Image credit: U.S. Department of State
Iran’s partial withdrawal from the JCPOA provides leverage for the EU to salvage the nuclear agreement.
Iran has announced that it will partially withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), known as the Iran nuclear deal, on the anniversary of the US withdrawal from the agreement. President Hassan Rouhani said that Iran would remain in the agreement, but only reduce its commitments to the deal. Iran will act in accordance with sections 26 and 36 of the JCPOA, which states that reimposition of sanctions is considered grounds for Iran to ‘cease performing its commitments under JCPOA in whole or in part’. To that end, following recent US sanctions on the purchase of Iran’s enriched uranium and heavy water, Iran’s National Security Council has decided to halt the sell and export of the surplus enriched uranium abroad.
Furthermore, President Rouhani also issued a 60-day ultimatum to the remaining signatory members of the JCPOA (4+1) that if they do not protect Iran’s oil and banking sectors from US extraterritorial sanctions, Iran will resume higher uranium enrichment and modernize its Arak heavy water reactor.
The decision marks Iran’s first major reciprocal response to the re-imposition of US unilateral sanctions. For 12 months, Iran exercised strategic patience and counted on other signatory members to salvage the agreement. 14 IAEA reports confirmed Iran’s full compliance with the agreement despite Trump’s additional provocative measures, including making the unprecedented decision to designate a branch of Iran’s military, the country’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. More recently, the United States also stopped issuing waivers to the 8 countries importing oil from Iran, seeking to reduce Iran’s oil exports to zero.
Meanwhile, US sanctions on Iran’s financial and oil sectors significantly damaged its economy. The sanctions have devalued the Iranian currency and increased the inflation rate to about 40%. Consequently, the deal has lost substantial popular support.
Nevertheless, France warned that the EU could re-impose sanctions once Iran reduces its commitments. This statement neglected the fact that Iran’s decision to partially withdraw from the agreement primarily stemmed from EU’s failure to abide by its obligations under the JCPOA. In fact, Iran used the mechanisms available within the JCPOA to implement its proportional and partial withdrawal, in accordance with sections 26 and 36 of the agreement. Iran followed the procedural framework of the agreement and had four fruitless meetings with the other signatory members to secure its interests under the deal. Though the EU promised to create a Special Purpose Vehicle to help preserve Iran’s legitimate economic relations with foreign industries, this mechanism has yet to be implemented. The EU-designed mechanism, known as INSTEX, was introduced to ensure the flow of humanitarian aid to Iran. This came as a clear disappointment to Tehran, which was seeking a broader easing of restrictions on its banking sector. The EU’s failure to accommodate Iran’s demands ultimately contributed to the changing calculus within the Iranian leadership and led to the subsequent partial withdrawal from the agreement.
Given that Iran has warned that it can abandon its cooperation with the EU on fighting terrorism and lift its restrictions on refugee and drug flows from Afghanistan to Europe, preserving the agreement has become imperative for European security. Moreover, the deal is enshrined in UN Security Council Resolution 2231 and it is in Europe’s interest to protect international law and stand up to US unilateralism. Thuswise, other EU member-states, with the exception of France, have refrained from announcing support for re-imposition of EU sanctions.
However, threatening Iran with re-imposition of sanctions and or making symbolic political statements in support of the deal can be ineffective in preventing the collapse of the agreement. Instead, the EU can utilize Iran’s partial withdrawal as leverage to bring the United States back to the negotiating table. EU leaders had little leverage in convincing the Trump administration to stay in the agreement. Now that the complete collapse of the deal has become a real possibility, the EU can cite the serious implications of US disengagement from the negotiating table and persuade the White House to de-escalate tensions. Europe has 60 days to flex its diplomatic muscle and seriously engage the United States to prevent yet another catastrophic conflict
in the region.
The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author.