Throughout history, only a few powers have successfully dominated the Middle East. These include the Achaemenid Empire, Alexander the Macedonian, and the Islamic empires of the Rashidun and later Umayyad Caliphates. However, these cases are extreme outliers in a region with one of the longest recorded histories of war and political fragmentation. Most of the time, hegemony in West Asia has been as elusive as it once was in Europe, with regional powers balancing one another rather than succumbing to external rule.
Anatolia, the Iranian plateau, and the Nile River Valley have historically served as geographic and cultural anchors for competing regional powers, fostering a succession of states that resisted overarching control by any individual power. Even as migrations and the arrival of new elites — often from the Eurasian steppe — altered demographic compositions, the geographic realities of these regions continuously reasserted themselves, forming naturally powerful and defensible states. This equilibrium persisted until European expansion, in conjunction with the Industrial Revolution, provided maritime powers with an unprecedented capacity to influence regional dynamics outside the Global North.
After the Second World War, the United States and its allies, especially under the influence of Neoconservatives, sought to establish a dominant role in the Middle East presumably to “contain” Soviet expansionism. Under this framework, Western powers — led by the U.S. — aimed to stabilize oil and gas prices while bringing key resources under de facto American protection. With the exception of the Nixon administration, this bipartisan strategy not only sought to prevent indigenous states from emerging as regional powers but also promoted a globalized, market-friendly economic ideology that was expected to unify the entire world under a neoliberal system. Additionally, American power was systematically used to compel Arab states to recognize and normalize relations with Israel. This amounted to a hegemonic project in all but name.
This hegemonic policy outlasted the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989. General Wesley Clark once revealed that, following 9/11, Pentagon planners envisioned a campaign to remake the Middle East through direct and indirect military interventions, with the ultimate goal of toppling the Iranian government. Under the rubric of the Great War on Terror, the strategy targeted Iraq, Libya, Syria, Somalia, and Sudan — countries that, in the years since, have suffered immense violence, domestic instability, and even state failure, with many becoming active theaters for American military operations, either willingly or otherwise.
At first glance and in the wake of October 7th, current developments in the Middle East might suggest that the neoconservative vision for the region has finally materialized. Israel is asserting itself in Lebanon and invading parts of Syria, Hezbollah is on the defensive, and Syria — once a bastion of Arab nationalism — has largely collapsed. However, rather than signifying the success of the hegemonic project, these conditions underscore its failure.
The unipolar moment has passed, and the relentless pursuit of regime change has only weakened America’s position. Even disregarding the immense human and economic costs of these interventions and their peripheral nature for U.S. security, a sober analysis reveals that, despite the removal of many governments opposed to U.S. interests, American domination of the region is more distant today than at any time since World War II.
While the U.S. expended vast resources on power projection in the Middle East, local states with historical civilizational endurance and geopolitical strengths quietly reasserted themselves as the primary drivers of regional politics. As the U.S. and, to some extent, Russia have hemorrhaged influence, these indigenous middle powers like Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia have strengthened their geopolitical networks and economic resilience through a multi-aligned foreign policy. This transformation shifts the focus from a zero-sum great power competition between China, Russia, and the U.S. to a polycentric world shaped by balance-of-power dynamics in the region itself.
Turkey has led this shift, leveraging NATO protection while pursuing independent relationships — particularly with Russia — that defy traditional alliance constraints. Iran, long a nemesis of American plans for the region, continues to mobilize a weakened but large and active network of sub-state actors that counterbalance the regional designs of its rivals and adversaries. In doing so, both countries are reviving their culturally and geographically rooted realms of power and reclaiming their traditional status as regional poles — reawakening historical tensions between Anatolia and Persia in the process.
The case of Iraq exemplifies this transformation. Despite the U.S. invasion and occupation, Iraq today is more aligned with Tehran than with Washington, reflecting a historical pattern reminiscent of the Parthian and Sassanian periods. Similarly, Syria — once a focal point of U.S. and allied intervention — is now heavily influenced by Turkey, recalling its status under the Seljuks and Ottomans. Such regional rivalries between Turkey and Iran, particularly in Mesopotamia and the Caucasus, are likely to intensify.
Realism, the most consistently vindicated school of international relations, suggests that ascendant powers seek to defend their regional sphere of interest from powerful neighbors and superpower interventions while maximizing their autonomy. In such conditions, they prioritize security concerns based on geographic proximity rather than ideological alignment or normative commitments to idealistic causes like internationalism.
Unable to fully trust regional competitors, rising states often chart divergent and opportunistic foreign policies — not only for security reasons but also to affirm their national sovereignty and gain domestic political support. As these Middle Powers reassert themselves in their respective historical regions, they naturally become skeptical of external great powers. They recognize that their own proximity and staying in power in the region grants them escalation dominance over distant actors whose presence is discretionary and fleeting rather than necessary and permanent.
Despite its unparalleled alliance with the United States or perhaps because of it, not even Israel is immune to these dynamics. Not a region-defining power like Turkey or Iran, Israel remains a revisionist state committed to reshaping borders and power structures in its vicinity in the name of security. While U.S. policy has routinely amplified Israeli interests—often at the cost of regional stability—this reliance on external sponsorship and military support has long-term consequences.
Just as in Ukraine, the artificial augmentation of Israeli power (by proxy) invites aggressive balancing by adjacent regional powers. If Israel continues to expand at the expense of its neighbors, it risks increasing the number of conflicts it faces. Some within the Israeli security establishment already recognize this danger. Additionally, Washington’s unwavering support for Israel may face greater domestic scrutiny—if not backlash—as America’s vital national interests and political expediency become increasingly incompatible with sustained entanglement in the Middle East.
Moreover, Israel’s nuclear monopoly introduces a structural imbalance that heightens regional tensions. As Iran and Turkey grow more powerful, the likelihood of nuclear proliferation by these middle powers increases, further diminishing the ability of external great powers to interject on Israel’s behalf. Alternatively, if Israel normalizes relations with its most powerful neighbors through diplomacy and more restrained policies and actively lessens its reliance on Washington, it can enjoy more sustainable security over the long term—taking part in the region’s new security architecture as a proper West Asian state rather than being regarded as a Western outpost.
All this aligns with a broader systemic trend of the post-unipolar era that rewards regional balance-of-power politics while punishing the fantasy of global hegemony.
A critical blind spot in the interventionist mindset regarding the Middle East is the assumption that regime change in Iran would fundamentally alter regional dynamics. While Iran has suffered major setbacks in Lebanon and Syria, and its government faces significant domestic unrest and perhaps even a succession crisis, the collapse of the Islamic Republic would not eliminate resistance to American intervention or Israeli expansion.
Any new Iranian regime — whether nationalist, monarchist, or even a Western-style liberal democracy — would inherit Iran’s geographic and security imperatives and the historical redlines of the Persian state. Not only would initial rapprochement with Washington—or even a strategic pivot away from Russia — not change strategic continuity in Tehran, but it would likely accelerate and intensify its strategic rivalry with Turkey and its key allies such as Azerbaijan and Qatar.
A pro-Israel Iran could also just as easily create new regional fault lines, with Turkey stepping in to fill the role of Israel’s leading adversary in the Islamic world. Conversely, a post-theocratic Iran might be welcomed by other states, including Israel and major Arab countries, as a counterweight to Ankara’s neo-Ottoman imperial agenda, prompting a reconfiguration of existing alliances. In any scenario, realpolitik would reassert itself once the immediate disruptions subside. The assumption that the fall of the theocracy in Tehran would pave the way for an American-aligned Middle East is thus deeply flawed.
The postwar experiment in global hegemony under the liberal international order is proving to be neither unique nor permanent. Rather than a natural or inevitable order, it was an ideological construct enabled by superpowers — first the competing hegemonic visions of the Soviet Union and the United States, and later, American unipolar dominance. That era is now receding as power disperses globally, forcing even the world’s most powerful states to reconsider their strategic priorities and adapt to a more constrained geopolitical reality. The Middle East exemplifies this shift.
With the world’s economic and industrial centers of gravity shifting beyond the North Atlantic, emerging middle powers are asserting greater strategic autonomy. No longer willing to serve as peripheral actors in a superpower-led global system dominated by Washington or Beijing, they are forging their own paths. As this multinodal world solidifies, imposing a singular hegemonic order on the Middle East becomes not just improbable but structurally impossible.
The end of Pax Americana does not imply chaos or a power vacuum in the Middle East, nor will it erase long-standing regional rivalries. Instead, the emergence of a multipolar West Asia signals a return to the region’s natural equilibrium — one in which historically entrenched regional powers, each with a defined geopolitical reach and distinct strategic imperatives and constraints, balance one another in a more stable and self-sustaining order.
What is clear, however, is that no amount of blood and treasure expended by the United States — or any other great power — will secure lasting hegemony over the region. Once again, history has returned to vindicate realism over globalist crusades, ensuring that balance-of-power politics — not hegemonic domination — will continue to shape the Middle East’s geopolitical landscape.
The Western powers have failed to effectively manage the increasing threat of proliferation in the Middle East. While the international community is concerned with Iran’s nuclear program, Saudi Arabia has moved forward with developing its own nuclear program, and independent studies show that Israel has longed possessed dozens of nuclear warheads. The former is a member of the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while the latter has refused to sign the international agreement.
On Middle East policy, the Biden campaign had staunchly criticized the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal and it has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier since assuming office in January 2021. However, serious obstacles remain for responsible actors in expanding non-proliferation efforts toward a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.
This panel will discuss how Western powers and multilateral institutions, such as the IAEA, can play a more effective role in managing non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Peggy Mason: Canada’s former Ambassador to the UN for Disarmament
– Mark Fitzpatrick: Associate Fellow & Former Executive Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
– Ali Vaez: Iran Project Director, International Crisis Group
– Negar Mortazavi: Journalist and Political Analyst, Host of Iran Podcast
– David Albright: Founder and President of the Institute for Science and International Security
Closing (5:45 PM – 6:00 PM ET)
What is the current economic landscape in the Middle East? While global foreign direct investment is expected to fall drastically in the post-COVID era, the World Bank reported a 5% contraction in the economic output of the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries in 2020 due to the pandemic. While oil prices are expected to rebound with normalization in demand, political instability, regional and geopolitical tensions, domestic corruption, and a volatile regulatory and legal environment all threaten economic recovery in the Middle East. What is the prospect for economic growth and development in the region post-pandemic, and how could MENA nations promote sustainable growth and regional trade moving forward?
At the same time, Middle Eastern diaspora communities have become financially successful and can help promote trade between North America and the region. In this respect, the diaspora can become vital intermediaries for advancing U.S. and Canada’s business interests abroad. Promoting business diplomacy can both benefit the MENA region and be an effective and positive way to advance engagement and achieve foreign policy goals of the North Atlantic.
This panel will investigate the trade and investment opportunities in the Middle East, discuss how facilitating economic engagement with the region can benefit Canadian and American national interests, and explore relevant policy prescriptions.
Panelists:
– Hon. Sergio Marchi: Canada’s Former Minister of International Trade
– Scott Jolliffe: Chairperson, Canada Arab Business Council
– Esfandyar Batmanghelidj: Founder and Publisher of Bourse & Bazaar
– Nizar Ghanem: Director of Research and Co-founder at Triangle
– Nicki Siamaki: Researcher at Control Risks
The Middle East continues to grapple with violence and instability, particularly in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Fueled by government incompetence and foreign interventions, terrorist insurgencies have imposed severe humanitarian and economic costs on the region. Meanwhile, regional actors have engaged in an unprecedented pursuit of arms accumulation. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have imported billions of both Western and Russian-made weapons and funded militant groups across the region, intending to contain their regional adversaries, particularly Iran. Tehran has also provided sophisticated weaponry to various militia groups across the region to strengthen its geopolitical position against Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Israel.
On the other hand, with international terrorist networks and intense regional rivalry in the Middle East, it is impractical to discuss peace and security without addressing terrorism and the arms race in the region. This panel will primarily discuss the implications of the ongoing arms race in the region and the role of Western powers and multilateral organizations in facilitating trust-building security arrangements among regional stakeholders to limit the proliferation of arms across the Middle East.
Panelists:
Luciano Zaccara: Assistant Professor, Qatar University
Dania Thafer: Executive Director, Gulf International Forum
Kayhan Barzegar: Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Science and Research Branch of Azad University
Barbara Slavin: Director of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council
Sanam Shantyaei: Senior Journalist at France24 & host of Middle East Matters
The emerging regional order in West Asia will have wide-ranging implications for global security. The Biden administration has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier, an initiative staunchly opposed by Israel, while also taking a harder line on Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen. Meanwhile, key regional actors, including Qatar, Iraq, and Oman, have engaged in backchannel efforts to bring Iran and Saudi Arabia to the negotiating table. From a broader geopolitical perspective, with the need to secure its energy imports, China is also expected to increase its footprint in the region and influence the mentioned challenges.
In this evolving landscape, Western powers will be compelled to redefine their strategic priorities and adjust their policies with the new realities in the region. In this panel, we will discuss how the West, including the United States and its allies, can utilize multilateral diplomacy with its adversaries to prevent military escalation in the region. Most importantly, the panel will discuss if a multilateral security dialogue in the Persian Gulf region, proposed by some regional actors, can help reduce tensions among regional foes and produce sustainable peace and development for the region.
Panelists:
– Abdullah Baabood: Academic Researcher and Former Director of the Centre for Gulf Studies, Qatar University
– Trita Parsi: Executive Vice-President, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
– Ebtesam Al-Ketbi: President, Emirates Policy Centre
– Jon Allen: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Israel
– Elizabeth Hagedorn: Washington correspondent for Al-Monitor
Military interventions, political and economic instabilities, and civil unrest in the Middle East have led to a global refugee crisis with an increasing wave of refugees and asylum seekers to Europe and Canada. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has, in myriad ways, exacerbated and contributed to the ongoing security threats and destabilization of the region.
While these challenges pose serious risks to Canadian security, Ottawa will also have the opportunity to limit such risks and prevent a spillover effect vis-à-vis effective humanitarian initiatives in the region. In this panel, we will primarily investigate Canada’s Middle East Strategy’s degree of success in providing humanitarian aid to the region. Secondly, the panel will discuss what programs and initiatives Canada can introduce to further build on the renewed strategy. and more specifically, how Canada can utilize its policy instruments to more effectively deal with the increasing influx of refugees from the Middle East.
Panelists:
Erica Di Ruggiero: Director of Centre for Global Health, University of Toronto
Reyhana Patel: Head of Communications & Government Relations, Islamic Relief Canada
Amir Barmaki: Former Head of UN OCHA in Iran
Catherine Gribbin: Senior Legal Advisor for International and Humanitarian Law, Canadian Red Cross
In 2016, Canada launched an ambitious five-year “Middle East Engagement Strategy” (2016-2021), committing to investing CA$3.5 billion over five years to help establish the necessary conditions for security and stability, alleviate human suffering and enable stabilization programs in the region. In the latest development, during the meeting of the Global Coalition against ISIS, Minister of Foreign Affairs Marc Garneau announced more than $43.6 million in Peace and Stabilization Operations Program funding for 11 projects in Syria and Iraq.
With Canada’s Middle East Engagement Strategy expiring this year, it is time to examine and evaluate this massive investment in the Middle East region in the past five years. More importantly, the panel will discuss a principled and strategic roadmap for the future of Canada’s short-term and long-term engagement in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Ferry de Kerckhove: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Egypt
– Dennis Horak: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
– Chris Kilford: Former Canadian Defence Attaché in Turkey, member of the national board of the Canadian International Council (CIC)
– David Dewitt: University Professor Emeritus, York University
While the United States continues to pull back from certain regional conflicts, reflected by the Biden administration’s decision to halt American backing for Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen and the expected withdrawal from Afghanistan, US troops continue to be stationed across the region. Meanwhile, Russia and China have significantly maintained and even expanded their regional activities. On one hand, the Kremlin has maintained its military presence in Syria, and on the other hand, China has signed an unprecedented 25-year strategic agreement with Iran.
As the global power structure continues to shift, it is essential to analyze the future of the US regional presence under the Biden administration, explore the emerging global rivalry with Russia and China, and at last, investigate the implications of such competition for peace and security in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Dmitri Trenin: Director of Carnegie Moscow Center
– Joost R. Hiltermann: Director of MENA Programme, International Crisis Group
– Roxane Farmanfarmaian: Affiliated Lecturer in International Relations of the Middle East and North Africa, University of Cambridge
– Andrew A. Michta: Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at Marshall Center
– Kelley Vlahos: Senior Advisor, Quincy Institute
The security architecture of the Middle East has undergone rapid transformations in an exceptionally short period. Notable developments include the United States gradual withdrawal from the region, rapprochement between Israel and some GCC states through the Abraham Accords and the rise of Chinese and Russian regional engagement.
With these new trends in the Middle East, it is timely to investigate the security implications of the Biden administration’s Middle East policy. In this respect, we will discuss the Biden team’s new approach vis-à-vis Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The panel will also discuss the role of other major powers, including China and Russia in shaping this new security environment in the region, and how the Biden administration will respond to these powers’ increasing regional presence.
Panelists:
– Sanam Vakil: Deputy Director of MENA Programme at Chatham House
– Denise Natali: Acting Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies & Director of the Center for Strategic Research, National Defense University
– Hassan Ahmadian: Professor of the Middle East and North Africa Studies, University of Tehran
– Abdulaziz Sagar: Chairman, Gulf Research Center
– Andrew Parasiliti: President, Al-Monitor
