Key Takeaways
For decades, China’s rise has been a subject of intense debate and speculation, particularly regarding its intentions on the global stage. Some observers argue that China is on a path to dominate the world, seeking to replace the United States as the global hegemon. However, a closer examination of China’s actions, strategies, and diplomatic postures reveals a more nuanced picture: China is not primarily seeking global domination. Instead, it is focused on undermining American hegemony and promoting a multi-nodal world order within the existing “rules-based” paradigm, where power is distributed among several global powers. By understanding China’s true intentions, we can better grasp the evolving dynamics of international relations and formulate more effective strategic responses from the United States.
Ultimately, China’s grand strategy can be understood through a sober analysis of its actions and capabilities across multiple regions and domains. First, the PRC does not yet have the capability to overthrow American hegemony through head-on competition. Second, China’s actions are geared toward diluting U.S. dominance and fostering a more balanced global order. This strategy includes fostering multi-alignment — a diplomatic approach that encourages countries to maintain cooperative relations with multiple major powers rather than aligning strictly with one. This multi-alignment strategy is evident in key regions such as the Middle East, East Asia, and Europe, as well as in global governance institutions like the United Nations.
At the core of this strategy lies China’s desire to create a geopolitical environment that is more conducive to its rise and interests. China seeks to shape a global order that reflects its priorities and values without triggering either direct or by-proxy confrontation with the United States. This approach enables China to expand its influence while avoiding the risks associated with outright hegemonic ambitions.
A nation’s strategy must fundamentally reflect its power level and be adapted to the resources at its disposal. China’s grand strategy is constrained by its power projection ability relative to the United States and the rest of the world. Moreover, China has actively made understanding these dynamics a key component of its strategic decision-making. Measures of “Comprehensive National Power” (CNP, 综合国力) are a critical part of the Chinese international policymaking framework, and most estimates place American power above that of the PRC. These indicators suggest that China is not only bound by the limits of its power but that its policymakers actively take these limitations into account. If China remains weaker than the United States in terms of CNP, it follows that the PRC is more likely to rely on indirect influence and limited competition rather than attempting to provoke direct hegemonic conflict with Washington. A critical analysis of China’s power base and capabilities supports this conclusion.
Although China’s economy has achieved aggregate parity with the United States in recent years, it faces two critical obstacles to sustained growth. The first is demographic. Up until recently, China’s human capital development has been driven by the “demographic dividend” of the one-child policy. Until the mid-2010s, a high proportion of working-age individuals compared to the entire population drove unprecedented economic growth. Yet this demographic dividend provides only temporary boosts to productivity. China’s declining population effectively spells the end for a development strategy based on the demographic dividend. The early generations affected by the one-child policy will soon retire, becoming dependents rather than contributors to economic productivity. Meanwhile, their children, raised in a culture that normalized having a single child, are making similar reproductive choices. In many regions, the population pyramid has inverted, with a single grandchild supporting two aging parents and four grandparents — a phenomenon known as the “4-2-1” trap. This demographic shift will place significant strain on the PRC’s tax base and welfare programs, constraining economic growth.
Second, China faces a “middle-income trap” as it attempts to transition to a modern service-based economy. Due to its declining population and rising wages, China’s comparative advantage in manufacturing has eroded. Many industries once dominated by the PRC (such as textiles and electronics assembly) have relocated to countries with lower labor costs. Some estimates suggest that China may have already reached the Lewis Turning Point — the stage at which labor surplus turns into labor shortage. The COVID-19 pandemic and trade tensions with the United States have further disrupted the supply chains critical to Chinese industry. A shrinking export sector will accelerate the need for China to transition to a service- and innovation-driven economy.
Despite a rapid and expensive modernization effort, China’s military continues to lag behind that of the United States. Xi Jinping has set a target of 2035 for full military modernization. But even if achieved, gaps in doctrine and training will persist. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the PLA lacks significant combat experience and institutional knowledge, which weakens both its military effectiveness and the credibility of its deterrence.
China’s military influence is largely confined to its immediate periphery. Most contemporary assessments, such as RAND’s US-China scorecard, note that “Chinese [military] power diminishes rapidly across even relatively modest distances.” The U.S. Department of Defense’s 2023 Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China also notes that “The PLA’s ability to perform missions beyond the FIC (First Island Chain) is modest but growing as it gains more experience operating in distant waters and acquires larger and more advanced platforms.” While China may have the capability to successfully wage a regional conflict against the United States in its near abroad, it currently lacks the ability to project military force on a global scale, as one would expect of a burgeoning great power.
Finally, China lacks the normative weight and soft power of the United States, which has played a leading role in shaping the global order since 1945 and has been the world’s sole superpower since 1991. America’s liberal values have become the default norms behind the “rules” of the current international order, influencing not only state behavior on the world stage but also domestic economic policies and governance structures. Before these norms can be replaced, they must first be displaced. To this end, the PRC is pursuing a dual strategy: working within existing institutions while simultaneously attempting to create its own.
Ultimately, all the aforementioned realities mean that, barring a cataclysmic “overturning of the board” akin to the Napoleonic or World Wars, the PRC will struggle to impose a new world order at the expense of the United States. At present, China hardly possesses the necessary military capability to even sustain a hegemonic conflict, much less prevail in one. These limitations shape the policy choices available to China’s leadership and are therefore crucial to understanding the grand strategy of the PRC.
Next, we must examine the PRC’s current policies, focusing on Chinese efforts in Afro-Eurasia. While China has made significant investments in South America in recent years, its financial, military, and diplomatic actions have demonstrated a clear strategic focus on the Old World. This is most evident in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which stretches from China across the Middle East to Europe. Thus, this primer will concentrate on those regions that Beijing has strategically prioritized.
China’s foreign policy has been most assertive in East Asia, particularly in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. Viewing the region as its immediate sphere of influence, China seeks to challenge the U.S.-led security architecture that has shaped the region since the end of World War II.
Beijing has pursued a two-pronged strategy of economic integration and military modernization to expand its influence and challenge U.S. presence in East and Southeast Asia. Economically, China has leveraged its market size and investment capabilities to strengthen regional ties. Through initiatives like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the BRI, China has deepened economic linkages that could deter neighboring states from aligning too closely with the United States. This strategy has been particularly effective in Southeast Asia, where many countries are reluctant to choose sides between Washington and Beijing, preferring instead to engage with both powers.
On the security front, China has significantly modernized its military, particularly its navy and missile forces, to deter U.S. intervention in regional conflicts. It has invested heavily in Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities designed to constrain American freedom of maneuver in a potential Pacific conflict. China’s militarized posture in the South China Sea, including the construction of artificial islands and the deployment of military assets on disputed areas, aims to assert territorial claims and counter U.S. freedom of navigation operations.
These actions have heightened tensions with both neighboring states and the United States reflecting China’s broader strategy to weaken U.S. alliances and partnerships in the region. However, China’s increasing assertiveness has also alienated potential regional partners, incentivizing them to deepen security cooperation with Washington. If this trend persists, Asian states will likely strengthen their security ties with both the U.S. and one another to counterbalance Beijing.
Despite its assertiveness, China does not seek outright regional dominance. Beijing maintains strong trade relations with India and Japan and has not displaced American influence in the Pacific. Recognizing that overt aggression could provoke a robust counter-response from the U.S. and its allies, China instead aims to gradually shift the regional balance of power in its favor by reducing American influence while expanding its own strategic space.
China’s increasing involvement in the Middle East is primarily driven by its energy needs and economic interests. The region is central to Beijing’s economic strategy as a critical source of oil and gas essential for China’s continued growth. However, rather than seeking military or political dominance, China has prioritized economic ties and infrastructure investments, particularly in ports and energy facilities, under the BRI. This pragmatic approach allows China to secure its energy supplies while avoiding the entanglements and costs associated with a heavy military footprint.
China has positioned itself as a neutral actor, engaging with all major regional players, including Saudi Arabia, Iran, Israel, and Egypt. Unlike the United States, which has often pursued interventionist policies, China has avoided direct involvement in regional conflicts, instead leveraging economic partnerships and diplomatic engagement to enhance its influence in a non-ideological manner. Concurrently, it has adopted a shrewd “wedging” strategy seeking to exploit any geopolitical or ideological rifts between the U.S. and its regional partners to further its own interests. This approach has enhanced China’s influence in the region, as it is seen as a reliable economic partner that, unlike the Global West, refrains from imposing political conditions or interfering in the domestic affairs of its partners.
Beijing’s balanced approach is particularly evident in its simultaneous engagement with Saudi Arabia and Iran despite their longstanding rivalry. This strategy enables China to position itself as a mediator while expanding its diplomatic clout and limiting U.S. influence in the region. By promoting multi-alignment rather than a hegemonic or zero-sum approach like the Global West, China seeks to gradually erode American dominance while maximizing its own strategic leverage in the Middle East.
Beijing’s European strategy has prioritized economic engagement while deliberately avoiding political and security entanglements that could provoke opposition from European capitals or Washington. China has invested in European infrastructure, including ports, railways, and telecommunications while cultivating bilateral trade relations with many European countries.
This economic strategy is driven by three key objectives. First, Europe represents a major market for Chinese goods and services, providing opportunities for economic diversification and reducing its dependence on the United States. Second, by investing in European infrastructure and technology, China gains access to advanced capabilities that bolster its own economic and technological development. Third, by forging economic partnerships in Europe, China aims to weaken transatlantic unity, particularly on contentious issues such as trade and human rights. Beijing has also targeted investment toward Eastern Europe, capitalizing on economic disparities and weaker institutional constraints in comparison to Western Europe.
Despite its careful approach, China faces growing European skepticism over unfair trade practices, human rights concerns, and cybersecurity threats. Nonetheless, by prioritizing economic engagement while steering clear of political entanglements, China continues to cultivate partnerships that could serve as a counterweight to U.S. influence in Europe, especially in a more multipolar context that will increasingly compel European nations to reclaim their strategic autonomy from Washington.
Among the regions where China’s strategy of eroding American influence is most evident, Africa stands out. The PRC has cultivated longstanding relationships with many African nations, dating back to Mao’s designation of Africa as the “First Intermediate Zone”. Beijing has traditionally framed its African engagement through a shared anti-colonial narrative, emphasizing the principle of non-interference. African states played a pivotal role in the PRC’s recognition at the United Nations, representing nine of the 17 member states that provided the initial backing for its ascension to the Security Council in place of the Republic of China (ROC).
Africa exemplifies a mature iteration of China’s global strategy. While African nations generally uphold the U.S.-led international order, China wields considerable economic and consultative influence over them, with many African governments aligning with Beijing on matters of global governance and international organizations. Institutions like the African Union and the China-led Southern African Development Community serve as instruments of China’s broader strategy to gradually displace U.S. influence in the region.
As alluded to above, China’s challenge to U.S. global hegemony extends beyond regional strategies and is particularly evident in its approach to global governance. Beijing has become increasingly assertive in international organizations such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), where it seeks to reshape global norms and standards in alignment with its interests. This includes advocating for de-dollarization and reinforcing the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states.
China’s growing influence within these institutions is part of a broader effort to create an international environment less susceptible to unilateral U.S. action and more conducive to a polycentric world order. This strategy capitalizes on widespread resentment among peripheral states toward the U.S.-led postwar international order. However, this should not be mistaken for a diplomatic crusade to promote a universally applicable, and ideologically inflected, Chinese model. Rather, China’s approach is pragmatic and ideologically neutral, appealing primarily to states dissatisfied with Washington’s universalist, if self-righteous, prescriptions for governance — based on its parochial neoliberal or “democratist” models. In any case, the PRC has repeatedly demonstrated its transactional approach, willing to collaborate with all types of regimes, including democratic and capitalist ones, when strategic interests align.
For instance, China’s endorsement of sovereignty and non-interference to push back against Western criticism of its domestic policies also resonates with elites in many developing countries, who oppose the imposition of neoliberal policies by Western-led global institutions like the World Bank and the IMF. This dynamic, described by Salvador Regilme and Henrik Hartmann of Leiden University as “mutual delegitimization”, should not be seen as an attempt to impose Chinese values but rather as an effort to challenge the universality of American-led norms.
In tandem with this diplomatic push, China has increased its financial contributions to international institutions to raise its influence while promoting the yuan’s use in global trade and finance, thus offering an alternative to U.S. financial hegemony. These initiatives do not aim to replace existing global institutions outright; rather, they serve to decentralize their authority and dilute American dominance within the system.
Ultimately, China’s approach to global governance is not about dismantling the existing international order but about replacing its universalist values with a pluralistic framework that would better accommodate its own interests and those of emerging middle powers. By reducing the influence of U.S.-dominated institutions over global norms and policies, China seeks to foster a more balanced international order where no single power holds absolute sway. This strategy enables Beijing to expand its global influence without directly confronting Washington.
The period following the Cold War, often referred to as the “unipolar moment”, was characterized by unrivaled U.S. dominance in global affairs. During this time, the United States wielded unprecedented military, economic, and diplomatic influence, enabling it to shape the international order according to its interests and values. However, with this era of unipolarity now drawing to a close, China and other emerging middle and civilizational powers — such as Russia, India, Turkey, and Brazil — are determined to reshape the global order to better reflect the realities of a polycentric system.
The shift toward polycentrism is driven by several key factors. First, the relative decline of U.S. power — both economically and militarily — has created opportunities for other states to expand their influence. Second, the growing economic and strategic capabilities of rising powers like China, Russia, and India have enabled them to play a more assertive role in global affairs, especially in their own regions. Third, the increasing complexity and regionalization of the global economy have made it more difficult for any single power to dominate.
For China, advancing new global norms based on polycentrism and multi-alignment is a strategic imperative. This approach allows Beijing to expand its global influence while mitigating the risks associated with directly challenging U.S. primacy. By fostering a more balanced distribution of power, China aims to cultivate a global geopolitical landscape that is more conducive to its rise and less susceptible to hegemonic domination.
China’s grand strategy objective is not global hegemony. As such, Beijing is not driven by the logic of “great power competition” such as Washington is. Instead, China seeks to incrementally diminish U.S. influence and shape an order where no single power dictates the rules, norms, or institutions of global governance unilaterally. Through multi-alignment and the strategic application of its economic and diplomatic tools, China seeks to position itself as an alternative partner — and architect of a competing vision of international order — for nations disillusioned with U.S. policies. In doing so, Beijing advances an alternative to the U.S.-led world order that better aligns with its long-term interests.
Understanding China’s strategy has significant implications for U.S. policy. Rather than attempting to “contain” China as it did with the Soviet Union, Washington should adopt a strategy of balancing and blunting.
Balancing entails maintaining a robust network of alliances and partnerships, particularly in Asia, to counteract China’s growing influence. This approach requires the United States to deepen its engagement with key allies such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, and India, while also cultivating closer ties with Southeast Asian nations to construct a more resilient and inclusive regional security architecture. Given the fact that many of these states perceive China as a more immediate threat than the distant United States, Washington must both prioritize its bilateral defense relationships in the region and strengthen intra-regional security partnerships. This dual strategy empowers local actors — especially middle powers like Japan — to be viable security partners rather than acquiescent vassals, and share the burden of counterbalancing China’s power without necessitating an overwhelming U.S. military presence.
Blunting, by contrast, aims to limit China’s ability to use its economic and military power coercively, without seeking to stifle its growth or isolate it diplomatically. In contrast with containment, this approach acknowledges the irreversible nature of China’s rise and focuses instead on shaping Beijing’s behavior rather than attempting to halt its ascent.
Blunting could involve initiatives such as enhancing U.S. economic competitiveness, investing in emerging technologies, and bolstering U.S. military capabilities to more effectively deter China’s more assertive actions. Crucially, this strategy requires a degree of strategic empathy and an acceptance of China’s role as a near-peer power — allowing it certain privileges comparable to those Washington claims for itself, including a sphere of influence in its immediate neighborhood. However, even a blunting strategy has its red lines: if China were to act aggressively and threaten key strategic nodes, such as Japan, the United States must be prepared to respond with decisive force. By simultaneously mitigating escalation risks and making aggression an unattractive option for Beijing, a blunting strategy can serve as an effective deterrent to conflict.
Finally, the United States should engage with China in areas of mutual interest, such as arms control, Middle Eastern stability, and nuclear non-proliferation, where cooperation is essential for addressing transnational challenges. By identifying shared priorities and fostering dialogue, Washington can reduce tensions and cultivate a more stable and constructive relationship with Beijing.
The concept of a “Cold War 2.0” with China is not only a flawed analogy but also a dangerous one. It oversimplifies the complexities of U.S.-China relations and risks escalating tensions unnecessarily. Unlike the Cold War, where the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in a global ideological struggle with little to no economic interdependence, the U.S. and China are deeply intertwined across economic, social, and cultural domains. A new Cold War mindset would ignore these interdependencies and could lead to self-defeating policies that damage both countries while destabilizing the global economy.
Unlike the Soviet Union during the Cold War, China is not an isolated adversary but one that is deeply integrated in the global economy, having pursued a strategy of engagement rather than outright confrontation. The Cold War analogy suggests a binary world order of two antagonistic blocs, which does not accurately reflect the complex reality of today’s increasingly polycentric global system.
Moreover, the ideological dimensions that made the Cold War unique are largely absent in the current competition. Unlike the USSR or even the early days of the PRC, modern China does not intend to export Communist ideology, foment revolution, or install ideologically aligned regimes around the world. Instead, its approach is rooted in classical power politics rather than missionary activity or ideological proselytization — Beijing readily cooperates with capitalist and even theocratic governments when it serves its interests. The implied ideological baggage and ontological imprints of a “Cold War II” framing risks encouraging American overreach, not to mention a counterproductive Manichaean mindset that rewards escalatory saber-rattling and hawkishness.
Finally, a “Cold War II” narrative risks alienating U.S. allies and partners, many of whom have deep economic ties with China already and are reluctant to choose sides. These countries are more likely to support a U.S. strategy that emphasizes strategic balancing and pragmatic engagement rather than containment and confrontation — one that enables them to adopt multi-aligned strategies in pursuit of their own national interests. By avoiding the Cold War framework, the United States can work more effectively with its allies and partners to address shared concerns about China’s behavior while reducing the risk of unnecessary escalation or conflict.
China’s grand strategy is not about global domination but about fostering a more balanced international order where U.S. hegemony is diluted. By promoting multi-alignment and leveraging its economic and diplomatic power, Beijing aims to cement the end of the unipolar moment and accelerate the ongoing shift to a polycentric global system.
For Washington, the challenge is not to contain China but to adapt to this structural reality by adopting a highly targeted and precisely calibrated strategy of balancing and blunting. While the United States must learn to coexist peacefully alongside a powerful China, it should still strategically reinforce regional security in East Asia and the Pacific to hedge against potential Chinese primacy by supporting a carefully selected network of resilient middle powers with formidable national defense capacity — such as Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, and India. Washington should only step in as a last-resort backstop against major Chinese aggression toward these regional partners.
Ultimately, U.S. strategy should always encourage and empower its friends and allies to be capable partners willing to defend their own interests, not turn them into meek and dependent vassals with little stake in their own national security. By recognizing the nuances of China’s grand strategy and the inherent flaws of its conventional alliance strategy, the United States can more astutely navigate the challenges of the 21st century and secure its interests in an increasingly polycentric world.
As the United States grapples with China’s rise, it must move beyond outdated paradigms and develop a disciplined and pragmatic grand strategy that reflects the fluid and evolving realities of today’s shifting global order. A balanced, prudent approach integrating selective engagement and strategic cooperation with competition and offshore balancing will enable Washington to manage its relationship with Beijing more effectively — ensuring a stable and prosperous future for all while safeguarding America’s core national interests in a rapidly changing global geopolitical landscape.
The Western powers have failed to effectively manage the increasing threat of proliferation in the Middle East. While the international community is concerned with Iran’s nuclear program, Saudi Arabia has moved forward with developing its own nuclear program, and independent studies show that Israel has longed possessed dozens of nuclear warheads. The former is a member of the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while the latter has refused to sign the international agreement.
On Middle East policy, the Biden campaign had staunchly criticized the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal and it has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier since assuming office in January 2021. However, serious obstacles remain for responsible actors in expanding non-proliferation efforts toward a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.
This panel will discuss how Western powers and multilateral institutions, such as the IAEA, can play a more effective role in managing non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Peggy Mason: Canada’s former Ambassador to the UN for Disarmament
– Mark Fitzpatrick: Associate Fellow & Former Executive Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
– Ali Vaez: Iran Project Director, International Crisis Group
– Negar Mortazavi: Journalist and Political Analyst, Host of Iran Podcast
– David Albright: Founder and President of the Institute for Science and International Security
Closing (5:45 PM – 6:00 PM ET)
What is the current economic landscape in the Middle East? While global foreign direct investment is expected to fall drastically in the post-COVID era, the World Bank reported a 5% contraction in the economic output of the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries in 2020 due to the pandemic. While oil prices are expected to rebound with normalization in demand, political instability, regional and geopolitical tensions, domestic corruption, and a volatile regulatory and legal environment all threaten economic recovery in the Middle East. What is the prospect for economic growth and development in the region post-pandemic, and how could MENA nations promote sustainable growth and regional trade moving forward?
At the same time, Middle Eastern diaspora communities have become financially successful and can help promote trade between North America and the region. In this respect, the diaspora can become vital intermediaries for advancing U.S. and Canada’s business interests abroad. Promoting business diplomacy can both benefit the MENA region and be an effective and positive way to advance engagement and achieve foreign policy goals of the North Atlantic.
This panel will investigate the trade and investment opportunities in the Middle East, discuss how facilitating economic engagement with the region can benefit Canadian and American national interests, and explore relevant policy prescriptions.
Panelists:
– Hon. Sergio Marchi: Canada’s Former Minister of International Trade
– Scott Jolliffe: Chairperson, Canada Arab Business Council
– Esfandyar Batmanghelidj: Founder and Publisher of Bourse & Bazaar
– Nizar Ghanem: Director of Research and Co-founder at Triangle
– Nicki Siamaki: Researcher at Control Risks
The Middle East continues to grapple with violence and instability, particularly in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Fueled by government incompetence and foreign interventions, terrorist insurgencies have imposed severe humanitarian and economic costs on the region. Meanwhile, regional actors have engaged in an unprecedented pursuit of arms accumulation. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have imported billions of both Western and Russian-made weapons and funded militant groups across the region, intending to contain their regional adversaries, particularly Iran. Tehran has also provided sophisticated weaponry to various militia groups across the region to strengthen its geopolitical position against Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Israel.
On the other hand, with international terrorist networks and intense regional rivalry in the Middle East, it is impractical to discuss peace and security without addressing terrorism and the arms race in the region. This panel will primarily discuss the implications of the ongoing arms race in the region and the role of Western powers and multilateral organizations in facilitating trust-building security arrangements among regional stakeholders to limit the proliferation of arms across the Middle East.
Panelists:
Luciano Zaccara: Assistant Professor, Qatar University
Dania Thafer: Executive Director, Gulf International Forum
Kayhan Barzegar: Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Science and Research Branch of Azad University
Barbara Slavin: Director of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council
Sanam Shantyaei: Senior Journalist at France24 & host of Middle East Matters
The emerging regional order in West Asia will have wide-ranging implications for global security. The Biden administration has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier, an initiative staunchly opposed by Israel, while also taking a harder line on Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen. Meanwhile, key regional actors, including Qatar, Iraq, and Oman, have engaged in backchannel efforts to bring Iran and Saudi Arabia to the negotiating table. From a broader geopolitical perspective, with the need to secure its energy imports, China is also expected to increase its footprint in the region and influence the mentioned challenges.
In this evolving landscape, Western powers will be compelled to redefine their strategic priorities and adjust their policies with the new realities in the region. In this panel, we will discuss how the West, including the United States and its allies, can utilize multilateral diplomacy with its adversaries to prevent military escalation in the region. Most importantly, the panel will discuss if a multilateral security dialogue in the Persian Gulf region, proposed by some regional actors, can help reduce tensions among regional foes and produce sustainable peace and development for the region.
Panelists:
– Abdullah Baabood: Academic Researcher and Former Director of the Centre for Gulf Studies, Qatar University
– Trita Parsi: Executive Vice-President, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
– Ebtesam Al-Ketbi: President, Emirates Policy Centre
– Jon Allen: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Israel
– Elizabeth Hagedorn: Washington correspondent for Al-Monitor
Military interventions, political and economic instabilities, and civil unrest in the Middle East have led to a global refugee crisis with an increasing wave of refugees and asylum seekers to Europe and Canada. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has, in myriad ways, exacerbated and contributed to the ongoing security threats and destabilization of the region.
While these challenges pose serious risks to Canadian security, Ottawa will also have the opportunity to limit such risks and prevent a spillover effect vis-à-vis effective humanitarian initiatives in the region. In this panel, we will primarily investigate Canada’s Middle East Strategy’s degree of success in providing humanitarian aid to the region. Secondly, the panel will discuss what programs and initiatives Canada can introduce to further build on the renewed strategy. and more specifically, how Canada can utilize its policy instruments to more effectively deal with the increasing influx of refugees from the Middle East.
Panelists:
Erica Di Ruggiero: Director of Centre for Global Health, University of Toronto
Reyhana Patel: Head of Communications & Government Relations, Islamic Relief Canada
Amir Barmaki: Former Head of UN OCHA in Iran
Catherine Gribbin: Senior Legal Advisor for International and Humanitarian Law, Canadian Red Cross
In 2016, Canada launched an ambitious five-year “Middle East Engagement Strategy” (2016-2021), committing to investing CA$3.5 billion over five years to help establish the necessary conditions for security and stability, alleviate human suffering and enable stabilization programs in the region. In the latest development, during the meeting of the Global Coalition against ISIS, Minister of Foreign Affairs Marc Garneau announced more than $43.6 million in Peace and Stabilization Operations Program funding for 11 projects in Syria and Iraq.
With Canada’s Middle East Engagement Strategy expiring this year, it is time to examine and evaluate this massive investment in the Middle East region in the past five years. More importantly, the panel will discuss a principled and strategic roadmap for the future of Canada’s short-term and long-term engagement in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Ferry de Kerckhove: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Egypt
– Dennis Horak: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
– Chris Kilford: Former Canadian Defence Attaché in Turkey, member of the national board of the Canadian International Council (CIC)
– David Dewitt: University Professor Emeritus, York University
While the United States continues to pull back from certain regional conflicts, reflected by the Biden administration’s decision to halt American backing for Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen and the expected withdrawal from Afghanistan, US troops continue to be stationed across the region. Meanwhile, Russia and China have significantly maintained and even expanded their regional activities. On one hand, the Kremlin has maintained its military presence in Syria, and on the other hand, China has signed an unprecedented 25-year strategic agreement with Iran.
As the global power structure continues to shift, it is essential to analyze the future of the US regional presence under the Biden administration, explore the emerging global rivalry with Russia and China, and at last, investigate the implications of such competition for peace and security in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Dmitri Trenin: Director of Carnegie Moscow Center
– Joost R. Hiltermann: Director of MENA Programme, International Crisis Group
– Roxane Farmanfarmaian: Affiliated Lecturer in International Relations of the Middle East and North Africa, University of Cambridge
– Andrew A. Michta: Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at Marshall Center
– Kelley Vlahos: Senior Advisor, Quincy Institute
The security architecture of the Middle East has undergone rapid transformations in an exceptionally short period. Notable developments include the United States gradual withdrawal from the region, rapprochement between Israel and some GCC states through the Abraham Accords and the rise of Chinese and Russian regional engagement.
With these new trends in the Middle East, it is timely to investigate the security implications of the Biden administration’s Middle East policy. In this respect, we will discuss the Biden team’s new approach vis-à-vis Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The panel will also discuss the role of other major powers, including China and Russia in shaping this new security environment in the region, and how the Biden administration will respond to these powers’ increasing regional presence.
Panelists:
– Sanam Vakil: Deputy Director of MENA Programme at Chatham House
– Denise Natali: Acting Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies & Director of the Center for Strategic Research, National Defense University
– Hassan Ahmadian: Professor of the Middle East and North Africa Studies, University of Tehran
– Abdulaziz Sagar: Chairman, Gulf Research Center
– Andrew Parasiliti: President, Al-Monitor
