The political trends in the Western capitals, Moscow and Kyiv, and the military trend between Russia and Ukraine offer ground for prediction about the course of the Russia-Ukraine war, which is raging into its third year. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán (being formally President of the Council of the EU) was widely criticized among EU leaders for his self-designated peace missions to Russia, the United States (Donald Trump), China and Turkey, countries that have significant influence on the course of the Russia-Ukraine war.
It is nevertheless important to note Orbán’s short report to the European Council President, Charles Michel, for its following observations: (i) since the warring parties are determined to involve themselves deeper in the conflict, it would take significant external involvement for a way out, (ii) with the United States in election mode, the EU should discuss the viability of creating the incentives for a ceasefire or peace talks, (iii) China is unlikely to get diplomatically involved in such a process unless it holds a high chance of success. A closer examination of the three observations shows that, although their negotiation positions remain far apart, Russia-Ukraine talks are increasingly possible.
As for the warring parties’ determination to deepen the war, first, the picture seems more nuanced than in Orbán’s assessment. While Russia and Ukraine keep testing each other on the battlefield, they are not excluding the possibility of talks in parallel.
On the Russian side (unlike in Western Europe), the economy is currently doing well with a projected growth of 2.3 percent for 2024. Although high inflation and an elevated central bank interest rate may be a sign of overheating, the transition of the economy to a war footing does not seem to shake the regime. And although the salary increases for military service indicate growing voluntary recruitment problems, the Kremlin currently does not seem to be in need of another unpopular mobilization round. Russia is making slow but steady progress in the Donbas and enjoys the continued advantage of possessing many times more artillery shells than Ukraine.
Nevertheless, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin in May voiced himself in favor of peace talks provided that Ukraine would renounce its NATO membership goal and accept the loss of the four regions plus Crimea claimed by Moscow. Following Ukraine’s recent incursion into Russia’s Kursk region, Russia said that negotiations were off the table but that its stance might change, depending on how the situation develops. There seems to be no urgency for Russia in getting the war to a close, but the human and economic costs of war remain a liability to President Putin and, in turn, an incentive for him to negotiate. Putin may have to reassess his will to continue the war depending on his battlefield results come autumn when offensive operations again become more difficult due to the weather.
On the Ukrainian side, there is a mix of growing domestic war fatigue and renewed battlefield initiative. A poll conducted in June 2024 by the Ukrainian think tank Razumkov showed that 44 percent of Ukrainians believe the time has come for direct negotiations with Russia, while 35 percent are against (21 percent are undecided). Yet, the Ukrainians are not considering meeting Russia’s demands for peace. According to the same poll, only around five percent believe that Ukraine should give up the four regions and Crimea for peace, while 22 percent believe that Ukraine should give up its NATO membership aspiration and right to acquire nuclear weapons.
Ukraine’s surprise advance into Russia’s Kursk region adds no unequivocal conclusion about its will to fight or negotiate. In one interpretation, Kyiv may be trying to change the narrative in the West that Russia is winning a war of attrition and that it has the boldness to retake the military initiative, if only its partners would increase their military aid. In another interpretation, Kyiv may be seeking to keep Russian territory (if it can fortify its defensive lines there) to be able to trade it back for control of its own territory when or if the time for negotiations comes.
While the Ukrainians now seem ready for talks, their negotiating position still seems to be too far off that of Russia to make those a meaningful undertaking to achieve peace. If Ukraine can hold its recent seizures in the Kursk region without weakening its position in the east/southeast, it may increase the incentive for talks. President Zelensky remains politically vested in his long-standing goal of ‘victory’ (and has forbidden himself by law to negotiate with Putin). But it is possible that the international circumstances will change to an extent that will provide Ukraine with no alternative. Thus, President Zelensky voiced himself in favor of Russia’s participation at the next peace conference, and his Head of Office, Andriy Yermak, recently said that indirect negotiations might be possible in a format similar to the 2022 Black Sea grain deal, when Ukraine dealt with Russia through Turkey and the United Nations.
As for Western involvement in the conflict, all eyes are naturally on the U.S. presidential election less than three months away. If Kamala Harris wins, it is unclear if she would pursue a different path than President Biden of officially supporting Ukraine ‘for as long as it takes’, while avoiding a direct conflict with Russia. Donald Trump so far dominates the narrative around any future settlement. If Trump wins, it can be assumed that he would try to deliver on his promise to bring the war to a swift close. His choice of J.D. Vance as his running mate, who opposed the latest U.S. aid package for Ukraine and earlier said that supporting Ukraine lies beyond U.S. will and manufacturing capacity, reinforces this assumption. Even beyond Trump’s orbit, mainstream U.S. foreign policy discourse increasingly seems to be acknowledging that foreign policy should not just be desirable but also doable, which means focusing on enabling Ukraine to defend the territory it currently controls rather than cultivating illusions about liberating all of its territory. Under this circumstance, Zelensky is increasingly likely to be presented with a choice between participating in talks and continuing to fight without additional U.S. aid.
The political situation in Europe does not give much greater reason to believe that Ukraine could improve its battlefield situation, let alone resume larger offensive operations. A survey conducted by the Institute for Global Affairs revealed large majorities in Great Britain, Germany and France in favor of ending the war as soon as possible. Germany, the largest European contributor in absolute terms, surprised Western observers by first announcing that it would halve its military aid next year, claiming the shortfall could be offset by interest from frozen Russian assets. Subsequently, Germany declared that it would cease all new military aid to Ukraine to cut spending. In France, President Emmanuel Macron’s defeat in the parliamentary election seems to have constrained his earlier talks about sending troops to Ukraine, and Paris remains among the lowest military contributors to the war effort in any event. Although the Nordic, Baltic and many Central European countries contribute high numbers in relative terms, they are too small countries to make up for Ukraine’s battlefield disadvantage.
Thirdly and finally, Ukraine’s current best-case scenario—a stalemate on the battlefield, coupled with Russia’s slow and costly military progress—naturally draws attention to Orbán’s remarks on China’s role in the international diplomacy of the war. The lesson from the Swiss Peace Summit in June is that the abstention of significant non-supporting countries of Ukraine fails to exert enough pressure on Russia to reconsider its warpath. Only China, through its diplomatic support and provision of dual-use technology that enables Russia to increase its war production, appears to wield decisive influence over Moscow. Beijing’s intentions regarding the war remain ambiguous: it may want the conflict to continue to challenge Western hegemony alongside Russia, or it may desire an end to avoid association with a Russia that fails to win a conflict it initiated. However, the essence of diplomacy is to explore these preferences.
No European country with the notable exception of Hungary and perhaps Slovakia is willing to lead the way for a negotiated settlement because that would make their rhetorical support of Ukraine appear as a bluff (and because many remain appalled by Russia’s targeting of civilians). However, Western public diplomacy since Ukraine’s failed counteroffensive in 2023 is detached from its own domestic political realities that there is simply no appetite to give Ukraine a significant edge on the battlefield and maybe not even enough to halt Russia’s current advance. Things may change if Trump wins the election in November, whereby Western diplomacy may come more into line with this reality with a message to Kyiv that time is ripe for negotiations. But diplomacy should in this case also involve Beijing to explore the possibility of exerting political and not just military pressure on Moscow.
The Western powers have failed to effectively manage the increasing threat of proliferation in the Middle East. While the international community is concerned with Iran’s nuclear program, Saudi Arabia has moved forward with developing its own nuclear program, and independent studies show that Israel has longed possessed dozens of nuclear warheads. The former is a member of the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while the latter has refused to sign the international agreement.
On Middle East policy, the Biden campaign had staunchly criticized the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal and it has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier since assuming office in January 2021. However, serious obstacles remain for responsible actors in expanding non-proliferation efforts toward a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.
This panel will discuss how Western powers and multilateral institutions, such as the IAEA, can play a more effective role in managing non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Peggy Mason: Canada’s former Ambassador to the UN for Disarmament
– Mark Fitzpatrick: Associate Fellow & Former Executive Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
– Ali Vaez: Iran Project Director, International Crisis Group
– Negar Mortazavi: Journalist and Political Analyst, Host of Iran Podcast
– David Albright: Founder and President of the Institute for Science and International Security
Closing (5:45 PM – 6:00 PM ET)
What is the current economic landscape in the Middle East? While global foreign direct investment is expected to fall drastically in the post-COVID era, the World Bank reported a 5% contraction in the economic output of the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries in 2020 due to the pandemic. While oil prices are expected to rebound with normalization in demand, political instability, regional and geopolitical tensions, domestic corruption, and a volatile regulatory and legal environment all threaten economic recovery in the Middle East. What is the prospect for economic growth and development in the region post-pandemic, and how could MENA nations promote sustainable growth and regional trade moving forward?
At the same time, Middle Eastern diaspora communities have become financially successful and can help promote trade between North America and the region. In this respect, the diaspora can become vital intermediaries for advancing U.S. and Canada’s business interests abroad. Promoting business diplomacy can both benefit the MENA region and be an effective and positive way to advance engagement and achieve foreign policy goals of the North Atlantic.
This panel will investigate the trade and investment opportunities in the Middle East, discuss how facilitating economic engagement with the region can benefit Canadian and American national interests, and explore relevant policy prescriptions.
Panelists:
– Hon. Sergio Marchi: Canada’s Former Minister of International Trade
– Scott Jolliffe: Chairperson, Canada Arab Business Council
– Esfandyar Batmanghelidj: Founder and Publisher of Bourse & Bazaar
– Nizar Ghanem: Director of Research and Co-founder at Triangle
– Nicki Siamaki: Researcher at Control Risks
The Middle East continues to grapple with violence and instability, particularly in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Fueled by government incompetence and foreign interventions, terrorist insurgencies have imposed severe humanitarian and economic costs on the region. Meanwhile, regional actors have engaged in an unprecedented pursuit of arms accumulation. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have imported billions of both Western and Russian-made weapons and funded militant groups across the region, intending to contain their regional adversaries, particularly Iran. Tehran has also provided sophisticated weaponry to various militia groups across the region to strengthen its geopolitical position against Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Israel.
On the other hand, with international terrorist networks and intense regional rivalry in the Middle East, it is impractical to discuss peace and security without addressing terrorism and the arms race in the region. This panel will primarily discuss the implications of the ongoing arms race in the region and the role of Western powers and multilateral organizations in facilitating trust-building security arrangements among regional stakeholders to limit the proliferation of arms across the Middle East.
Panelists:
Luciano Zaccara: Assistant Professor, Qatar University
Dania Thafer: Executive Director, Gulf International Forum
Kayhan Barzegar: Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Science and Research Branch of Azad University
Barbara Slavin: Director of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council
Sanam Shantyaei: Senior Journalist at France24 & host of Middle East Matters
The emerging regional order in West Asia will have wide-ranging implications for global security. The Biden administration has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier, an initiative staunchly opposed by Israel, while also taking a harder line on Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen. Meanwhile, key regional actors, including Qatar, Iraq, and Oman, have engaged in backchannel efforts to bring Iran and Saudi Arabia to the negotiating table. From a broader geopolitical perspective, with the need to secure its energy imports, China is also expected to increase its footprint in the region and influence the mentioned challenges.
In this evolving landscape, Western powers will be compelled to redefine their strategic priorities and adjust their policies with the new realities in the region. In this panel, we will discuss how the West, including the United States and its allies, can utilize multilateral diplomacy with its adversaries to prevent military escalation in the region. Most importantly, the panel will discuss if a multilateral security dialogue in the Persian Gulf region, proposed by some regional actors, can help reduce tensions among regional foes and produce sustainable peace and development for the region.
Panelists:
– Abdullah Baabood: Academic Researcher and Former Director of the Centre for Gulf Studies, Qatar University
– Trita Parsi: Executive Vice-President, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
– Ebtesam Al-Ketbi: President, Emirates Policy Centre
– Jon Allen: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Israel
– Elizabeth Hagedorn: Washington correspondent for Al-Monitor
Military interventions, political and economic instabilities, and civil unrest in the Middle East have led to a global refugee crisis with an increasing wave of refugees and asylum seekers to Europe and Canada. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has, in myriad ways, exacerbated and contributed to the ongoing security threats and destabilization of the region.
While these challenges pose serious risks to Canadian security, Ottawa will also have the opportunity to limit such risks and prevent a spillover effect vis-à-vis effective humanitarian initiatives in the region. In this panel, we will primarily investigate Canada’s Middle East Strategy’s degree of success in providing humanitarian aid to the region. Secondly, the panel will discuss what programs and initiatives Canada can introduce to further build on the renewed strategy. and more specifically, how Canada can utilize its policy instruments to more effectively deal with the increasing influx of refugees from the Middle East.
Panelists:
Erica Di Ruggiero: Director of Centre for Global Health, University of Toronto
Reyhana Patel: Head of Communications & Government Relations, Islamic Relief Canada
Amir Barmaki: Former Head of UN OCHA in Iran
Catherine Gribbin: Senior Legal Advisor for International and Humanitarian Law, Canadian Red Cross
In 2016, Canada launched an ambitious five-year “Middle East Engagement Strategy” (2016-2021), committing to investing CA$3.5 billion over five years to help establish the necessary conditions for security and stability, alleviate human suffering and enable stabilization programs in the region. In the latest development, during the meeting of the Global Coalition against ISIS, Minister of Foreign Affairs Marc Garneau announced more than $43.6 million in Peace and Stabilization Operations Program funding for 11 projects in Syria and Iraq.
With Canada’s Middle East Engagement Strategy expiring this year, it is time to examine and evaluate this massive investment in the Middle East region in the past five years. More importantly, the panel will discuss a principled and strategic roadmap for the future of Canada’s short-term and long-term engagement in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Ferry de Kerckhove: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Egypt
– Dennis Horak: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
– Chris Kilford: Former Canadian Defence Attaché in Turkey, member of the national board of the Canadian International Council (CIC)
– David Dewitt: University Professor Emeritus, York University
While the United States continues to pull back from certain regional conflicts, reflected by the Biden administration’s decision to halt American backing for Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen and the expected withdrawal from Afghanistan, US troops continue to be stationed across the region. Meanwhile, Russia and China have significantly maintained and even expanded their regional activities. On one hand, the Kremlin has maintained its military presence in Syria, and on the other hand, China has signed an unprecedented 25-year strategic agreement with Iran.
As the global power structure continues to shift, it is essential to analyze the future of the US regional presence under the Biden administration, explore the emerging global rivalry with Russia and China, and at last, investigate the implications of such competition for peace and security in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Dmitri Trenin: Director of Carnegie Moscow Center
– Joost R. Hiltermann: Director of MENA Programme, International Crisis Group
– Roxane Farmanfarmaian: Affiliated Lecturer in International Relations of the Middle East and North Africa, University of Cambridge
– Andrew A. Michta: Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at Marshall Center
– Kelley Vlahos: Senior Advisor, Quincy Institute
The security architecture of the Middle East has undergone rapid transformations in an exceptionally short period. Notable developments include the United States gradual withdrawal from the region, rapprochement between Israel and some GCC states through the Abraham Accords and the rise of Chinese and Russian regional engagement.
With these new trends in the Middle East, it is timely to investigate the security implications of the Biden administration’s Middle East policy. In this respect, we will discuss the Biden team’s new approach vis-à-vis Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The panel will also discuss the role of other major powers, including China and Russia in shaping this new security environment in the region, and how the Biden administration will respond to these powers’ increasing regional presence.
Panelists:
– Sanam Vakil: Deputy Director of MENA Programme at Chatham House
– Denise Natali: Acting Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies & Director of the Center for Strategic Research, National Defense University
– Hassan Ahmadian: Professor of the Middle East and North Africa Studies, University of Tehran
– Abdulaziz Sagar: Chairman, Gulf Research Center
– Andrew Parasiliti: President, Al-Monitor