Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) represents an ambitious attempt by Ottawa to redefine its engagement in a region that has become a focal point of global geopolitical competition. The strategy outlines five interconnected objectives: promoting resilience, peace, and security; expanding trade, investment, and supply chain resilience; investing in people-to-people connections; fostering a sustainable and green future; and establishing Canada as a proactive partner in the Indo-Pacific. However, the strategy appears more aspirational than actionable, particularly when considering Canada’s limited resources and geopolitical influence. While the IPS promises a significant presence across the entire Indo-Pacific, this broad ambition dilutes focus and risks overstretching Canada’s already modest capabilities.
A more strategic approach would require Canada to prioritize specific areas of critical interest, particularly in the North Pacific. This region, given its proximity to Canada and its centrality to North American security and economic interests, should take precedence in any long-term policy planning. By narrowing its focus, Canada could more effectively contribute to regional stability while reinforcing its role in North America and the Arctic — regions where Canada holds more influence and where its security interests are most pressing.
Section 1 of the IPS places a strong emphasis on enhancing security and resilience, aimed at building Canada’s capabilities to counter complex threats such as cyberattacks, terrorism, and geopolitical tensions. The strategy calls for deepening intelligence and defense ties with key allies and regional partners to bolster Canada’s ability to counter state-led disinformation, espionage, and other malign activities. Yet, despite these ambitious goals, the proposed measures—including an increased Canadian Armed Forces presence and expanded cyber diplomacy — risk spreading Canada’s resources too thin. By concentrating efforts on the North Pacific, Canada could avoid the pitfalls of overreach and ensure a more sustainable and consequential engagement in the Indo-Pacific.
This paper critically examines the IPS’s security dimension, arguing that the strategy’s broad security-related agenda undermines Canada’s ability to deliver meaningful contributions to the security of that region. Canada’s limited strategic reach and over-reliance on existing policies necessitate a more focused approach—one that aligns with its priorities in the North Pacific and its broader objectives in North America and the Arctic.
Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy sets out a broad vision for engagement in a region that is becoming the epicenter of global geopolitical tensions. However, a closer examination of the three major security-related projects outlined in the strategy reveals several gaps and questionable assumptions about Canada’s actual capacity to influence regional dynamics.
One of the central components of the IPS is Canada’s commitment to reinforcing its defense presence in the Indo-Pacific, which includes increasing participation in regional military exercises and expanding naval operations. The strategy suggests that these efforts will position Canada as a significant player in regional security. However, with a relatively modest budget of $492.9 million spread over five years, these initiatives are unlikely to make a substantial impact. The proposed increases in military presence, such as participation in joint exercises and the deployment of additional naval assets, pale in comparison to the investments and military commitments of major regional powers like the United States, China, and Japan.
Canada's defense spending and capability enhancements are limited, and the country’s current budgetary commitments do not reflect the level of ambition outlined in the strategy. The reality is that Canada lacks the military assets and infrastructure necessary to maintain a significant and sustained presence in the Indo-Pacific. Without a substantial increase in defense spending and a clear strategy for operational deployment, Canada’s ability to influence regional security dynamics will remain marginal.
Another key initiative under the IPS involves strengthening security partnerships and capacity-building efforts with regional allies. While the strategy emphasizes enhancing regional responses to crime, terrorism, and weapons proliferation, the actual funding allocation of $92.6 million over five years raises doubts about the effectiveness of these initiatives. The modest budget suggests that Canada’s capacity-building efforts will be limited to a handful of symbolic initiatives rather than comprehensive programs that could meaningfully enhance regional security capabilities.
Furthermore, Canada’s attempts to bolster its partnerships with regional customs and law enforcement agencies face significant challenges. The competitive and often fragmented nature of security dynamics in the Indo-Pacific, characterized by competing national interests and varying levels of capacity, means that Canada’s modest investments are unlikely to yield significant strategic gains. While deepening cooperation with Southeast Asian nations through ASEAN-led frameworks is a commendable goal, the impact of such initiatives will be constrained by Canada’s limited diplomatic and economic clout in the region.
The IPS also focuses on cybersecurity and digital technology diplomacy as key components of Canada’s modest engagement in the Indo-Pacific. The strategy proposes a new multi-department initiative to develop Canada’s cyber diplomacy, including building cybersecurity capacity in select partner countries and deploying dedicated cyber attachés. However, the proposed funding of $47.4 million over five years raises questions about the scale and effectiveness of these initiatives. Given the rapid pace of technological advancements and the growing complexity of cyber threats, Canada’s modest investment in cybersecurity diplomacy appears inadequate to address the challenges posed by state and non-state actors in the region.
While the strategy aims to enhance Canada’s cyber capabilities and deepen cooperation with regional partners, it does not provide a clear roadmap for achieving these objectives. The deployment of cyber attachés and the establishment of new cyber cooperation frameworks will require substantial diplomatic efforts and sustained funding, both of which are currently lacking. Moreover, Canada’s limited influence in the digital technology space, particularly in comparison to major powers like the United States and China, further diminishes the likelihood of achieving meaningful outcomes in this domain.
A closer examination of Canada’s progress in achieving the security-related objectives outlined in the IPS reveals several challenges and limitations:
While Canada has made some efforts to deepen defense relations with key Indo-Pacific nations, these engagements remain relatively modest and sporadic. Public records and diplomatic communiqués indicate that Canada’s military engagements have been limited to occasional high-level visits and participation in joint exercises. For instance, Canada’s approach to China — described in the IPS as a mix of engagement and strategic caution — lacks a coherent strategy for addressing the complex security challenges posed by Beijing’s growing influence in the region. Canada’s strategic partnerships with Japan and South Korea, though highlighted in recent diplomatic engagements, also face limitations.
High-level meetings and joint statements reaffirming commitments to deepen cooperation are insufficient to translate into concrete actions that would significantly enhance Canada’s strategic position in the Indo-Pacific. The lack of substantial military assets and infrastructure to support a sustained presence further undermines the credibility of Canada’s security commitments in the region.
Canada’s ongoing military operations, such as Operation NEON and Operation HORIZON, provide some evidence of a commitment to the IPS objectives. However, these operations are constrained by limited resources and a lack of strategic depth. Operation NEON, for example, focuses on enforcing UN sanctions against North Korea through sporadic deployments of naval and air assets. While these efforts demonstrate Canada’s willingness to participate in international security operations, they do not represent a significant increase in Canada’s influence or presence in the region.
Similarly, Operation HORIZON, which aims to maintain a forward military presence and promote regional stability, has been characterized by limited deployments and participation in multinational exercises. The modest scale and scope of these operations suggest that Canada’s ability to contribute to regional security remains marginal. Without a clear strategic vision and increased resources, Canada’s military operations in the Indo-Pacific are unlikely to achieve the objectives outlined in the IPS.
Canada’s initiatives in cybersecurity and digital diplomacy, although well-intentioned, are hampered by insufficient funding and limited strategic reach. The $2.6 million investment in cyber initiatives over five years appears inadequate to address the growing cyber threats in the Indo-Pacific. Canada’s participation in regional cyber forums and multilateral exercises is commendable, but its limited influence in shaping the regional cybersecurity landscape raises questions about the effectiveness of these efforts.
The strategy’s emphasis on cybersecurity reflects Canada’s recognition of the growing importance of digital infrastructure in maintaining regional stability. However, the lack of substantial funding and a clear implementation plan suggests that Canada’s cyber diplomacy efforts will remain largely symbolic. Without a more substantial commitment of resources and a coherent strategy for engaging regional partners on cyber issues, Canada’s ability to influence the regional cybersecurity agenda will remain limited.
One of the key challenges in implementing the IPS is the allocation of sufficient resources to achieve its stated objectives. With a budget of $2.2 billion over five years, the strategy requires careful prioritization of initiatives to ensure effective use of limited resources. Given the vast geographic scope of the Indo-Pacific and the diverse range of security challenges, Canada must balance its commitments with available resources. Prioritizing initiatives in areas of critical interest, such as the North Pacific, where Canada’s security concerns align more directly with its national interests and geographic proximity, will be essential. This focus allows Canada to concentrate its efforts where it can have a more meaningful and lasting impact, especially in areas related to North American and Arctic security.
Another significant challenge is managing complex relationships with major powers in the region, particularly China. The IPS articulates a nuanced approach to China, recognizing the need to both cooperate and challenge Beijing as circumstances dictate. This balancing act requires careful diplomacy and a clear understanding of Canada’s strategic priorities in the region. Engaging with China on areas of mutual interest, such as climate change and trade, while addressing concerns related to human rights, cyber threats, and regional security, is a delicate task that requires deft diplomatic handling.
Canada’s approach to China is further complicated by the need to align its policies with those of its key allies, particularly the United States, Japan, and Australia. As tensions between China and Western powers continue to escalate, Canada must navigate this complex geopolitical landscape carefully, balancing its economic interests with its security partnerships. A focused approach on the North Pacific can help streamline efforts to align with key partners like the U.S. and Japan, where shared security interests in the region are already established.
Canada faces significant limitations in multilateral regional engagement, especially considering its absence from key minilateral security groupings like AUKUS (Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), the Quad (Australia, India, Japan, and the United States), and the emerging Camp David trilateral alliance between the U.S., Japan, and South Korea. While participation in these groups could risk overstretching Canada's limited resources, their formation without Canada underscores a challenge: the risk of being sidelined as U.S.-led coalitions shape regional security architecture. To mitigate this, Canada should focus on strengthening engagement with broader multilateral frameworks such as ASEAN, the East Asia Summit, and the ASEAN Regional Forum. These platforms offer more inclusive opportunities for Canada to promote its security and economic interests while avoiding overreach. In addition, Canada can invest in key bilateral relationships where mutual interests align, particularly in the North Pacific, ensuring targeted, sustainable partnerships that reinforce its influence in this strategically significant region.
Although the Indo-Pacific presents significant opportunities for expanding trade and investment, Canada's efforts face challenges. The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which Canada is a part of, is attracting aspirant applicants such as Taiwan and Mainland China. Navigating the membership applications of these regions poses significant diplomatic and strategic challenges, particularly as Canada must carefully balance competing interests within the CPTPP while addressing the broader geopolitical implications of admitting new members. Taiwan's bid could strain Canada's relations with Mainland China, while China’s potential membership could complicate efforts to uphold high trade and environmental standards. This creates a complex environment where Canada must manage trade opportunities without compromising its principles or relationships with key partners.
Furthermore, despite Canada's goal of leveraging economic opportunities in the Indo-Pacific, its capacity to compete with other major players in the region remains limited. Canada will need to prioritize sectors and markets where its strengths, such as clean energy and technology, align with the region’s demands, ensuring that its limited resources are effectively utilized. A targeted approach to trade partnerships in the North Pacific, with economies like Japan and South Korea, would allow Canada to deepen economic ties in areas where it already has a foothold and mutual interests.
Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) outlines an ambitious framework for increasing engagement in a region of growing strategic importance. However, a closer analysis reveals substantial gaps between the strategy’s stated objectives and Canada’s actual capacity to achieve them. While the IPS introduces new initiatives and allocates additional funding, it largely reinforces Canada’s existing foreign policy framework, signaling continuity rather than a major shift. The modest funding allocations and limited military capabilities reflected in the strategy highlight the significant constraints that Canada faces in bolstering its strategic footprint in the Indo-Pacific.
To successfully implement the IPS, Canada will need to engage in careful strategic prioritization, ensuring that resources are allocated to the most impactful initiatives. Navigating the complex geopolitical environment of the Indo-Pacific will require a nuanced approach to managing relationships with major powers while advancing Canada’s modest interests in the region. While the IPS opens up opportunities for enhancing Canada’s role as a partner in the Indo-Pacific, the country’s limited resources and strategic reach suggest its influence in shaping regional dynamics will remain constrained.
In particular, Canada must focus on areas where its engagement can have the most significant effect, especially in the North Pacific, a sub-region where security and stability are paramount. Prioritizing efforts in this domain will be crucial to ensuring that Canada contributes meaningfully to regional peace, security, and prosperity, even if its overall influence in the broader Indo-Pacific remains limited. By aligning its strategic ambitions with its capabilities, particularly in the security sphere of the North Pacific, Canada can ensure that its efforts are both sustainable and consequential.
The Western powers have failed to effectively manage the increasing threat of proliferation in the Middle East. While the international community is concerned with Iran’s nuclear program, Saudi Arabia has moved forward with developing its own nuclear program, and independent studies show that Israel has longed possessed dozens of nuclear warheads. The former is a member of the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while the latter has refused to sign the international agreement.
On Middle East policy, the Biden campaign had staunchly criticized the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal and it has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier since assuming office in January 2021. However, serious obstacles remain for responsible actors in expanding non-proliferation efforts toward a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.
This panel will discuss how Western powers and multilateral institutions, such as the IAEA, can play a more effective role in managing non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Peggy Mason: Canada’s former Ambassador to the UN for Disarmament
– Mark Fitzpatrick: Associate Fellow & Former Executive Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
– Ali Vaez: Iran Project Director, International Crisis Group
– Negar Mortazavi: Journalist and Political Analyst, Host of Iran Podcast
– David Albright: Founder and President of the Institute for Science and International Security
Closing (5:45 PM – 6:00 PM ET)
What is the current economic landscape in the Middle East? While global foreign direct investment is expected to fall drastically in the post-COVID era, the World Bank reported a 5% contraction in the economic output of the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries in 2020 due to the pandemic. While oil prices are expected to rebound with normalization in demand, political instability, regional and geopolitical tensions, domestic corruption, and a volatile regulatory and legal environment all threaten economic recovery in the Middle East. What is the prospect for economic growth and development in the region post-pandemic, and how could MENA nations promote sustainable growth and regional trade moving forward?
At the same time, Middle Eastern diaspora communities have become financially successful and can help promote trade between North America and the region. In this respect, the diaspora can become vital intermediaries for advancing U.S. and Canada’s business interests abroad. Promoting business diplomacy can both benefit the MENA region and be an effective and positive way to advance engagement and achieve foreign policy goals of the North Atlantic.
This panel will investigate the trade and investment opportunities in the Middle East, discuss how facilitating economic engagement with the region can benefit Canadian and American national interests, and explore relevant policy prescriptions.
Panelists:
– Hon. Sergio Marchi: Canada’s Former Minister of International Trade
– Scott Jolliffe: Chairperson, Canada Arab Business Council
– Esfandyar Batmanghelidj: Founder and Publisher of Bourse & Bazaar
– Nizar Ghanem: Director of Research and Co-founder at Triangle
– Nicki Siamaki: Researcher at Control Risks
The Middle East continues to grapple with violence and instability, particularly in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Fueled by government incompetence and foreign interventions, terrorist insurgencies have imposed severe humanitarian and economic costs on the region. Meanwhile, regional actors have engaged in an unprecedented pursuit of arms accumulation. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have imported billions of both Western and Russian-made weapons and funded militant groups across the region, intending to contain their regional adversaries, particularly Iran. Tehran has also provided sophisticated weaponry to various militia groups across the region to strengthen its geopolitical position against Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Israel.
On the other hand, with international terrorist networks and intense regional rivalry in the Middle East, it is impractical to discuss peace and security without addressing terrorism and the arms race in the region. This panel will primarily discuss the implications of the ongoing arms race in the region and the role of Western powers and multilateral organizations in facilitating trust-building security arrangements among regional stakeholders to limit the proliferation of arms across the Middle East.
Panelists:
Luciano Zaccara: Assistant Professor, Qatar University
Dania Thafer: Executive Director, Gulf International Forum
Kayhan Barzegar: Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Science and Research Branch of Azad University
Barbara Slavin: Director of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council
Sanam Shantyaei: Senior Journalist at France24 & host of Middle East Matters
The emerging regional order in West Asia will have wide-ranging implications for global security. The Biden administration has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier, an initiative staunchly opposed by Israel, while also taking a harder line on Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen. Meanwhile, key regional actors, including Qatar, Iraq, and Oman, have engaged in backchannel efforts to bring Iran and Saudi Arabia to the negotiating table. From a broader geopolitical perspective, with the need to secure its energy imports, China is also expected to increase its footprint in the region and influence the mentioned challenges.
In this evolving landscape, Western powers will be compelled to redefine their strategic priorities and adjust their policies with the new realities in the region. In this panel, we will discuss how the West, including the United States and its allies, can utilize multilateral diplomacy with its adversaries to prevent military escalation in the region. Most importantly, the panel will discuss if a multilateral security dialogue in the Persian Gulf region, proposed by some regional actors, can help reduce tensions among regional foes and produce sustainable peace and development for the region.
Panelists:
– Abdullah Baabood: Academic Researcher and Former Director of the Centre for Gulf Studies, Qatar University
– Trita Parsi: Executive Vice-President, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
– Ebtesam Al-Ketbi: President, Emirates Policy Centre
– Jon Allen: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Israel
– Elizabeth Hagedorn: Washington correspondent for Al-Monitor
Military interventions, political and economic instabilities, and civil unrest in the Middle East have led to a global refugee crisis with an increasing wave of refugees and asylum seekers to Europe and Canada. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has, in myriad ways, exacerbated and contributed to the ongoing security threats and destabilization of the region.
While these challenges pose serious risks to Canadian security, Ottawa will also have the opportunity to limit such risks and prevent a spillover effect vis-à-vis effective humanitarian initiatives in the region. In this panel, we will primarily investigate Canada’s Middle East Strategy’s degree of success in providing humanitarian aid to the region. Secondly, the panel will discuss what programs and initiatives Canada can introduce to further build on the renewed strategy. and more specifically, how Canada can utilize its policy instruments to more effectively deal with the increasing influx of refugees from the Middle East.
Panelists:
Erica Di Ruggiero: Director of Centre for Global Health, University of Toronto
Reyhana Patel: Head of Communications & Government Relations, Islamic Relief Canada
Amir Barmaki: Former Head of UN OCHA in Iran
Catherine Gribbin: Senior Legal Advisor for International and Humanitarian Law, Canadian Red Cross
In 2016, Canada launched an ambitious five-year “Middle East Engagement Strategy” (2016-2021), committing to investing CA$3.5 billion over five years to help establish the necessary conditions for security and stability, alleviate human suffering and enable stabilization programs in the region. In the latest development, during the meeting of the Global Coalition against ISIS, Minister of Foreign Affairs Marc Garneau announced more than $43.6 million in Peace and Stabilization Operations Program funding for 11 projects in Syria and Iraq.
With Canada’s Middle East Engagement Strategy expiring this year, it is time to examine and evaluate this massive investment in the Middle East region in the past five years. More importantly, the panel will discuss a principled and strategic roadmap for the future of Canada’s short-term and long-term engagement in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Ferry de Kerckhove: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Egypt
– Dennis Horak: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
– Chris Kilford: Former Canadian Defence Attaché in Turkey, member of the national board of the Canadian International Council (CIC)
– David Dewitt: University Professor Emeritus, York University
While the United States continues to pull back from certain regional conflicts, reflected by the Biden administration’s decision to halt American backing for Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen and the expected withdrawal from Afghanistan, US troops continue to be stationed across the region. Meanwhile, Russia and China have significantly maintained and even expanded their regional activities. On one hand, the Kremlin has maintained its military presence in Syria, and on the other hand, China has signed an unprecedented 25-year strategic agreement with Iran.
As the global power structure continues to shift, it is essential to analyze the future of the US regional presence under the Biden administration, explore the emerging global rivalry with Russia and China, and at last, investigate the implications of such competition for peace and security in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Dmitri Trenin: Director of Carnegie Moscow Center
– Joost R. Hiltermann: Director of MENA Programme, International Crisis Group
– Roxane Farmanfarmaian: Affiliated Lecturer in International Relations of the Middle East and North Africa, University of Cambridge
– Andrew A. Michta: Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at Marshall Center
– Kelley Vlahos: Senior Advisor, Quincy Institute
The security architecture of the Middle East has undergone rapid transformations in an exceptionally short period. Notable developments include the United States gradual withdrawal from the region, rapprochement between Israel and some GCC states through the Abraham Accords and the rise of Chinese and Russian regional engagement.
With these new trends in the Middle East, it is timely to investigate the security implications of the Biden administration’s Middle East policy. In this respect, we will discuss the Biden team’s new approach vis-à-vis Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The panel will also discuss the role of other major powers, including China and Russia in shaping this new security environment in the region, and how the Biden administration will respond to these powers’ increasing regional presence.
Panelists:
– Sanam Vakil: Deputy Director of MENA Programme at Chatham House
– Denise Natali: Acting Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies & Director of the Center for Strategic Research, National Defense University
– Hassan Ahmadian: Professor of the Middle East and North Africa Studies, University of Tehran
– Abdulaziz Sagar: Chairman, Gulf Research Center
– Andrew Parasiliti: President, Al-Monitor
