To call the recent NATO Washington Summit eventful would be an understatement. On July 10, allied members released the Washington Summit Declaration with a range of commitments including on Ukraine’s future in the Alliance, and promises of long term militarily support to Kyiv.1“Washington Summit Declaration,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, July 10, 2024, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_227678.htm. Also, on July 11, after a year of domestic and international pressure, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau finally announced that Canada will reach its two percent of GDP commitment by 2032,2Judy Trinh, “Canada says it expects to spend 2% of GDP on defence by 2032, but no specific details provided,” CTV News, July 11, 2024, https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/canada-set-to-provide-details-on-defence-funding-timeline-as-nato-summit-wraps-up-1.6959499. drastically breaking from his previous private statements to NATO officials that Ottawa will never meet the target.3Amanda Coletta, “Trudeau told NATO that Canada will never meet spending goal, Discord leak shows,” Washington Post, April 19, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/04/19/canada-military-trudeau-leaked-documents/.
On the same day, the United States, Canada, and Finland announced the Icebreaker Collaboration Effort, also known as the ICE Pact: an agreement to collaborate on producing icebreakers and other polar capabilities4“Biden-Harris Administration Announced New Polar Partnership ‘ICE Pact’ Alongside Finland and Canada,” The White House, United States Government, July 11, 2024, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/07/11/biden-harris-administration-announces-new-polar-partnership-ice-pact-alongside-finland-and-canada/. that could result in around 90 ships being produced.5Leyland Cocco, “US, Canada and Finland form ‘Ice Pact’ to project influence into Arctic region,” The Guardian, July 11, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jul/11/us-canada-finland-ice-pact-arctic. It consists of three key components: information exchange, workforce development collaboration, and encouraging allies and partners to buy American, Canadian, and Finnish-made icebreakers.6
“Biden-Harris Administration Announced New Polar Partnership ‘ICE Pact’ Alongside Finland and Canada,” The White House, United States Government.
The last component is especially crucial, since it will allow the three countries to compete with Russia and China as alternative icebreaker suppliers.7Cocco, “US, Canada and Finland form ‘Ice Pact’ to project influence into Arctic region.” While implementation details have not yet been released, plans are in place to develop a joint memorandum of understanding for its execution within six months.8“New Canada, Finland, and the United States partnership,” Prime Minister of Canada, Government of Canada, July 11, 2024, https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/backgrounders/2024/07/11/new-canada-finland-and-united-states-partnership.
This agreement is in line with Canadian strategic interests, and will provide Ottawa the capacity to monitor and safeguard its Arctic coasts, as well as counter Russia’s naval presence in the Arctic Ocean. It will likewise make an important naval contribution to the Defence Policy Update’s goals of ensuring that the Canadian Armed Forces can maintain a persistent presence in the region to defend its coasts and maritime approaches.9 Department of National Defence, Our North, Strong and Free: A Renewed Vision for Canada’s Defence (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2024), 11, 26, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/north-strong-free-2024.html. It is also a step in the right direction for the United States. Its Coast Guard has long needed the capacity to create and maintain a consistent maritime presence in the Arctic and around Alaska.10Zamone Perez, “US Coast Guard calls for larger icebreaker fleet to compete in the Arctic,” Defense News, July 14, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2022/07/14/us-coast-guard-calls-for-larger-icebreaker-fleet-to-compete-in-the-arctic/. According to the White House, the increased development of icebreakers will help address this gap, and allow the Coast Guard to conduct key missions in the North such as search and rescue, environmental protection, and defence readiness.11“Biden-Harris Administration Announced New Polar Partnership ‘ICE Pact’ Alongside Finland and Canada,” The White House, United States Government.
However, the ICE Pact will also face key challenges that Washington and Ottawa need to account for in order to maintain stability in the North American Arctic and prevent current strategic tensions elsewhere from worsening. To preserve resources needed for its top strategic priorities, a prudent option for the United States and Canada would be utilizing an approach based on diplomacy and restraint to ensure regional security and stability. For their allies and partners, this means collaboration to develop and sign agreements to resolve disputes that may emerge from the ICE Pact. In regard to rivals like Russia, it is crucial to avoid actions that risk deepening security dilemmas in the Arctic.
The first challenge stems from Canada-U.S. disputes over the Northwest Passage (NWP). While new research suggests that climate change will complicate, rather than create, new shipping prospects,12Allison J. Cook, Jackie Dawson, Stephen E.L. Howell, Jean E. Holloway, and Mike Brady, “Sea ice choke points reduce the length of the shipping season in the Northwest Passage,” Communications Earth & Environment 5, no. 362 (2024): 8, https://doi.org/10.1038/s43247-024-01477-6. the use of icebreakers will provide a likely solution, although Arctic sea smog, which reduces visibility, remains an issue.13Bridget Stringer-Holden, “Melting sea ice was supposed to help Arctic shipping, but new research says otherwise,” CBC News, July 11, 2024, https://www.cbc.ca/news/science/melting-arctic-sea-ice-shipping-1.7260569. Thus, since the trilateral joint statement on the agreement refers to new, faster shipping routes as economic opportunities that decrease shipping costs,14“Canada, Finland, and the United States joint statement on ICE Pact,” Prime Minister of Canada, Government of Canada, July 11, 2024, https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/statements/2024/07/11/canada-finland-and-united-states-joint-statement-ice-pac. the prospect of using icebreakers to facilitate trade could reopen the issue of Canadian sovereignty over the region.
For decades, the United States has maintained that the NWP is an international strait, despite Canada’s assertions that they are internal waters.15Adam Lajeunesse and Rob Huebert, “Preparing for the next Arctic sovereignty crisis: The Northwest Passage in the age of Donald Trump,” International Journal 74, no. 2 (2019): 227-228. https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702019849641. However, renewed considerations of Canadian sovereignty over the straits will unlikely rupture Canada-U.S. relations. Instead, both countries would more likely develop and sign an arrangement based on the Agreement on Arctic Cooperation. Signed in 1988 and still in force today, it ensures that Canada’s position on the NWP is respected, while guaranteeing Washington’s ability to navigate the straits,16Lajeunesse and Huebert, “Preparing for the next Arctic sovereignty crisis,” 228-229. by stipulating that all transit by American icebreakers will be done with Canadian consent.17“Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America on Arctic Cooperation,” Government of Canada, January 11, 1988, https://www.treaty-accord.gc.ca/text-texte.aspx?id=101701.
The real challenge comes from the possibility of the United Kingdom or European Union wanting to use these new icebreakers to navigate the Northwest Passage for economic purposes. Like the United States, they do not recognize Canada’s sovereignty claim.18Murray Brewster, “NATO chief warns Canada that Russia, China have designs on the Arctic,” CBC News, August 26, 2022, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/nato-stoltenberg-trudeau-russia-china-1.6563825. Nevertheless, their commercial interests in the NWP would place Washington in a difficult position. If it concurs that Canada should allow shipping to pass through, its agreement with Ottawa would be undermined by virtue of British and European vessels transiting the straits without Canadian permission. Conversely, if the United States defended its northern neighbour’s sovereignty claims, it would set a precedent that challenges its ability to freely navigate in other strategically important waterways.19Matthew Kosnik, “Canada and the U.S. Need to Make a Deal on the Northwest Passage,” The National Interest, October 28, 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/canada-and-us-need-make-deal-northwest-passage-171472.
Nonetheless, it does not mean there are no solutions for Washington and Ottawa to address this potential issue. To prevent the United Kingdom and European Union from directly challenging Canada’s sovereignty claims over the NWP, the U.S. should collaborate with Ottawa to expand the Agreement on Arctic Cooperation to include commercial transit. These talks should also include officials from London and Brussels, with the purpose of incorporating both actors into the agreement as additional signees.
The second and more difficult challenge stems from Russia’s perception about the development of new Western icebreakers. According to the United States, they would operate on a global scale alongside polar ships of allies and partners.20“Biden-Harris Administration Announced New Polar Partnership ‘ICE Pact’ Alongside Finland and Canada,” The White House, United States Government. However, Moscow strongly opposes freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) in their territorial waters. The Kremlin believes that the United States intends to dominate the oceans and limit its access to maritime resources and sea lines of communication,21Anna Davis and Ryan Vest, trans., Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation (Newport, RI: Russia Maritime Studies Institute, 2022), 6, https://dnnlgwick.blob.core.windows.net/portals/0/NWCDepartments/Russia%20Maritime%20Studies%20Institute/20220731_ENG_RUS_Maritime_Doctrine_FINALtxt.pdf?sv=2017-04-17&sr=b&si=DNNFileManagerPolicy&sig=2zUFSaTUSPcOpQDBk%2FuCtVnb%2FDoy06Cbh0EI5tGpl2Y%3D. This explains why Russia has been taking military, political, and legal measures to deter a possible FONOP, as well as preparing to repel unauthorized foreign ships transiting its Arctic waters.22Katarzyna Zysk and Rebecca Pincus, “Getting Sporty in Russia’s Arctic,” War on the Rocks, October 24, 2023, https://warontherocks.com/2023/10/getting-sporty-in-russias-arctic/.
Consequently, in a pure security dilemma fashion, Russia will likely see American, Canadian, and Finnish investments in icebreakers as all but confirmation that the West is trying to strategically encircle it in the Arctic. Moscow already believes that Western, or “unfriendly”, states aim to militarize the region and limit its sovereignty.23“The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation,” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, March 31, 2023, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/fundamental_documents/1860586/. Additionally, it lists the expansion of NATO’s military infrastructure near Russia’s borders, the increase of naval exercises near its territory, efforts by states to weaken its control of the Northern Sea Route, and an expanded foreign naval presence in the Arctic Ocean as threats to its security.24Davis and Vest, trans., Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation, 6-7.
During the ICE Pact’s implementation phase, there is little the United States and Canada can do to alleviate Russian anxieties. It is not in Washington’s interest to publicly declare that its new icebreakers will not be used for FONOPs in the Russian Arctic. Otherwise, it will provide leverage for China to push their case that American FONOPs in the South China Sea are violations of its sovereignty.25Heather Mongilio, “China Protests U.S. South China Sea Freedom of Navigation Operation,” USNI News, March 24, 2023, https://news.usni.org/2023/03/24/china-protests-u-s-south-china-sea-freedom-of-navigation-operation. Simultaneously, Washington and Ottawa cannot roll back on the agreement because they would allow Moscow to achieve strategic naval superiority in the Arctic Ocean – it currently owns 46 icebreakers26Colin Wall and Njord Wegge, The Russian Arctic Threat: Consequences of the Ukraine War (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2023), 4, https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-arctic-threat-consequences-ukraine-war. – which it will use to project power elsewhere.
Once their icebreakers are fully operational, however, the United States and Canada can minimize Russian security anxieties by refraining from conducting FONOPs in the Russian Arctic, since it risks escalating tensions with Moscow.27David Auerswald, “Now is not the time for a FONOP in the Arctic,” War on the Rocks, October 11, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/10/now-is-not-the-time-for-a-fonop-in-the-arctic/. Additionally, Washington should take a leading role to ensure that any security dilemma with the Kremlin stemming from the ICE Pact does not intensify into conflict. Since Western sanctions complicate traditional diplomatic engagements, a good alternative would be maintaining and leveraging military-to-military communications with Russia to communicate intentions, counter misperceptions and prevent accidents.28Ellen Mitchell, “US, Russia set up military communication line to prevent accidental clash,” The Hill, March 3, 2022, https://thehill.com/policy/defense/596789-us-russia-set-up-military-communication-line-to-prevent-accidental-clash/. Despite tensions, both sides have strong incentives to avoid escalation and conflict, since it could quickly turn into nuclear war. Thus, a form of low-level military diplomacy, via these communication lines, can and should be utilized to inform the Russian military about the purposes of naval operations conducted in the Greenland and Norwegian Seas, especially to assure them that Western vessels will not enter the Russian Arctic.
Indeed, the ICE Pact is a crucial milestone for the United States and Canada as key Arctic powers. To prevent this opportunity from turning into another geopolitical headache, Washington and Ottawa must collaborate with their allies and partners, closely monitor the reactions of adversaries, and maintain open lines of communication. This approach will enable them to fully capitalize on the agreement and ensure that their icebreakers are used in support of their national interests, without escalating tensions in the Arctic.
The Western powers have failed to effectively manage the increasing threat of proliferation in the Middle East. While the international community is concerned with Iran’s nuclear program, Saudi Arabia has moved forward with developing its own nuclear program, and independent studies show that Israel has longed possessed dozens of nuclear warheads. The former is a member of the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while the latter has refused to sign the international agreement.
On Middle East policy, the Biden campaign had staunchly criticized the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal and it has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier since assuming office in January 2021. However, serious obstacles remain for responsible actors in expanding non-proliferation efforts toward a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.
This panel will discuss how Western powers and multilateral institutions, such as the IAEA, can play a more effective role in managing non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Peggy Mason: Canada’s former Ambassador to the UN for Disarmament
– Mark Fitzpatrick: Associate Fellow & Former Executive Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
– Ali Vaez: Iran Project Director, International Crisis Group
– Negar Mortazavi: Journalist and Political Analyst, Host of Iran Podcast
– David Albright: Founder and President of the Institute for Science and International Security
Closing (5:45 PM – 6:00 PM ET)
What is the current economic landscape in the Middle East? While global foreign direct investment is expected to fall drastically in the post-COVID era, the World Bank reported a 5% contraction in the economic output of the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries in 2020 due to the pandemic. While oil prices are expected to rebound with normalization in demand, political instability, regional and geopolitical tensions, domestic corruption, and a volatile regulatory and legal environment all threaten economic recovery in the Middle East. What is the prospect for economic growth and development in the region post-pandemic, and how could MENA nations promote sustainable growth and regional trade moving forward?
At the same time, Middle Eastern diaspora communities have become financially successful and can help promote trade between North America and the region. In this respect, the diaspora can become vital intermediaries for advancing U.S. and Canada’s business interests abroad. Promoting business diplomacy can both benefit the MENA region and be an effective and positive way to advance engagement and achieve foreign policy goals of the North Atlantic.
This panel will investigate the trade and investment opportunities in the Middle East, discuss how facilitating economic engagement with the region can benefit Canadian and American national interests, and explore relevant policy prescriptions.
Panelists:
– Hon. Sergio Marchi: Canada’s Former Minister of International Trade
– Scott Jolliffe: Chairperson, Canada Arab Business Council
– Esfandyar Batmanghelidj: Founder and Publisher of Bourse & Bazaar
– Nizar Ghanem: Director of Research and Co-founder at Triangle
– Nicki Siamaki: Researcher at Control Risks
The Middle East continues to grapple with violence and instability, particularly in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Fueled by government incompetence and foreign interventions, terrorist insurgencies have imposed severe humanitarian and economic costs on the region. Meanwhile, regional actors have engaged in an unprecedented pursuit of arms accumulation. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have imported billions of both Western and Russian-made weapons and funded militant groups across the region, intending to contain their regional adversaries, particularly Iran. Tehran has also provided sophisticated weaponry to various militia groups across the region to strengthen its geopolitical position against Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Israel.
On the other hand, with international terrorist networks and intense regional rivalry in the Middle East, it is impractical to discuss peace and security without addressing terrorism and the arms race in the region. This panel will primarily discuss the implications of the ongoing arms race in the region and the role of Western powers and multilateral organizations in facilitating trust-building security arrangements among regional stakeholders to limit the proliferation of arms across the Middle East.
Panelists:
Luciano Zaccara: Assistant Professor, Qatar University
Dania Thafer: Executive Director, Gulf International Forum
Kayhan Barzegar: Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Science and Research Branch of Azad University
Barbara Slavin: Director of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council
Sanam Shantyaei: Senior Journalist at France24 & host of Middle East Matters
The emerging regional order in West Asia will have wide-ranging implications for global security. The Biden administration has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier, an initiative staunchly opposed by Israel, while also taking a harder line on Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen. Meanwhile, key regional actors, including Qatar, Iraq, and Oman, have engaged in backchannel efforts to bring Iran and Saudi Arabia to the negotiating table. From a broader geopolitical perspective, with the need to secure its energy imports, China is also expected to increase its footprint in the region and influence the mentioned challenges.
In this evolving landscape, Western powers will be compelled to redefine their strategic priorities and adjust their policies with the new realities in the region. In this panel, we will discuss how the West, including the United States and its allies, can utilize multilateral diplomacy with its adversaries to prevent military escalation in the region. Most importantly, the panel will discuss if a multilateral security dialogue in the Persian Gulf region, proposed by some regional actors, can help reduce tensions among regional foes and produce sustainable peace and development for the region.
Panelists:
– Abdullah Baabood: Academic Researcher and Former Director of the Centre for Gulf Studies, Qatar University
– Trita Parsi: Executive Vice-President, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
– Ebtesam Al-Ketbi: President, Emirates Policy Centre
– Jon Allen: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Israel
– Elizabeth Hagedorn: Washington correspondent for Al-Monitor
Military interventions, political and economic instabilities, and civil unrest in the Middle East have led to a global refugee crisis with an increasing wave of refugees and asylum seekers to Europe and Canada. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has, in myriad ways, exacerbated and contributed to the ongoing security threats and destabilization of the region.
While these challenges pose serious risks to Canadian security, Ottawa will also have the opportunity to limit such risks and prevent a spillover effect vis-à-vis effective humanitarian initiatives in the region. In this panel, we will primarily investigate Canada’s Middle East Strategy’s degree of success in providing humanitarian aid to the region. Secondly, the panel will discuss what programs and initiatives Canada can introduce to further build on the renewed strategy. and more specifically, how Canada can utilize its policy instruments to more effectively deal with the increasing influx of refugees from the Middle East.
Panelists:
Erica Di Ruggiero: Director of Centre for Global Health, University of Toronto
Reyhana Patel: Head of Communications & Government Relations, Islamic Relief Canada
Amir Barmaki: Former Head of UN OCHA in Iran
Catherine Gribbin: Senior Legal Advisor for International and Humanitarian Law, Canadian Red Cross
In 2016, Canada launched an ambitious five-year “Middle East Engagement Strategy” (2016-2021), committing to investing CA$3.5 billion over five years to help establish the necessary conditions for security and stability, alleviate human suffering and enable stabilization programs in the region. In the latest development, during the meeting of the Global Coalition against ISIS, Minister of Foreign Affairs Marc Garneau announced more than $43.6 million in Peace and Stabilization Operations Program funding for 11 projects in Syria and Iraq.
With Canada’s Middle East Engagement Strategy expiring this year, it is time to examine and evaluate this massive investment in the Middle East region in the past five years. More importantly, the panel will discuss a principled and strategic roadmap for the future of Canada’s short-term and long-term engagement in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Ferry de Kerckhove: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Egypt
– Dennis Horak: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
– Chris Kilford: Former Canadian Defence Attaché in Turkey, member of the national board of the Canadian International Council (CIC)
– David Dewitt: University Professor Emeritus, York University
While the United States continues to pull back from certain regional conflicts, reflected by the Biden administration’s decision to halt American backing for Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen and the expected withdrawal from Afghanistan, US troops continue to be stationed across the region. Meanwhile, Russia and China have significantly maintained and even expanded their regional activities. On one hand, the Kremlin has maintained its military presence in Syria, and on the other hand, China has signed an unprecedented 25-year strategic agreement with Iran.
As the global power structure continues to shift, it is essential to analyze the future of the US regional presence under the Biden administration, explore the emerging global rivalry with Russia and China, and at last, investigate the implications of such competition for peace and security in the Middle East.
Panelists:
– Dmitri Trenin: Director of Carnegie Moscow Center
– Joost R. Hiltermann: Director of MENA Programme, International Crisis Group
– Roxane Farmanfarmaian: Affiliated Lecturer in International Relations of the Middle East and North Africa, University of Cambridge
– Andrew A. Michta: Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at Marshall Center
– Kelley Vlahos: Senior Advisor, Quincy Institute
The security architecture of the Middle East has undergone rapid transformations in an exceptionally short period. Notable developments include the United States gradual withdrawal from the region, rapprochement between Israel and some GCC states through the Abraham Accords and the rise of Chinese and Russian regional engagement.
With these new trends in the Middle East, it is timely to investigate the security implications of the Biden administration’s Middle East policy. In this respect, we will discuss the Biden team’s new approach vis-à-vis Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The panel will also discuss the role of other major powers, including China and Russia in shaping this new security environment in the region, and how the Biden administration will respond to these powers’ increasing regional presence.
Panelists:
– Sanam Vakil: Deputy Director of MENA Programme at Chatham House
– Denise Natali: Acting Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies & Director of the Center for Strategic Research, National Defense University
– Hassan Ahmadian: Professor of the Middle East and North Africa Studies, University of Tehran
– Abdulaziz Sagar: Chairman, Gulf Research Center
– Andrew Parasiliti: President, Al-Monitor
