Executive Summary
China has significantly expanded its influence in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) as Western dominance declines, leveraging economic investments, diplomatic engagement, and strategic partnerships. Through bilateral ties, multilateral platforms like BRICS and the SCO, and major infrastructure and energy deals, China has positioned itself as a key external power in the region. Its pragmatic, non-interventionist approach, combined with support for Palestinian causes, has strengthened its appeal, particularly as Western backing of Israel erodes trust in the U.S. and Europe. As MENA states seek greater autonomy and diversify partnerships, China’s rise poses a direct challenge to traditional Western influence, reshaping the geopolitical landscape in its favor.
Under President Xi Jinping, China has made significant inroads in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) at a time when Western states have seen their influence wane across the region. Consequently, an increasing number of MENA states view China as an alternative great power — one without the baggage of colonial history or a legacy of military intervention and regime change. The implications for the strategic posture of the United States and European states in MENA are profound.
China’s political and economic rise in the Middle East and North Africa is neither accidental nor merely a byproduct of declining Western influence. Rather, Beijing’s current strategic position in MENA is the result of over a decade of deliberate policy planning and implementation. Beginning in 2011, Chinese scholars and policy analysts advocated for a more structured and multi-layered engagement with the MENA region to advance China’s foreign and domestic national interests. Analyzing China’s policies over the past decade reveals that the country’s leadership internalized these scholarly debates and shaped its MENA strategy accordingly.
The consequence has been a deeper Chinese presence across the Arab and Muslim worlds, from Morocco to Iran. Indeed, recent polling on elite and public opinion in MENA states–outlined in detail below– indicate that China has emerged as a highly valued and respected major power. Much of this growing support stems from Beijing’s multi-dimensional strategic approach, which includes forging extensive bilateral ties with all MENA states, engaging through multilateral platforms such as the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum, and integrating its MENA policy with China’s flagship foreign policy initiatives, including BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
China’s support for a ceasefire in Gaza and its alignment with Arab and Muslim perspectives on Palestinian solidarity has further bolstered its status in MENA. In contrast, many in the region perceive Western governments as hypocritical due to their continued unconditional support for Israel. However, it is crucial to understand China’s backing of Palestine not as a mere opportunistic maneuver but as part of a broader long-term strategy. This strategy links China’s engagement with the Arab and Muslim worlds to its domestic policies, particularly regarding its Muslim population and governance in Xinjiang.
From this perspective, the challenge that China presents to U.S. and European influence in MENA is more profound than much of Western commentary suggests. The depth and sustainability of Beijing’s approach indicate that China is better positioned to achieve medium- to long-term gains in the region, while Washington and Brussels struggle with foreign policies that are comparatively under-resourced and less inclusive. If the U.S. and Europe seek to maintain their influence in MENA, they must develop a clearer understanding of China’s strategy and recalibrate their policies accordingly.
Chinese academic discourse on MENA (zhongdong beifei) began in earnest in 2011, largely in response to the Arab Spring and the Global Financial Crisis — two events that Chinese analysts believed had the potential to profoundly reshape the region’s “political ecology.” A central theme in these early writings was that MENA societies were becoming increasingly anti-Western as they reflected on the destabilizing legacies of European colonialism, American militarism, Western-led democratization efforts, and continued support for Israel.
Rather than progressing toward a fourth wave of democratization, MENA states were instead becoming more nationalistic and autocratic, creating opportunities for China to expand its influence. China’s state-led economic model and its relative lack of historical entanglements in the region were seen as advantages that Beijing could leverage to deepen its relationships with MENA states, many of which were experimenting with their own forms of state-directed capitalism. For Chinese strategic thinkers, the instability that characterized MENA from the 2010s to the 2020s presented an opening — provided that China could implement a calibrated engagement strategy and position itself as a viable alternative to the Western-imposed order.
The strategic benefits of deeper Chinese engagement across MENA — particularly with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Iran — were clear. At the most fundamental level, MENA’s geopolitical centrality made it a key arena for great power competition. Chinese analysts recognized that for China to compete effectively with other major powers, particularly the United States, it needed a stronger presence in both the Middle East and North Africa. Additionally, China could benefit from stronger economic ties with MENA’s emerging economies, providing a counterbalance to its relations with the West. This engagement strategy also marked an early instance of China’s broader diplomatic outreach to the non-Western world, a defining feature of its contemporary foreign policy.
Another major concern for Chinese policymakers was the security and protection of its growing overseas assets and citizens. The 2011 evacuation of Chinese nationals from Libya, which proved challenging for Beijing, underscored the need for a stronger on-the-ground presence in MENA. Consequently, some Chinese scholars advocated for establishing maritime supply hubs in the Persian Gulf and North Africa — akin to China’s “string of pearls” (zhenzhu lian shi) strategy in the Indo-Pacific. Discussions also emerged around potential military bases in strategic locations such as Oman, Syria, and Qatar.
Energy security also played a pivotal role in shaping China’s MENA strategy. As China’s reliance on MENA oil and gas deepened, securing stable and long-term energy partnerships became a strategic priority. The Belt and Road Initiative provided an early institutional framework for such engagements. Additionally, China sought to leverage its growing economic ties with MENA states to challenge the dominance of the U.S. dollar in global trade, particularly by encouraging energy transactions in RMB. This economic realignment was part of China’s broader “westward movement” (xijin yundong), aimed at diversifying its economic dependencies away from Northeast Asia and the United States in favor of deeper engagement with the Middle East and Africa.
Finally, integrating China’s MENA policy with its domestic security concerns — particularly in Xinjiang — was another key strategic consideration. Chinese analysts argued that closer ties with Arab and Islamic states, many of which shared China’s concerns over Islamic extremism, could help Beijing counter separatist movements (jing du) in Xinjiang. Concurrently, China’s large Muslim population was seen as a potential bridge for fostering economic and cultural linkages between China and the broader MENA region while also helping to address Xinjiang’s economic under-development.
To achieve these objectives, China has pursued a four-pronged strategy in the region: (1) deepening bilateral ties with individual MENA states, (2) engaging in strategic dialogue through regional forums like the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum and The Arab League, (3) integrating MENA into China-led transregional initiatives such as BRICS and the SCO, and (4) acting as a positive agent and stakeholder to mediate regional conflicts between its regional partners and shape consensus through diplomacy.
Generally, in contrast to U.S. and European approaches, China has emphasized pragmatic engagement over ideological alignment, prioritizing stability and non-interference in the domestic affairs of others. At a time of “great chaos” (daluan ju) around the world and heightened anti-Western resentment in the Middle East and North Africa, China has, therefore, presented itself as a preferable great power alternative to the MENA states frustrated with the Global West.
An exception to China’s non-interventionist stance, however, has been its willingness to engage in “creative intervention” (chuangzaoxing jieru) — a concept advocating diplomatic efforts to mediate interstate disputes and promote regional stability. In recent years, China has increasingly prioritized conflict mediation, most notably facilitating the 2023 Saudi-Iranian détente, which it celebrated as a significant geopolitical milestone. It has also taken a proactive stance on the Gaza-Israeli conflict, working with Arab states to push for a ceasefire. This approach emphasizes China’s role as a positive partner, seeking to facilitate conflict resolution, economic integration, and peaceful coexistence among MENA states while protecting China’s investments and strategic interests.
In practice, Chinese foreign policy across MENA has closely adhered to the above theoretical frameworks, particularly with respect to their comprehensive nature, multi-level lattice-like approach to state and intra-state relations, and prioritization of pragmatic engagement over ideological posturing. The upshot of this approach, which the Xi Jinping administration began in earnest, is a dense web of government and institutional relations that provide China with a sustainable, multi-channel mechanism to advance its national interests — including on issues unrelated to MENA, such as Taiwan — while supporting regional stability.
In distinct contrast to the U.S.’s high-profile engagement with states like Saudi Arabia and its “ironclad” support for Israel, China’s lower-profile yet expanding presence has allowed it to quietly leverage diplomatic and economic ties in pursuit of its strategic goals, including efforts that enhance its status as a “responsible power” in the Global South.
At the regional level, China’s strategic and operational approaches have significantly strengthened its engagement and reputation across the Middle East and Africa. Even before the 2023 October 7 terrorist attacks in Israel, surveys showed strong support for China across MENA, with China ranked as the most popular partner in 12 Arab states, according to Arab Barometer. Since then, China’s perceived backing of Palestinian self-determination, its contributions to regional peace and stability, and its opposition to Israel’s military actions in Gaza have further boosted its standing in the region. Meanwhile, declining perceptions of the United States, European states, and the United Kingdom have reinforced this trend, with some respondents framing their support for China as an instance of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”.
Furthermore, media reports and leadership statements in countries like Iran, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt indicate a growing desire for closer ties with China. Since 2023, MENA discourse has become increasingly critical of Western involvement in the region and more appreciative of China’s approach, which is perceived as balanced and conducive to regional stability. Public statements and media coverage in key regional powers like Iran and Saudi Arabia further reflect this shift, suggesting this trend cuts across the region’s traditional political and geopolitical divides.
Polling data from the region supports this observation. In Iraq, 2022 surveys showed 54% of respondents viewed China favorably, compared to 35% for the United States. China’s $10.5 billion in BRI investments that year significantly influenced public sentiment, with 54% of Iraqis favoring stronger economic ties with China over the 46% who preferred closer relations with Washington. Iraqi policymakers and media have also backed Chinese counter-terrorism policies in Xinjiang and its new security law in Hong Kong, signaling broader political alignment. Analysts attribute this to the country’s growing disillusionment with the U.S. and the West and a preference for China’s alternative approach.
Unconditional Western support for Israel’s war in Gaza has reinforced these trends. In Jordan, post-2023 polling showed 67% of respondents identified China as the extra-regional power most supportive of Palestinian rights — an increase of 16 points since 2022. In contrast, only 28% held positive views of the U.S., citing Washington’s perceived indifference toward Palestinian rights. Jordanian media has echoed this shift, regularly advocating closer bilateral ties in trade, cultural exchange, and regional diplomacy.
The sentiment also extends to all North African states. In Tunisia, approval of China’s role in the Middle East rose from 70% to 75% after October 2023, while U.S. approval plummeted from 40% to 10%. More than 50% of Tunisians expressed approval of Xi Jinping, while only 6% approved of Biden. Following the 2024 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Summit and the establishment of a strategic partnership in May 2024, Tunisian media and political leadership have been especially vocal in their praise for China. Tunisian officials have reiterated support for Chinese policies in Xinjiang and Hong Kong while commending Beijing’s stance on Gaza.
In Egypt, 2022 polling already showed a shift in public sentiment toward China and away from the U.S., with up to 64% of Egyptians preferring ties with Beijing. Post-2023 media coverage suggests this shift has only deepened, as Egyptian outlets increasingly praise Beijing’s foreign policy while criticizing U.S. support for Israel.
Libyan polling from 2022 similarly showed 49% of the public viewed China positively, compared to 37% for the U.S. Half of Libyans also supported closer economic ties with China, placing it just behind Saudi Arabia, the country’s top economic partner. Xi Jinping also enjoyed greater approval than Joe Biden in that country (35% vs. 24%). Moreover, the Libyan media frequently cites Beijing’s lack of a colonial past in Libya and the broader Maghreb as a key consideration, justifying its strong support for deeper economic and political ties with China.
In Algeria, too, 2022 polling showed 68% of respondents viewed China favorably, compared to 46% for the U.S. Algerian leaders and media have consistently promoted closer ties with Beijing, reflecting a broader policy push to strengthen Algiers’s comprehensive strategic partnership with China. During his August 2024 state visit to China, President Abdelmadjid Tebboune praised bilateral relations, signed 19 cooperation agreements, and thanked Xi Jinping for China’s support of Algeria’s BRICS entry.
Finally, Moroccan perceptions of China also improved significantly following Israel’s invasion of Gaza. In 2024, 79% of Moroccans held favorable views of China, up 16 points from 2022. This increase stemmed largely from China’s perceived support for Palestinians. In recent years, Moroccan media coverage has become overwhelmingly positive toward China, particularly regarding bilateral relations and Beijing’s position on Gaza. Moroccan Commentators regularly highlight bilateral trade and Chinese investments in Moroccan industry, infrastructure, energy, mining, and auto manufacturing sectors as a “win-win” relationship for both countries — with Rabat viewing its strategic partnership with Beijing since 2016 as a source of growing political goodwill.
The broad support for engagement with China across public, elite, and media discourse in MENA states indicates Beijing has made significant strategic inroads into the region. MENA views of China in the aftermath of October 7th suggest Beijing has successfully positioned itself as an alternative power in the region — one seen as better attuned to Global South priorities and therefore a more preferred partner than the United States or Europe. Through extensive diplomatic engagement, regional and global minilateralism, and “creative interventions”, China has emerged as a stabilizing force in the region, strengthened its position as a leader in Global South relations, secured its assets and citizens in MENA, and ensured access to local energy supplies and markets.
China’s positive gains in bolstering its reputation and regional status translate into clear strategic advantages for China at both the regional (MENA) and international levels, which Beijing regards as interconnected spheres for raising its global prestige. Across MENA, China has cultivated influence with states and societies while countering Western narratives depicting it as an aggressor or threat. Even U.S.-aligned states like Morocco and Jordan increasingly view economic and technological engagement with China as beneficial.
China’s vocal support for Palestinians has reinforced its image as the sole extra-regional actor willing to privilege both MENA security interests and Arab/Muslim identity politics over its ties with Israel. Beijing’s criticism of Israeli military actions in Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon has contrasted sharply with the U.S.-led Global West’s unrestrained backing of Israel, further enhancing China’s appeal. As noted, MENA states and societies increasingly see China’s foreign policy as fairer and more inclusive than that of Euro-Atlantic states, making it a preferred partner for economic, political, and security cooperation.
China has also bolstered its standing by supporting MENA countries’ integration into alternative global governance structures. Using its leverage as a great power, Beijing has backed, and even mediated, closer ties between Egypt, Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE as part of a more unified BRICS framework, enabling its partners to engage with other key non-Western middle powers on a host of issues from global finance to international diplomacy. It has also promoted greater MENA involvement in Chinese-led initiatives like the (UN-backed) Global Development Initiative, the Global Civilization Initiative, and the Global Security Initiative, offering MENA states expanded engagement with Global South countries, including the Group of 77.
At the regional level, China has leveraged bilateral and multilateral diplomacy to secure oil and gas access and expand economic cooperation, particularly in key high-tech sectors like digital infrastructure, electric vehicles, and renewable energy. Since the Gaza war began, China has signed major energy agreements on the production, exploration, and trade of oil and liquified natural gas (LNG) with Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Qatar, and the UAE. It has also become Iraq’s top foreign partner in oil and gas, receiving at least 35% of the country’s total exports as of November 2024.
China has also expanded its presence in MENA’s digital economy. Chinese tech giants like Huawei, Alibaba, and Tencent have launched research and development centers in Saudi Arabia, broadband services in Bahrain, and cloud computing in Egypt. Meanwhile, Beijing has signed MOUs with Cairo, Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi on artificial intelligence, surveillance, and cybersecurity. China is also increasingly the MENA’s top supplier of weapons and aerospace systems, including advanced fighter jets, drones, and satellites from firms like MinoSpace and BeiDou Navigation. These initiatives are key to China’s Digital Silk Road strategy, which aims to advance its high-tech superiority while promoting global digital standards aligned with the Chinese model.
China has also ramped up its clean energy and electric vehicles (EV) investments in the region since the Gaza war. While MENA has long been a focal point of BRI projects, Beijing has capitalized on its stronger regional position to sign landmark renewable energy deals. In 2024, Chinese firms such as China Energy Engineering, Jinko Solar, and TCL Zhonghuan partnered with Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund to build water manufacturing plants, wind and solar farms, and solar cell factories, with investments exceeding $3 billion. These projects align with Saudi Arabia’s Green Initiative to diversify its economy beyond fossil fuels. China is also supporting the UAE’s Net Zero 2050 strategy, an effort accelerated following Xi Jinping’s June 2024 summit with Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed. Similar initiatives are underway in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, including the development of green chemical plants in Egypt and solar panel factories in Algeria.
China’s EV footprint has also expanded significantly since the Gaza war, both in market access and production. In 2024, Chinese EV firm Nio created a joint venture with Abu Dhabi’s CYVN Holdings to manufacture and distribute EVs across MENA, working with Egypt to integrate North African markets. Chinese automakers Chijet Motor and Faw Group have signed agreements with Algerian and Egyptian firms for local production and distribution. More than 10 Chinese EV firms, including BYD, have established manufacturing hubs in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, where demand is rising in tandem with Chinese supply.
Among MENA economies, Morocco has seen the fastest growth in Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI). In late 2023 and 2024, Gotion High-Tech committed $6.3 billion to build the region’s first EV gigafactory. Other Chinese EV firms, including BTR New Material and Hailiang, have similarly invested heavily in Morocco’s EV sector, citing its strategic location near African and European markets.
While China’s growing presence in the greater Middle East is not solely attributable to its post-Gaza war diplomacy, its deepening ties across MENA in terms of investment, trade, and influence since October 2023 are notable in both scale and scope. Not only has China solidified dominance in priority sectors like fossil fuels, renewables, and EVs, but it has also increased its appeal at both the state and societal levels. China’s success is partly the result of Beijing capitalizing on increasingly negative public opinion about the U.S. and Europe in MENA, despite their continued economic importance to the region. Crucially, China’s expanding economic and diplomatic footprint enhances its long-term potential as MENA’s predominant external strategic actor.
These shifting regional dynamics mark a profound transformation in MENA’s geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape, long dominated by U.S. and European interests. While China has not yet displaced Washington, London, Paris, or Brussels — particularly in defense and security, where the U.S. remains dominant — it has emerged as an increasingly attractive partner for MENA states seeking to move beyond colonial-era Western dependency and exploitation.
Beijing has successfully positioned itself as an alternative power by emphasizing its ideological non-alignment, status as a developing economy, and leadership in the Global South. Unlike the West, it presents itself as less interested in manipulating regional balances of power for its own gain and more committed to cultivating new avenues for diplomacy and dialogue.
For the U.S. and Europe, China’s growing influence presents a significant strategic challenge. Western leadership, values, and strategic interests have long shaped MENA’s security landscape, but China’s rise as an alternative model in governance, economics, and value-neutral diplomacy allows regional states to reconsider their foreign relations with greater autonomy and renewed confidence.
In the past, MENA states were often compelled to adopt Western ideals — economic liberalism, human rights, and democracy — as the only viable paths to modernization. Now, they can more easily discard Western universalism and selectively determine how to develop their economies, prioritize social programs, and address domestic challenges based on their particular cultural contexts.
As MENA states gain alternatives to Western dependency, U.S. and European influence weakens, and policies perceived as infringing on local sovereignty face greater resistance. This shift is most evident in the region’s growing opposition to Western support for Israel, particularly amid the Gaza war, which international bodies such as the UN and the International Criminal Court (ICC) have flagged as involving potential war crimes. Rather than passively accepting Western intervention in their affairs, MENA states are actively rejecting past and present Western paradigms.
Beyond diplomatic tensions, this shift has direct consequences for U.S. and European firms, leading to lost partnerships, strained relationships, and failed mergers and acquisitions. However, the most profound impact is strategic: China’s ascending role in mediating regional issues — from Saudi-Iran relations to clean technologies and Palestine — enhances its global leadership, in stark contrast with the Global West’s declining credibility.
Public opposition to Western policies can also constrain governments’ ability to engage in beneficial diplomatic and economic partnerships. In MENA, longstanding opposition to Israel has historically hindered normalization efforts, even when informal or narrow economic, technological, and security relations could offer clear benefits.
While dissatisfaction with Western involvement in MENA has not reached the same intensity as anti-Israeli sentiment, frustration over American and European complicity in the Gaza war and their perceived double standards in dealings with developed and developing economies suggests the Global West’s traditional dominance in the region could erode further. Given China’s ongoing ascendence in MENA, if domestic and regional opposition to the U.S. and Europe hardens into structural barriers, the Global West could be entirely marginalized or excluded from the region.
Notably, dissatisfaction with Western engagement does not necessarily correlate with strong approval of China. Instead, Beijing benefits from its status as an alternative power — one unburdened by the historical baggage, ideological fervor, and political demands that often accompany U.S. and European partnerships. The availability of Chinese investment, technology, diplomatic backing, and, potentially, defense cooperation empowers MENA states to bypass the conditions, constraints, and general subservience historically associated with Western hegemony.
For MENA states, this diversification of partnerships expands their agency and strategic autonomy in international affairs. But for the U.S. and Europe, it represents a strategic setback. Long accustomed to unchallenged dominance over MENA’s economic and political institutions, Western powers now face a competitive geostrategic landscape where their past advantages have turned into liabilities.
Recent events illustrate these shifting dynamics and the challenges they pose to the United States and Europe. In November 2024, Saudi Arabia announced it would no longer pursue a comprehensive defense treaty with the U.S. that was contingent on normalization with Israel. Citing the lack of progress over a Gaza ceasefire deal and Israel’s rejection of a two-state solution, Riyadh opted for a more limited security agreement with Washington. Notably, this decision followed Saudi Arabia’s July 2024 announcement of a deeper defense partnership with China after a meeting between Chinese Ambassador Zhang Hua and General Fayyadh Al-Ruwaili, Chief of the Saudi Armed Forces.
Similarly, European powers have lost strategic ground as Chinese influence expands. In 2024, Algeria withdrew its ambassador to France after Paris recognized Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara — a move driven by deteriorating Franco-Moroccan relations. Meanwhile, as noted earlier, China has deepened ties with both Algeria and Morocco, giving them greater leverage in their dealings with France.
In April 2024, UAE leaders canceled high-level meetings with UK officials after London blocked a UAE-backed bid to acquire The Telegraph. To mend ties, UK Deputy Prime Minister Oliver Dowden was compelled to make a secret trip to Abu Dhabi, expressing “contrition” while encouraging continued Emirati investment in Britain. The timing of this diplomatic strain — coinciding with warm relations between China and the UAE — is notable, highlighting Beijing’s deepening influence at the expense of traditional Western partners.
Ultimately, the deepening alignments between China and MENA states pose significant geopolitical and economic challenges for the U.S. and Europe. While Washington and its allies still wield considerable influence through global financial institutions, trade networks, and military partnerships, their dominance is increasingly contested by China, which presents itself as a pragmatic, non-interventionist alternative. Although most MENA states actively avoid framing their foreign policy in terms of a zero-sum competition between China and the U.S., if current trends persist, Western primacy in the region’s strategic landscape will continue to erode.
While these developments do not signal a full-scale realignment of MENA away from the Global West toward China, they do underscore a fundamental shift in regional dynamics — from MENA dependency on Western diplomatic and economic engagement to greater agency among MENA countries, with China playing at least a midwifing role.
For MENA states, this transformation in the region’s geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape presents an opportunity to leverage their position as “battleground states” in global great power competition to attract more investment, adopt independent domestic and foreign policies, and better resist unwelcome external pressures.
For the U.S. and European states, these shifting dynamics represent a loss of prestige and access — both critical to their foreign policy objectives in the region. That MENA countries are no longer willing to accept unbalanced relations with external powers to the same extent as before means that Global West states must now compete to maintain their long-standing regional influence — an influence that powers like the U.S., France, and the UK have often treated as an entitlement.
Viewed through the lens of contemporary public opinion, however, the Global West is poorly positioned to compete on equal footing with other external powers, as its long-established policies have consistently prioritized support for Israel over all other considerations in the region — a stance that, while unchanged in Western capitals, is increasingly out of step with regional sentiment and shifting balances of power. Absent a strategic reset in its collective approach to MENA — one that prioritizes balanced, interest-based engagement and economic partnerships over defense-driven policies — the U.S. and Europe risk losing ground not only to China but also to growing intra-regional cooperation that sidelines Western involvement.
China stands to gain from this reconfiguration of regional dynamics away from Western hegemony and toward regionalism and polycentrism. In any case, Beijing will find MENA states increasingly receptive to bilateral and multilateral engagement, including through Chinese-led institutions like BRICS and its strategic initiatives such as the BRI. As MENA states diversify their economic and diplomatic relations, China naturally emerges as their primary non-regional great power alternative.
Yet China is taking a far more robust approach to its engagement in MENA. Its strategy is rooted in the deliberate cultivation of extensive regional, national, and domestic ties across multiple sectors to deepen its ties to the region. Indeed, Beijing appears to be doubling down on diplomatic outreach and innovative engagement strategies — such as its mediatory role through “creative interventions” — to reinforce its regional foothold and institutional networks.
To be sure, Chinese leadership recognizes the strategic opportunities inherent in MENA’s shifting landscape and is actively positioning itself to reap long-term geopolitical and economic benefits. However, the fact that China’s engagement is waxing just as Western influence in the region is waning should be cause for serious concern in Washington and Brussels. If they aren’t worried, they aren’t paying close enough attention.
The Western powers have failed to effectively manage the increasing threat of proliferation in the Middle East. While the international community is concerned with Iran’s nuclear program, Saudi Arabia has moved forward with developing its own nuclear program, and independent studies show that Israel has longed possessed dozens of nuclear warheads. The former is a member of the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while the latter has refused to sign the international agreement.
On Middle East policy, the Biden campaign had staunchly criticized the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal and it has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier since assuming office in January 2021. However, serious obstacles remain for responsible actors in expanding non-proliferation efforts toward a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.
This panel will discuss how Western powers and multilateral institutions, such as the IAEA, can play a more effective role in managing non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Peggy Mason: Canada’s former Ambassador to the UN for Disarmament
– Mark Fitzpatrick: Associate Fellow & Former Executive Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
– Ali Vaez: Iran Project Director, International Crisis Group
– Negar Mortazavi: Journalist and Political Analyst, Host of Iran Podcast
– David Albright: Founder and President of the Institute for Science and International Security
Closing (5:45 PM – 6:00 PM ET)
What is the current economic landscape in the Middle East? While global foreign direct investment is expected to fall drastically in the post-COVID era, the World Bank reported a 5% contraction in the economic output of the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries in 2020 due to the pandemic. While oil prices are expected to rebound with normalization in demand, political instability, regional and geopolitical tensions, domestic corruption, and a volatile regulatory and legal environment all threaten economic recovery in the Middle East. What is the prospect for economic growth and development in the region post-pandemic, and how could MENA nations promote sustainable growth and regional trade moving forward?
At the same time, Middle Eastern diaspora communities have become financially successful and can help promote trade between North America and the region. In this respect, the diaspora can become vital intermediaries for advancing U.S. and Canada’s business interests abroad. Promoting business diplomacy can both benefit the MENA region and be an effective and positive way to advance engagement and achieve foreign policy goals of the North Atlantic.
This panel will investigate the trade and investment opportunities in the Middle East, discuss how facilitating economic engagement with the region can benefit Canadian and American national interests, and explore relevant policy prescriptions.
Panelists:
– Hon. Sergio Marchi: Canada’s Former Minister of International Trade
– Scott Jolliffe: Chairperson, Canada Arab Business Council
– Esfandyar Batmanghelidj: Founder and Publisher of Bourse & Bazaar
– Nizar Ghanem: Director of Research and Co-founder at Triangle
– Nicki Siamaki: Researcher at Control Risks
The Middle East continues to grapple with violence and instability, particularly in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Fueled by government incompetence and foreign interventions, terrorist insurgencies have imposed severe humanitarian and economic costs on the region. Meanwhile, regional actors have engaged in an unprecedented pursuit of arms accumulation. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have imported billions of both Western and Russian-made weapons and funded militant groups across the region, intending to contain their regional adversaries, particularly Iran. Tehran has also provided sophisticated weaponry to various militia groups across the region to strengthen its geopolitical position against Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Israel.
On the other hand, with international terrorist networks and intense regional rivalry in the Middle East, it is impractical to discuss peace and security without addressing terrorism and the arms race in the region. This panel will primarily discuss the implications of the ongoing arms race in the region and the role of Western powers and multilateral organizations in facilitating trust-building security arrangements among regional stakeholders to limit the proliferation of arms across the Middle East.
Panelists:
Luciano Zaccara: Assistant Professor, Qatar University
Dania Thafer: Executive Director, Gulf International Forum
Kayhan Barzegar: Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Science and Research Branch of Azad University
Barbara Slavin: Director of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council
Sanam Shantyaei: Senior Journalist at France24 & host of Middle East Matters
The emerging regional order in West Asia will have wide-ranging implications for global security. The Biden administration has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier, an initiative staunchly opposed by Israel, while also taking a harder line on Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen. Meanwhile, key regional actors, including Qatar, Iraq, and Oman, have engaged in backchannel efforts to bring Iran and Saudi Arabia to the negotiating table. From a broader geopolitical perspective, with the need to secure its energy imports, China is also expected to increase its footprint in the region and influence the mentioned challenges.
In this evolving landscape, Western powers will be compelled to redefine their strategic priorities and adjust their policies with the new realities in the region. In this panel, we will discuss how the West, including the United States and its allies, can utilize multilateral diplomacy with its adversaries to prevent military escalation in the region. Most importantly, the panel will discuss if a multilateral security dialogue in the Persian Gulf region, proposed by some regional actors, can help reduce tensions among regional foes and produce sustainable peace and development for the region.
Panelists:
– Abdullah Baabood: Academic Researcher and Former Director of the Centre for Gulf Studies, Qatar University
– Trita Parsi: Executive Vice-President, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
– Ebtesam Al-Ketbi: President, Emirates Policy Centre
– Jon Allen: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Israel
– Elizabeth Hagedorn: Washington correspondent for Al-Monitor
Military interventions, political and economic instabilities, and civil unrest in the Middle East have led to a global refugee crisis with an increasing wave of refugees and asylum seekers to Europe and Canada. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has, in myriad ways, exacerbated and contributed to the ongoing security threats and destabilization of the region.
While these challenges pose serious risks to Canadian security, Ottawa will also have the opportunity to limit such risks and prevent a spillover effect vis-à-vis effective humanitarian initiatives in the region. In this panel, we will primarily investigate Canada’s Middle East Strategy’s degree of success in providing humanitarian aid to the region. Secondly, the panel will discuss what programs and initiatives Canada can introduce to further build on the renewed strategy. and more specifically, how Canada can utilize its policy instruments to more effectively deal with the increasing influx of refugees from the Middle East.
Panelists:
Erica Di Ruggiero: Director of Centre for Global Health, University of Toronto
Reyhana Patel: Head of Communications & Government Relations, Islamic Relief Canada
Amir Barmaki: Former Head of UN OCHA in Iran
Catherine Gribbin: Senior Legal Advisor for International and Humanitarian Law, Canadian Red Cross
In 2016, Canada launched an ambitious five-year “Middle East Engagement Strategy” (2016-2021), committing to investing CA$3.5 billion over five years to help establish the necessary conditions for security and stability, alleviate human suffering and enable stabilization programs in the region. In the latest development, during the meeting of the Global Coalition against ISIS, Minister of Foreign Affairs Marc Garneau announced more than $43.6 million in Peace and Stabilization Operations Program funding for 11 projects in Syria and Iraq.
With Canada’s Middle East Engagement Strategy expiring this year, it is time to examine and evaluate this massive investment in the Middle East region in the past five years. More importantly, the panel will discuss a principled and strategic roadmap for the future of Canada’s short-term and long-term engagement in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Ferry de Kerckhove: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Egypt
– Dennis Horak: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
– Chris Kilford: Former Canadian Defence Attaché in Turkey, member of the national board of the Canadian International Council (CIC)
– David Dewitt: University Professor Emeritus, York University
While the United States continues to pull back from certain regional conflicts, reflected by the Biden administration’s decision to halt American backing for Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen and the expected withdrawal from Afghanistan, US troops continue to be stationed across the region. Meanwhile, Russia and China have significantly maintained and even expanded their regional activities. On one hand, the Kremlin has maintained its military presence in Syria, and on the other hand, China has signed an unprecedented 25-year strategic agreement with Iran.
As the global power structure continues to shift, it is essential to analyze the future of the US regional presence under the Biden administration, explore the emerging global rivalry with Russia and China, and at last, investigate the implications of such competition for peace and security in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Dmitri Trenin: Director of Carnegie Moscow Center
– Joost R. Hiltermann: Director of MENA Programme, International Crisis Group
– Roxane Farmanfarmaian: Affiliated Lecturer in International Relations of the Middle East and North Africa, University of Cambridge
– Andrew A. Michta: Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at Marshall Center
– Kelley Vlahos: Senior Advisor, Quincy Institute
The security architecture of the Middle East has undergone rapid transformations in an exceptionally short period. Notable developments include the United States gradual withdrawal from the region, rapprochement between Israel and some GCC states through the Abraham Accords and the rise of Chinese and Russian regional engagement.
With these new trends in the Middle East, it is timely to investigate the security implications of the Biden administration’s Middle East policy. In this respect, we will discuss the Biden team’s new approach vis-à-vis Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The panel will also discuss the role of other major powers, including China and Russia in shaping this new security environment in the region, and how the Biden administration will respond to these powers’ increasing regional presence.
Panelists:
– Sanam Vakil: Deputy Director of MENA Programme at Chatham House
– Denise Natali: Acting Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies & Director of the Center for Strategic Research, National Defense University
– Hassan Ahmadian: Professor of the Middle East and North Africa Studies, University of Tehran
– Abdulaziz Sagar: Chairman, Gulf Research Center
– Andrew Parasiliti: President, Al-Monitor
