President Trump has been adamant that, under his administration, the fighting between Russia and Ukraine must end. Yet critical questions remain about how his team — chief among them his special envoy, Keith Kellogg — plans to bring the two sides to the negotiating table. What strategy will the administration pursue to broker peace? What will be the general framework of any deal, and how far-reaching should it be? Should the administration settle for a temporary armistice, or push for a comprehensive settlement? And what would an America First approach to this conflict entail in practice?
These questions are not merely theoretical; they have profound implications for U.S. foreign policy, European security, and the future of great-power relations. Given the failure of the Biden administration’s approach to the war and waning American public support for continued aid to Ukraine, the need for a coherent and pragmatic alternative has never been more urgent.
Following Trump’s inauguration, IPD-USA convened a symposium with leading experts in U.S. foreign policy, European affairs, and U.S.-Russia relations to bring much-needed clarity and intellectual rigor to this debate. We asked them: “What key measures should the United States and President Trump adopt to increase the likelihood of negotiations between Russia and Ukraine and achieve a more durable settlement?”
Their contributions — drawn from a range of perspectives — seek to offer practical recommendations that ground U.S. strategy in realism while ensuring that whatever course the administration ultimately pursues aligns with America’s long-term national interests.
In a pivotal White House meeting in July 1965, amid discussions on President Lyndon Johnson’s plan to escalate the Vietnam War, the lone dissenter in Johnson’s war cabinet, Undersecretary of State George Ball, urged caution. He reminded the president that, “every great captain in history is not afraid to make a tactical withdrawal if conditions are not favorable to him.”
The time for such a withdrawal from Ukraine has arrived.
Ukraine is running out of manpower, while the West is running out of money, materiel, and — crucially — patience. Reaching an endgame boils down to a question of leverage: Who holds it, and who does not? The only party in this conflict over which Washington has meaningful leverage is Ukraine. For Ukraine’s sake, President Trump should exercise this leverage and direct President Zelensky to begin negotiations to end the war.
If Zelensky resists, Trump should immediately order the withdrawal of all American special operations forces, as well as military and intelligence advisers, from Ukraine. He should also instruct the secretary of defense Pete Hegseth to dismantle the Ukraine Defense Contact Group at Ramstein Air Base in Germany.
Keeping Ukraine on a path that leads only to its destruction ranks among the cruelest and most counterproductive foreign policy blunders Washington has made in recent memory. President Trump must do what his predecessor was too weak to accomplish: act as a great captain and decisively turn the page on this shameful chapter in American history.
The key to a successful negotiating posture is recognizing that while the battlefield dynamics favor Russia, the West retains significant economic and political leverage over Russia’s long-term strategic interests.
The Trump team’s best path to a durable settlement in Ukraine overlaps with Henry Kissinger’s concept of diplomatic linkage: the broader the scope of negotiations — incorporating issues like energy normalization and strategic stability — the greater the chance of their long-term success.
This approach requires structuring negotiations along two tracks, with the understanding that progress in both areas is necessary for a lasting agreement: the bilateral conflict between Russia and Ukraine and the broader question of Russia’s place in Europe’s security architecture.
While the White House is rightly prioritizing an end to the war, ensuring Russia’s long-term integration into a stable European order is equally critical and will demand sustained diplomatic engagement.
The outline of the war’s end has been clear since March 2022, when it became obvious to outside observers that (1) the Russians were going to fail to march into Kyiv and overthrow the Zelensky government, but also that (2) Ukraine was not going to eject Russian troops from its territories in the east. Neither side was ready to accept those harsh realities in 2022, so the war dragged on, and hundreds of thousands have died pointless deaths.
The exhausted Ukrainians now appear ready to accept the inevitable. President Trump has to make it clear to Vladimir Putin that America and its allies will not sit idly by while he tries to conquer more Ukrainian territory. He needs to re-affirm the US commitment to Ukraine — while also assuring Russia that no NATO invitation will be forthcoming. Russia will not agree to any deal that leaves open the NATO option; Ukraine will not trust any agreement with Putin if it feels abandoned by the West. President Trump has to strike a balance between formal commitment and abandonment.
The good news, however, is that both sides may be close to accepting a peace deal that will satisfy neither completely. The Trump administration’s main role should be to midwife that ceasefire, after which the president can do what he loves to do: Take all the credit.
The United States should push for a sustainable Ukraine-Russia peace settlement that goes beyond a ceasefire and redefines NATO-Russia relations. This settlement would establish a non-aligned, non-nuclear Ukraine backed by U.S. and international security guarantees. International peacekeeping forces from non-aligned states — such as India, South Africa, Turkey, and Brazil — could oversee force withdrawals, buffer zones, and ceasefire enforcement under a UN mandate, provided they are acceptable to both Kyiv and Moscow.
In its diplomatic efforts, the U.S. should coordinate with major and regional powers most affected by the war to demonstrate to both Moscow and Kyiv that continued conflict is futile, while concessions would yield mutual benefits. Working with Beijing is also essential given its political and economic influence over Moscow.
To encourage Russian compliance, sanctions could be lifted gradually, while Kyiv could face reduced U.S. military and financial aid if it resists negotiations. A ceasefire should leave room for future territorial compromises, prisoner exchanges, and potential arrangements for shared sovereignty over contested areas. International economic and energy projects in the Black Sea region could help fund war reparations and reconstruction.
At the same time, Washington and Moscow should work toward reshaping European and global security cooperation — including bilateral talks over a new strategic arms control agreement. By leveraging diplomacy, economic incentives, and security guarantees, the U.S. can broker a sustainable peace that stabilizes a neutral Ukraine, reshapes NATO-Russia relations, and lays the groundwork for a new global security framework.
First, before the Trump administration can even hope to launch a credible diplomatic initiative between Ukraine and Russia, the President and his team must insist on accurate, verified intelligence and rigorous analysis to make clear-eyed assessments. They must also critically evaluate the confidence levels behind any reporting — from battlefield casualties to economic strain to political developments.
Second, any chance of success in what will be complex and difficult negotiations depends on eliminating uncertainty about U.S. intentions and commitments. Beyond President Trump himself, there must be a single, authoritative envoy who speaks with his full backing — without contradiction from other senior officials, including the Secretaries of State and Defense, the National Security Advisor, relevant ambassadors, and congressional leaders.
Talks will stall if either Vladimir Putin or Volodymyr Zelensky receive conflicting assurances from different members of the President’s team that a supposedly firm U.S. position can be quietly modified or reinterpreted, blocked in an interagency process, or overridden by Congress or allied nations. Both countries could leverage such mixed signals to avoid making the necessary concessions or to renege on previously agreed parameters.
Neither Ukraine nor Russia is inclined to believe that U.S. mediation will fully account for their core national interests. No matter how strong or innovative a proposal may be, mixed messages and unclear lines of authority will guarantee failure and destroy an already challenging peace process.
Although Russia and Ukraine remain reluctant to begin peace talks, the United States holds leverage over both — and should use it — to jumpstart negotiations. Ukraine, for instance, will require significant U.S. assistance even after the fighting ends to rebuild its military, economy, and infrastructure. Russia, meanwhile, seeks a settlement that extends beyond Ukraine to include the future of Europe’s security architecture.
The United States should make postwar military aid to Ukraine, and its willingness to discuss long-term U.S. military posture in Europe with Russia, contingent on both parties’ participation in peace talks within 30 days. By signaling that U.S. terms will become less favorable over time, Washington can create urgency for both sides to negotiate without delay.
Once at the bargaining table, Washington must push for a durable settlement, as any resumption of hostilities in Ukraine would risk escalation into a Russia-NATO conflict. Territorial questions will ultimately be resolved based on the current battlefield realities, with temporary borders established along the conflict’s front line. To reinforce the long-term stability of any agreement, a demilitarized zone should separate the two sides. This buffer could be monitored by drones or by neutral, non-U.S., non-European peacekeepers.
For Ukraine’s long-term security, its best option — and NATO’s — is “armed neutrality”, which would forgo formal security guarantees while ensuring sustained U.S. and European military aid over the next five to ten years to build a credible deterrent. The United States should also press Russia and Ukraine to agree on mutual security assurances, such as geographic limits on military deployments or restrictions on foreign troop presence.
Finally, Washington must be willing to revisit the NATO-Russia relationship, which was a key driver of Moscow’s 2022 invasion. Here, the United States should use negotiations to make strategic shifts, including changes to U.S. posture in Europe and NATO’s Open Door policy — not as concessions to Moscow, but as a recognition that its unchecked push for enlarging the alliance has contributed to regional instability and worsened U.S. overextension.
President Trump’s instinct to end the Ukraine war is strategically sound, but achieving a settlement requires confronting hard realities: Ukraine cannot reclaim all its lost territory, and Russia will not negotiate away the regions it currently occupies. Both sides still believe they can improve their positions — Ukraine through continued Western support, and Russia through a war of attrition. The key to unlocking negotiations is forcing both to accept that neither can achieve total victory on the battlefield.
The most effective way for Trump to bring both parties to the table is to explicitly condition future U.S. military aid on serious negotiations while simultaneously signaling to Moscow that Western support for Ukraine will continue if Russia refuses to engage. This approach would pressure Kyiv to recognize that its maximalist aims are unrealistic while making clear to Putin that an indefinite war will not produce a better outcome. Trump’s leverage lies in recalibrating expectations, not indulging them.
A viable settlement would freeze the conflict along current battle lines, with Russia retaining control of the territories it occupies while Ukraine receives binding U.S.-European security guarantees for its remaining territory. Crimea’s status could be deferred to a long-term international framework. In return, Russia must halt offensive operations and accept phased sanctions relief tied to compliance. While Ukraine would be forced to cede land, it would secure its future as a Western-aligned state under a credible security umbrella.
Such a deal would be imperfect for both Moscow and Kyiv, but that is precisely why it could succeed. Trump’s challenge is to impose costs on both sides until peace becomes the least bad option.
The United States must take decisive steps to end the war in Ukraine through diplomacy rather than prolong a conflict that has reached a strategic deadlock. To that end, President Trump should pursue four key actions to encourage negotiations between Russia and Ukraine and increase the likelihood of an enduring settlement.
The first and most immediate measure is to suspend all military aid to Ukraine, forcing Kyiv to recognize that continued resistance without U.S. support will result only in further territorial losses and human suffering. This will recalibrate Ukraine’s expectations and push it toward serious negotiations. Simultaneously, Trump should order the withdrawal of all U.S. military and intelligence personnel from Ukraine, signaling an unequivocal shift away from military escalation — and reinforcing America’s role as a neutral broker rather than a participant in the conflict.
Third, to move negotiations forward, the U.S. should propose a regional peace conference involving Russia, Ukraine’s neighboring states (Poland, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Belarus), and Germany to determine new borders, troop levels, and a monitoring mechanism. A precedent for this already exists in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks, which established concrete limits on conventional force deployments in Central and Eastern Europe during the Cold War. A similar framework would ensure that those most affected by the war have direct input into a settlement while sidelining actors — such as the UK or France — who seek to prolong the conflict for their own political or strategic gain.
Finally, provided that boundary adjustments and military deployments satisfy the security concerns of Kyiv’s neighbors, the United States must signal its willingness to support and guarantee Ukraine’s neutrality under an Austrian-style model. This would allow Ukraine to maintain an army while securing binding protections from all parties on its neutral status. In return, Kyiv would be constitutionally barred from joining any military alliances or hosting foreign bases on its territory.
By leveraging military, diplomatic, and strategic incentives, Washington can define an endgame for the war — one that prioritizes regional stability and America’s long-term national interests.
With President Trump’s reelection, a broad consensus has emerged in Washington that America’s costly and destructive proxy war against Russia, using Ukrainians as pawns, must end.
Trump’s push for a peaceful resolution is welcome. Any potential deal, however, must reflect fundamental realities — not magical thinking or the sunk-cost fallacy. Russia is winning. Not only does its sheer size and population dwarf Ukraine’s, but Moscow is also a nuclear-armed geopolitical power with a formidable industrial base capable of sustaining a long-term war effort. Meanwhile, Ukraine is losing — in territory, equipment, and manpower. Continuing the war now only accelerates Ukraine’s destruction, casting doubt on its future viability as a state.
Resolving the conflict in Ukraine requires Washington to confront uncomfortable truths it has long ignored, discard the Biden administration’s false framing of the war, and heed the Russian red lines. The United States has minimal leverage over Russia. Contrary to dominant Western narratives, the conflict has never been about Ukrainian sovereignty or Russian imperial conquest. Its root cause was NATO enlargement — which Russia has viewed as the Global West expanding its sphere of influence and an existential threat. Since an ongoing war effectively forecloses that possibility, Moscow is not “desperate” to negotiate — and will not do so unless its security concerns are explicitly addressed through ironclad assurances of Ukraine’s permanent neutrality.
In any case, U.S. coercive tactics would only obstruct a future settlement. No amount of sanctions or military support for Kyiv will alter the Russian calculus in what it sees as an existential — even civilizational — war. Ramping up pressure on Russia through new aid packages for Ukraine is also politically untenable in the U.S., as such measures are deeply unpopular with Trump’s core MAGA base. Moreover, they will only worsen America’s $36 trillion national debt and further weaken its strategic position vis-à-vis China.
Instead, the best path to negotiations is for the Trump administration to adopt a pragmatic stance by accepting Russian control over Crimea and the Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhya regions, facilitating the creation of an internationally monitored buffer zone demarcated along the eastern banks of the Dnieper, and guaranteeing a neutral Ukraine west of the river that precludes Kyiv from military alliances or allowing foreign forces on its territory. Ukraine’s neutrality must be enshrined both in its constitution and through a regional treaty backed by the United States and Russia.
Ultimately, any lasting settlement to the Russia-Ukraine war must address the elephant in the room — the unnecessary antagonism between Russia and America and the lingering Cold War mentality in Washington. Doing so requires negotiating a holistic U.S.-Russia peace agreement based on geopolitical realities, strategic empathy, diplomatic expediency, and peaceful coexistence — one that acknowledges both nations as superior powers with distinct spheres of interest in a post-hegemonic, multi-nodal world.
Since the collapse of the Istanbul peace talks in early 2022, the reality on the battlefield has shifted — early Ukrainian successes have given way to a prolonged war of attrition that increasingly favors Russia. This means that any negotiation today will be more favorable to Moscow than it would have been at an earlier stage.
While there is still an opportunity to secure Ukraine’s future, the solution lies beyond Kyiv. Russia has consistently argued that the neutrality of contested states in its near-abroad is an acceptable resolution to its disputes with the West over spheres of influence. It is time to put that claim to the test.
In exchange for negotiations on establishing neutral buffer states along the NATO-CIS periphery — not just Ukraine — U.S. negotiators should demand an immediate halt to Russia’s military advances and a freeze on current front lines. Washington should encourage NATO members that have maintained relatively stable relations with Moscow, such as Hungary and Turkey, to take a leading role in brokering this compromise.
Such discussions would involve recognizing Georgia, Moldova, and even Belarus as potential neutral buffer states, alongside Ukraine. The logic — and how it could be framed to both Moscow and a skeptical domestic audience — is that the primary beneficiary of continued conflict and escalation between Washington and Moscow has been Beijing.
Despite widespread rhetoric in the West portraying China and Russia as members of a unified anti-liberal bloc, their partnership is largely a reaction to their shared threat perception over a truculent Global West. As the clear junior partner, Russia has legitimate long-term reservations about its strategic autonomy in its relationship with Beijing.
The Trump administration must leverage these concerns and make it clear to Moscow that greater deconfliction with the United States would allow Russia to act with more autonomy in its dealings with China. In any case, decoupling the nascent and increasingly forced Russia-China alignment is far more pivotal to American interests than the eventual territorial boundaries of Ukraine.
After two years, the war cannot continue as it has so far. In particular, the strategies used over the past two years can no longer be expected to achieve their intended results. Sanctions have pushed America’s rivals closer together, while on the battlefield, the grind of war is increasingly undermining Ukraine’s position. Given the military situation, Ukraine’s bargaining power is now weaker than it was even in mid-2023. For example, sanctions relief or even recognition of Russia’s territorial control may or may not be enough to bring Moscow to the table as long as it believes it can sustain the war effort.
For its part, Ukraine will face immense challenges in the aftermath of war, and the West has not done enough to prepare for its reconstruction. Ukrainian society is now fractured, and an abandoned Ukraine could quickly become alienated and embittered. This makes it all the more urgent to conclude this chapter of conflict and pursue a lasting settlement.
The new American administration has many tools at its disposal to bring the two sides to the table, including heightened military and economic pressure, as well as President Trump’s unique negotiating ability. But the longer the war drags on, the greater the need for a comprehensive resolution — not just to the immediate conflict, but to the broader questions of Europe’s security architecture, which must eventually include Russia. The good news is that the U.S. is uniquely positioned to shape and advance such a proposal.
Russia and Ukraine share a fundamental aspiration — security. Ukraine seeks guarantees against future Russian aggression, while Russia seeks assurances against NATO expansion, which it views as a potential threat. The solution, therefore, is a security framework that allows both sides to achieve their objectives.
However, while Ukraine sees NATO as vital to its security, Russia views it as the source of its insecurity. Therefore, NATO itself cannot be part of the solution, but individual NATO members can. Both Zelensky and Putin have already acknowledged this reality.
The next step is for the United States to sponsor a pan-European security conference. Following an immediate ceasefire, the first item on the agenda should be brokering a postwar settlement between Russia and Ukraine, anchored in a broad European security treaty that defines each party’s obligations for upholding peace in Europe. Only such a comprehensive settlement can both reinforce the ceasefire in the short term and prevent Ukrainian revanchism in the long term.
Ultimately, the core issues of this conflict — ceasefire, peace between Russia and Ukraine, security guarantees, as well as sanctions, reparations, and minority rights — are interlinked and must be addressed as part of a single package. Moreover, they can only be resolved with the full participation of both Russia and Ukraine in shaping the postwar European security architecture. Absent that, all future Russian governments will act as spoilers, and all future Ukrainian governments will be driven by revanchism — obstructing peace in Europe.
To bring Russia to the negotiating table, the Trump administration must make clear that it is open to a comprehensive resolution of the conflict — not just a ceasefire. Moscow believes that, much like the Minsk process allowed Ukraine to buy time and strengthen itself, any temporary halt in fighting would ultimately undermine Russia’s political and security objectives. For talks to succeed, Russia must be reassured that a settlement would not simply be a prelude to renewed hostilities.
Securing Ukraine’s participation in negotiations requires addressing its fundamental security concerns. Kyiv must understand that the Trump administration takes security guarantees seriously and is committed to ensuring that any settlement prevents Russia from simply regrouping and invading again.
A European crisis consultation mechanism could help achieve both goals. By establishing a dedicated communication line between the United States, Russia, and key European actors, such a mechanism would shift Western policy from wishful thinking to pragmatic engagement — managing relations with the Russia that exists rather than the one some policymakers hoped for after the Cold War.
Expressing a willingness to create such a framework would signal to Moscow that Washington takes its security and status-related concerns seriously and understands that the war in Ukraine is part of a broader strategic dispute between Russia and the West. It would also demonstrate U.S. readiness for an open-ended process to manage post-conflict military force postures in both Russia and Ukraine. At the same time, it could persuade Kyiv that dialogue — not just deterrence — offers the best path to safeguarding Ukrainian sovereignty and security.
The one thing President Trump can do to compel peace talks is, in reality, three things — since three principal parties are involved. First, unlike his predecessor, Trump and his team of advisors must actively prefer an imperfect but achievable settlement over the available alternatives. Without this strategic shift, any American attempt at mediation will lack credibility.
Second, the U.S. must make it unequivocally clear to Ukraine that we are prepared to cut off aid entirely — ensuring an even worse territorial and political outcome for that country if Kyiv refuses to negotiate.
Third, we must make just as clear to Russia that the U.S. has the capacity and willingness to sustain Ukraine’s war effort indefinitely to impose even higher costs on Russia than before, meaning Moscow’s only path to a more favorable outcome is through negotiations.
To date, the United States has sought to end the war in Ukraine by supporting Kyiv while pressuring Moscow. Yet this strategy has failed. Continued fighting will inflict enormous human costs, with no prospect of commensurate gains. However imperfect any resulting settlement may be, the priority must now be to end the war as quickly and effectively as possible.
Wars typically end when the weaker party ceases fighting or signals a willingness to make concessions. Given Ukraine’s significant disadvantages against Russia, the surest path to peace lies in convincing its leadership that military victory is unattainable and that prolonging the war will only bring further destruction. Until now, U.S. policy has done the opposite. Pledges to support Ukraine for “as long as it takes,” incremental escalations — providing weapons previously deemed off-limits — and vague assurances of NATO membership or even European troop deployments have all fostered an optimism bias and discouraged Ukraine from recognizing its precarious position.
The Biden administration’s approach was to back whatever objectives Kyiv sets. The Trump administration, by contrast, must make it clear that future U.S. support is contingent on Ukraine entering negotiations to end the war — even if that requires difficult compromises.
Few things provoke President Trump’s critics more than his relationship with The Facts. A meticulously curated Wikipedia page exists solely to catalog his “False or Misleading Statements.” CNN has described his rhetoric as a “bombardment of dishonesty” and a “campaign of relentless lying.” Writing in Persuasion, Jonathan Rauch condemned Trump’s “Firehose of Falsehood” as an “information-warfare tactic” designed to leave the public disoriented and cynical.
Despite the establishment’s frustrations, however, Trump’s penchant for radical honesty is undeniable. When pressed by Bill O’Reilly on Russian President Vladimir Putin — “But he’s a killer!?” — Trump didn’t mince his words: “There are a lot of killers,” he replied. “You think our country’s so innocent?” According to The Atlantic’s Jeffrey Goldberg, Trump allegedly once asked, during a World War I commemoration, “Who were the good guys in this war?” — an episode that, while perhaps apocryphal, is revealing.
It was a perceptive question, given the tangled web of alliances and royal bloodlines that plunged Europe into war, turning a regional crisis into one of history’s deadliest conflicts — with little moral clarity at the time. More than mere contrarianism, it reflected Trump’s instinct to challenge accepted narratives.
Unburdened by the usual sanctimony of the Beltway, perhaps Trump can also offer Ukraine something it hasn’t gotten from recent administrations: the truth. NATO is off the table. Crimea isn’t coming back. And the U.S. will not support a security obligation that risks American lives in another prolonged and unwinnable conflict. Such strategic clarity is not only pivotal for kickstarting negotiations but must also undergird any future arrangement between Washington and Kyiv. Here is a case in which honesty is not just the best policy — it is the only viable one.
The Western powers have failed to effectively manage the increasing threat of proliferation in the Middle East. While the international community is concerned with Iran’s nuclear program, Saudi Arabia has moved forward with developing its own nuclear program, and independent studies show that Israel has longed possessed dozens of nuclear warheads. The former is a member of the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while the latter has refused to sign the international agreement.
On Middle East policy, the Biden campaign had staunchly criticized the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal and it has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier since assuming office in January 2021. However, serious obstacles remain for responsible actors in expanding non-proliferation efforts toward a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.
This panel will discuss how Western powers and multilateral institutions, such as the IAEA, can play a more effective role in managing non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Peggy Mason: Canada’s former Ambassador to the UN for Disarmament
– Mark Fitzpatrick: Associate Fellow & Former Executive Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
– Ali Vaez: Iran Project Director, International Crisis Group
– Negar Mortazavi: Journalist and Political Analyst, Host of Iran Podcast
– David Albright: Founder and President of the Institute for Science and International Security
Closing (5:45 PM – 6:00 PM ET)
What is the current economic landscape in the Middle East? While global foreign direct investment is expected to fall drastically in the post-COVID era, the World Bank reported a 5% contraction in the economic output of the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries in 2020 due to the pandemic. While oil prices are expected to rebound with normalization in demand, political instability, regional and geopolitical tensions, domestic corruption, and a volatile regulatory and legal environment all threaten economic recovery in the Middle East. What is the prospect for economic growth and development in the region post-pandemic, and how could MENA nations promote sustainable growth and regional trade moving forward?
At the same time, Middle Eastern diaspora communities have become financially successful and can help promote trade between North America and the region. In this respect, the diaspora can become vital intermediaries for advancing U.S. and Canada’s business interests abroad. Promoting business diplomacy can both benefit the MENA region and be an effective and positive way to advance engagement and achieve foreign policy goals of the North Atlantic.
This panel will investigate the trade and investment opportunities in the Middle East, discuss how facilitating economic engagement with the region can benefit Canadian and American national interests, and explore relevant policy prescriptions.
Panelists:
– Hon. Sergio Marchi: Canada’s Former Minister of International Trade
– Scott Jolliffe: Chairperson, Canada Arab Business Council
– Esfandyar Batmanghelidj: Founder and Publisher of Bourse & Bazaar
– Nizar Ghanem: Director of Research and Co-founder at Triangle
– Nicki Siamaki: Researcher at Control Risks
The Middle East continues to grapple with violence and instability, particularly in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Fueled by government incompetence and foreign interventions, terrorist insurgencies have imposed severe humanitarian and economic costs on the region. Meanwhile, regional actors have engaged in an unprecedented pursuit of arms accumulation. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have imported billions of both Western and Russian-made weapons and funded militant groups across the region, intending to contain their regional adversaries, particularly Iran. Tehran has also provided sophisticated weaponry to various militia groups across the region to strengthen its geopolitical position against Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Israel.
On the other hand, with international terrorist networks and intense regional rivalry in the Middle East, it is impractical to discuss peace and security without addressing terrorism and the arms race in the region. This panel will primarily discuss the implications of the ongoing arms race in the region and the role of Western powers and multilateral organizations in facilitating trust-building security arrangements among regional stakeholders to limit the proliferation of arms across the Middle East.
Panelists:
Luciano Zaccara: Assistant Professor, Qatar University
Dania Thafer: Executive Director, Gulf International Forum
Kayhan Barzegar: Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Science and Research Branch of Azad University
Barbara Slavin: Director of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council
Sanam Shantyaei: Senior Journalist at France24 & host of Middle East Matters
The emerging regional order in West Asia will have wide-ranging implications for global security. The Biden administration has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier, an initiative staunchly opposed by Israel, while also taking a harder line on Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen. Meanwhile, key regional actors, including Qatar, Iraq, and Oman, have engaged in backchannel efforts to bring Iran and Saudi Arabia to the negotiating table. From a broader geopolitical perspective, with the need to secure its energy imports, China is also expected to increase its footprint in the region and influence the mentioned challenges.
In this evolving landscape, Western powers will be compelled to redefine their strategic priorities and adjust their policies with the new realities in the region. In this panel, we will discuss how the West, including the United States and its allies, can utilize multilateral diplomacy with its adversaries to prevent military escalation in the region. Most importantly, the panel will discuss if a multilateral security dialogue in the Persian Gulf region, proposed by some regional actors, can help reduce tensions among regional foes and produce sustainable peace and development for the region.
Panelists:
– Abdullah Baabood: Academic Researcher and Former Director of the Centre for Gulf Studies, Qatar University
– Trita Parsi: Executive Vice-President, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
– Ebtesam Al-Ketbi: President, Emirates Policy Centre
– Jon Allen: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Israel
– Elizabeth Hagedorn: Washington correspondent for Al-Monitor
Military interventions, political and economic instabilities, and civil unrest in the Middle East have led to a global refugee crisis with an increasing wave of refugees and asylum seekers to Europe and Canada. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has, in myriad ways, exacerbated and contributed to the ongoing security threats and destabilization of the region.
While these challenges pose serious risks to Canadian security, Ottawa will also have the opportunity to limit such risks and prevent a spillover effect vis-à-vis effective humanitarian initiatives in the region. In this panel, we will primarily investigate Canada’s Middle East Strategy’s degree of success in providing humanitarian aid to the region. Secondly, the panel will discuss what programs and initiatives Canada can introduce to further build on the renewed strategy. and more specifically, how Canada can utilize its policy instruments to more effectively deal with the increasing influx of refugees from the Middle East.
Panelists:
Erica Di Ruggiero: Director of Centre for Global Health, University of Toronto
Reyhana Patel: Head of Communications & Government Relations, Islamic Relief Canada
Amir Barmaki: Former Head of UN OCHA in Iran
Catherine Gribbin: Senior Legal Advisor for International and Humanitarian Law, Canadian Red Cross
In 2016, Canada launched an ambitious five-year “Middle East Engagement Strategy” (2016-2021), committing to investing CA$3.5 billion over five years to help establish the necessary conditions for security and stability, alleviate human suffering and enable stabilization programs in the region. In the latest development, during the meeting of the Global Coalition against ISIS, Minister of Foreign Affairs Marc Garneau announced more than $43.6 million in Peace and Stabilization Operations Program funding for 11 projects in Syria and Iraq.
With Canada’s Middle East Engagement Strategy expiring this year, it is time to examine and evaluate this massive investment in the Middle East region in the past five years. More importantly, the panel will discuss a principled and strategic roadmap for the future of Canada’s short-term and long-term engagement in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Ferry de Kerckhove: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Egypt
– Dennis Horak: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
– Chris Kilford: Former Canadian Defence Attaché in Turkey, member of the national board of the Canadian International Council (CIC)
– David Dewitt: University Professor Emeritus, York University
While the United States continues to pull back from certain regional conflicts, reflected by the Biden administration’s decision to halt American backing for Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen and the expected withdrawal from Afghanistan, US troops continue to be stationed across the region. Meanwhile, Russia and China have significantly maintained and even expanded their regional activities. On one hand, the Kremlin has maintained its military presence in Syria, and on the other hand, China has signed an unprecedented 25-year strategic agreement with Iran.
As the global power structure continues to shift, it is essential to analyze the future of the US regional presence under the Biden administration, explore the emerging global rivalry with Russia and China, and at last, investigate the implications of such competition for peace and security in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Dmitri Trenin: Director of Carnegie Moscow Center
– Joost R. Hiltermann: Director of MENA Programme, International Crisis Group
– Roxane Farmanfarmaian: Affiliated Lecturer in International Relations of the Middle East and North Africa, University of Cambridge
– Andrew A. Michta: Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at Marshall Center
– Kelley Vlahos: Senior Advisor, Quincy Institute
The security architecture of the Middle East has undergone rapid transformations in an exceptionally short period. Notable developments include the United States gradual withdrawal from the region, rapprochement between Israel and some GCC states through the Abraham Accords and the rise of Chinese and Russian regional engagement.
With these new trends in the Middle East, it is timely to investigate the security implications of the Biden administration’s Middle East policy. In this respect, we will discuss the Biden team’s new approach vis-à-vis Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The panel will also discuss the role of other major powers, including China and Russia in shaping this new security environment in the region, and how the Biden administration will respond to these powers’ increasing regional presence.
Panelists:
– Sanam Vakil: Deputy Director of MENA Programme at Chatham House
– Denise Natali: Acting Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies & Director of the Center for Strategic Research, National Defense University
– Hassan Ahmadian: Professor of the Middle East and North Africa Studies, University of Tehran
– Abdulaziz Sagar: Chairman, Gulf Research Center
– Andrew Parasiliti: President, Al-Monitor
