Image credit: Callum Darragh
This article is published as part of IPD’s project and policy paper series, Deconstructing the Changing Middle East Security Architecture.
Abstract
A year after the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan, the international community is still grappling with formulating a response to the situation in the country. A central issue is how to reconcile counter-terrorism with the urgency to support the people of Afghanistan. This dilemma will persist as long as the Taliban hold exclusive control over the Afghan state. Diplomacy with the Taliban by individual states is unlikely to make the group modify its positions in response to international demands. Only a formalized and unified approach to diplomacy with the group, preferably mediated by the United Nations, stands the chance of yielding political outcomes that are acceptable both to the people of Afghanistan and to major regional and global players.
Background
The Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021 has resulted in a complex situation, leaving the world in a quandary about how to respond simultaneously to the terrorist threats emanating from the country and the humanitarian crisis afflicting its people. Two related dilemmas present themselves: the first is how to deal with the Taliban and the security threats originating from Taliban-ruled Afghanistan without harming the Afghan people; the second is how to support the people of Afghanistan without aiding or legitimizing the Taliban.
The Taliban’s assumption of power in Afghanistan has complicated the enforcement of preexisting international sanctions against the group, leading to much controversy about their knock-on effects. With sanctioned individuals and entities in charge of the institutions of the Afghan state, sanctions are effectively transferred to the already vulnerable population of Afghanistan. In particular, the provision of humanitarian aid has become problematic as no one can guarantee that such aid would not end up benefitting—directly or indirectly— the sanctioned individuals and entities.
Some ad-hoc measures have been taken to mitigate the humanitarian and economic crises in the country. For instance, through a pipeline established to transfer cash to Afghanistan, the UN has thus far imported over one billion dollars into Afghanistan to support humanitarian operations.[1] The United States has issued several general licenses to facilitate aid delivery.[2] In September, it also transferred half of the Afghan central bank’s frozen assets to a recently-established Swiss-based Afghan Fund.[3] But while these measures might somewhat facilitate the provision of aid in the short term, they cannot serve as long-term solutions to Afghanistan’s humanitarian and economic needs.
Policy Debate
The question of what kind of response might be needed to deal with the situation in Afghanistan has been the subject of much commentary over the past year. The proffered policy recommendations converge under one of two broad analytical rubrics: opposing the Taliban, or engaging with the group.[4] The Taliban’s actions over the past year and their continued affiliation with international terrorist groups have led to calls for a more oppositional international stance toward the group.
Several factors, however, militate against a policy of outright opposition to the Taliban. The fact that the Taliban rules over a population of forty million, that Afghanistan is grappling with a deep economic and humanitarian crisis, and that a host of international terrorist groups operate in the country—all these cold hard facts suggest that opposing the Taliban would carry further humanitarian and security risks.
Moreover, there is no appetite or political will for a renewed round of military intervention in Afghanistan. Even if such political will existed, the two-decade-long US-led military campaign in the country demonstrates the disutility of a military response to the situation in Afghanistan. Undermining the Taliban risks plunging the country into yet another cycle of full-fledged civil war—a scenario that could end up boosting terrorist groups such as the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISIS-K) while aggravating Afghanistan’s humanitarian crisis.
Surely, a policy of engagement with the Taliban has its own limitations and downsides. The group’s ideology, its violations of human rights,[5] as well as its social policies—especially restrictions on women and girls—mean that engagement with the group would entail domestic political costs for almost any government that chooses to do so. It is no surprise that more than a year after the Taliban’s return to power, not a single country has formally recognized their government.
Engagement has become even more difficult and limited by the sanctions regime in place and the Taliban’s continued close affinity with other terrorist groups. The United Nations Security Council has imposed sanctions on 135 senior members of the Taliban.[6] The United States has placed the Taliban and the Haqqani Network on its list of specially designated terrorist groups while designating the latter as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) as well.[7] Canada has designated the Taliban as a terrorist group.[8]
These designations, however, do not seem to have swayed the Taliban’s decision-making calculus. In May, the UN reported[9] that the Taliban had appointed forty-one of the individuals on the Security Council’s sanctions list to the cabinet and other top positions in the government. They included the prime minister, his three deputies, and fourteen ministers. Members of the influential Haqqani Network were also appointed to key positions within security institutions.
Policy Recommendations
Despite the foregoing risks and limitations, engagement with the Taliban remains the only practical way forward for dealing with the worsening crisis in Afghanistan. Deputy UN Special Representative in Afghanistan, Markus Potzel, began his recent briefing to the UN Security Council by stating that “patience is running out by many in the international community regarding a strategy of engagement with Afghanistan’s Taliban authorities.” He ended his briefing, however, by noting that “continued qualified engagement” stood the most realistic chance of promoting a governing arrangement in Afghanistan that would benefit the country’s people while respecting international norms.[10]
The crucial point is the character of engagement with the Taliban and its overall objective. Engagement with the Taliban must be done through a UN-mediated formal mechanism aimed at the formation of an inclusive governing arrangement in Afghanistan. Diplomacy with the Taliban by individual states is unlikely to make the group modify its positions in response to international demands. Through such one-to-one diplomacy with the Taliban, individual states seek to secure their short-term interests in Afghanistan. This pattern of one-on-one engagement with the Taliban will likely lead to intensified geopolitical competition in Afghanistan. It will also allow the Taliban to withstand international pressures by entering into distinct quid-pro-quo arrangements with individual countries.
Only a formalized and unified approach to diplomacy with the Taliban stands the chance of yielding political outcomes that are acceptable both to the people of Afghanistan and to major regional and global players. The United Nations should adopt a more proactive approach to the situation in Afghanistan. In this regard, one option is the revival of the old 6+2 forum, involving Afghanistan’s neighbors plus the US and Russia. Other interested and influential states from the region and beyond may be invited to this forum as well.
The guiding principle of this formalized, concerted engagement should be the formation of a more moderate, inclusive government in Afghanistan. The establishment of such a government can help realize the twin goals of countering terrorism and mitigating the humanitarian disaster. An inclusive government is also the most effective means of protecting the basic rights of the Afghan people. It can set the stage for the gradual normalization of relations with the Afghan government, which can in turn help reduce the severity of the country’s humanitarian and economic crises.
None of these goals are achievable as long as the Taliban hold a monopoly over the Afghan state. The Taliban’s ideology, history, links with international terrorist groups, and resistance to softening their positions in the face of domestic and international pressures— all these factors mean that as long as the group holds exclusive control over the Afghan state, the country will remain mired in the current deadlock.
Conclusion
Obviously, there is no silver bullet that can resolve the multiple crises facing Afghanistan at the moment. Almost any course of action, including diplomacy with the Taliban, will carry certain costs and risks. The fact that a host of regional and global powers, with competing interests, can and do influence the course of events in Afghanistan further complicates the search for a viable solution. But, in part for this reason, concerted international action is required to address the current precarious situation in the country effectively.
For decades, Afghanistan has been a site of contestation among external powers. Geopolitical competitions, both regional and global, have played a major role in destroying the country and uprooting its people. But just as international conflicts have wrecked the country, international cooperation is needed to restore some measure of normalcy to Afghanistan. Such cooperation is certainly not assured, as the history of the past few decades shows. Yet, any serious attempt at responding to the current situation requires close international cooperation and coordination.
Dr. A. Farid Tookhy (@FTookhy) is a Senior Fellow at the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy and a lecturer at the University of Ottawa. Dr. Tookhy has extensive professional experience in the fields of governance, election administration and conflict management. He served with the United Nations in Afghanistan, Sudan, and South Sudan, working on a wide range of issues including election administration, conflict management, and post-conflict state-building. Recently, he has conducted research on Afghanistan’s legislative elections and on Iran’s policy toward Afghanistan, both for the United States Institute of Peace (USIP).
Endnotes
[1] “The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security,” Quarterly Report (The United Nations, September 14, 2022), https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/220914_sg_report_on_afghanistan_s.2022.485.pdf.
[2] “Fact Sheet: Provision of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan and Support for the Afghan People” (U.S. Department of the Treasury, April 13, 2022), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/afg_factsheet_20220413.pdf.
[3] “Joint Statement by U.S. Treasury and State Department: The United States and Partners Announce Establishment of Fund for the People of Afghanistan,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, accessed September 26, 2022, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0947.
[4] James Dobbins, Andrew Radin, and Laurel E. Miller, “Engage, Isolate, or Oppose: American Policy Toward the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” (RAND Corporation, May 26, 2022), See, for example, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA1540-1.html.
[5] “Human Rights in Afghanistan: 15 August 2021 to 15 June 2022” (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, July 2022), https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unama_human_rights_in_afghanistan_report_-_june_2022_english.pdf.
[6] “Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) Concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals, Groups, Undertakings and Entities,” n.d., https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267.
[7] “Afghanistan-Related Sanctions,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, February 25, 2022, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/951.
[8] Global Affairs Canada, “Canadian Sanctions Related to Terrorist Entities, Including Al-Qaida and the Taliban,” GAC, October 19, 2015, https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/sanctions/terrorists-terroristes.aspx?lang=eng.
[9] “Thirteenth Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team Submitted Pursuant to Resolution 2611 (2021) Concerning the Taliban and Other Associated Individuals and Entities Constituting a Threat to the Peace Stability and Security of Afghanistan” (United Nations Security Council, May 26, 2022), https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2073803/N2233377.pdf.
[10] “Briefing by Deputy Special Representative Markus Potzel to the Security Council,” UNAMA, September 27, 2022, https://unama.unmissions.org/briefing-deputy-special-representative-markus-potzel-security-council-0.
Works Cited
Afghanistan-Related Sanctions,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, February 25, 2022, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/951.
Briefing by Deputy Special Representative Markus Potzel to the Security Council,” UNAMA, September 27, 2022, https://unama.unmissions.org/briefing-deputy-special-representative-markus-potzel-security-council-0.
Fact Sheet: Provision of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan and Support for the Afghan People” (U.S. Department of the Treasury, April 13, 2022), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/afg_factsheet_20220413.pdf.
Global Affairs Canada, “Canadian Sanctions Related to Terrorist Entities, Including Al-Qaida and the Taliban,” GAC, October 19, 2015, https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/sanctions/terrorists-terroristes.aspx?lang=eng.
Human Rights in Afghanistan: 15 August 2021 to 15 June 2022” (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, July 2022), https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unama_human_rights_in_afghanistan_report_-_june_2022_english.pdf.
James Dobbins, Andrew Radin, and Laurel E. Miller, “Engage, Isolate, or Oppose: American Policy Toward the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” (RAND Corporation, May 26, 2022), See, for example, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA1540-1.html.
Joint Statement by U.S. Treasury and State Department: The United States and Partners Announce Establishment of Fund for the People of Afghanistan,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, accessed September 26, 2022, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0947.
Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) Concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals, Groups, Undertakings and Entities,” n.d., https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267.
The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security,” Quarterly Report (The United Nations, September 14, 2022), https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/220914_sg_report_on_afghanistan_s.2022.485.pdf.
Thirteenth Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team Submitted Pursuant to Resolution 2611 (2021) Concerning the Taliban and Other Associated Individuals and Entities Constituting a Threat to the Peace Stability and Security of Afghanistan” (United Nations Security Council, May 26, 2022), https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2073803/N2233377.pdf.
