As President Biden’s term draws to a close, reflections on his foreign policy legacy in the Asia-Pacific—part of what observers have termed the ‘Biden Doctrine’—are starting to take shape. Most accounts are favorable, noting that President Biden restored U.S. leadership and prestige after the Trump administration’s erratic, transactional policies led to a steep decline in America’s standing in the region. Analysts have particularly praised the President’s approach to U.S. alliances and partnerships, which notably strengthened the U.S. position in the Asia-Pacific relative to China.
However, this positive assessment largely overlooks the sustainability of President Biden’s foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific, especially regarding the administration’s reliance on U.S. allies and partners in its ‘great power competition‘ with China. The Biden administration has established a single point of failure in U.S. strategy by heavily relying on the ongoing willingness of allies to provide critical and often controversial support. This support includes basing agreements, joint exercises, intelligence sharing, and logistical assistance, making the sustained backing of these allies and partners crucial to U.S. objectives in the region.
From this perspective, what initially appears to be a significant strength for Washington in Asia could turn into a glaring weakness, particularly as the U.S. increasingly relies on its allies’ capacities to compensate for its own. Whether in icebreaker construction or naval shipbuilding, Washington now depends more than ever on its allies to maintain an advantageous balance of power against China in Asia.
The flaw in this approach lies in the fact that leadership changes are inevitable—as will be the case with President Biden himself. Leadership preferences and policies often shift between administrations, especially as new generations of policymakers replace older ones. With the U.S. presidential election approaching in November, at least half of the U.S.-Asian alliance paradigm could shift unpredictably.
Continuity between regimes is also uncertain across key U.S. allies in Asia, where leadership priorities can vary widely between administrations. This trend is likely to accelerate as Asia becomes wealthier, more economically integrated, and more fragmented from other regions, making it less responsive to U.S. strategic priorities than it is today.
U.S.-Japan relations exemplify this issue. While President Biden and Prime Minister Kishida share a common understanding of China as a threat to Asia’s stability, there is no certainty that Japan’s next generation of leadership will fully share the U.S. view. Past Japanese prime ministers, such as Junichiro Koizumi, Yasuo Fukuda, and Yukio Hatoyama, were far less hawkish on China than more recent leaders. Prime Minister Kishida’s decision to step down in September 2024 will immediately introduce a new dynamic into Japan-U.S. relations. Notably, amid the public’s preference to replace Prime Minister Kishida, former Secretary-General Ishiba Shigeru has called for closer ties with China, including security participation with Beijing through an “Asian NATO.”
While a fundamental break between the U.S. and Japan on strategic issues is unlikely in the short to mid-term, any shift in Japanese leadership’s views on the U.S. and China will carry strategic implications for Washington that could become more pronounced over time. This is particularly true as a significant portion (41%) of the Japanese public remains committed to working with China on regional peace and stability, despite ongoing concerns about Beijing’s impact on Japan’s national security.
Equally impactful on U.S.-Japan relations will be the new U.S. president, who may have vastly different views on U.S. relations with allies than President Biden. Should former President Trump win a second term, for instance, he will likely pressure Japan to increase its defense spending and share more of the defense burden in the Asia-Pacific—a set of demands that could undermine Japanese public support for the U.S.-Japan security partnership. Should Vice President Harris win in November, her foreign policy approach to Asia may differ significantly from the Biden administration’s, potentially reconsidering the value of U.S. primacy as a national security imperative.
Similarly, a leadership change in South Korea could undo the progress the Biden administration has made in aligning Seoul’s foreign and security policies with Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy. President Yoon’s approach to China represents a significant departure from that of his predecessors, who prioritized engagement and dialogue with Beijing over alignment with the U.S. against China. Since the 1990s, South Korean Presidents, including Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun, Lee Myung-bak, Park Geun-hye, and Moon Jae-in, all prioritized maintaining good relations with China—to varying degrees—as a cornerstone of their foreign policy.
Given President Yoon’s low approval ratings, the next generation of Korean leadership is likely to seek a substantial break from his current policies, including his preference for alignment with Washington on regional affairs. Indeed, the current frontrunner to replace President Yoon, Lee Jae-myung, leader of the Democratic Party of Korea (DPK), has called for improved ties with Beijing and for South Korea to avoid involvement in Taiwan Strait security.
As with U.S.-Japan relations, the new U.S. president could also fundamentally reshape U.S.-South Korean relations, a possibility for which Korean strategists are already preparing. Former President Trump is reportedly reconsidering the long-held U.S. policy of denuclearization toward North Korea, believing acceptance of Pyongyang’s nuclear status could provide the basis for a breakthrough in Korean security. Vice President Harris, conversely, has indicated a need to work more closely with China on North Korean security issues.
Washington’s reliance on President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s support for U.S.-Philippines relations also represents a potential point of foreign policy failure, particularly since the Philippine constitution limits a president to a single six-year term. The tenure of former President Rodrigo Duterte illustrates how changes in Philippine leadership can significantly impact U.S.-Philippine security relations and the country’s approach to engagement with China. Given the Philippine public’s growing preference for Vice President Sara Duterte over President Marcos, a realignment of Philippine policy following the 2028 presidential election appears almost inevitable.
None of these leadership changes are occurring in a strategic vacuum. Among many Asian states, public sentiment has turned sharply against the U.S., largely due to President Biden’s unwavering support for Israel’s ongoing assault on Gaza. Recent polling shows that a majority of Singaporeans and Malaysians now hold a negative view of the U.S., lack confidence in President Biden, and have more faith in President Xi Jinping’s ability to act responsibly. Indonesian and Thai polls suggest similar public sentiment trends, while regional surveys indicate that more Southeast Asian states would prefer to work with China rather than the U.S. on Asia-Pacific security issues.
To strengthen the U.S.’s long-term strategic posture toward China in the Asia-Pacific, the next U.S. administration—whether led by Trump or Harris—should recalibrate President Biden’s focus on alliance relations in favor of a more comprehensive approach designed to integrate U.S. public and private sector actors across the region, irrespective of the state’s strategic or political leanings. Rather than privileging engagement with ‘like-minded’ states, the next U.S. administration should instead build an intra-regional, network-based foundation for continued U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific—one based on shared interests, ties, and relationships, not just formal treaty alliances.
One potential means to facilitate U.S. integration across the Asia-Pacific is the “mini-deal” model, which involves using executive orders or informal agreements to align standards, rules, and policies between states. Initially used as an informal trade policy alternative to formalized free-trade agreements (FTAs), mini-deals have emerged as critical tools for state engagement in Europe and Asia and an effective means to forge institutional ties at both state and sub-state levels.
In the European Union, for instance, member states have used mini-deals—or “unseen deals”—to drive European integration, particularly in areas not covered by formal FTAs. Rather than relying on extensive legislation to secure agreements, European states have instead relied on protocols, exchanges of letters, informal arrangements, memoranda of understanding, conventions, and declarations to facilitate policy alignment and encourage public and private sector engagement. The EU has similarly used calibrated legal action to facilitate a mini-deal with China on electric vehicles, relying more on diplomacy than formal trade restrictions or trade barriers to limit the import of Chinese EVs. The U.K. government similarly employed a mini-deal trade approach to ensure British access to the European market post-Brexit, seemingly believing that the sum of its mini-deal approach would be stronger than its individual parts. The political value of this approach lies in establishing trade ties that are not subject to review or Congressional approval in the U.S. case.
Within Asia, China relies on a mini-deal approach to establish ties, linkages, and relationships between the Chinese state and society and other states throughout the Asia-Pacific, primarily through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Despite frequent misrepresentation in Western discourse, the BRI is essentially a Chinese mini-deal approach to the Asia-Pacific (and other regions), premised on relationship development, policy alignment, and institutional cooperation across multiple fields, including environmental, cultural, educational, health, and political affairs, as well as economic ties.
Beijing uses the BRI, for instance, to establish bilateral agreements on green development, environmental protection, and “ecological civilization” (生态文明) with states throughout the Asia-Pacific, covering areas of economic and non-economic exchange as a matter of policy. Specifically focusing on what it calls the East Asian economic circle (东亚经济圈), Beijing describes its approach as a “five-link” (五通) plan by which it will work with Asian states and regional organizations like ASEAN and the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation to develop agreements around communication, environmental impact assessment, green trade, green financing, green people-to-people exchanges, and green research and development.
China has also integrated its Global Civilization Initiative (全球文明倡议) with the BRI to facilitate state-to-state and people-to-people ties with the express purpose of building social communities to advance bilateral relations. China uses the BRI to establish agreements on language training, education exchange, teachers’ scholarships, and Confucius Institutes with states, ministries, and schools across Asia. Through the new Health Silk Road, China is also using the BRI to establish a public health cooperation network across Asia, with discrete agreements at the bilateral, mini-lateral, and multilateral levels.
Through each of these BRI-related initiatives, Beijing employs a mini-deal approach, allowing it to develop actionable, enduring institutional ties with its partner state or states. These ties, in turn, constitute the basis of what is inherently a “relational” approach to Asian affairs. Measured by its perceived influence and the direction of its foreign policy engagement, this approach has served China well. As of 2024, most non-aligned Asian states identify China as their preferred partner of choice and as a positive contributor to regional peace and stability.
One finds some precedent for a U.S. mini-deal approach in both the Trump and Biden administrations’ trade policy. Former President Trump signed trade mini-deals with states like China, India, and Japan in lieu of comprehensive trade deals. President Biden, similarly, agreed to trade mini-deals with Japan around semiconductor supply chains, with Brazil on digital trade, with China on regulatory trade barriers, and with Vietnam on digital trade. While trade experts were critical of the administrations’ use of trade mini-deals, arguing they were a poor substitute for formal trade agreements, the deals nevertheless served the critical political purpose of establishing state, sub-state, and institutional trade ties.
The next administration could build on the administrations’ trade mini-deal framework to establish country-specific, region-wide approaches to foreign and security relations in the Asia-Pacific predicated on mini-deals. Starting with non-aligned states, the new administration should focus on non-economic areas where it might deepen relations through sub-state engagement, first considering the host country’s priorities and then building institutional ties and aligning standards and norms. Initially, the new administration should pursue a mini-deal approach through its bilateral relations, thereby strengthening the U.S. presence and influence across each Asia-Pacific state. Later, the administration should focus on connectivity within and between states to develop an Asia-Pacific web of actionable relations cultivated to bolster the U.S.’s long-term strategic posture in the region.
Of course, a U.S. mini-deal approach to non-trade-related exchange would differ from China’s, as Washington lacks an overarching strategic mechanism for engagement comparable to the BRI. U.S. initiatives like the Blue Dot Network and Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) have not developed into comprehensive frameworks for bilateral or multilateral exchange, despite the Biden administration’s best efforts. Neither is U.S. bilateral diplomacy necessarily designed to maximize network development. Instead, U.S. bilateral diplomacy tends to be decentralized, with the Chief of Mission having disproportionate influence over the types of engagement the U.S. embassy undertakes with its host country. This structure can sometimes result in uncoordinated efforts, as specific priorities and programs may vary significantly depending on the Chief of Mission’s strategic focus.
To develop an effective mini-deal strategy designed to integrate U.S. public and private sector actors across the Asia-Pacific, Washington would need to recalibrate its diplomatic priorities away from alliance relations toward pragmatic engagement with allies and non-aligned states alike. Rather than placing a strategic premium on shared strategic visions—which, as demonstrated above, can change with leadership transitions—the new U.S. administration should instead prioritize signing as many mini-deals as possible across a range of different issue areas of common interest. While each mini-deal can serve as a point of contact between the U.S. and the recipient state, Washington should also work to link the mini-deals together into a centralized, interconnected web of exchange that integrates U.S. activity within and across Asian states and ensures its staying power beyond any change of government.
Critically, the administration should forgo ideological for pragmatic engagement, understanding that it can better achieve its national security interests toward China, in particular, by further developing its status as a status-quo power. Rather than working to redefine the region’s order through alliance relations—an approach to Asia-Pacific affairs that makes many Asian states very nervous—the U.S. should instead demonstrate its intention to build a new Asian order from the ground up, through brownfield and greenfield initiatives, both economic and non-economic. The more the U.S. works to integrate itself across Asia, the more Asian states will believe its national interests are integrated with their own, up to and including its desire to avoid destabilizing action for the sake of the region’s stability and growth.
There are clear strategic benefits to a mini-deal approach over reliance on alliance relations. First, Washington can use a mini-deal strategy to develop a tailored, state-by-state approach to foreign relations in the Asia-Pacific that is both responsive to its partner states’ needs and proactive in supporting U.S. national interests. This is a critical component of the mini-deal approach, as every Asia-Pacific state’s national interests and priorities are unique, and the U.S. must adapt its mini-deal approach to provide as much value as possible to its bilateral relations.
Second, Washington can use mini-deals to deepen bilateral relations by fostering “thick” relationships—robust personal and institutional ties within and between states that have the potential to endure. This type of relational approach will create long-term opportunities for U.S. public and private sector actors to build deeper linkages between their host country counterparts and other regional actors. A mini-deal foreign policy like this will also enhance the U.S.’s medium- to long-term ability to influence policy developments and compete with China at the national level across the Asia-Pacific.
Third, and touched on earlier, a mini-deal approach is a significant improvement on Washington’s more traditional approach to bilateral diplomacy as it is more flexible, adaptive, and decentralized. It leverages bilateral relations for mini-lateral or multilateral outcomes, emphasizes pragmatism over ideology, and responds to regional trends. The mini-deal approach also allows for policy experimentation at the state and sub-state levels and serves as a sounding board for future policy agreements.
Most importantly, a mini-deal approach to U.S. state relations in the Asia-Pacific would reflect the region’s evolving nature. As Asian states become increasingly wealthy, powerful, and globally influential, they are more likely to prioritize their intra-regional ties over Washington’s strategic interests, particularly when those interests conflict with their own understanding of the Asia-Pacific balance of power. Future U.S. administrations will find it more difficult to persuade allies and partners to adopt U.S. strategic priorities or, more critically, to convince non-aligned states to follow its leadership when doing so is inimical to their national interests.
To maintain its ability to safeguard its national security interests in this complex and evolving geostrategic environment, the U.S. must develop a new strategic approach that enables it to engage with Asian states and societies on their own terms, moving beyond elite politics to embrace pragmatic, win-win relations. A foreign policy designed around mini-deals and relationship-building is far more sustainable than the Biden administration’s current approach in this respect, primarily because it responds to demand signals across the region that are becoming louder with each passing year.
The Western powers have failed to effectively manage the increasing threat of proliferation in the Middle East. While the international community is concerned with Iran’s nuclear program, Saudi Arabia has moved forward with developing its own nuclear program, and independent studies show that Israel has longed possessed dozens of nuclear warheads. The former is a member of the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while the latter has refused to sign the international agreement.
On Middle East policy, the Biden campaign had staunchly criticized the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal and it has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier since assuming office in January 2021. However, serious obstacles remain for responsible actors in expanding non-proliferation efforts toward a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.
This panel will discuss how Western powers and multilateral institutions, such as the IAEA, can play a more effective role in managing non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Peggy Mason: Canada’s former Ambassador to the UN for Disarmament
– Mark Fitzpatrick: Associate Fellow & Former Executive Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
– Ali Vaez: Iran Project Director, International Crisis Group
– Negar Mortazavi: Journalist and Political Analyst, Host of Iran Podcast
– David Albright: Founder and President of the Institute for Science and International Security
Closing (5:45 PM – 6:00 PM ET)
What is the current economic landscape in the Middle East? While global foreign direct investment is expected to fall drastically in the post-COVID era, the World Bank reported a 5% contraction in the economic output of the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries in 2020 due to the pandemic. While oil prices are expected to rebound with normalization in demand, political instability, regional and geopolitical tensions, domestic corruption, and a volatile regulatory and legal environment all threaten economic recovery in the Middle East. What is the prospect for economic growth and development in the region post-pandemic, and how could MENA nations promote sustainable growth and regional trade moving forward?
At the same time, Middle Eastern diaspora communities have become financially successful and can help promote trade between North America and the region. In this respect, the diaspora can become vital intermediaries for advancing U.S. and Canada’s business interests abroad. Promoting business diplomacy can both benefit the MENA region and be an effective and positive way to advance engagement and achieve foreign policy goals of the North Atlantic.
This panel will investigate the trade and investment opportunities in the Middle East, discuss how facilitating economic engagement with the region can benefit Canadian and American national interests, and explore relevant policy prescriptions.
Panelists:
– Hon. Sergio Marchi: Canada’s Former Minister of International Trade
– Scott Jolliffe: Chairperson, Canada Arab Business Council
– Esfandyar Batmanghelidj: Founder and Publisher of Bourse & Bazaar
– Nizar Ghanem: Director of Research and Co-founder at Triangle
– Nicki Siamaki: Researcher at Control Risks
The Middle East continues to grapple with violence and instability, particularly in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Fueled by government incompetence and foreign interventions, terrorist insurgencies have imposed severe humanitarian and economic costs on the region. Meanwhile, regional actors have engaged in an unprecedented pursuit of arms accumulation. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have imported billions of both Western and Russian-made weapons and funded militant groups across the region, intending to contain their regional adversaries, particularly Iran. Tehran has also provided sophisticated weaponry to various militia groups across the region to strengthen its geopolitical position against Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Israel.
On the other hand, with international terrorist networks and intense regional rivalry in the Middle East, it is impractical to discuss peace and security without addressing terrorism and the arms race in the region. This panel will primarily discuss the implications of the ongoing arms race in the region and the role of Western powers and multilateral organizations in facilitating trust-building security arrangements among regional stakeholders to limit the proliferation of arms across the Middle East.
Panelists:
Luciano Zaccara: Assistant Professor, Qatar University
Dania Thafer: Executive Director, Gulf International Forum
Kayhan Barzegar: Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Science and Research Branch of Azad University
Barbara Slavin: Director of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council
Sanam Shantyaei: Senior Journalist at France24 & host of Middle East Matters
The emerging regional order in West Asia will have wide-ranging implications for global security. The Biden administration has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier, an initiative staunchly opposed by Israel, while also taking a harder line on Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen. Meanwhile, key regional actors, including Qatar, Iraq, and Oman, have engaged in backchannel efforts to bring Iran and Saudi Arabia to the negotiating table. From a broader geopolitical perspective, with the need to secure its energy imports, China is also expected to increase its footprint in the region and influence the mentioned challenges.
In this evolving landscape, Western powers will be compelled to redefine their strategic priorities and adjust their policies with the new realities in the region. In this panel, we will discuss how the West, including the United States and its allies, can utilize multilateral diplomacy with its adversaries to prevent military escalation in the region. Most importantly, the panel will discuss if a multilateral security dialogue in the Persian Gulf region, proposed by some regional actors, can help reduce tensions among regional foes and produce sustainable peace and development for the region.
Panelists:
– Abdullah Baabood: Academic Researcher and Former Director of the Centre for Gulf Studies, Qatar University
– Trita Parsi: Executive Vice-President, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
– Ebtesam Al-Ketbi: President, Emirates Policy Centre
– Jon Allen: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Israel
– Elizabeth Hagedorn: Washington correspondent for Al-Monitor
Military interventions, political and economic instabilities, and civil unrest in the Middle East have led to a global refugee crisis with an increasing wave of refugees and asylum seekers to Europe and Canada. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has, in myriad ways, exacerbated and contributed to the ongoing security threats and destabilization of the region.
While these challenges pose serious risks to Canadian security, Ottawa will also have the opportunity to limit such risks and prevent a spillover effect vis-à-vis effective humanitarian initiatives in the region. In this panel, we will primarily investigate Canada’s Middle East Strategy’s degree of success in providing humanitarian aid to the region. Secondly, the panel will discuss what programs and initiatives Canada can introduce to further build on the renewed strategy. and more specifically, how Canada can utilize its policy instruments to more effectively deal with the increasing influx of refugees from the Middle East.
Panelists:
Erica Di Ruggiero: Director of Centre for Global Health, University of Toronto
Reyhana Patel: Head of Communications & Government Relations, Islamic Relief Canada
Amir Barmaki: Former Head of UN OCHA in Iran
Catherine Gribbin: Senior Legal Advisor for International and Humanitarian Law, Canadian Red Cross
In 2016, Canada launched an ambitious five-year “Middle East Engagement Strategy” (2016-2021), committing to investing CA$3.5 billion over five years to help establish the necessary conditions for security and stability, alleviate human suffering and enable stabilization programs in the region. In the latest development, during the meeting of the Global Coalition against ISIS, Minister of Foreign Affairs Marc Garneau announced more than $43.6 million in Peace and Stabilization Operations Program funding for 11 projects in Syria and Iraq.
With Canada’s Middle East Engagement Strategy expiring this year, it is time to examine and evaluate this massive investment in the Middle East region in the past five years. More importantly, the panel will discuss a principled and strategic roadmap for the future of Canada’s short-term and long-term engagement in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Ferry de Kerckhove: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Egypt
– Dennis Horak: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
– Chris Kilford: Former Canadian Defence Attaché in Turkey, member of the national board of the Canadian International Council (CIC)
– David Dewitt: University Professor Emeritus, York University
While the United States continues to pull back from certain regional conflicts, reflected by the Biden administration’s decision to halt American backing for Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen and the expected withdrawal from Afghanistan, US troops continue to be stationed across the region. Meanwhile, Russia and China have significantly maintained and even expanded their regional activities. On one hand, the Kremlin has maintained its military presence in Syria, and on the other hand, China has signed an unprecedented 25-year strategic agreement with Iran.
As the global power structure continues to shift, it is essential to analyze the future of the US regional presence under the Biden administration, explore the emerging global rivalry with Russia and China, and at last, investigate the implications of such competition for peace and security in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Dmitri Trenin: Director of Carnegie Moscow Center
– Joost R. Hiltermann: Director of MENA Programme, International Crisis Group
– Roxane Farmanfarmaian: Affiliated Lecturer in International Relations of the Middle East and North Africa, University of Cambridge
– Andrew A. Michta: Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at Marshall Center
– Kelley Vlahos: Senior Advisor, Quincy Institute
The security architecture of the Middle East has undergone rapid transformations in an exceptionally short period. Notable developments include the United States gradual withdrawal from the region, rapprochement between Israel and some GCC states through the Abraham Accords and the rise of Chinese and Russian regional engagement.
With these new trends in the Middle East, it is timely to investigate the security implications of the Biden administration’s Middle East policy. In this respect, we will discuss the Biden team’s new approach vis-à-vis Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The panel will also discuss the role of other major powers, including China and Russia in shaping this new security environment in the region, and how the Biden administration will respond to these powers’ increasing regional presence.
Panelists:
– Sanam Vakil: Deputy Director of MENA Programme at Chatham House
– Denise Natali: Acting Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies & Director of the Center for Strategic Research, National Defense University
– Hassan Ahmadian: Professor of the Middle East and North Africa Studies, University of Tehran
– Abdulaziz Sagar: Chairman, Gulf Research Center
– Andrew Parasiliti: President, Al-Monitor
