As the Trudeau government has sworn in its newest cabinet, a decision on Huawei’s involvement in Canada’s 5G network appears to be the next major policy decision to stress relations with China. Industry Minister François-Philippe Champagne hinted as much, stating that an announcement from his department is on the horizon with national security considerations to be front and centre.
Ottawa’s regulatory framework for 5G infrastructure vendors will be a litmus test for Canada-China relations and the direction of Ottawa’s China policy in the aftermath of the two Michaels. There is no doubt that the new policy will impose greater technical scrutiny on Chinese 5G technology equipment in Canadian networks. All major operators in Canada have already partnered up with vendors other than Huawei to develop their 5G networks. Therefore, the immediate impact of the government’s decision will be limited. However, it is the nature of how the expected 5G policy will target Chinese technology vendors (i.e. Huawei) that will clarify the government’s outlook on China and its positioning in the greater U.S.-China rivalry.
Beijing has long warned of potential consequences should Ottawa single out a particular company, such as Huawei, or establish more blanket orders through country-specific restrictions. Chinese Ambassador Cong Peiwu has elaborated that explicit “discriminatory” measures would invite a chilling effect on Chinese investment in Canada. He has also suggested that a Canadian telecom decision that reflects close alignment with U.S. pressure will be taken as a sign that Ottawa lacks autonomy.
As recently as the prime minister’s mission to Washington last month, the ranking member of the Senate foreign relations committee Jim Risch reminded Trudeau of U.S. expectations that Ottawa expedite its 5G decision. In conversation with the prime minister, Risch reiterated that “the Huawei issue needs to be resolved sooner rather than later.”
Given the turbulence in bilateral relations over the past several years, it is likely that Beijing fully expects Ottawa to impose a prohibition on Chinese vendors in some form. The key distinction will lie between a de jure ban targeting Chinese vendors and a de facto ban in the form of a security assessment and clearance process that is stringently enforced, but universally applied without singling out any particular company.
In terms of cybersecurity, a report from Citizen Lab underlines how a national telecommunication policy would be better served by an all-encompassing approach to mitigating security vulnerabilities across every vendor rather than Huawei alone. If the objective of banning Chinese technology in 5G networks is to prevent disruptions and cyberattack operations, the report notes that “there is no reason to expect that, should Canadian telecommunications companies be banned from using Huawei products, that such operations will stop being effective when directed toward Canadian networks and systems.”
In effect, a de jure and de facto ban may achieve the same ends in the short term. The difference between the two approaches’ foreign policy implications, however, is not minor. A federal decision to adopt one approach over the other will serve a political function as opposed to a technical judgement. Should the government opt for an explicit ban, it would signal the direction of Ottawa’s China policy through its willingness to accentuate its threat perception of Beijing. It would likely also influence Beijing’s willingness to treat Canada’s foreign policy independently of Washington’s.
New Zealand and Australia illustrate the difference between implicit and explicit telecom exclusions and the consequent Chinese policy response. Canberra’s consistency in characterizing its Huawei ban as a China-specific measure departs from Wellington’s approach. Under the Jacinda Ardern government, New Zealand has maintained a deliberate ambiguity in its telecom policy that is “blind” on evaluating the security merits of any one vendor.
In Australia’s case, Beijing has underlined its Huawei prohibition on a 14-point list of grievances that it says underpin Canberra’s choice to undertake a China policy that “does the bidding of the U.S.” Current Australian Defence Minister Peter Dutton has recalled how the country’s decision to ban the company was a “tipping point” in Australia’s relations with China.
On the opposite side of the spectrum, New Zealand’s cabinet has categorically dismissed designing its telecom policy to specifically forbid Chinese companies, even as its security protocols accomplish this outcome all the same. Contrary to media depictions of a “ban” on Huawei, Wellington has insisted on the neutrality of its vendor assessment process that has parallels in Canada’s review program for 4G network operators.
According to the minister in charge of New Zealand’s intelligence bureau, the designation of security risks in Huawei equipment as part of a domestic 5G carrier proposal was a result of a technical procedure that would “never ban a particular company or a particular country.”
Prime Minister Ardern has emphasized this point repeatedly, noting that Huawei’s future operations in New Zealand would remain subject to a framework where “our legislation is vendor and country neutral.” She has also raised it in discussions to clarify her government’s security regulations with counterparts in Beijing, providing assurances that Wellington’s process is “very different than what any of our other Five Eyes partners are going through.” In stark contrast with Australia, New Zealand’s telecom policy has not produced similar diplomatic reprisals from China.
Ultimately, China likely understands that Canada’s regulatory options are circumscribed by the demands of its national security community and intelligence collaborations within the Five Eyes. At the same time, Beijing reckons that there is space within these limits for Canada, at minimum, to cushion a potential 5G ban in rhetoric if not in practice.
The Western powers have failed to effectively manage the increasing threat of proliferation in the Middle East. While the international community is concerned with Iran’s nuclear program, Saudi Arabia has moved forward with developing its own nuclear program, and independent studies show that Israel has longed possessed dozens of nuclear warheads. The former is a member of the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while the latter has refused to sign the international agreement.
On Middle East policy, the Biden campaign had staunchly criticized the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal and it has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier since assuming office in January 2021. However, serious obstacles remain for responsible actors in expanding non-proliferation efforts toward a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.
This panel will discuss how Western powers and multilateral institutions, such as the IAEA, can play a more effective role in managing non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East.
– Peggy Mason: Canada’s former Ambassador to the UN for Disarmament
– Mark Fitzpatrick: Associate Fellow & Former Executive Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
– Ali Vaez: Iran Project Director, International Crisis Group
– Negar Mortazavi: Journalist and Political Analyst, Host of Iran Podcast
– David Albright: Founder and President of the Institute for Science and International Security
Closing (5:45 PM – 6:00 PM ET)
What is the current economic landscape in the Middle East? While global foreign direct investment is expected to fall drastically in the post-COVID era, the World Bank reported a 5% contraction in the economic output of the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries in 2020 due to the pandemic. While oil prices are expected to rebound with normalization in demand, political instability, regional and geopolitical tensions, domestic corruption, and a volatile regulatory and legal environment all threaten economic recovery in the Middle East. What is the prospect for economic growth and development in the region post-pandemic, and how could MENA nations promote sustainable growth and regional trade moving forward?
At the same time, Middle Eastern diaspora communities have become financially successful and can help promote trade between North America and the region. In this respect, the diaspora can become vital intermediaries for advancing U.S. and Canada’s business interests abroad. Promoting business diplomacy can both benefit the MENA region and be an effective and positive way to advance engagement and achieve foreign policy goals of the North Atlantic.
This panel will investigate the trade and investment opportunities in the Middle East, discuss how facilitating economic engagement with the region can benefit Canadian and American national interests, and explore relevant policy prescriptions.
– Hon. Sergio Marchi: Canada’s Former Minister of International Trade
– Scott Jolliffe: Chairperson, Canada Arab Business Council
– Esfandyar Batmanghelidj: Founder and Publisher of Bourse & Bazaar
– Nizar Ghanem: Director of Research and Co-founder at Triangle
– Nicki Siamaki: Researcher at Control Risks
The Middle East continues to grapple with violence and instability, particularly in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Fueled by government incompetence and foreign interventions, terrorist insurgencies have imposed severe humanitarian and economic costs on the region. Meanwhile, regional actors have engaged in an unprecedented pursuit of arms accumulation. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have imported billions of both Western and Russian-made weapons and funded militant groups across the region, intending to contain their regional adversaries, particularly Iran. Tehran has also provided sophisticated weaponry to various militia groups across the region to strengthen its geopolitical position against Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Israel.
On the other hand, with international terrorist networks and intense regional rivalry in the Middle East, it is impractical to discuss peace and security without addressing terrorism and the arms race in the region. This panel will primarily discuss the implications of the ongoing arms race in the region and the role of Western powers and multilateral organizations in facilitating trust-building security arrangements among regional stakeholders to limit the proliferation of arms across the Middle East.
Luciano Zaccara: Assistant Professor, Qatar University
Dania Thafer: Executive Director, Gulf International Forum
Kayhan Barzegar: Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Science and Research Branch of Azad University
Barbara Slavin: Director of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council
Sanam Shantyaei: Senior Journalist at France24 & host of Middle East Matters
The emerging regional order in West Asia will have wide-ranging implications for global security. The Biden administration has begun re-engaging Iran on the nuclear dossier, an initiative staunchly opposed by Israel, while also taking a harder line on Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen. Meanwhile, key regional actors, including Qatar, Iraq, and Oman, have engaged in backchannel efforts to bring Iran and Saudi Arabia to the negotiating table. From a broader geopolitical perspective, with the need to secure its energy imports, China is also expected to increase its footprint in the region and influence the mentioned challenges.
In this evolving landscape, Western powers will be compelled to redefine their strategic priorities and adjust their policies with the new realities in the region. In this panel, we will discuss how the West, including the United States and its allies, can utilize multilateral diplomacy with its adversaries to prevent military escalation in the region. Most importantly, the panel will discuss if a multilateral security dialogue in the Persian Gulf region, proposed by some regional actors, can help reduce tensions among regional foes and produce sustainable peace and development for the region.
– Abdullah Baabood: Academic Researcher and Former Director of the Centre for Gulf Studies, Qatar University
– Trita Parsi: Executive Vice-President, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
– Ebtesam Al-Ketbi: President, Emirates Policy Centre
– Jon Allen: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Israel
– Elizabeth Hagedorn: Washington correspondent for Al-Monitor
Military interventions, political and economic instabilities, and civil unrest in the Middle East have led to a global refugee crisis with an increasing wave of refugees and asylum seekers to Europe and Canada. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has, in myriad ways, exacerbated and contributed to the ongoing security threats and destabilization of the region.
While these challenges pose serious risks to Canadian security, Ottawa will also have the opportunity to limit such risks and prevent a spillover effect vis-à-vis effective humanitarian initiatives in the region. In this panel, we will primarily investigate Canada’s Middle East Strategy’s degree of success in providing humanitarian aid to the region. Secondly, the panel will discuss what programs and initiatives Canada can introduce to further build on the renewed strategy. and more specifically, how Canada can utilize its policy instruments to more effectively deal with the increasing influx of refugees from the Middle East.
Erica Di Ruggiero: Director of Centre for Global Health, University of Toronto
Reyhana Patel: Head of Communications & Government Relations, Islamic Relief Canada
Amir Barmaki: Former Head of UN OCHA in Iran
Catherine Gribbin: Senior Legal Advisor for International and Humanitarian Law, Canadian Red Cross
In 2016, Canada launched an ambitious five-year “Middle East Engagement Strategy” (2016-2021), committing to investing CA$3.5 billion over five years to help establish the necessary conditions for security and stability, alleviate human suffering and enable stabilization programs in the region. In the latest development, during the meeting of the Global Coalition against ISIS, Minister of Foreign Affairs Marc Garneau announced more than $43.6 million in Peace and Stabilization Operations Program funding for 11 projects in Syria and Iraq.
With Canada’s Middle East Engagement Strategy expiring this year, it is time to examine and evaluate this massive investment in the Middle East region in the past five years. More importantly, the panel will discuss a principled and strategic roadmap for the future of Canada’s short-term and long-term engagement in the Middle East.
– Ferry de Kerckhove: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Egypt
– Dennis Horak: Canada’s Former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
– Chris Kilford: Former Canadian Defence Attaché in Turkey, member of the national board of the Canadian International Council (CIC)
– David Dewitt: University Professor Emeritus, York University
While the United States continues to pull back from certain regional conflicts, reflected by the Biden administration’s decision to halt American backing for Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen and the expected withdrawal from Afghanistan, US troops continue to be stationed across the region. Meanwhile, Russia and China have significantly maintained and even expanded their regional activities. On one hand, the Kremlin has maintained its military presence in Syria, and on the other hand, China has signed an unprecedented 25-year strategic agreement with Iran.
As the global power structure continues to shift, it is essential to analyze the future of the US regional presence under the Biden administration, explore the emerging global rivalry with Russia and China, and at last, investigate the implications of such competition for peace and security in the Middle East.
– Dmitri Trenin: Director of Carnegie Moscow Center
– Joost R. Hiltermann: Director of MENA Programme, International Crisis Group
– Roxane Farmanfarmaian: Affiliated Lecturer in International Relations of the Middle East and North Africa, University of Cambridge
– Andrew A. Michta: Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at Marshall Center
– Kelley Vlahos: Senior Advisor, Quincy Institute
The security architecture of the Middle East has undergone rapid transformations in an exceptionally short period. Notable developments include the United States gradual withdrawal from the region, rapprochement between Israel and some GCC states through the Abraham Accords and the rise of Chinese and Russian regional engagement.
With these new trends in the Middle East, it is timely to investigate the security implications of the Biden administration’s Middle East policy. In this respect, we will discuss the Biden team’s new approach vis-à-vis Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The panel will also discuss the role of other major powers, including China and Russia in shaping this new security environment in the region, and how the Biden administration will respond to these powers’ increasing regional presence.
– Sanam Vakil: Deputy Director of MENA Programme at Chatham House
– Denise Natali: Acting Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies & Director of the Center for Strategic Research, National Defense University
– Hassan Ahmadian: Professor of the Middle East and North Africa Studies, University of Tehran
– Abdulaziz Sagar: Chairman, Gulf Research Center
– Andrew Parasiliti: President, Al-Monitor