing (5:45 PM – 6:00 PM ET)
What is the current economic landscape in the Middle East? While global foreign direct investment is expected to fall drastically in the post-COVID era, the World Bank reported a 5% contraction in the economic output of the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries in 2020 due to the pandemic. While oil prices are expected to rebound with normalization in demand, political instability, regional and geopolitical tensions, domestic corruption, and a volatile regulatory and legal environment all threaten economic recovery in the Middle East. What is the prospect for economic growth and development in the region post-pandemic, and how could MENA nations promote sustainable growth and regional trade moving forward?
At the same time, Middle Eastern diaspora communities have become financially successful and can help promote trade between North America and the region. In this respect, the diaspora can become vital intermediaries for advancing U.S. and Canada’s business interests abroad. Promoting business diplomacy can both benefit the MENA region and be an effective and positive way to advance engagement and achieve foreign policy goals of the North Atlantic.
This panel will investigate the trade and investment opportunities in the Middle East, discuss how facilitating economic engagement with the region can benefit Canadian and American national interests, and explore relevant policy prescriptions.
Panelists:
– Hon. Sergio Marchi: Canada’s Former Minister of International Trade
– Scott Jolliffe: Chairperson, Canada Arab Business Council
– Esfandyar Batmanghelidj: Founder and Publisher of Bourse & Bazaar
– Nizar Ghanem: Director of Research and Co-founder at Triangle
– Nicki Siamaki: Researcher at Control Risks
The Middle East continues to grapple with violence and instability, particularly in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Fueled by government incompetence and foreign interventions, terrorist insurgencies have imposed severe humanitarian and economic costs on the region. Meanwhile, regional actors have engaged in an unprecedented pursuit of arms accumulation. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have imported billions of both Western and Russian-made weapons and funded militant groups across the region, intending to contain their regional adversaries, particularly Iran. Tehran has also provided sophisticated weaponry to various militia groups across the region to strengthen its geopolitical position against Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Israel.
On the other hand, with international terrorist networks and intense regional rivalry in the Middle East, it is impractical to discuss peace and security without addressing terrorism and the arms race in the region. This panel will primarily discuss the implications of the ongoing arms race in the region and the role of Western powers and multilateral organizations in facilitating trust-building security arrangements among regional stakeholders to limit the proliferation of arms across the Middle East.
Panelists:
Luciano Zaccara: Assistant Professor, Qatar University
Dania Thafer: Executive Director, Gulf International Forum
Kayhan Barzegar: Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Science and Research Branch of Azad University
Barbara Slavin: Director of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council
Sanam Shantyaei: Senior Journalist at France24 & host of Middle East Matters
The emerging regional order in West Asia will have wide-ranging implications for global security. The Biden administration has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier, an initiative staunchly opposed by Israel, while also taking a harder line on Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen. Meanwhile, key regional actors, including Qatar, Iraq, and Oman, have engaged in backchannel efforts to bring Iran and Saudi Arabia to the negotiating table. From a broader geopolitical perspective, with the need to secure its energy imports, China is also expected to increase its footprint in the region and influence the mentioned challenges.
In this evolving landscape, Western powers will be compelled to redefine their strategic priorities and adjust their policies with the new realities in the region. In this panel, we will discuss how the West, including the United States and its allies, can utilize multilateral diplomacy with its adversaries to prevent military escalation in the region. Most importantly, the panel will discuss if a multilateral security dialogue in the Persian Gulf region, proposed by some regional actors, can help reduce tensions among regional foes and produce sustainable peace and development for the region.
Panelists:
– Abdullah Baabood: Academic Researcher and Former Director of the Centre for Gulf Studies, Qatar University
– Trita Parsi: Executive Vice-President, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
– Ebtesam Al-Ketbi: President, Emirates Policy Centre
– Jon Allen: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Israel
– Elizabeth Hagedorn: Washington correspondent for Al-Monitor
Military interventions, political and economic instabilities, and civil unrest in the Middle East have led to a global refugee crisis with an increasing wave of refugees and asylum seekers to Europe and Canada. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has, in myriad ways, exacerbated and contributed to the ongoing security threats and destabilization of the region.
While these challenges pose serious risks to Canadian security, Ottawa will also have the opportunity to limit such risks and prevent a spillover effect vis-à-vis effective humanitarian initiatives in the region. In this panel, we will primarily investigate Canada’s Middle East Strategy’s degree of success in providing humanitarian aid to the region. Secondly, the panel will discuss what programs and initiatives Canada can introduce to further build on the renewed strategy. and more specifically, how Canada can utilize its policy instruments to more effectively deal with the increasing influx of refugees from the Middle East.
Panelists:
Erica Di Ruggiero: Director of Centre for Global Health, University of Toronto
Reyhana Patel: Head of Communications & Government Relations, Islamic Relief Canada
Amir Barmaki: Former Head of UN OCHA in Iran
Catherine Gribbin: Senior Legal Advisor for International and Humanitarian Law, Canadian Red Cross
In 2016, Canada launched an ambitious five-year “Middle East Engagement Strategy” (2016-2021), committing to investing CA$3.5 billion over five years to help establish the necessary conditions for security and stability, alleviate human suffering and enable stabilization programs in the region. In the latest development, during the meeting of the Global Coalition against ISIS, Minister of Foreign Affairs Marc Garneau announced more than $43.6 million in Peace and Stabilization Operations Program funding for 11 projects in Syria and Iraq.
With Canada’s Middle East Engagement Strategy expiring this year, it is time to examine and evaluate this massive investment in the Middle East region in the past five years. More importantly, the panel will discuss a principled and strategic roadmap for the future of Canada’s short-term and long-term engagement in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Ferry de Kerckhove: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Egypt
– Dennis Horak: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
– Chris Kilford: Former Canadian Defence Attaché in Turkey, member of the national board of the Canadian International Council (CIC)
– David Dewitt: University Professor Emeritus, York University
While the United States continues to pull back from certain regional conflicts, reflected by the Biden administration’s decision to halt American backing for Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen and the expected withdrawal from Afghanistan, US troops continue to be stationed across the region. Meanwhile, Russia and China have significantly maintained and even expanded their regional activities. On one hand, the Kremlin has maintained its military presence in Syria, and on the other hand, China has signed an unprecedented 25-year strategic agreement with Iran.
As the global power structure continues to shift, it is essential to analyze the future of the US regional presence under the Biden administration, explore the emerging global rivalry with Russia and China, and at last, investigate the implications of such competition for peace and security in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Dmitri Trenin: Director of Carnegie Moscow Center
– Joost R. Hiltermann: Director of MENA Programme, International Crisis Group
– Roxane Farmanfarmaian: Affiliated Lecturer in International Relations of the Middle East and North Africa, University of Cambridge
– Andrew A. Michta: Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at Marshall Center
– Kelley Vlahos: Senior Advisor, Quincy Institute
The security architecture of the Middle East has undergone rapid transformations in an exceptionally short period. Notable developments include the United States gradual withdrawal from the region, rapprochement between Israel and some GCC states through the Abraham Accords and the rise of Chinese and Russian regional engagement.
With these new trends in the Middle East, it is timely to investigate the security implications of the Biden administration’s Middle East policy. In this respect, we will discuss the Biden team’s new approach vis-à-vis Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The panel will also discuss the role of other major powers, including China and Russia in shaping this new security environment in the region, and how the Biden administration will respond to these powers’ increasing regional presence.
Panelists:
– Sanam Vakil: Deputy Director of MENA Programme at Chatham House
– Denise Natali: Acting Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies & Director of the Center for Strategic Research, National Defense University
– Hassan Ahmadian: Professor of the Middle East and North Africa Studies, University of Tehran
– Abdulaziz Sagar: Chairman, Gulf Research Center
– Andrew Parasiliti: President, Al-Monitor
