In U.S. foreign policy, being called an “isolationist” is like being accused of heresy in the Middle Ages: you’re seen as a dangerous and mentally unstable anti-establishment extremist who should be cast out from polite society. Isolationism is widely denounced as a dangerous and backward approach to global affairs. For decades its mere mention has been enough to shut down serious discussion. Scholars and policymakers who entertain even a hint of retrenchment, or a shift toward less interventionist foreign policy, are often derided and sidelined. Isolationism is portrayed not just as an error, but as a moral failing—a violation of America’s global responsibility.
Take former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s much-commented-upon essay in Foreign Affairs, which is emblematic of this mentality. In her piece, unsubtly titled “The Perils of Isolationism” (subtitle: “The World Still Needs America—and America Still Needs the World”), Rice stresses the need for continued U.S. engagement abroad, stressing that “isolation has never been the answer to the country’s security or prosperity.” She warns how the future “will be determined by the alliance of democratic, free-market states or […] by the revisionist powers, harking back to a day of territorial conquest abroad and authoritarian practices at home.” In other words, if America does not lead, chaos, disorder, and evil will fill the void. This argument is not new, of course. It’s been the staple of the U.S. foreign policy establishment for years.
But something significant is happening: the potency of this charge, the stigma of not doing more, is starting to wane. And that shift represents an existential crisis for established foreign policy elites.
Since the end of World War II, isolationism has been anathematized in U.S. foreign policy. To suggest that America should pull back from its global commitments, reduce its military footprint abroad, or take a more restrained approach to world affairs has been viewed as naive at best, treasonous at worst. This attitude is rooted in a specific conception of U.S. leadership, where America is seen as an indispensable force for good. According to this worldview, U.S. engagement — whether in Europe, Asia, or the Middle East — is not only justified but necessary for the preservation of a stable global order. Failure here risks repeating, as Condoleezza Rice puts it, the “horrors of the interwar period,” marked by “international aggression” — with Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan as the principal examples of this — along with “beggar-thy-neighbor protectionism, currency manipulation, and violent quests for resources.”
This is why, from World War II to the present, many senior diplomatic and political figures have framed U.S. involvement abroad as a moral imperative. To them, America’s leadership is not just strategic, it’s ethical. It carries the weight of history and the responsibility of power. Challengers to this worldview, particularly foreign policy realists and restrainers, are often dismissed as naive, ignorant, cowardly, or worst of all, ill-intentioned. In the words of Stephen Wertheim — author of Tomorrow, the World: The Birth of U.S. Global Supremacy, the definitive tour de force on the subject — “so long as the phantom of isolationism is held to be the most grievous sin, all is permitted.” Whatever you do, never be accused of being an “appeaser”.
These charges, however, have long misrepresented the full spectrum of realist, restrained, or otherwise non-interventionist foreign policy thinking. Advocates of restraint, for instance, argue that overextending U.S. military and diplomatic resources not only harms America’s domestic interests but also often leads to chaos abroad. The interventions in Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan over the past twenty years are often cited as prime examples of how well-intentioned U.S. action can backfire spectacularly, destabilizing entire regions in the name of security and democracy. Yet despite these failures, the U.S. foreign policy establishment has clung to its script, continuing to demonize alternative approaches as dangerous isolationism.
The tide, however, is clearly shifting. A confluence of geopolitical, economic, and cultural factors is driving this change, making the isolationist charge less effective as a means of shutting down debate. Not only that, but its increasingly frantic usage is itself gradually delegitimizing the U.S. foreign policy establishment.
Start with geopolitics. Washington now broadly accepts, albeit reluctantly, that the post-Cold War unipolar moment has faded. The rise of China, the resurgence of Russia, and the emergence of new power centers in the developing world, along with numerous key geopolitical events, all highlighted America’s diminishing ability to resolve crises on its own or enforce its will unilaterally — even if Washington’s intentions are benign, which is questionable. This decline is not just a product of failing military-industrial capacity and domestic fatigue of constant involvement in foreign affairs — though there is indeed plenty of that — but also a reflection of the shifting global balance of power and military-diplomatic overstretch. Time and again, the United States has found itself either unable to act decisively, forced to rely on other powers to stabilize situations, or simply not intervening in a situation that it is either unwilling or unprepared to accept responsibility for.
Perhaps the clearest example of this came during the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. As the world’s financial systems teetered on the brink of collapse, Washington found itself unable to resolve the crisis through domestic policy alone. While the Federal Reserve and U.S. Treasury Department played critical roles, it became increasingly clear that the global economic recovery would depend on more than just American leadership. China, whose economy was already growing rapidly, stepped in with massive stimulus measures that not only helped restart its own economy but also provided crucial momentum to the global recovery. This moment marked a fundamental shift in global economic power — one in which the West, and particularly the United States, could no longer claim unipolar dominance over the global financial system. China’s role as a major economic player was solidified, demonstrating that U.S. economic influence was no longer sufficient on its own to steer global outcomes.
In that same year, the Russo-Georgian War provided another indication of the limits of U.S. power. When Russia invaded Georgia, a U.S. partner, Washington’s response was largely rhetorical, offering diplomatic condemnation and symbolic gestures of support without taking meaningful action to reverse Russian actions. This marked a stark contrast to earlier decades when American interventions in regions like the Balkans and the Middle East often shifted the balance of power. In Georgia, however, Russia tested — and exposed — the limits of U.S. capacity to defend its partners in regions where its interests directly conflicted with those of other powers.
The failure to enforce a “red line” in Syria in 2013 was another blow to U.S. credibility. After Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime was accused of using chemical weapons against civilians, President Barack Obama drew a very public “red line”, warning that any further use of such weapons would trigger direct U.S. intervention. But when that line was crossed that line, the White House opted for a diplomatic solution brokered with Russia to dismantle some of Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile rather than resorting to promised military action. Though some regarded this diplomatic solution as a pragmatic effort to avoid another Middle Eastern conflict, others saw it as a sign that the U.S. was either unwilling — or, more notably, unable — to enforce its own self-proclaimed foreign policy red lines.
Perhaps the clearest example highlighting the ongoing limits of U.S. power in shaping global events is the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine — building upon Moscow’s 2014 incursion and annexation of Crimea. While the United States has played a decisive role in supporting Ukraine through military aid and economic sanctions against Russia, it has refrained from direct military involvement despite constant calls from various senior lawmakers and policy experts to do just that. This represents not only a recognition of the risks of a broader conflict with a nuclear-armed adversary but is also a de facto acknowledgment that the U.S. military is too overstretched to become involved even if the political will for direct conflict existed. To quote a senior defense official: “You face a two-front war where we don’t have a two-front military.” Moreover, the Ukraine War has exposed the degree to which U.S. influence is constrained by global economic interdependence. Despite heavy if unproductive sanctions, Russia has been able to maintain significant support from many countries — including major powers like China and India — which have resisted U.S. pressure to isolate Moscow. This reluctance to align with Washington’s strategy highlights the multipolar or polycentric nature of today’s global order—one where U.S. influence is no longer as dominant as it once was.
More recently, a variety of less-covered geopolitical events underline how overwhelmed Washington is by a rapidly changing world. The Sahel region in Africa has been “lost” to long-standing frustrations with Western policies and military strategies that have not effectively addressed the region’s complex challenges. The recent revolution in Bangladesh, the eighth most populous country in the world, has gone practically unrecognized by Western media. U.S. Navy efforts to halt the blockade of the Red Sea by Yemen’s Houthis have failed. Relatedly, the war between Israel and Hamas is still ongoing with Washington unable or unwilling to use its leverage on Israel to orchestrate a ceasefire; the war has now spread to Lebanon and has the potential to spiral out of control into a broader regional war engulfing the Middle East and the thousands of U.S. troops stationed there. The list goes on.
Taken together, these events — among others — underscore the gradual but undeniable relative decline of U.S. power. Whether in the economic, military, or diplomatic realm, America’s ability to act unilaterally and decisively is increasingly limited. The rise or return of other powers — especially China and Russia — has introduced new complexities to the global system, forcing U.S. policymakers to recognize that they can no longer dictate outcomes as they did in the 1990s and early 2000s. In this changing landscape, the old model of U.S. foreign policy — predicated on military supremacy and economic hegemony — is rapidly becoming untenable. Washington now faces the uncomfortable reality that it must share the global stage with emerging rivals.
America’s geopolitical problems are compounded by its significant domestic challenges.
Start with the economic realm. Public infrastructure is somewhere between crumbling and “dangerously overstretched”. Income inequality is widening, and a recent study from the Economic Innovation Group demonstrates how “by 2022, 53 [%]—more than half of all U.S counties—drew at least a quarter of their [personal] income from government aid.” Inflation remains high in the aftermath of the coronavirus pandemic and a recent slew of government spending, with a report from Cummings and Mahoney warning that “the impact of inflation on consumer sentiment fades out with a decay rate of about 50 percent per year,” meaning it will take years for the sting of the high inflationary period to substantially dissipate — and that is assuming interest rates remain high (despite significant pressure for cuts) and the U.S. government doesn’t embark on a new round of spending.
More concerningly for foreign policy analysts and U.S. defense planners, in recent years a number of U.S. economic projects have highlighted significant weaknesses in the country’s military-industrial capacity, posing serious challenges to its ability to maintain a hegemonic geopolitical role. Take the inefficiency and bloat within the defense procurement system, for instance. Major defense contractors, such as Lockheed Martin and Boeing, have struggled with delays and cost overruns on critical projects, including the F-35 fighter jet program. Such failures in military production highlight systemic issues that prevent the U.S. from rapidly adapting to new security challenges.
The war in Ukraine has further exposed gaps in the U.S. defense industry’s capacity to sustain prolonged conflicts. As Washington committed substantial arms supplies to Ukraine, it became evident that America’s stockpiles of critical munitions — including artillery shells and advanced missiles — deplete faster than they can be replenished. The Pentagon has faced significant challenges in ramping up production of these munitions, revealing that the country’s military-industrial base is not structured for the kind of high-intensity, extended warfare that is currently being fought in Ukraine. A single Wall Street Journal headline from April 2023 best captures the absurdity of the situation: “The U.S. Military Relies on One Louisiana Factory. It Blew Up.” The uncomfortable truth is that the U.S. military is oriented toward producing high-cost, complex weapons systems at a relatively slow pace. This mismatch between production capacity and modern warfare needs has raised grave concerns about whether America is truly capable of supporting multiple simultaneous conflicts, should they arise, without exhausting its supplies.
Furthermore, the declining capacity of American manufacturing has made the military-industrial complex increasingly reliant on foreign supply chains, including critical materials like rare earth elements, which are essential for advanced electronics and defense systems. The United States is highly dependent on China for these materials, a vulnerability that Beijing could potentially exploit in times of heightened geopolitical tensions. Recent attempts by the U.S. government to onshore these supply chains — such as incentivizing domestic mining and production — have been slow to bear fruit. For instance, the CHIPS Act, aimed at boosting domestic semiconductor production, is an attempt to mitigate dependency on foreign suppliers. However, the scale and timeframe required to rebuild these capabilities suggest that America will remain reliant on external sources for years to come.
These industrial shortcomings, among others, reveal that, without a resilient and adaptable economic base, the United States simply cannot sustain its global military position, especially in an era of rising great power competition.
More broadly, Americans are increasingly skeptical that their country can afford to spend trillions on foreign interventions while basic needs at home go unmet. Polling data reflects this shift in public sentiment. According to a 2023 survey by the Pew Research Center, a growing number of Americans — across both political parties — now believe that the United States should prioritize solving its own problems over trying to solve the world’s. This year’s survey reveals similar results and a more in-depth survey on Americans’ attitudes on foreign policy priorities found decreasing support for foreign engagement. Some highlights:
“When it comes to goals that focus on international engagement […] fewer than a third of Americans mark these as top foreign policy priorities.”
“Only about a quarter of Americans prioritize promoting human rights in other countries…”
“At the bottom of this list of foreign policy priorities are promoting global democracy (a major policy push from the Biden administration) and aiding refugees fleeing violence around the world — about two-in-ten Americans describe these as top concerns. These assessments come amid a recent global surge in asylum claims. Still, in Center surveys, democracy promotion has typically been at the bottom of Americans’ list of foreign policy priorities, even dating back to George W. Bush’s and Barack Obama’s administrations.”
Furthermore, there is a clear generational gap when it comes to such attitudes. It is evident that younger Americans “do not prioritize […] supporting other countries” (emphasis in the original). For example, 48 percent of 18- to 29-year-olds polled indicated that supporting Israel militarily or diplomatically should be given no priority. 34 percent indicated similar for Ukraine, and an identical percentage said that “promoting democracy in other nations” should receive no priority. Such figures, it should be noted, are trending upward compared to past years.
Perhaps most distressingly for Washington foreign policy types is the fact that the term “America First,” which once had a strictly negative and distinctly partisan connotation, has gained mainstream appeal — including within the Biden administration — alongside broader arguments for a more restrained U.S. role abroad.
In a sense, what is happening is akin to what historian and philosopher Thomas Kuhn called a “paradigm shift”, which describes how established scientific theories are replaced when they can no longer explain observed anomalies. In Kuhn’s view, scientists work within a dominant “paradigm” until accumulating problems reveal their limitations, prompting a sudden and fundamental change to a new way of understanding.
This model can be applied to both domestic and foreign policy. Consider, for instance, Donald Trump’s 2016 election victory. Trump’s willingness to dismiss and ignore the conventional foreign political establishment and the incumbent sense of propriety was key to his rise. His rhetoric was unpolished, his strategy incoherent, but he understood one crucial thing: many Americans had grown tired of “politics as usual”— whether it took the form of neoliberal economics or Washington’s endless wars, nation-building projects, and sprawling global commitments. Trump didn’t get bogged down trying to refute every criticism lobbed at him. Instead, he embraced the populist energy and charged ahead, ultimately resulting in his victory. At present, it is obvious the paradigm has definitely shifted—the grassroots and intellectual energy of the Republican Party is now firmly “Trumpist.”
This idea can also be applied to U.S. foreign policy, which has long operated under the paradigm that America must lead globally to maintain world stability. However, the failures of recent interventions, rising competition from other powers, and growing public dissatisfaction have exposed the limits of this approach. These repeated challenges are forcing a re-evaluation of the old model, much like the shift in scientific thinking Kuhn described. As the incumbent paradigm loses its credibility, U.S. foreign policy is undergoing a pivotal transformation — moving away from global leadership and intervention toward a more isolationist and domestically focused stance. Similarly, today’s foreign policy realists and restrainers are taking a similar approach: quasi-embracing the isolationist label, rejecting the old accusations, and pushing forward regardless.
The postwar U.S. foreign policy establishment is thus beginning to recognize that its old tactics no longer work. Despite a constant slew of articles, the specter of isolationism doesn’t send shivers down the spine like it once did. The heresy has lost its power. The reasons for this are varied, but the simple reality is that the United States can no longer afford — figuratively and literally — to act as the world’s sheriff and hegemon, and everyone is gradually realizing it.
What happens next? The U.S. foreign policy consensus is starting to crack, and those cracks will only grow wider in the coming years. Restrainers, realists, and others advocating for less intervention will no longer be content to play defense. They’re embracing the fight and pushing for radical change — with some beginning to outright embrace the label of isolationist. The old guard may hold the levers of power for now, but their grip is weakening. Isolationism — once used as a slur and seen as an unacceptable position in American politics — is gaining ground.
In the coming decade, Americans should prepare for a foreign policy that looks very different from what they’ve known. The rise of isolationist sentiment is not just a trend, it’s the beginning of a more fundamental shift to realign American foreign policy with the post-unipolar reality. The world is changing, and so too is America’s place in it.
The Western powers have failed to effectively manage the increasing threat of proliferation in the Middle East. While the international community is concerned with Iran’s nuclear program, Saudi Arabia has moved forward with developing its own nuclear program, and independent studies show that Israel has longed possessed dozens of nuclear warheads. The former is a member of the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while the latter has refused to sign the international agreement.
On Middle East policy, the Biden campaign had staunchly criticized the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal and it has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier since assuming office in January 2021. However, serious obstacles remain for responsible actors in expanding non-proliferation efforts toward a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.
This panel will discuss how Western powers and multilateral institutions, such as the IAEA, can play a more effective role in managing non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Peggy Mason: Canada’s former Ambassador to the UN for Disarmament
– Mark Fitzpatrick: Associate Fellow & Former Executive Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
– Ali Vaez: Iran Project Director, International Crisis Group
– Negar Mortazavi: Journalist and Political Analyst, Host of Iran Podcast
– David Albright: Founder and President of the Institute for Science and International Security
Closing (5:45 PM – 6:00 PM ET)
What is the current economic landscape in the Middle East? While global foreign direct investment is expected to fall drastically in the post-COVID era, the World Bank reported a 5% contraction in the economic output of the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries in 2020 due to the pandemic. While oil prices are expected to rebound with normalization in demand, political instability, regional and geopolitical tensions, domestic corruption, and a volatile regulatory and legal environment all threaten economic recovery in the Middle East. What is the prospect for economic growth and development in the region post-pandemic, and how could MENA nations promote sustainable growth and regional trade moving forward?
At the same time, Middle Eastern diaspora communities have become financially successful and can help promote trade between North America and the region. In this respect, the diaspora can become vital intermediaries for advancing U.S. and Canada’s business interests abroad. Promoting business diplomacy can both benefit the MENA region and be an effective and positive way to advance engagement and achieve foreign policy goals of the North Atlantic.
This panel will investigate the trade and investment opportunities in the Middle East, discuss how facilitating economic engagement with the region can benefit Canadian and American national interests, and explore relevant policy prescriptions.
Panelists:
– Hon. Sergio Marchi: Canada’s Former Minister of International Trade
– Scott Jolliffe: Chairperson, Canada Arab Business Council
– Esfandyar Batmanghelidj: Founder and Publisher of Bourse & Bazaar
– Nizar Ghanem: Director of Research and Co-founder at Triangle
– Nicki Siamaki: Researcher at Control Risks
The Middle East continues to grapple with violence and instability, particularly in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Fueled by government incompetence and foreign interventions, terrorist insurgencies have imposed severe humanitarian and economic costs on the region. Meanwhile, regional actors have engaged in an unprecedented pursuit of arms accumulation. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have imported billions of both Western and Russian-made weapons and funded militant groups across the region, intending to contain their regional adversaries, particularly Iran. Tehran has also provided sophisticated weaponry to various militia groups across the region to strengthen its geopolitical position against Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Israel.
On the other hand, with international terrorist networks and intense regional rivalry in the Middle East, it is impractical to discuss peace and security without addressing terrorism and the arms race in the region. This panel will primarily discuss the implications of the ongoing arms race in the region and the role of Western powers and multilateral organizations in facilitating trust-building security arrangements among regional stakeholders to limit the proliferation of arms across the Middle East.
Panelists:
Luciano Zaccara: Assistant Professor, Qatar University
Dania Thafer: Executive Director, Gulf International Forum
Kayhan Barzegar: Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Science and Research Branch of Azad University
Barbara Slavin: Director of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council
Sanam Shantyaei: Senior Journalist at France24 & host of Middle East Matters
The emerging regional order in West Asia will have wide-ranging implications for global security. The Biden administration has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier, an initiative staunchly opposed by Israel, while also taking a harder line on Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen. Meanwhile, key regional actors, including Qatar, Iraq, and Oman, have engaged in backchannel efforts to bring Iran and Saudi Arabia to the negotiating table. From a broader geopolitical perspective, with the need to secure its energy imports, China is also expected to increase its footprint in the region and influence the mentioned challenges.
In this evolving landscape, Western powers will be compelled to redefine their strategic priorities and adjust their policies with the new realities in the region. In this panel, we will discuss how the West, including the United States and its allies, can utilize multilateral diplomacy with its adversaries to prevent military escalation in the region. Most importantly, the panel will discuss if a multilateral security dialogue in the Persian Gulf region, proposed by some regional actors, can help reduce tensions among regional foes and produce sustainable peace and development for the region.
Panelists:
– Abdullah Baabood: Academic Researcher and Former Director of the Centre for Gulf Studies, Qatar University
– Trita Parsi: Executive Vice-President, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
– Ebtesam Al-Ketbi: President, Emirates Policy Centre
– Jon Allen: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Israel
– Elizabeth Hagedorn: Washington correspondent for Al-Monitor
Military interventions, political and economic instabilities, and civil unrest in the Middle East have led to a global refugee crisis with an increasing wave of refugees and asylum seekers to Europe and Canada. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has, in myriad ways, exacerbated and contributed to the ongoing security threats and destabilization of the region.
While these challenges pose serious risks to Canadian security, Ottawa will also have the opportunity to limit such risks and prevent a spillover effect vis-à-vis effective humanitarian initiatives in the region. In this panel, we will primarily investigate Canada’s Middle East Strategy’s degree of success in providing humanitarian aid to the region. Secondly, the panel will discuss what programs and initiatives Canada can introduce to further build on the renewed strategy. and more specifically, how Canada can utilize its policy instruments to more effectively deal with the increasing influx of refugees from the Middle East.
Panelists:
Erica Di Ruggiero: Director of Centre for Global Health, University of Toronto
Reyhana Patel: Head of Communications & Government Relations, Islamic Relief Canada
Amir Barmaki: Former Head of UN OCHA in Iran
Catherine Gribbin: Senior Legal Advisor for International and Humanitarian Law, Canadian Red Cross
In 2016, Canada launched an ambitious five-year “Middle East Engagement Strategy” (2016-2021), committing to investing CA$3.5 billion over five years to help establish the necessary conditions for security and stability, alleviate human suffering and enable stabilization programs in the region. In the latest development, during the meeting of the Global Coalition against ISIS, Minister of Foreign Affairs Marc Garneau announced more than $43.6 million in Peace and Stabilization Operations Program funding for 11 projects in Syria and Iraq.
With Canada’s Middle East Engagement Strategy expiring this year, it is time to examine and evaluate this massive investment in the Middle East region in the past five years. More importantly, the panel will discuss a principled and strategic roadmap for the future of Canada’s short-term and long-term engagement in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Ferry de Kerckhove: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Egypt
– Dennis Horak: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
– Chris Kilford: Former Canadian Defence Attaché in Turkey, member of the national board of the Canadian International Council (CIC)
– David Dewitt: University Professor Emeritus, York University
While the United States continues to pull back from certain regional conflicts, reflected by the Biden administration’s decision to halt American backing for Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen and the expected withdrawal from Afghanistan, US troops continue to be stationed across the region. Meanwhile, Russia and China have significantly maintained and even expanded their regional activities. On one hand, the Kremlin has maintained its military presence in Syria, and on the other hand, China has signed an unprecedented 25-year strategic agreement with Iran.
As the global power structure continues to shift, it is essential to analyze the future of the US regional presence under the Biden administration, explore the emerging global rivalry with Russia and China, and at last, investigate the implications of such competition for peace and security in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Dmitri Trenin: Director of Carnegie Moscow Center
– Joost R. Hiltermann: Director of MENA Programme, International Crisis Group
– Roxane Farmanfarmaian: Affiliated Lecturer in International Relations of the Middle East and North Africa, University of Cambridge
– Andrew A. Michta: Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at Marshall Center
– Kelley Vlahos: Senior Advisor, Quincy Institute
The security architecture of the Middle East has undergone rapid transformations in an exceptionally short period. Notable developments include the United States gradual withdrawal from the region, rapprochement between Israel and some GCC states through the Abraham Accords and the rise of Chinese and Russian regional engagement.
With these new trends in the Middle East, it is timely to investigate the security implications of the Biden administration’s Middle East policy. In this respect, we will discuss the Biden team’s new approach vis-à-vis Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The panel will also discuss the role of other major powers, including China and Russia in shaping this new security environment in the region, and how the Biden administration will respond to these powers’ increasing regional presence.
Panelists:
– Sanam Vakil: Deputy Director of MENA Programme at Chatham House
– Denise Natali: Acting Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies & Director of the Center for Strategic Research, National Defense University
– Hassan Ahmadian: Professor of the Middle East and North Africa Studies, University of Tehran
– Abdulaziz Sagar: Chairman, Gulf Research Center
– Andrew Parasiliti: President, Al-Monitor