In mid-September, the German frigate Baden-Wuerttemberg and its support ship Frankfurt am Main transited the Taiwan Strait, marking the first time a German naval vessel passed through the region in over twenty years. Germany’s Federal Foreign Office described the transit as a “routine operation”, clarifying its legal opinion on freedom of navigation. The German Federal Ministry of Defense stated that the naval vessels had taken the most direct and safest course between South Korea and the Philippines through international waters.
German and U.S. media were largely supportive of Berlin’s transit, portraying the freedom of navigation operation (FONOP) as a show of strength for the international rules-based order and against Chinese aggression in Asia’s maritime domain. U.S. allies like Australia, Japan, and the Philippines also lauded the German navy’s transit as evidence that European states were willing and able to contribute more to Asian security.
However, reactions from non-aligned Asian states were more ambivalent. Indonesian media focused on the destabilizing effects of the transit, highlighting China’s unhappiness with the move. Similarly, Malaysian outlets were critical, perceiving Germany’s decision to ignore Chinese warnings as unnecessary provocation. Thai and Vietnamese media also treated the transit as inherently destabilizing, cautioning against China’s likely reaction.
Chinese media condemned Germany’s transit, accusing Berlin of deliberately violating China’s territorial sovereignty and escalating regional tensions. Chinese commentators claimed that Germany was acting on behalf of the United States, propagating Washington’s “China threat” narrative. Across Chinese social media, users questioned why Germany was sending its naval forces to Asia at a time when there was war in Europe.
While Germany’s transit alone is unlikely to significantly affect regional stability, it highlights broader trends in Asia, including the increasing military involvement of European countries in the region and the tendency of external powers from the “global West” to internationalize Asia’s security landscape. These trends point to the development of a Euro-Atlantic, U.S.-led alliance aimed at countering China’s influence and assertiveness. They also illustrate growing resistance from non-aligned or multi-aligned Asian states — the “emerging non-West” — to the securitization of their region by external powers and their rejection of the West’s portrayal of China as a unique threat to a rules-based regional order.
Europe’s interest in the Asia-Pacific — more recently referred to as the “Indo-Pacific” by many Western states — is partly rooted in its colonial legacy, with France being a prominent example. In 2018, France became the first European country to release an Indo-Pacific strategy and an Indo-Pacific defense policy, aimed at enhancing its strategic presence by positioning itself as a Pacific nation. French policymakers cited their overseas territories of New Caledonia, French Polynesia, Réunion, and Mayotte as key assets, arguing that their control over these territories granted France a significant exclusive economic zone (EEZ). This, they claimed, necessitated a more active defense against threats such as illegal fishing and piracy. Ironically, while retaining control over its former colonies, France simultaneously argued that its Indo-Pacific presence would strengthen international law and promote multilateralism.
The Netherlands introduced its own Indo-Pacific strategy in 2020, which similarly reflected its colonial past, though with a different emphasis. While no longer holding colonial assets, the Dutch leveraged their strong economic and cultural ties, particularly with Indonesia, to enhance modern-day relations. Their strategy focused on multilateral cooperation on global issues like climate change, human rights, and maintaining a rules-based international order. In contrast to France’s defense-driven agenda, the Dutch emphasized collaboration with the European Union to support maritime security, digital connectivity, and sustainable trade. Despite this, the Netherlands also demonstrated a willingness to project military force, participating in naval exercises in the South China Sea.
The UK’s Indo-Pacific engagement, as outlined in its 2021 Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development, and Foreign Policy, also draws heavily on its colonial past. The UK seeks to expand its naval presence in the region through joint military exercises with partners like Australia, India, Japan, and South Korea, as well as military cooperation through alliances like AUKUS (Australia, UK, and the U.S.) and the Five Eyes (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, US, and the UK). Although the UK’s strategy emphasizes multilateralism, its continued control over former territories such as Diego Garcia reflects lingering colonial-era dynamics.
Germany’s Indo-Pacific approach is notably different. With a much smaller colonial footprint in Asia compared to France, the Netherlands, and the UK, Germany’s engagement is rooted in supporting multilateral and institutional development, focusing on sustainable economic growth and trade. Initially, Germany’s Indo-Pacific guidelines, issued in 2020, emphasized conflict prevention and maritime security, de-emphasizing direct military engagement. However, with its Indo-Pacific Deployment 2024 plan, Germany signaled a more active security role, working alongside partners like Australia, Canada, France, and the United States.
Despite not being in Europe and never having held colonial territories in Asia, Canada also subscribes to the European rationale for involvement in Asia, although through a different approach. Its 2022 Indo-Pacific strategy centered on contemporary issues such as governance, economic engagement, and security cooperation, reflecting broader alignment with global West partners. Despite lacking historical colonial ties to the region, Canada’s strategy shares the same underlying premise as its European counterparts — that external intervention and leadership are essential to maintaining regional stability in Asia.
At the core of these Euro-Atlantic strategies lies a hegemonic worldview. Western states frequently position themselves as defenders of multilateralism and international law, yet often impose their vision of governance and security on world regions. These narratives imply that Asia requires Western leadership to navigate its development, a notion that reflects the colonial legacies and neo-imperial impulses of these states. For instance, France’s Indo-Pacific strategy under President Macron underscores the perceived indispensability of French leadership in maintaining Asia’s rules-based order and balancing against Chinese aggression.
Similarly, Dutch policymakers frame the Netherlands as a leader in promoting democratic values, human rights, and governance, asserting that many Indo-Pacific states require European support to counter China’s militarization and assertive foreign policy. The UK’s strategic logic is also rooted in this narrative, advocating for British leadership on regional security issues ranging from climate change to defense.
Germany, while less burdened by colonial narratives, still frames its involvement in terms of supporting a “rules-based” international order alongside “like-minded” states. This reveals a similar assumption that external leadership is crucial to shaping Asia’s security and economic development. Although Canada’s situation differs from European states, Ottawa’s Indo-Pacific approach is similarly paternalistic. Rather than engaging Asian states on their own terms, Canadian policymakers have crafted a foreign policy that privileges ‘Canadian values’ — such as a feminist international assistance program and indigenous reconciliation — over the region’s own priorities.
The web of narratives surrounding ‘global leadership’ and ‘the West’s indispensability’, while differing in emphasis and nuance, share a common thread: they serve the Euro-Atlantic objective of global primacy under the guise of promoting regional stability. This rather globalist and ideological lens distorts interest-based thinking among Atlanticists. It also perpetuates a false image of Asia, particularly the paternalistic notion that Asian states lack the agency or the intellectual capacity to manage their own security and development without Western intervention. By projecting Western values as universal and Euro-Atlantic leadership as globally necessary, these narratives often result in policies that not only decenter core national interests of Western countries but also lack sufficient regional input, thereby undermining local dynamics and exacerbating tensions rather than fostering genuine global stability.
The Euro-Atlantic military presence in the Indo-Pacific, almost always coordinated with the United States and its regional allies — Australia, Japan, and the Philippines — serves as a direct challenge to China’s strategic posture in the region. The involvement of countries like Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK in Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) and joint military exercises reflects their internalization of the idea that their military presence stabilizes the region. However, this notion reintroduces an outdated form of European “gunboat diplomacy” into the Asian theater, one that is increasingly out of step with the region’s needs and expectations.
Opponents of this critique often argue that Asian states welcome a greater Euro-Atlantic role in regional security, particularly in the maritime domain. However, polling and media narratives across the region consistently demonstrate the opposite. While the United States and its allies may advocate for European involvement, non-aligned states, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, often view it as irrelevant or destabilizing. The assumption that external Western leadership is required to maintain regional order lacks support from the broader Asian community, and the repeated emphasis on military force ignores the nuanced and often diplomatic approaches favored by many regional actors.
Another argument often made in favor of Euro-Atlantic engagement is that cooperation extends beyond the U.S. and its traditional allies to include states like Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. While military cooperation has occurred, the problem is not engagement per se, but in the ideological manner in which Euro-Atlantic powers select their regional partners. The security strategies of Western countries focus primarily on developing partnerships with “like-minded” states, or those that share their foreign policy values and national security interests: primarily the Asian states already a part of the US alliance network. This selective approach undermines broader regional stability — with the focus on confrontation with China dividing the region into opposing blocs rather than building an inclusive, region-wide security architecture.
The rationale behind most of the Global West’s military interjection in Asia is to uphold a “rules-based order”, yet the persistence of Euro-Atlantic military involvement has contributed to regional polarization. By reinforcing the U.S.-led bloc, which is committed to challenging China’s influence, European and North American states are inadvertently helping to splinter the region into rival factions. This dynamic risks exacerbating tensions, particularly as the region’s non-aligned states, including those in ASEAN, are focused on stability through diplomacy, not militarization.
The divergence between Asia’s non-aligned or multi-aligned states and the U.S.-led Euro-Atlantic security partnership is becoming increasingly evident. While this divide has not yet led to a formal breakdown in relations, it is placing significant strains on the region’s security architecture. As Euro-Atlantic states double down on military shows of force, particularly around Taiwan and the South China Sea, the potential for a splintering of the region into opposing blocs grows.
The global West’s approach to the Indo-Pacific is driven by a strategic narrative that portrays China as the singular threat to regional stability. However, many Asian states do not share this view. Non-aligned countries often see the security landscape as far more complex, with multiple actors and interests at play. Moreover, the global South increasingly rejects the notion that Asia requires Western leadership to manage its security. This growing dissonance between the global West and the rest of the world reflects a broader global trend: the rejection of Western-centric models of governance and security in favor of more regionally-driven solutions.
By crafting Indo-Pacific strategies in capitals far removed from Asia — such as Ottawa, Amsterdam, and Paris — Euro-Atlantic states prioritize their globalist and often ideological agenda over the national interests and agency of Asian states. As members of elite global institutions like the G7 and NATO, they view their intervention as both a right and a responsibility. Yet their actions often perpetuate a status quo that places the interests of their establishments above those of the region’s states, ultimately undermining the very stability they claim to protect.
This divide is further complicated by the fact that Euro-Atlantic strategies are increasingly linked to global narratives about the West’s relative decline and the rise of China. Western states frame their military activities in the Indo-Pacific as part of a broader struggle against authoritarianism, drawing parallels between China’s assertiveness in Asia and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This global merging of distinct regional concerns has led to discussions about expanding NATO’s presence in Asia, a move that would undoubtedly exacerbate regional tensions and further alienate non-aligned states.
Despite the confidence that Euro-Atlantic states place in their military capacity, their involvement in the Indo-Pacific may be creating more risks than rewards. The persistence of a Western military presence, combined with a lack of regional support, raises questions about the long-term sustainability of this approach. Polling consistently shows minimal backing for Euro-Atlantic involvement in regional security, apart from Washington, which the people in the region view as both a key player and a destabilizing force.
Rather than stabilizing the region, Euro-Atlantic involvement often intensifies existing tensions, especially around sensitive areas like Taiwan and the South China Sea. By prioritizing short-term goals — such as supporting the U.S. narrative of countering Chinese aggression — Euro-Atlantic states risk prolonging regional conflicts rather than resolving them. For example, ASEAN and China might be more inclined to reach an agreement on a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea if external powers were less involved in favoring one side over the other.
The overlap between the U.S.-Asian alliance system and Euro-Atlantic security priorities underscores that an inherent bias against Beijing clouds the West’s ‘Indo-Pacific’ strategies. When Euro-Atlantic states engage with regional actors, they typically prioritize relationships with Australia, Japan, and India, largely framing their engagement as part of a broader effort to contain China. This approach not only alienates other regional players but also perpetuates an externally constructed strategic framework that does not reflect the region’s evolving dynamics.
While Western audiences have largely become accustomed to the idea of Euro-Atlantic involvement in Asia, there is nothing inherently “natural” about the global West’s military presence in the region. Neither is there anything “universal” about the values that Western states seek to propagate and presumably defend through their military activities in the Indo-Pacific. The notion that Euro-Atlantic powers should act as security guarantors or “offshore balancers” reflects a deep-seated belief in the righteousness of Western global hegemony that maps onto the historical hierarchy of states in the postwar international order. However, this hierarchical dynamic is increasingly at odds with the region’s shifting geopolitical realities.
A counterfactual scenario highlights the absurdity of the Euro-Atlantic approach. Imagine, for instance, if Southeast Asian states, in partnership with China, began operating across Europe to prevent political or military developments unfavorable to their interests. How might the European states react if foreign navies conducted FONOPs in their waters, or if Southeast Asian powers challenged European maritime claims? Such scenarios seem absurd, but they mirror what the Euro-Atlantic states are currently undertaking in the Indo-Pacific — a projection of military power to affect and alter the regional balance(s) outside their own neighborhood, ostensibly to advance their own security interests.
The notion that Euro-Atlantic powers are necessary to Asia’s stability is rooted in a historical view that no longer reflects the geopolitical or economic realities of the region. Asia has developed into one of the most dynamic economic regions in the world, with states like China, Indonesia, India, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam growing in wealth, human capital, technological prowess, interconnectivity, and military power. These states are increasingly capable of addressing their national and regional security concerns without the intervention of Western powers. As Asia’s influence rises, the relative influence of Euro-Atlantic states — particularly Europe and Canada — is declining. This raises an important question: under what conditions will Asian states continue to look to Europe and North America for leadership?
As Europe and Canada face stagnating economies, aging populations, and a growing nationalist backlash against their globalist policies, it becomes increasingly unclear what value they can offer to countries in South and East Asia. In fact, as their own domestic social orders come under strain, it is questionable whether they can maintain their current levels of involvement in the region. Even more critically, if Western states cannot effectively manage Russian aggression in Ukraine through NATO, their ability to influence Asia’s security dynamics is likely to be even more minimal.
This reliance on U.S. military support further complicates the picture. Euro-Atlantic states consistently avoid discussing the central role of Washington in their Indo-Pacific strategies, instead focusing on partnerships with “like-minded” states. Yet, without America’s military leadership and deterrence capability, none of these states could independently challenge China’s strategic role in the region. Even the more robust military actors, such as France and the UK, depend on U.S. strategic cover for their “autonomous” Indo-Pacific deployments.
For the United States, its collaboration with Euro-Atlantic states in the Indo-Pacific presents significant medium- to long-term strategic vulnerabilities. While the short-term benefits of reinforcing alliances with European partners may seem clear, this partnership feeds into the narrative — propagated by China — that the U.S. is an outsider attempting to impose its will on the region. This perception weakens America’s position as an effective partner in Asia, particularly among non-aligned and multi-aligned states, where anti-Western sentiment is growing.
Additionally, by relying heavily on Euro-Atlantic partners for operations such as FONOPS or Taiwan Strait transits, the U.S. risks undermining regional organizations like ASEAN, which aim to advance security objectives through dialogue and multilateralism. Instead of fostering a regional order that promotes inclusivity, the U.S.-Euro-Atlantic consortium may inadvertently suppress local initiatives that could contribute to a more sustainable balance of power. This undermines the broader goal of ensuring long-term regional stability, which requires cooperation beyond just U.S. allies and partners.
Moreover, U.S. reliance on European states for its Indo-Pacific strategy exposes it to the risk of strategic isolation should any of its Euro-Atlantic partners reconsider their involvement in the region. Given the domestic political pressures confronting European governments — including growing nationalism and demands for a focus on domestic concerns — it is not far-fetched to foresee a scenario where European states begin to withdraw from Indo-Pacific engagements. Without these partners, Washington would find itself more isolated in its efforts to counter China, relying solely on its Asian allies who are themselves wary of being caught in a great power competition.
Perhaps the most significant risk for the U.S. is the long-term shift in the global balance of power. In less than a decade, Asia is projected to become significantly wealthier and more powerful than Europe, with several Asian states emerging as major military actors, particularly in the naval domain. Given these trends, the idea that European and North American states could maintain a leading role in Asia’s security becomes increasingly implausible. As Asia’s economic and military power grows, the ability of Euro-Atlantic states to project influence in the region will continue to diminish.
The future of Euro-Atlantic involvement in the Indo-Pacific is uncertain. While Western states remain committed to their current strategies, these approaches are becoming increasingly unsustainable. The economic and military rise of Asian states, coupled with shifting political dynamics in Europe and North America, suggests that the current model of Western “leadership” in the region may not last much longer.
For Euro-Atlantic states, the challenge lies in recognizing the limits to their influence. As their own societies grapple with domestic challenges and as Asia grows more self-sufficient, it is likely that Western states will need to recalibrate their approach to the Asian continent. This recalibration may involve shifting away from a military-centric strategy toward one that emphasizes diplomatic engagement, economic cooperation, and regional security complexes. However, such a shift will require these states to relinquish their historically exceptionalist assumptions about their primacy and leadership in the region and instead adopt a more humble, facilitator-collaborator approach.
Ultimately, the key question for the Euro-Atlantic states is whether they can adapt to the new multipolar global reality where they are no longer the self-appointed arbiters of other region’s security orders, particularly with regard to China. As Asia continues to rise, the global West’s ability to shape the region’s future will increasingly depend on its willingness to engage with the region on more equal terms and with strategic empathy — respecting the viewpoints, agency, and leadership of the region’s own states.
The Western powers have failed to effectively manage the increasing threat of proliferation in the Middle East. While the international community is concerned with Iran’s nuclear program, Saudi Arabia has moved forward with developing its own nuclear program, and independent studies show that Israel has longed possessed dozens of nuclear warheads. The former is a member of the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while the latter has refused to sign the international agreement.
On Middle East policy, the Biden campaign had staunchly criticized the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal and it has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier since assuming office in January 2021. However, serious obstacles remain for responsible actors in expanding non-proliferation efforts toward a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.
This panel will discuss how Western powers and multilateral institutions, such as the IAEA, can play a more effective role in managing non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Peggy Mason: Canada’s former Ambassador to the UN for Disarmament
– Mark Fitzpatrick: Associate Fellow & Former Executive Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
– Ali Vaez: Iran Project Director, International Crisis Group
– Negar Mortazavi: Journalist and Political Analyst, Host of Iran Podcast
– David Albright: Founder and President of the Institute for Science and International Security
Closing (5:45 PM – 6:00 PM ET)
What is the current economic landscape in the Middle East? While global foreign direct investment is expected to fall drastically in the post-COVID era, the World Bank reported a 5% contraction in the economic output of the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries in 2020 due to the pandemic. While oil prices are expected to rebound with normalization in demand, political instability, regional and geopolitical tensions, domestic corruption, and a volatile regulatory and legal environment all threaten economic recovery in the Middle East. What is the prospect for economic growth and development in the region post-pandemic, and how could MENA nations promote sustainable growth and regional trade moving forward?
At the same time, Middle Eastern diaspora communities have become financially successful and can help promote trade between North America and the region. In this respect, the diaspora can become vital intermediaries for advancing U.S. and Canada’s business interests abroad. Promoting business diplomacy can both benefit the MENA region and be an effective and positive way to advance engagement and achieve foreign policy goals of the North Atlantic.
This panel will investigate the trade and investment opportunities in the Middle East, discuss how facilitating economic engagement with the region can benefit Canadian and American national interests, and explore relevant policy prescriptions.
Panelists:
– Hon. Sergio Marchi: Canada’s Former Minister of International Trade
– Scott Jolliffe: Chairperson, Canada Arab Business Council
– Esfandyar Batmanghelidj: Founder and Publisher of Bourse & Bazaar
– Nizar Ghanem: Director of Research and Co-founder at Triangle
– Nicki Siamaki: Researcher at Control Risks
The Middle East continues to grapple with violence and instability, particularly in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Fueled by government incompetence and foreign interventions, terrorist insurgencies have imposed severe humanitarian and economic costs on the region. Meanwhile, regional actors have engaged in an unprecedented pursuit of arms accumulation. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have imported billions of both Western and Russian-made weapons and funded militant groups across the region, intending to contain their regional adversaries, particularly Iran. Tehran has also provided sophisticated weaponry to various militia groups across the region to strengthen its geopolitical position against Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Israel.
On the other hand, with international terrorist networks and intense regional rivalry in the Middle East, it is impractical to discuss peace and security without addressing terrorism and the arms race in the region. This panel will primarily discuss the implications of the ongoing arms race in the region and the role of Western powers and multilateral organizations in facilitating trust-building security arrangements among regional stakeholders to limit the proliferation of arms across the Middle East.
Panelists:
Luciano Zaccara: Assistant Professor, Qatar University
Dania Thafer: Executive Director, Gulf International Forum
Kayhan Barzegar: Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Science and Research Branch of Azad University
Barbara Slavin: Director of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council
Sanam Shantyaei: Senior Journalist at France24 & host of Middle East Matters
The emerging regional order in West Asia will have wide-ranging implications for global security. The Biden administration has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier, an initiative staunchly opposed by Israel, while also taking a harder line on Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen. Meanwhile, key regional actors, including Qatar, Iraq, and Oman, have engaged in backchannel efforts to bring Iran and Saudi Arabia to the negotiating table. From a broader geopolitical perspective, with the need to secure its energy imports, China is also expected to increase its footprint in the region and influence the mentioned challenges.
In this evolving landscape, Western powers will be compelled to redefine their strategic priorities and adjust their policies with the new realities in the region. In this panel, we will discuss how the West, including the United States and its allies, can utilize multilateral diplomacy with its adversaries to prevent military escalation in the region. Most importantly, the panel will discuss if a multilateral security dialogue in the Persian Gulf region, proposed by some regional actors, can help reduce tensions among regional foes and produce sustainable peace and development for the region.
Panelists:
– Abdullah Baabood: Academic Researcher and Former Director of the Centre for Gulf Studies, Qatar University
– Trita Parsi: Executive Vice-President, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
– Ebtesam Al-Ketbi: President, Emirates Policy Centre
– Jon Allen: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Israel
– Elizabeth Hagedorn: Washington correspondent for Al-Monitor
Military interventions, political and economic instabilities, and civil unrest in the Middle East have led to a global refugee crisis with an increasing wave of refugees and asylum seekers to Europe and Canada. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has, in myriad ways, exacerbated and contributed to the ongoing security threats and destabilization of the region.
While these challenges pose serious risks to Canadian security, Ottawa will also have the opportunity to limit such risks and prevent a spillover effect vis-à-vis effective humanitarian initiatives in the region. In this panel, we will primarily investigate Canada’s Middle East Strategy’s degree of success in providing humanitarian aid to the region. Secondly, the panel will discuss what programs and initiatives Canada can introduce to further build on the renewed strategy. and more specifically, how Canada can utilize its policy instruments to more effectively deal with the increasing influx of refugees from the Middle East.
Panelists:
Erica Di Ruggiero: Director of Centre for Global Health, University of Toronto
Reyhana Patel: Head of Communications & Government Relations, Islamic Relief Canada
Amir Barmaki: Former Head of UN OCHA in Iran
Catherine Gribbin: Senior Legal Advisor for International and Humanitarian Law, Canadian Red Cross
In 2016, Canada launched an ambitious five-year “Middle East Engagement Strategy” (2016-2021), committing to investing CA$3.5 billion over five years to help establish the necessary conditions for security and stability, alleviate human suffering and enable stabilization programs in the region. In the latest development, during the meeting of the Global Coalition against ISIS, Minister of Foreign Affairs Marc Garneau announced more than $43.6 million in Peace and Stabilization Operations Program funding for 11 projects in Syria and Iraq.
With Canada’s Middle East Engagement Strategy expiring this year, it is time to examine and evaluate this massive investment in the Middle East region in the past five years. More importantly, the panel will discuss a principled and strategic roadmap for the future of Canada’s short-term and long-term engagement in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Ferry de Kerckhove: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Egypt
– Dennis Horak: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
– Chris Kilford: Former Canadian Defence Attaché in Turkey, member of the national board of the Canadian International Council (CIC)
– David Dewitt: University Professor Emeritus, York University
While the United States continues to pull back from certain regional conflicts, reflected by the Biden administration’s decision to halt American backing for Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen and the expected withdrawal from Afghanistan, US troops continue to be stationed across the region. Meanwhile, Russia and China have significantly maintained and even expanded their regional activities. On one hand, the Kremlin has maintained its military presence in Syria, and on the other hand, China has signed an unprecedented 25-year strategic agreement with Iran.
As the global power structure continues to shift, it is essential to analyze the future of the US regional presence under the Biden administration, explore the emerging global rivalry with Russia and China, and at last, investigate the implications of such competition for peace and security in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Dmitri Trenin: Director of Carnegie Moscow Center
– Joost R. Hiltermann: Director of MENA Programme, International Crisis Group
– Roxane Farmanfarmaian: Affiliated Lecturer in International Relations of the Middle East and North Africa, University of Cambridge
– Andrew A. Michta: Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at Marshall Center
– Kelley Vlahos: Senior Advisor, Quincy Institute
The security architecture of the Middle East has undergone rapid transformations in an exceptionally short period. Notable developments include the United States gradual withdrawal from the region, rapprochement between Israel and some GCC states through the Abraham Accords and the rise of Chinese and Russian regional engagement.
With these new trends in the Middle East, it is timely to investigate the security implications of the Biden administration’s Middle East policy. In this respect, we will discuss the Biden team’s new approach vis-à-vis Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The panel will also discuss the role of other major powers, including China and Russia in shaping this new security environment in the region, and how the Biden administration will respond to these powers’ increasing regional presence.
Panelists:
– Sanam Vakil: Deputy Director of MENA Programme at Chatham House
– Denise Natali: Acting Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies & Director of the Center for Strategic Research, National Defense University
– Hassan Ahmadian: Professor of the Middle East and North Africa Studies, University of Tehran
– Abdulaziz Sagar: Chairman, Gulf Research Center
– Andrew Parasiliti: President, Al-Monitor
