The evolving geopolitical landscape has heightened the threat of foreign interference.1This piece draws on our formal submission to the PIFI Commission: Foreign Interference in a Geopolitical Context: Transnational Linkages, Diaspora Mobilisation and Grey Zone Conflict: https://carleton.ca/cifp/2024/foreign-interference-in-a-geopolitical-context-transnational-linkages-diaspora-mobilisation-and-grey-zone-conflict/ Canada is frequently targeted by various adversaries and allies seeking to advance their interests through transnational means, such as mobilizing diaspora groups and employing hybrid tactics. These efforts aim to influence and disrupt a country’s internal economic and political processes. Democratic states like Canada face a delicate balance: complete immunity from interference would require sacrificing the openness that defines their societies.
Canada faces potential indirect but damaging forms of interference, especially in light of its changing demographics and sources of economic prosperity. With over 20% of the Canadian population born overseas—nearing 40% in major metropolitan areas—and 97.6% of population growth stemming from international migration, Canada is increasingly an ethnic mosaic. Despite a generally effective integration process, challenges remain, such as the ghettoization of immigrant communities and a pervasive sense of “otherness.” Addressing these challenges requires Canada to not only lead in sustaining a tolerant multicultural society, but also to develop foreign, defence, and security policies that are responsive to this reality.
The relationship between diaspora communities and their countries of origin is influenced by several factors, including their integration into Canadian society and their access to national and provincial programs. Many diaspora communities, especially those from conflict zones, may face economic and political challenges that limit their ability to engage effectively with both their homeland and their new country. This can impact their influence and participation in Canadian politics and policies.
Navigating a world where interference is pervasive, Canada must distinguish between legitimate foreign influence and illegitimate foreign interference. The latter involves covert actions that seek to manipulate or discredit individuals, organizations, and governments to further a foreign agenda. Distinguishing between legitimate influence and interference is crucial, as the latter often involves hidden involvement and deceptive tactics. This is especially pertinent given the challenges posed by non-state actors who import conflict abroad—a phenomenon known as conflict transportation. Conflict transportation, driven by factors such as migration, homeland nationalism, and inadequate integration efforts, can manifest in various forms, including political and discursive violence.
In their 2018 study, Carment and Calleja demonstrate how proxy diaspora indicators are linked to the performance of fragile and conflict-affected states. Their model, which focuses on diaspora linkages between home and host states, is grounded in the concepts of positionality and alignment. High positionality and alignment enable diaspora groups to positively influence conflict dynamics in their homelands.
In brief, while diaspora groups can influence national policies, the effectiveness of such influence varies based on their positionality and alignment in Canada. For instance, Canada’s Palestinian diaspora exhibits weak alignment and positionality, reflecting their limited influence on Canadian foreign policy regarding Israel and Palestine. This has been evident since the escalation of the war on Gaza since October 7, 2023.
Indeed diasporas with low positionality and alignment are less likely to be effective in traditional forms of interference. Foreign states may find it resource-intensive to mobilize these diasporas through traditional interference methods. Instead, these groups might rely on transnational organizations to covertly engage with foreign states, as seen with the Tamil diaspora’s use of similar strategies during the LTTE’s prominence.
To be clear, Canada’s federal government and intelligence agencies often target diaspora groups based on their own foreign policy priorities, choosing to hold some specific diaspora groups accountable for foreign meddling while ignoring others. This is similar to the U.S., which, for example, chooses to hold the Russian and Chinese governments accountable for their foreign influence operations but ignores the activities of the United Arab Emirates, considering it a friend and ally. Much like the U.S., Canada selectively chooses when to hold states responsible for foreign meddling, unfairly labeling some national groups as larger threats than others.
This situation is reminiscent of past controversies, such as the allegations against a former Ontario cabinet minister accused of ties to the Chinese government. The cabinet minister defended his connections as part of the cultural ties valued by many Canadians, arguing that such connections are integral to Canada’s multicultural fabric. Chan’s case underscores the ongoing challenge of balancing diaspora connections with national security concerns and the broader issue of how Canada’s security discourse can sometimes exacerbate tensions and lead to unfounded accusations.
The repeated focus on individuals of Chinese origin contrasts with the reality that many MPs exhibit loyalties to their homeland such as those from India, Israel, and Ukraine. This influence is evident in Canada’s foreign policy decisions, including its stance on Palestinian statehood, the closure of the embassy in Tehran, and military support to Ukraine—each shaped, to some extent, by diaspora lobbying.
These ongoing issues reflect broader challenges in Canada’s approach to diaspora relations and national security. The tendency to inflate minor threats can lead to inconsistent resource allocation and counterproductive policies. Historical precedents, such as the wrongful internment of Japanese Canadians during WWII and unjust accusations against figures like Maher Arar and Herbert Norman, illustrate the risks of hyper-vigilance and the politicization of national security concerns.
Diaspora manipulation is not unique to Canada’s so-called “adversaries.” Indeed, Canada itself engages in diaspora politics, which can lead to counterproductive outcomes. This manipulation often results in favouritism and special treatment for some groups at the expense of others. This is reflected in the allocation of sizable budgets for certain diaspora initiatives. Shifts in Canadian policies toward countries like Russia, China, and India highlight how successive governments have used diaspora politics to navigate international relations.
Both Liberal and Conservative governments have, at various times, leveraged diaspora political agendas, making Canada susceptible to external interference by states aiming to disrupt internal affairs. Historically, Canadian governments recognized that national security depends on policies that serve the interests of diverse groups, rather than privileging a few. However, recent administrations have increasingly supported narrowly defined ethnic nationalism abroad, leading to domestic political disputes imported from countries of origin.
This trend toward populism threatens the cohesion of traditional Canadian civic nationalism and risks damaging Canada’s national identity in the long term. The enduring impact of diaspora politics makes it a critical issue in Canadian international policy for the twenty-first century.
Policy decisions are often made to maximize support for the current government. However, these policies can have significant repercussions in the public sphere, particularly in federal ridings where representatives of targeted ethnic groups are often involved. This dual focus on domestic support and international relations creates a complex set of challenges. For example, the recognition of the Armenian genocide displeased Turkey, and backing Kosovo’s independence rekindled Balkan conflicts. Notably, Canada’s hostile stance towards Iran, aimed at appeasing a pro-Israel political base, culminated in the closure of the Canadian embassy in Tehran, significantly reducing Canada’s influence in the Middle East.
Further, Jason Kenney, then Minister of Immigration, publicly criticized the decision to list the Tamil Tigers as a terrorist organization, a stance that ignited controversy both within the Tamil Canadian community and the broader public. This incident highlighted how diaspora politics can be used strategically, sometimes to the detriment of broader national interests. Kenney’s comments were made to an ethnic press, revealing the targeted nature of such policy decisions and their potential to stir up significant controversy. Such confrontations can lead to outcomes that hinder Canada’s ability to maintain constructive diplomatic channels with other countries on the world stage.
The dynamics of diaspora influence in Canada are marked by significant disparities among different groups. Some diasporas are more organized, cohesive, and resourceful than others, leading to uneven outcomes and perceptions of favouritism. This “black box” of influence-peddling and lobbying remains largely undocumented, making it challenging to fully grasp how certain groups impact individual MPs, constituency dynamics, and candidate selection.
A particularly illustrative case is the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada. The influence of this diaspora on the federal government and parliamentarians, and the government’s insistence on catering to their interests for political gains, has contributed to a lack of debate and diverse perspectives in the mainstream on Canada’s position vis-à-vis the war in Ukraine, resulting in the stifling of any alternative opinion that advocates for resolving the war through diplomatic solutions.
Canada’s lack of a nuanced position in the Ukraine-Russia war, and the federal government’s firm opposition to hearing any alternative views on resolving the war, is partly due to the way information about the conflict is filtered through a limited number of media outlets. This has led to a policy discourse that often lacks comprehensive, fact-based analysis, resulting in a skewed public understanding of Canada’s commitment and its actual costs.
While diaspora influence is not confined to any one group and extends to many Canadians of East European heritage, the Ukrainian diaspora’s impact is particularly pronounced. This relationship has become even more significant in recent years. Under former Prime Minister Stephen Harper, the Conservative government’s policy towards Russia exemplifies how ideological alignment between diaspora leaders and political agendas can shape national policy.
Harper’s government aligned itself with the anti-Russian sentiment that is prevalent among many Canadian émigrés from Eastern Europe. Ukraine, in particular, was prominently featured as a victim of both Soviet and Russian aggression, reinforcing a narrative that resonated strongly with these diaspora communities.
The close alignment between diaspora groups and government policy can lead to problematic outcomes. A notable example is the controversial recognition of a Ukrainian World War II veteran, who was a former member of the Nazi party, with privileged access and public recognition in the House of Commons. This incident highlights the dangers of allowing diaspora influence to shape policy without thorough vetting and due diligence, potentially leading to significant diplomatic and reputational consequences.
Another example involves Canada’s Indian diaspora. India’s perception of the Khalistan separatist movement as a severe threat is rooted in historical context, including the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by her Sikh bodyguards in 1984. Only a year later, in June 1985, an Air India flight traveling from Canada to India exploded mid-flight due to a bomb hidden in a suitcase, killing all 329 people on board, including 268 Canadians. As in the previous incident, Sikh separatists were deemed responsible for the attack. The legacy of these two attacks amplifies India’s view of any Khalistan-related activism as not merely political dissent but as a potential security threat. India’s stance is that Canada’s political environment has, at times, provided a platform for separatist voices under the guise of free speech, a position that has strained diplomatic relations.
The Foreign Interference Commission has highlighted that Indian officials in Canada have increasingly engaged Canadian-based proxies, who work closely with Indian intelligence, to conduct activities related to foreign interference. This situation reflects a broader pattern of using diaspora communities to exert influence, with Indian authorities reportedly employing both financial incentives and disinformation to sway Canadian politicians.
Further, there have been Indian disinformation campaigns aimed specifically at embarrassing Canadian officials, including personal attacks on Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. Notably, in September 2023, a former Indian diplomat alleged that Trudeau’s plane was loaded with cocaine during a G20 summit in New Delhi, a claim that reflects the extreme tactics sometimes used in these disinformation campaigns.
Allegations of Israeli involvement in foreign interference in Canada reflect broader concerns about the influence of foreign governments and the manipulation of diaspora communities.
In June 2024, Global Affairs Canada (GAC) reported a coordinated disinformation campaign aimed at spreading Islamophobia and misinformation about the Gaza conflict. Key elements included fake social media accounts to disseminate anti-Muslim narratives, and the use of AI to alter images from pro-Palestinian protests. In one instance, a photo was digitally edited to falsely depict protestors holding a banner reading “Shariah for Canada.” Despite Haaretz’s report linking the Israeli government to this influence campaign, the Israeli government has denied involvement. This situation underscores the difficulty in confirming the origins of disinformation campaigns, especially when powerful states are implicated.
In addition to the recent allegations, there are past instances where Israeli meddling has been reported. One example is the case of Mada Al-Carmal. The NGO, based in the Middle East, faced attempts to disrupt its operations and undermine its credibility. Such actions were part of a broader strategy to influence perceptions and policies related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The spread of anti-Muslim narratives and disinformation can exacerbate social tensions and polarize communities within Canada. Such campaigns aim to influence public opinion and political stances on international issues, including Canada’s position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The denial by the Israeli government highlights the difficulty in attributing and addressing such actions, which can complicate responses and accountability.
Recent U.S. reports have alleged that the Israeli government through its Ministry for Diaspora Affairs has commissioned an influence operation to spread pro-Israeli content, urging U.S. lawmakers to continue supporting military aid to Israel. Despite extensive reporting confirming the influence operations, the U.S. government has not committed to a formal investigation or articulated a response strategy.
In the U.S., several databases have been created to track propaganda from foreign entities based on lobbying materials filed under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA). Examples of this include the Open Secrets platform, which continues to monitor foreign lobbying expenditures and their effects on US politics, and the Foreign Lobby Watch tool, which uses FARA filings to assess how much countries spend on lobbying efforts annually.
Canada currently lacks a comprehensive foreign influence or interference tracker akin to those in the US. The absence of a registry like FARA complicates the tracking of foreign influence and interference in Canada. Aside from the U.S., Australia’s Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act (FITS) and the UK’s planned registry are models Canada might consider implementing. Such trackers could help make foreign influence more transparent and reduce covert actions by foreign agents.
The complexity of foreign influence and interference underscores the need for robust tracking and transparency mechanisms. For Canada, developing a comprehensive foreign influence registry could be a crucial step in addressing these challenges and ensuring that diaspora communities are not exploited for foreign agendas.
Canada’s immigrant population is not only a primary driver of demographic growth, it also plays a significant role in shaping the country’s policies and international relations. Diaspora communities today are more transnational, wielding influence over their countries of origin and their host nations. This dual influence can impact Canada’s security, trade policies, development strategies, and investment preferences. Diverse perspectives and experiences are vital for shaping more comprehensive and effective policies. Ignoring these voices can result in missed opportunities and reduced effectiveness in achieving Canadian interests on the global stage.
Going further, the lack of diverse perspectives, including from diaspora communities, or the presence of systemic racism within government agencies, against certain communities or segments within certain diaspora communities, can undermine Canada’s ability to address contemporary challenges. Huda Mukbil, a former CSIS Intelligence Officer, has been open about her experiences with racism in Canada’s intelligence institutions. Continuous efforts are needed to reform and improve security and intelligence institutions to better reflect and address the diverse realities of modern security environments.
Crucially, elected officials have an ethical responsibility to manage relationships with diaspora communities in a manner that avoids favouritism, prevents internal conflicts and maintains equitable treatment for all constituents. Importantly, this can prevent the transfer of homeland conflicts to the host country, thus avoiding a strain on social services and an escalation of political tensions domestically and internationally.
Transparency is essential for maintaining trust in the democratic process. When governments cater to specific diaspora groups for political gain, it often results in uneven outcomes and creates perceptions of inequality. There is limited evidence suggesting that such practices strengthen Canada as a whole; rather, they may weaken national unity and exacerbate divisions. One way to increase this transparency and accountability is through Implementing systems to track foreign influence and diaspora lobbying, similar to those in the U.S., Australia, and the UK. This would help monitor the impact of foreign entities and diaspora groups on Canadian politics.
Avoiding favouritism will help maintain national unity and prevent the exploitation of diaspora communities for partisan purposes. Further, addressing behind-the-scenes lobbying and ensuring transparency in political engagements with diaspora groups can help preserve the democratic integrity of Canada.
To address the challenges surrounding diaspora politics, establishing a federally funded arm’s-length diaspora office could be a crucial step. Doing so would help ensure that diaspora communities are engaged in a way that is independent of the immediate and often fluctuating partisan interests of political parties. The office could systematically document and strategize the contributions of diaspora communities to Canada, providing a clear, evidence-based account of their impact on Canadian society, economy, and culture. Such an office could encourage diaspora groups to work together on shared agendas and interests, rather than pursuing fragmented or conflicting objectives.
To support a more effective and nuanced approach to diaspora politics and foreign interference, graduate programs that train future diplomats should consider making several revisions. Curriculums should include an in-depth analysis of grey zone conflict, diaspora politics and conflict transportation, as these concepts are crucial for modern diplomacy. Collective problem-solving instead of threat-driven analytical frameworks should be stressed in order to foster a collaborative international relations perspective. Lastly, critical thinking and problem-solving skills, which are essential for navigating today’s international affairs challenges should be emphasized.
The Western powers have failed to effectively manage the increasing threat of proliferation in the Middle East. While the international community is concerned with Iran’s nuclear program, Saudi Arabia has moved forward with developing its own nuclear program, and independent studies show that Israel has longed possessed dozens of nuclear warheads. The former is a member of the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while the latter has refused to sign the international agreement.
On Middle East policy, the Biden campaign had staunchly criticized the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal and it has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier since assuming office in January 2021. However, serious obstacles remain for responsible actors in expanding non-proliferation efforts toward a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.
This panel will discuss how Western powers and multilateral institutions, such as the IAEA, can play a more effective role in managing non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Peggy Mason: Canada’s former Ambassador to the UN for Disarmament
– Mark Fitzpatrick: Associate Fellow & Former Executive Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
– Ali Vaez: Iran Project Director, International Crisis Group
– Negar Mortazavi: Journalist and Political Analyst, Host of Iran Podcast
– David Albright: Founder and President of the Institute for Science and International Security
Closing (5:45 PM – 6:00 PM ET)
What is the current economic landscape in the Middle East? While global foreign direct investment is expected to fall drastically in the post-COVID era, the World Bank reported a 5% contraction in the economic output of the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries in 2020 due to the pandemic. While oil prices are expected to rebound with normalization in demand, political instability, regional and geopolitical tensions, domestic corruption, and a volatile regulatory and legal environment all threaten economic recovery in the Middle East. What is the prospect for economic growth and development in the region post-pandemic, and how could MENA nations promote sustainable growth and regional trade moving forward?
At the same time, Middle Eastern diaspora communities have become financially successful and can help promote trade between North America and the region. In this respect, the diaspora can become vital intermediaries for advancing U.S. and Canada’s business interests abroad. Promoting business diplomacy can both benefit the MENA region and be an effective and positive way to advance engagement and achieve foreign policy goals of the North Atlantic.
This panel will investigate the trade and investment opportunities in the Middle East, discuss how facilitating economic engagement with the region can benefit Canadian and American national interests, and explore relevant policy prescriptions.
Panelists:
– Hon. Sergio Marchi: Canada’s Former Minister of International Trade
– Scott Jolliffe: Chairperson, Canada Arab Business Council
– Esfandyar Batmanghelidj: Founder and Publisher of Bourse & Bazaar
– Nizar Ghanem: Director of Research and Co-founder at Triangle
– Nicki Siamaki: Researcher at Control Risks
The Middle East continues to grapple with violence and instability, particularly in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Fueled by government incompetence and foreign interventions, terrorist insurgencies have imposed severe humanitarian and economic costs on the region. Meanwhile, regional actors have engaged in an unprecedented pursuit of arms accumulation. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have imported billions of both Western and Russian-made weapons and funded militant groups across the region, intending to contain their regional adversaries, particularly Iran. Tehran has also provided sophisticated weaponry to various militia groups across the region to strengthen its geopolitical position against Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Israel.
On the other hand, with international terrorist networks and intense regional rivalry in the Middle East, it is impractical to discuss peace and security without addressing terrorism and the arms race in the region. This panel will primarily discuss the implications of the ongoing arms race in the region and the role of Western powers and multilateral organizations in facilitating trust-building security arrangements among regional stakeholders to limit the proliferation of arms across the Middle East.
Panelists:
Luciano Zaccara: Assistant Professor, Qatar University
Dania Thafer: Executive Director, Gulf International Forum
Kayhan Barzegar: Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Science and Research Branch of Azad University
Barbara Slavin: Director of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council
Sanam Shantyaei: Senior Journalist at France24 & host of Middle East Matters
The emerging regional order in West Asia will have wide-ranging implications for global security. The Biden administration has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier, an initiative staunchly opposed by Israel, while also taking a harder line on Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen. Meanwhile, key regional actors, including Qatar, Iraq, and Oman, have engaged in backchannel efforts to bring Iran and Saudi Arabia to the negotiating table. From a broader geopolitical perspective, with the need to secure its energy imports, China is also expected to increase its footprint in the region and influence the mentioned challenges.
In this evolving landscape, Western powers will be compelled to redefine their strategic priorities and adjust their policies with the new realities in the region. In this panel, we will discuss how the West, including the United States and its allies, can utilize multilateral diplomacy with its adversaries to prevent military escalation in the region. Most importantly, the panel will discuss if a multilateral security dialogue in the Persian Gulf region, proposed by some regional actors, can help reduce tensions among regional foes and produce sustainable peace and development for the region.
Panelists:
– Abdullah Baabood: Academic Researcher and Former Director of the Centre for Gulf Studies, Qatar University
– Trita Parsi: Executive Vice-President, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
– Ebtesam Al-Ketbi: President, Emirates Policy Centre
– Jon Allen: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Israel
– Elizabeth Hagedorn: Washington correspondent for Al-Monitor
Military interventions, political and economic instabilities, and civil unrest in the Middle East have led to a global refugee crisis with an increasing wave of refugees and asylum seekers to Europe and Canada. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has, in myriad ways, exacerbated and contributed to the ongoing security threats and destabilization of the region.
While these challenges pose serious risks to Canadian security, Ottawa will also have the opportunity to limit such risks and prevent a spillover effect vis-à-vis effective humanitarian initiatives in the region. In this panel, we will primarily investigate Canada’s Middle East Strategy’s degree of success in providing humanitarian aid to the region. Secondly, the panel will discuss what programs and initiatives Canada can introduce to further build on the renewed strategy. and more specifically, how Canada can utilize its policy instruments to more effectively deal with the increasing influx of refugees from the Middle East.
Panelists:
Erica Di Ruggiero: Director of Centre for Global Health, University of Toronto
Reyhana Patel: Head of Communications & Government Relations, Islamic Relief Canada
Amir Barmaki: Former Head of UN OCHA in Iran
Catherine Gribbin: Senior Legal Advisor for International and Humanitarian Law, Canadian Red Cross
In 2016, Canada launched an ambitious five-year “Middle East Engagement Strategy” (2016-2021), committing to investing CA$3.5 billion over five years to help establish the necessary conditions for security and stability, alleviate human suffering and enable stabilization programs in the region. In the latest development, during the meeting of the Global Coalition against ISIS, Minister of Foreign Affairs Marc Garneau announced more than $43.6 million in Peace and Stabilization Operations Program funding for 11 projects in Syria and Iraq.
With Canada’s Middle East Engagement Strategy expiring this year, it is time to examine and evaluate this massive investment in the Middle East region in the past five years. More importantly, the panel will discuss a principled and strategic roadmap for the future of Canada’s short-term and long-term engagement in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Ferry de Kerckhove: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Egypt
– Dennis Horak: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
– Chris Kilford: Former Canadian Defence Attaché in Turkey, member of the national board of the Canadian International Council (CIC)
– David Dewitt: University Professor Emeritus, York University
While the United States continues to pull back from certain regional conflicts, reflected by the Biden administration’s decision to halt American backing for Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen and the expected withdrawal from Afghanistan, US troops continue to be stationed across the region. Meanwhile, Russia and China have significantly maintained and even expanded their regional activities. On one hand, the Kremlin has maintained its military presence in Syria, and on the other hand, China has signed an unprecedented 25-year strategic agreement with Iran.
As the global power structure continues to shift, it is essential to analyze the future of the US regional presence under the Biden administration, explore the emerging global rivalry with Russia and China, and at last, investigate the implications of such competition for peace and security in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Dmitri Trenin: Director of Carnegie Moscow Center
– Joost R. Hiltermann: Director of MENA Programme, International Crisis Group
– Roxane Farmanfarmaian: Affiliated Lecturer in International Relations of the Middle East and North Africa, University of Cambridge
– Andrew A. Michta: Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at Marshall Center
– Kelley Vlahos: Senior Advisor, Quincy Institute
The security architecture of the Middle East has undergone rapid transformations in an exceptionally short period. Notable developments include the United States gradual withdrawal from the region, rapprochement between Israel and some GCC states through the Abraham Accords and the rise of Chinese and Russian regional engagement.
With these new trends in the Middle East, it is timely to investigate the security implications of the Biden administration’s Middle East policy. In this respect, we will discuss the Biden team’s new approach vis-à-vis Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The panel will also discuss the role of other major powers, including China and Russia in shaping this new security environment in the region, and how the Biden administration will respond to these powers’ increasing regional presence.
Panelists:
– Sanam Vakil: Deputy Director of MENA Programme at Chatham House
– Denise Natali: Acting Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies & Director of the Center for Strategic Research, National Defense University
– Hassan Ahmadian: Professor of the Middle East and North Africa Studies, University of Tehran
– Abdulaziz Sagar: Chairman, Gulf Research Center
– Andrew Parasiliti: President, Al-Monitor
